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Abstract 
 
Margaret Thatcher‘s concern over Soviet ambitions strongly influenced her Middle 
East policy.  The present thesis will contend that this was a highly significant factor 
behind the cooperation between 10 Downing Street and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the Middle East during the period in question.  
Notwithstanding her instinctive understanding for the State of Israel, Thatcher 
increasingly perceived Israeli policies as a liability rather than an asset for Western 
interests. There was unease that these policies were increasing instability in the 
Middle East, and therefore undermining the security of Britain‘s Arab allies. 
Thatcher feared that the Soviets and other radical forces would exploit regional 
turmoil in order to expand their influence in the Middle East. Therefore, Thatcher 
agreed with the FCO on the urgent need to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict as a 
means of defusing regional tensions.   
 
As Thatcher acquired greater authority in the realm of international affairs, there was 
a growing convergence with the traditional position of the FCO on the Palestinian 
question.  Thus, Thatcher used her stronger control over foreign policy to enhance 
the objectives of the FCO rather than to counter them, in the Middle East arena.  
Furthermore, during the second term of the Thatcher Government, it was the FCO 
rather than 10 Downing Street which took an initiative to advance a political 
dialogue with the State of Israel, resulting in a significant improvement in relations 
between Britain and Israel. Within Israeli Government circles and the Anglo-Jewish 
community, the FCO was generally viewed as the source of the apparently hostile 
British attitude towards Israel, while Number Ten was considered the more 
sympathetic institution. However, it is argued here that this is a simplistic view of 
the respective roles played by the FCO and 10 Downing Street in Middle East 
policy. 
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Note on Sources 
 
The research for this thesis is based primarily upon a wide range of archival sources, 
including documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOI) and 
restricted material that was made available to me at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in Jerusalem. I have also used documents from the Archive of the Board of Deputies 
of British Jews, the Thatcher Papers at Churchill College and the Reagan Library in 
the United States.  In addition, I conducted interviews with over forty former 
statesmen, leading politicians and officials, and drew on the British Diplomatic Oral 
History Programme (BDOHP), which contains interviews with officials who played 
a key role in policymaking during the Thatcher period. The Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation (MTF) was an invaluable source for interviews, statements and speeches 
by the former Prime Minister, and I also made extensive use of autobiographies and 
memoirs.  
 
There is a ‗30-year rule‘ in place covering British government documents. Under 
this rule, most government records are transferred to The National Archives, and are 
made accessible to the public, thirty years after publication. A similar rule applies in 
Israel. This has meant that very few documents were available for the bulk of the 
period under discussion. Documents have been released in Britain and Israel for the 
years 1979-1980. These have been used extensively in Chapters 1 and 2, but in order 
to build a full picture of the Thatcher Government Middle East policy during the 
remaining period, I had to put in multiple FOI requests to both the FCO and the 
Cabinet Office. In general, while the FCO were very helpful in releasing documents, 
the process of release was very cumbersome, and delayed the completion of this 
research. Very few documents were released by the Cabinet Office.  
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Similar difficulties were experienced in gaining access to documents in Israel and 
the United States. As with the National Archive in Britain, the Israel State Archive 
would provide me only with documents covering the first eighteen months of the 
Thatcher period. Indeed, I was originally informed that even these documents were 
unavailable. It was only through repeated requests and perseverance that the relevant 
documents were eventually obtained. In addition, after a protracted process of 
negotiation with the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, access was eventually granted to 
some forty files on Anglo-Israeli relations covering the entire Thatcher period, 
although highly confidential material remained inaccessible. The difficulty was 
considerably greater in regard to American documents. Nevertheless, I succeeded in 
obtaining the release of a small number of documents from the Reagan Library.  
 
I am therefore aware that I have utilized only a small fraction of British, US and 
Israeli documents dating from the Thatcher period. While this has nevertheless 
enabled me to make a contribution to our understanding of British policy towards 
the Arab-Israel conflict, the picture that emerged from these documents was 
inevitably incomplete. I have sought to address this problem by conducting 
numerous interviews with statesmen, politicians and diplomats, mainly based in 
Britain and Israel.   Most of these interviews were carried out on a face-to-face basis, 
while a small number were conducted by telephone and even through email 
correspondence. The questions in each session were tailored specifically to the 
individual interviewee. With one exception, all the interviews have been digitally 
recorded. In many cases, the questions were sent to interviewees ahead of our 
meetings. I sought to encourage interviewees, where applicable, to expand on 
information that I discovered in the archival sources.    
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In the discipline of history, there is some debate over the value of oral sources in 
research.
1
 The interviews complemented the information I was able to obtain 
elsewhere, and provided unique personal insights from those involved in the policy 
process. I am aware of the problems inherent in the interviewing process: the 
memories of interviewees are not always reliable, some of them who seek to avoid 
controversy are liable to respond to questions on that basis and some may provide 
self-serving responses, exaggerating or underplaying their personal role. It was 
incumbent on me to exercise my judgment and to cross-reference their assertions 
with other interviews and with the documents and sources at my disposal, to ensure 
that the picture I obtained was as accurate as possible. 
 
In a similar vein, there are also some difficulties with the use of biographies in 
historical research.  There is a view that political biographies are driven by the need 
to entertain rather than to shed light on the development of political structures and 
processes. Furthermore, there is some debate over whether biography contributes to 
our understanding of the past. Biographers can lose a sense of perspective as they 
become ―deeply involved with their subjects.‖2 The difficulty is greater still in 
relation to personal memoirs, where the author may be prone to self justification. I 
have taken these limitations into account, in the course of this research.   
  
 
 
                                                          
1
 For example, Gwyn Prins , ‗Oral History‘, in Peter Burke (ed), New Perspectives on Historical Writing (Polity Press: 
Cambridge, 1991), pp. 114-140  
2
 Ben Pimlott, ‗Is Contemporary Biography History?‘, The Political Quarterly, 70:1, (January 1999), pp. 31-41 
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Introduction 
 
Literature Review 
 
While much has been written about Britain‘s post-war Middle East policy and the 
formulation of British foreign policy in general, the existing literature on the policy 
of the Thatcher Government towards the Middle East is sparse and somewhat 
problematic. Furthermore, there is a particular problem with the general discussion 
of the Thatcher Government‘s foreign policy, inasmuch as it tends to focus on 
Margaret Thatcher‘s personality and leadership style, which has implications for the 
discussion of her Middle East policy specifically and her foreign policy in general. 
As Hennessy puts it, ―policy reflected the enhanced potency of Mrs Thatcher‘s 
Downing Street.‖1 Although Hennessy is not concerned specifically with policy 
towards the Middle East, his assumption is that both Thatcher‘s domestic policy and 
her foreign policy were essentially an expression of the Prime Minister‘s presidential 
style of leadership. Thus, while it is true that the  policy unit in Number Ten grew 
increasingly powerful during Thatcher‘s second and third terms in office, this was 
not necessarily reflected in Britain‘s Middle East policy where cooperation between 
10 Downing Street and the FCO was maintained.   Hennessy fails to provide an 
explanation of the impact of Thatcher‘s leadership style on foreign policy. The 
politicization of the policy process, exemplified in Thatcher‘s employment of senior 
advisers such as Anthony Parsons and Percy Cradock, is discussed extensively in the 
literature, but there is little explanation of the impact of this politicization on foreign 
policy. 
 
Realism is the best known approach in the international relations literature, placing 
an emphasis on the importance of power in an unstable international system.
2
 The 
realist approach has traditionally focused on factors within the international system 
                                                          
1
 Peter Hennessy,  The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders Since 1945  (Penguin Books: London, 2000),  p. 424 
2 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003), p.6 
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as opposed to domestic processes. In accordance with this thinking, the foreign 
policies of states will be strongly influenced by the need to pursue material interests 
in an unpredictable international environment. However, within the international 
relations field, it is now generally accepted that foreign policy is also influenced to 
some degree by processes occurring within states.
3
 Thus, scholars adopting a 
‗domestic process‘ approach view the pressures facing policy-makers as originating 
in the national, political, economic and social systems. According to this view, ―the 
international arena is thus essentially the arena in which policy is implemented, not 
the source of policy itself.‖4 Christopher Hill claims that foreign policy is affected by 
a continuous flow of domestic influences, as well as international factors. 
Furthermore, domestic society imposes constraints on policymakers. As a 
consequence, governments will often anticipate possible domestic opposition to 
certain elements of foreign policy and will build into this policy a sense of what the 
population will tolerate.
5
  
 
To what degree have domestic factors influenced foreign policy? The British 
parliament exercises oversight and supervision over foreign policy. However, its 
capacity to influence policy is limited.
6
 As Reynolds points out, the British 
parliament has little involvement in foreign policy formulation. In Britain, public 
attitudes have less impact on specific policies than in setting the broad ideological 
parameters within which foreign policy is conducted.
7
 In contrast, the US Congress 
enjoys significant power over policymaking, including the right to declare war and 
authorize legislation in the foreign policy arena.
8
 
 
Hill describes public opinion as ―a constraint which exists at least as much in the 
minds of decision-makers as it is embodied in substantive elements like law, 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p.220 
4
 Steve Smith and Michael Smith, ‗The Analytical Background‘,  in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds), British 
Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation (Unwin Hyman Ltd: London, 1988)  p.8 
5 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, pp.222-223 
6
 Ibid., p.256 
7 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy & World Power in the 20th Century, (Longman Group Ltd: London, 
1991), pp.38-41 
8
 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p.253 
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institutions, demonstrations.‖9  The Thatcher Government found that it was 
increasingly difficult to ignore the shift in British public opinion on the Arab-Israel 
issue.
10
 Among this public, there are interest groups seeking to exercise influence 
over the direction of foreign policy. Pro-Israeli interest groups in the United States 
have been more successful than their British counterparts, partly because they have been 
able to exert influence in the US Congress, which has a greater involvement in foreign 
policy legislation than the British parliament.  
 
Mark Stuart has suggested that Thatcher‘s ―pro-Israeli stance‖ was linked to her 
Finchley constituency and its large Jewish population which she represented as an 
MP. According to Stuart, Thatcher‘s position on Israel caused difficulties with the 
FCO.
11
 There are difficulties with this claim. First, while Thatcher was influenced by 
the views she heard in her constituency, this was just one of many factors which 
affected her position on the Arab-Israel issue. It ultimately had a very limited impact 
on the Middle East policy of the Thatcher Government. Furthermore, over time, 
there was an increasing convergence between Thatcher and the FCO on the Arab-
Israel issue.  
 
Hill concludes that while the foreign policy process is largely pluralist in nature, the 
processes of scrutiny even in liberal democracies are not very effective. The regular 
influence of interest groups and the media operates in an indirect and erratic manner. 
For the most part, actual participation in foreign policy decision-making is very 
difficult even for those who are articulate and knowledgeable.
12
 Thus, policymakers 
have considerable room for maneuver in regard to the formulation and execution of 
foreign policy.  
 
Rynhold and Spyer have maintained that British policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict has traditionally swung between a ‗Diplomatic‘ and a ‗Strategic‘ orientation. 
                                                          
9
 Ibid.,p.268  
10
 See below,p.123  
11
 Mark Stuart, Douglas Hurd: The Public Servant (Mainstream:London, 1998), p.119 
12
 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p.282 
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They have argued that the Diplomatic orientation places an emphasis on the 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is viewed as a core issue affecting 
general Middle East policy. This orientation, associated with the FCO, has defined 
British interests largely in terms of building and maintaining alliances with existing 
Arab regimes as well as enhancing commercial interests in the region.  By extension, 
therefore, this orientation has traditionally viewed Israel as a factor complicating 
British interests in the Middle East. In contrast, the Strategic orientation is associated 
more with 10 Downing Street and defines British interests largely in terms of 
containing anti-Western threats in the Middle East. Israel is viewed in a more 
sympathetic light as a bulwark against these threats, and a greater emphasis is placed 
on close ties with the United States – a traditional supporter of Israel.13  
 
While these two orientations have not given rise to two competing British policies on 
the Middle East (one pursued by 10 Downing Street and the other advocated by the 
FCO), an examination of British practices in the Arab-Israeli conflict over the last 
sixty years does reveal that fluctuations between these orientations have been 
reflected to some extent in policy. Thus, according to Rynhold and Spyer, while the 
early post-war years saw a preponderance of the Diplomatic orientation at a time 
when the FCO elite exercised a strong impact on Middle East policy, the period of 
the mid-to-late 1960s saw the Strategic orientation prevail, as 10 Downing Street 
took greater control over policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
14
  
 
The Diplomatic orientation views the Arab-Israeli conflict as the main cause of 
instability in the Middle East, undermining British interests in the region. In 
accordance with this perception, a comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict would go a long way towards removing the sources of hostility towards 
Britain in the Arab world.
15
 As we will see, this perception was commonly held 
among the British foreign policy elites in the early post-war years, and it also held 
sway during the Thatcher period.  The perception that the Arab-Israeli conflict was at 
                                                          
13
 Jonathan Rynhold and Jonathan Spyer, 'British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena 1973-2004', British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 34:2 ( August 2007), pp. 137-155 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid.  
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the core of the difficulties facing Britain in its Middle East policy was illustrated, for 
example, by the Alpha Plan of 1955. Alpha was a major initiative involving 
confidential discussions between the British and American governments with a view 
to solving the Palestinian refugee problem and adjusting Israel‘s frontiers. Alpha was 
designed to address Arab grievances and place Israeli-Egyptian relations on a new 
footing.
16
 It was symptomatic of FCO thinking during the 1950s: According to this 
logic, a limited settlement between Israel and even one of the Arab states could help 
defuse Arab hostility, which was undermining British interests in the region.
17
   
 
A key difficulty in some of the literature is the tendency to accentuate the differences 
between the FCO and 10 Downing Street on British policy towards the Arab-Israel 
conflict. For example, the attempts to associate the FCO with the ‗Diplomatic‘ 
orientation, as against Number Ten‘s association with the ‗Strategic‘ orientation18, 
serve only to reinforce the differences between the two institutions. As this thesis 
will demonstrate, such an approach is somewhat simplistic and misleading. Thatcher 
was instinctively sympathetic towards Israel, and did attempt briefly to counter the 
FCO position on the Middle East. However, there were numerous occasions when 
she took the lead in adopting policies that caused considerable difficulties for the 
Israeli political leadership.  At the same time, it was the FCO that initiated a dialogue 
with the Israeli Government, paving the way for the eventual groundbreaking visit of 
a British Prime Minister to Israel in 1986.    
 
Against this background, the present thesis will highlight an interesting paradox. The 
FCO‘s post-war policy towards the Middle East focused on the enhancement of ties 
with conservative Arab regimes and the avoidance of close ties with the State of 
Israel. In contrast, Thatcher entered Number Ten in May 1979 with a reputation as a 
stalwart friend of the Jewish State. There was some concern within the Arab world 
that Thatcher would adopt a pro-Israeli policy in view of the fact that she represented 
                                                          
16
 William Roger Louis and Roger Owen, ‗Introduction‘ in  William Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds), Suez 1956; The 
Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp..2-3 
17
 Shimon Shamir,  ‗The Collapse of Project Alpha‘ in William Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds), Suez 1956; The Crisis and 
its Consequences (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp.84-92 
18
 Rynhold and Spyer, 'British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena ', pp. 137-155 
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a constituency with a substantial Jewish population.
19
 There were some within the 
FCO who shared this unease.
20
  Thatcher, who considered the FCO to be prejudiced 
towards the Arab viewpoint, had been hostile towards the institution.
21
 During her 
period of service in Number Ten, she came under considerable pressure from pro-
Israeli organizations and supporters of Israel within her constituency to adopt a 
policy that was supportive of the Israeli Government. In addition, the fact that 
Britain had become less dependent than before on Middle East oil supplies would 
arguably have reduced the pressure on her Government to pacify the Arab world on 
the Palestinian question. Thus, as policy became concentrated in the hands of 
Number Ten, one would have expected it to diverge significantly from the position 
of the FCO. Yet this did not occur.  
 
Thatcher‘s hostility to the FCO is well-known.22 There were significant differences 
in attitudes on various policy issues, including in the Middle East arena. However, 
policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict was cohesive, in spite of Thatcher‘s hostility 
towards Whitehall. As Neill Lochery has pointed out, Thatcher may have disliked 
the culture and ethos of the FCO, but she tended to agree with its position on the 
Arab-Israel Conflict.
23
  This thesis will contend that on occasions, it was Thatcher 
herself, rather than the FCO, that took the lead in advancing a policy which was 
problematic from the Israeli Government‘s perspective. In turn, it was the FCO, 
rather than Number Ten, that was chiefly responsible for advancing a more 
conciliatory policy towards Israel, especially during the second term of the Thatcher 
Government. Thus, the present study will question the exaggerated emphasis that has 
been placed on the differences between Whitehall and Downing Street. 
 
In particular, the present thesis seeks to demonstrate why Thatcher was ready to 
cooperate with the FCO in the Middle East arena. During her early months in power, 
Thatcher had been opposed to the FCO‘s attempt to advance a policy shift on 
                                                          
19
 Anthony Parsons, ‗The Middle East‘ in Peter Byrd (ed), British Foreign Policy under Thatcher (St Martins Press: New York, 
1988), p.89 
20
 See below, p.53 
21
 See below, p. 126 
22
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p.309 
23
 Neill Lochery, Loaded Dice: The FCO and Israel, (Continuum International Publishing Group: London, 2007) p.196 
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Palestinian self-determination, and viewed Israel as a strategic asset in the Middle 
East. This situation did not last. This thesis contends that the most significant factor 
driving Thatcher‘s thinking in the Arab-Israel arena was the perceived Soviet threat. 
During 1979, the year in which she became Prime Minister, the Soviets had invaded 
Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution had taken place in Iran. The need to prevent 
Soviet expansion and political instability in the region had now become a matter of 
greater urgency.
24
 There was also acute concern over the implications of the 
revolution in Iran.
25
 It was in this context that British policy was formulated during 
the early 1980s. It was felt that a comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israel 
conflict would dilute the threats to Western strategic interests in the region. In a 
similar vein, by 1990 with the ending of the cold war, a fresh opportunity had arrived 
to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. The inflexibility of the Likud 
leadership on the Palestinian question was a significant factor that strengthened 
agreement between 10 Downing Street and Whitehall. Furthermore, it was 
increasingly difficult for the Prime Minister to ignore shifts in British public opinion 
on the Palestinian question. Thus, Thatcher‘s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict 
was closely aligned to the FCO, as it became increasingly clear that British strategic 
interests demanded a certain detachment from the State of Israel.  
 
The thesis is based, to a large degree, on recently declassified archival materials 
located in Britain and Israel, on FCO documents that have been released to the 
researcher under the Freedom of Information Act, as well as on numerous interviews 
conducted with senior statesmen, politicians and officials in Britain and Israel. These 
primary sources provide a rich and complex picture of the relationship between 
Thatcher and Whitehall. They show that Thatcher‘s policy towards the region was 
dictated by concerns over threats to the stability of the moderate Arab states, rather 
than by either the pro-Israel or the pro-Arab lobbies. They also indicate that Thatcher 
consistently displayed hostility to the leadership of the Likud Party, since its 
inflexible policies had negative ramifications for the stability of the region. As a 
result, the Prime Minister largely agreed with the Whitehall bureaucracy on the need 
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to adopt a policy shift on the Palestinian question
26
, and to put an end to the situation 
where the Soviet Union was an advocate for Arab Governments against an Israel 
backed by the United States.
27
 Indeed, the primary sources indicate that Thatcher 
was prepared on occasions to go beyond the FCO in adopting policies that were 
uncomfortable for the Israeli political leadership. The British policy towards the 
Arab-Israel conflict under Thatcher was influenced largely by international-level 
factors. Nevertheless, there were also domestic processes that had a significant 
impact on policy in the Arab-Israeli arena.  For example, the patrician wing of the 
Conservative Party exerted a significant influence on policy during the first term of 
the Thatcher Government, and public opinion became increasingly significant. In 
addition, domestic economic interests played an important part in the sales of arms to 
the Arab world.  
 
This fills a gap in our understanding of the relationship between statecraft and the 
substance of policy, as the policy of the Thatcher Government towards the Middle 
East serves as a case study that sheds light on the formation of other areas of foreign 
policy. The present thesis shows that even as the private office in Downing Street 
exerted stronger control over foreign policy, there was still extensive cooperation 
with the FCO on the Middle East. The fact that Thatcher had adopted a presidential 
leadership style did not necessarily signify a change in the substance of policy. It 
suggests that Thatcher‘s leadership style was more significant in the management of 
foreign policy than the actual substance and outcome of this policy. 
 
In order to fully understand the factors underlying British policy towards the Middle 
East during the Thatcher period, it is necessary to look at the broader pattern of 
interplay between the Prime Minister‘s Office and Whitehall over the thirty years 
prior to the Conservative election victory of 1979. What was the traditional policy of 
the FCO towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and to what degree did the occupants of 
Number Ten follow this policy? In the rest of this chapter, I will explore the 
evolution of British policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict as reflected in the 
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existing literature, with an emphasis on the period between the Suez invasion of 
1956 and the late 1970s, focusing on a number of key themes: the British perception 
of Israel/Palestine as the core issue in Middle Eastern politics; the development of 
the FCO position on Israel; the application of this policy, with special reference to 
the issue of arms sales to the region, and the influences of Downing Street and the 
FCO on British policy.  
 
British Perceptions of Israel/Palestine as the Core Issue in  
Middle Eastern Politics 
 
There is no question that Britain‘s role in the creation of the State of Israel was 
uppermost in the minds of many leading British policymakers, during the early years 
of the Jewish State‘s existence. Arnold Toynbee exerted a strong influence on British 
policy during those years, in his capacity as the long-standing Director of Studies at 
Chatham House. The key elements of Toynbee‘s doctrine (described by the historian 
Elie Kedourie as the ‗Chatham House version‘) was that the Arab peoples had 
suffered an injustice at the hands of the British in the wake of the 1917 Balfour 
Declaration, which promised the Jews a national home in Palestine.
28
 Toynbee 
maintained that the British Government, and indirectly the British people, were 
―extremely responsible‖ for the change in the Middle East brought about by the 
Balfour Declaration. 
29
 Kedourie maintained in his classic work, The Chatham 
House Version, that the views of Toynbee were ―widely shared among the 
intellectual and official classes in Britain.‖30 One of the most contentious claims 
presented by Toynbee and other scholars in the publications of Chatham House was 
that Palestine was the key issue in Middle East politics and was singularly 
responsible for the difficulties affecting British interests in the Middle East.
31
 
Kedourie attacks this thesis, arguing that Britain‘s relations with countries such as 
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Egypt, Iran and Iraq were influenced solely by local issues.
32
  Nevertheless, 
Toynbee‘s view has influenced the thinking of many British policymakers, officials 
and politicians, including arguably Thatcher herself. 
 
Elizabeth Monroe has written that among the majority of Arabs, resentment over 
Palestine ―destroyed every shred of regard for Britain.‖ 33 Nevertheless, she also 
maintained that it was wrong to argue that Palestine alone brought about the 
deterioration of the Anglo-Arab relationship. Monroe claimed that there were other 
relevant factors in this deterioration such as Egyptian and Iraqi antipathy towards 
British military bases. The Iranian nationalism of the 1950s, for example, was 
untouched by the Palestine issue, and the Egyptians only embraced the Palestine 
cause after the Second World War. Palestine certainly exacerbated nationalist 
emotions, but it was only one factor among many. 
34
 
 
The Development of the FCO Position on Israel 
 
Britain‘s post-war policy in the Middle East placed an emphasis on the consolidation 
of ties with conservative Arab regimes, securing oil supplies, fending off the Soviet 
threat and maintaining stability in the region.  In the years following the 
establishment of the State of Israel, there was a strong belief among British 
policymakers that close relations with Israel would harm British interests.
35
 Indeed, 
in the years following Israel‘s independence, Britain kept its distance from the 
Jewish State, ruling out strategic cooperation of any kind. Nevertheless, by the end 
of the 1950s, Britain realized that there was more to gain from establishing friendlier 
relations and cooperation with Israel (which would provide it with a measure of 
influence), although not at the expense of its ties with Arab countries.
36
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Although the period leading up to the establishment of the State of Israel is outside 
the scope of the present study, it is helpful to briefly survey the literature relating to 
FCO attitudes on Palestine, as they set the tone for what followed in the decades to 
come.  According to William Roger Louis, in the mid 1940s, the FCO adopted an 
anti-Zionist position, but this was not necessarily motivated by anti-Semitism.
37
 
Louis maintains that the FCO worked towards the establishment of an Arab state, 
with the restriction of Jewish immigration to Palestine, in order to preserve British 
influence in the Middle East through Anglo-Arab friendship. Indeed, this had been 
the objective of the 1939 White Paper.
38
 Such an option would have ruled out an 
independent Jewish State, thereby crushing Zionist aspirations. Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin was responsible for overseeing this policy following the Labour party 
election victory of 1945. Bevin strongly believed that through expressing public 
opposition to the establishment of an independent Jewish homeland in Palestine, 
Britain would be able to deflect Arab hostility away from Britain. Yet even after the 
State of Israel was established, Bevin and leading FCO officials continued to 
demonstrate a marked aversion to the fledgling Jewish State. Bevin was also 
concerned that the creation of Israel would stimulate anti-western feeling among 
Muslims.
39
  
 
Although Bevin was well known for his unsympathetic attitudes towards the Jewish 
State, his views were shared by some leading FCO officials. For example, Sir John 
Troutbeck, the Head of the British Middle East Office in Cairo had this to say about 
Zionism in the wake of the Deir Yassin massacre of April 1948: ―It is difficult to see 
that Zionist policy is anything else than unashamed aggression carried out by 
methods of deceit and brutality not unworthy of Hitler.‖  He added that the Jews 
―would bring bitterness and unrest and, wherever the Jew was in control of an Arab 
population, the worst form of oppression. Deir Yassin is a warning of what a Jew 
will do to gain his purpose.‖40  Similarly, Troutbeck‘s visit to Gaza in 1949 
reinforced his anti-Zionism and sense of guilt over the Balfour Declaration: 
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After all it was we who created the situation in which they are now 
floundering and but for our action or inaction over the past thirty years there 
would not today be 700,000 odd refugees starving and shivering on the 
hillsides.
41
 
 
Troutbeck was backed by Bevin and opposed the notion of a peace agreement 
between Israel and Jordan during the reign of King Abdullah, believing that this 
would jeopardize British oil interests and endanger its position in Suez – any peace 
had to be accepted by the Arab world. According to Louis, it was more important for 
Britain to appease Egypt than to encourage peace between Israel and Jordan. 
42
 
 
During the course of the 1950s, Evelyn Shuckburgh, Under-Secretary for Middle 
East Affairs in the FCO, set the tone for Britain‘s policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Now that the State of Israel was a reality, Shuckburgh believed that it would 
be a struggle for Britain to win over Arab support. As he wrote in his diary, ―How 
the Arabs hate us really… They will never forgive us Israel.‖43 He also wrote that 
―Palestine was the burial ground of our hopes for maintaining the British position in 
the Middle East,‖ adding: ―I suppose this was inevitable from the time of the Balfour 
Declaration….‖ 44 
 
Nevertheless, as Shamir points out, Shuckburgh‘s hostility towards Israel was shared 
by other senior FCO officials. Indeed, Shamir maintains that during the 1950s, 
Whitehall found it difficult to get to grips with the reality of Israeli statehood, and 
did not view Israel as a fully sovereign state.
45
 Thus, Sir John Nicholls, the British 
Ambassador to Israel from 1954-1957 wrote: ―The centre of infection in the region is 
Israel and I believe that we must treat the Israelis as a sick people‖. Sir Nicholls had 
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also written:  ―It is not reasonable to expect that a nation made up of individuals so 
psychologically unstable should be capable of a mature foreign policy.‖46 
 
During this period, Whitehall tended to view Israel as a liability and this was 
reflected in British policy and rhetoric. Thus, Shuckburgh would tell Shimon Peres 
(then Director General of the Israel Defence Ministry) that the Western powers 
―must necessarily nurse their relations with the Arab world and cannot, even if they 
should be inclined to do so, sacrifice their major interests there for Israel.‖47 This 
statement neatly sums up FCO attitudes towards the Jewish State, during the 1950s, 
in particular.   
 
Over the years, there has been an interesting debate over the FCO position in regard 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict – particularly in the early years of the State of Israel‘s 
existence. Frank Brenchley, a former official in the British diplomatic service, has 
maintained that there is some truth in claims that the FCO traditionally has been pro-
Arab. He explained that while a large number of British diplomats have been 
exposed to Arab culture and perspectives through service in the numerous Arab 
countries, comparatively few have been exposed to the Israeli experience, as there is 
only one diplomatic mission in Israel to influence the way in which Middle East 
issues are perceived.
48
 This view was shared by former British Prime Minister, 
Harold Wilson.
49
 Brenchley claimed that the number of Arabists in the FCO 
increased significantly from the early 1950s, as a result of the introduction of new 
procedures which placed an emphasis on fluency in the local language.
50
 At one 
time, the Arabists were the only group with a separate FCO training centre – the 
Middle East Centre for Arab Studies (MECAS). These specialists could often expect 
to spend up to half their career working in their area of expertise.
51
 It is therefore not 
surprising that their worldview and experience in the Arab world carried weight 
within the FCO.  
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Against these views, Lochery maintains that the FCO is not ―systematically anti-
Israeli‖ or ―institutionally pro-Arab‖. Over the last sixty years, it has sought to 
defend British interests as it has seen fit, and this admittedly has often meant 
associating British interests with Arab interests, as opposed to Israeli ones, mainly as 
a result of Britain‘s oil needs. Nevertheless, the FCO has also expended considerable 
energy in efforts to maintain influence with Israel from the late 1950s onwards.
52
 
 
Britain initiated the Alpha Plan in tandem with the United States, with a view to 
establishing a settlement between Israel and Egypt. Shuckburgh, the key architect of 
the Alpha Plan, believed that the Arab-Israeli conflict was a festering wound which 
―poisoned‖ Britain‘s relations with Egypt and weakened the West in its attempts to 
block Soviet penetration of the Middle East. Shuckburgh believed that a settlement 
of the Arab-Israeli dispute would deny the Soviets a foothold in the region. Alpha 
placed an emphasis on Israeli concessions over refugees as well as over territory in 
the Negev desert, with a view to establishing a land link between Jordan and Egypt. 
In return, the powers would provide ―guarantees of security‖ to Israel and Egypt.53 
 
In November 1955, Prime Minister Anthony Eden made a public reference to the 
Alpha Plan in a speech at Guildhall. In it, he described the territorial concessions 
expected of Israel, defining them as a compromise between the 1947 partition plan 
and the existing borders. Israel responded fiercely to the Guildhall speech, with 
Prime Minister Ben Gurion declaring in the Knesset that ―the essence of Sir Anthony 
Eden‘s proposal is the crushing of the State of Israel.‖54 Yet, as Shamir points out, it 
is difficult to see how the Alpha Plan could have succeeded. The Alpha planners 
failed to take into account the intense attachment of Israel to the Negev. 
Furthermore, Israel‘s sense of being under siege, already heightened by strict 
restrictions on arms supplies, was now further exacerbated, this making it even less 
willing to be flexible and make concessions. Significantly, Britain was in no position 
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to pressure Israel to make concessions at a time of great distrust between the two 
countries. Although the United States had also given strong support to the Alpha 
Plan and cooperated closely with Britain on the project, it showed a greater 
understanding for Israel‘s position, and altogether, a more even-handed approach. 
Britain, on the other hand, was considerably less sympathetic towards Israel, and this 
undermined its attempts to obtain Israeli goodwill on Alpha.
55
 Britain‘s lack of 
influence over Israel continued to be a problem which FCO officials had to address 
in the following decades.  
 
Arguably, the belief of British policymakers that Nasser‘s anti-British sentiments 
were linked largely to anger over Israel reflected a core misreading of realities in the 
Middle East. The evidence appears to show that Nasser was considerably more upset 
about the Baghdad Pact of 1955, whereby Britain had joined a defensive alliance 
comprising Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran
56
, than he was about Britain‘s policy 
towards Israel. Britain did not take into account Nasser‘s intense rivalry with Iraq, 
and disregarded Egypt‘s fierce resentment over Britain‘s strategic alliances and its 
colonial bases in the Middle East.
57
   
 
One of the cornerstones of post-war British policy in the Middle East was the 
establishment of regional stability through fostering strategic alliances with moderate 
Arab regimes. Stability was essential for Britain in order to safeguard its military 
bases in the region and to protect oil supplies. The prospect of the growth of Soviet 
influence in the Middle East focused British minds and required urgent steps to be 
taken in order to ensure that Arab states would remain within the Western orbit.  
 
During the early part of the 1950s, leading FCO officials strongly believed that it 
was in Britain‘s interest to remain detached from the State of Israel, so as not to 
upset Arab opinion. Almog has chronicled the tense relations between Britain and 
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Israel during the course of the 1950s. She argues that the Anglo-Israeli relationship 
between 1950 and 1956 was formal without cooperation. Britain feared that 
cooperation with Israel would extinguish its influence in the Middle East. Thus, 
Britain rejected in March 1956, an Israeli request to join the Commonwealth.  
According to the FCO, ―it would confirm Arab arguments that Israel is a spearhead 
of Western Imperialism in a new guise.‖ Almog maintains that British officials were 
ambivalent towards the State of Israel in these early years. While there were 
expressions of admiration for Israel‘s pioneering spirit and accomplishments, there 
was also an unsympathetic attitude reflected through the British Ambassador to Tel 
Aviv, Sir John Nicholls, who believed that the ‗ghetto syndrome‘ was perpetuated in 
Israel and that Zionism had succeeded ―in exchanging a thousand ghettos for a single 
comprehensive one.‖58 
 
In the summer of 1956, Ambassador Nicholls, notwithstanding his unsympathetic 
perspective on Israel, did briefly entertain the idea of fostering a closer relationship 
between Britain and Israel. This was roundly rejected by the FCO on the basis of the 
belief that the Israelis would take full advantage of such a gesture, to the detriment of 
British interests. Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador to the United States, 
claimed that ―[Israelis had] devious ways of achieving their ends.‖ 59 
 
Lochery argues that the Anglo-Israeli collusion of 1956 was strictly a ―one-
off…marriage of convenience‖ for the British who wished to punish Nasser for 
striking at Britain‘s interests in the Suez Canal area. Once the Suez adventure was 
over, the FCO led the way in distancing Britain from Israel in order to regain the 
confidence of the Arab world.  During this period, the Israeli leadership (and 
particularly Prime Minister Ben Gurion) believed that the FCO was appeasing the 
Arabs at Israel‘s expense, in order to retain British influence in the Middle East. It 
was only when King Hussein‘s regime came under threat in 1958 that Britain and 
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Israel would discover a shared interest in protecting the Hashemite Kingdom, leading 
eventually to a closer understanding between the two countries. 
60
 
 
British Policy on Arms Sales to Israel 
 
One of the main sources of frustration for Israeli leaders, particularly during the 
1950s, was Britain‘s refusal to authorize significant arms sales to Israel, in contrast 
to its arms sales to Iraq, Jordan and even Egypt. Northedge maintains that Britain 
wished to strengthen Arab states in the early 1950s, in order to offset growing Israeli 
military power. Thus, in line with treaty agreements, Britain supplied limited arms to 
Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, following the lifting of the UN Security Council arms 
embargo in August 1949. The United States and France were concerned that Israel 
would turn to Russia for assistance to counteract the British support to the Arab 
states. As a result, Britain, France and the United States issued the Tripartite 
Declaration in May 1950, in order to prevent an Israel-Arab arms race, and laid 
down the principle that an application for arms should be viewed only ―in light of 
legitimate self-defence and …defence of the area as a whole.‖ The powers also 
undertook to take action both within and without the UN, in the event that 
preparations were being made to violate the armistice agreements of 1949.
61
  
 
Britain‘s refusal to sell arms to Israel would become a major source of rancour in 
Anglo-Israeli relations. Sir William Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary of State at 
the FCO, had indicated that the British Government would not be supplying Israel 
with arms until peace had been reached between Israel and her neighbours. Lochery 
writes that the issue of the sale of British arms to Israel was consistently viewed by 
the Israeli Government as the ―litmus test‖ of Anglo-Israeli ties. Ben Gurion had 
identified the arms issue as the central element of the bilateral relationship during his 
meeting with the British Ambassador Knox Helm in June 1950. Indeed, Lochery 
points out that by November 1950, the FCO itself had identified the issue of the 
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supply of arms as ―virtually the only question outstanding between Britain and 
Israel.‖62  In the first half of the 1950s, Britain barely sold any arms to Israel. Up to 
1955, the British arms supply to Israel consisted of 9 jet aircraft and 20 Sherman 
tanks,
63
 while the UK arms shipment to Nasser in 1955 alone was more than the total 
arms sold to Israel in the previous seven years.
64
  
 
Phythian argues that the political significance of arms sales lies in the ―expression of 
approval‖ that is bestowed upon the recipient. Although the supplying country may 
not always perceive the supply of arms as an expression of approval, the recipient 
country clearly does. Furthermore, the arms sales tend to result in the supplier 
country ―aligning itself‖ more closely with the recipient country, leading eventually 
to closer bilateral ties.
65
 This argument carries some weight when analyzing Britain‘s 
policy towards Israel during the Thatcher period. In the mid 1950s, Britain was not 
only concerned about Israel upsetting the military balance in the region; It had 
concerns that the sale of arms to Israel would be perceived in terms of British 
approval for Israeli policies, and would ultimately deprive Britain of influence in the 
Arab world. Thus, the very limited British arms shipments to Israel were suspended 
in early 1956, following Operation Olive Leaves - an Israeli attack on Syrian 
positions. Almog points out that Israel was the only country in the region to which 
Britain adopted a ‗trickle‘ policy in arms deliveries.66  
 
Arguably, the most significant change in British policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in the decade to come was the readiness to supply arms to Israel. By early 
1964, there was a gradual increase in the amount of tanks supplied.
67
 Nevertheless, 
while relations between Britain and Israel during the early 1960s were incomparably 
better than before, London was only prepared to go so far in enhancing ties with 
Israel. Lochery points out, for example, that Ben Gurion‘s requests for the supply of 
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surface-to-air missiles were repeatedly turned down during his meetings with British 
leaders.  Britain feared, once again, that such a deal with Israel could cause 
considerable damage to its interests in the Arab world.
68
  
 
According to Gat, by the 1960s, Britain believed that Israel‘s military strength would 
help preserve stability in the Middle East. This was a considerable shift from earlier 
British thinking, which had viewed a strong Israel as a threat to regional stability.  
The British were now readier than before to sell arms and submarines to Israel 
because they sought to maintain quiet in the Middle East. It was believed that the 
provision of arms to Israel would prevent a regional war which would damage the 
interests of the Western powers.
69
  
 
In 1964, British guidelines on arms sales to Israel and the Arab states placed an 
emphasis on maintaining a balance of military capabilities between the sides, 
restricting supplies to defensive weaponry and holding back the supply of materials 
that could contribute to the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. In addition, the FCO 
recommended that Britain should avoid becoming the principal supplier of either 
side to the conflict.
70
 In September 1964, Israeli Deputy Minister of Defence, 
Shimon Peres, visited London in great secrecy to negotiate a deal with Britain over 
the sale of Centurion tanks. The visit was successful, with Britain agreeing to sell 
250 tanks to Israel. Percy Cradock of the FCO was concerned that Israel might 
interpret the sale of tanks as part of a general British shift in its policy towards the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict.  To this end, Lord (Peter) Carrington, a senior cabinet minister, 
told Peres that the arms sale did not represent a shift in attitudes towards the wider 
Arab-Israeli conflict. He emphasized that Britain was selling arms to Israel with a 
view to maintaining a balance of power that would maintain peace in the region. 
71
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The FCO now viewed the sale of tanks positively in terms of maintaining the 
balance of arms in the region in the wake of the Soviet arming of Egypt. 
Nevertheless, concern was expressed about the effect on ties with the Arab states. 
The FCO stressed that the deal had to be kept secret so as not to antagonize the 
Arabs. Peres later described the deal as a case of ―you will sell us the tanks and we 
will keep it a secret.‖ Phythian maintains that FCO concerns regarding the 
ramifications of closer ties with Israel permeated all areas of policy. Thus, the FCO 
rejected a proposal of annual talks between the Israeli Armoured Corps and the 
Royal Armoured Corps as the sort of ―special relationship with Israel‖ that should be 
avoided. More significantly, in late 1965, it was decided not to sell the offensive 
Buccaneer aircraft to Israel.
72
 
 
The Countervailing Influences of the FCO and Downing Street 
 
A common thread that runs through the literature on Britain‘s policy towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict is Britain‘s deep reluctance to provide public support to Israel, 
whether through the provision of security guarantees or by taking a stand in the wake 
of Arab attacks on the Jewish State. Thus, Gat argues that between 1964 and 1967, 
Britain sought, above all else, to maintain a low profile and avoid committing itself 
to either side in the dispute. One prime example of this was the water dispute 
between Israel and the Arab countries, which erupted in 1963. Israel commenced 
work in the early 1960s on a national water carrier involving the diversion of waters 
from the Jordan River to the Negev region. Israel‘s leaders viewed this project as a 
matter of the highest importance, laying the foundations for the development of the 
Jewish state in the decades to come. However, Israel‘s Arab neighbours responded 
belligerently to the project, with Syria taking the lead in establishing a counter-
diversion scheme, to prevent Israel from exploiting the Lake Tiberias waters. 
Although FCO officials such as John Beith, the British Ambassador to Israel, 
sympathized with Israel‘s position in the dispute and found the Arab claims to be 
unjustified, the overwhelming position adopted by the FCO was that Britain would 
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have to maintain a low profile on the issue, as it was not worth risking the hostility 
of the Arab countries.
73
  Through 1965, Britain resisted Israeli requests for a 
commitment to deter aggression and calls to condemn the Arab counter-diversion 
scheme. Britain feared that strong support for Israel would strengthen Soviet 
penetration of the Middle East, to the detriment of British interests.
74
 As events were 
to show, the growing understanding for Israel‘s predicament would not signify a 
change in Britain‘s public position on Israel.  
 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who entered office in 1964, was a friend of Israel and 
viewed its predicaments with considerable sympathy. During his first two years in 
office, though, the FCO was largely setting the tone of policy towards Israel, 
exemplified by Britain‘s refusal to take a stand on the water dispute and the terrorist 
attacks against the Jewish state. The FCO was largely responsible for the decision 
not to support Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol‘s plea for British support of Israel‘s 
―independence and integrity‖, following the Egyptian threat to close the Straits of 
Tiran to Israeli shipping. The FCO feared that a declaration of support would 
threaten its interests in the Arab world.
75
 However, once Nasser closed the Straits of 
Tiran to Israeli shipping on May 22, Wilson decided to intervene and take full charge 
of policy towards the Arab-Israeli crisis. Wilson believed that the Straits of Tiran 
constituted an international waterway, which had to remain open to the shipping of 
all nations, and he supported international action to secure the opening of the 
waterway. Gat argues that the shift in the handling of policy from the FCO to 10 
Downing Street would also bring a corresponding change to the policy of 
maintaining a low profile. Now, Britain would have total involvement in the Middle 
East crisis.
76
 In spite of Wilson‘s support for action, his cabinet was still reluctant to 
take the lead in a military operation in the Straits, fearing a backlash in the Arab 
world. It was argued that Britain should not take a lead in even organizing a 
declaration at the UN since its economic interests lay with the Arab side.
77
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Gat sees an irony in Wilson‘s intervention to secure the opening of the Straits of 
Tiran, in order to prevent a war that could damage British interests. Ultimately, it 
was the intervention itself that threatened to undermine British interests in the 
Middle East, since the Arabs saw British efforts to keep the Straits open as proof that 
Britain was backing Israel and that it was anti-Arab. Indeed, in Arab eyes, this could 
be seen as a throwback to the British-Israeli collaboration of 1956.
78
  
 
Rynhold and Spyer argue that where Number Ten decides to intervene in foreign 
policy, it is able to determine policy. Thus, Wilson‘s eventual intervention during the 
1967 crisis both in support of action to open the Straits of Tiran and by his approval 
of the secret supply of ammunition to Israel, is a case in point. Once the 1967 War 
had erupted, the official FCO line was that Britain should adopt a position of ‗strict 
neutrality‘ in the conflict. Nevertheless, Wilson approved the secret supply of tank 
ammunition to Israel, overruling FCO objections.
79
  
 
Rynhold and Spyer maintain that between 1957 and 1967, the Strategic orientation 
largely prevailed in British policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.
80
 This was 
exemplified by a tendency to augment Israel‘s military strength in order to 
consolidate a pro-Western balance of power against attempts by Arab nationalists to 
destabilize the Middle East. In other words, the most important factor for both the 
Macmillan and Wilson governments was the need to maintain stability and to 
counter anti-Western threats in the Middle East, and this involved a relatively 
sympathetic attitude towards Israel. In contrast, the Heath Government, like the 
Attlee Government before it, embraced the Diplomatic orientation, placing a greater 
emphasis on the enhancement of political and commercial relations with the Arab 
world, if necessary, at the expense of the State of Israel.
81
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In the wake of Israel‘s swift and decisive victory in the 1967 War, the tensions in 
Britain‘s arms policy came to the fore once again. Phythian draws attention to these 
tensions in relation to the issue of the sale of Chieftain Tanks to Israel. Foreign 
Secretary Michael Stewart opposed the sale, claiming that Israel would gain a 
decisive military advantage over Arab sides. He also pointed to the dangers of an 
arms race spiraling out of control, and highlighted the potential damage to ties with 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, especially given the efforts invested after the Six-Day-War 
in improving ties with these Arab States. There was a risk of losing around £400 
million in arms contracts with Arab states as a result of the sale of Chieftain Tanks to 
Israel.
82
 The Thatcher Government would later take exactly the same perspective on 
the issue of arms sales to Israel.  
 
The FCO was firmly opposed to the sale of the tanks, believing that it would 
jeopardize relations with the Arab world. At the very least, the British Government 
felt that there should be a quid pro quo – Israel would receive the tanks only in return 
for territorial concessions.
83
 Defence Secretary Dennis Healey, however, was a 
strong advocate of arms sales to Israel and favoured the sale of Chieftain tanks. 
Healey questioned the FCO belief that the sale would upset the ―prevailing political 
balance in the region‖, and argued that the military balance had altered to Israel‘s 
disadvantage since the 1967 war. He swung the cabinet on the issue and it moved 
towards approving the sale even though it contravened the Government‘s own 
guidelines on the matter. Wilson recognized the ―obvious risks‖ of such a decision 
and emphasized the importance of maintaining secrecy on the matter. 
84
 
 
In June 1969, the new Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, visited London and held 
talks with the British Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary, in a 
bid to secure the delivery of the tanks. Lochery claims that the FCO had decided not 
to go through with the sale in order to send a message to Israel - if Israel wished its 
relations with Britain to remain harmonious, it would have to show greater 
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flexibility. Nevertheless, following Meir‘s visit to Britain, the FCO admitted that this 
policy had failed to bring about a change in Israel‘s policy.85 
 
Following the 1967 War, Israel feared that Britain had adopted a pro-Arab stance. It 
was particularly unhappy with Foreign Secretary George Brown‘s address to the 
Fifth Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly of June 20, 1967.  In his 
address, Brown stated that gains could not be made from war, and there was a call 
for Israel to withdraw from the territories captured.  Brown warned Israel against 
annexing the Old City of Jerusalem, stating that this would ―isolate them not only 
from world opinion but will also lose them the support which they have.‖86 
Brenchley points out, however, that Brown chose to make a pro-Arab speech without 
reference to his cabinet or the Prime Minister. Although the address may well have 
been motivated by Brown‘s own beliefs on the issue, it is also likely that Lord 
Caradon, Britain‘s Permanent Representative to the UN, had influenced him. 
Caradon had sent a telegram to Brown during the 1967 War, arguing that Britain was 
―in a good position to maintain working relations with the Arabs….We must start 
rebuilding bridges with them.‖87 Thus, the influence of the FCO was significant in 
bringing about closer ties between Britain and the Arab countries during the latter 
stage of Wilson‘s period in office.  
  
For Israel, further proof that Britain had now adopted a pro-Arab position was 
evident in Britain‘s attempts to curry favour with Nasser and restore relations with 
Egypt. It was felt that Britain was enabling the Arabs to save face and evade the 
question of recognition of Israel. An Israeli newspaper blamed this on ‗Bevinism‘ at 
the FCO. Foreign Minister Brown argued in return that ―it was to Israel‘s interest as 
well as ours that we should have diplomatic relations with the UAR: we would be 
better able to influence them.‖88   
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Lord Caradon was also instrumental in bringing about the compromise formula that 
resulted in the successful passage of Resolution 242 through the Security Council. 
Brown described this as ―the first effective British initiative on a contentious issue 
for a long time.‖89 Brenchley claims that Caradon‘s position was ―completely 
consistent‖ with the ideas of the FCO at the time of Resolution 242: the FCO 
approved of minor exchanges of territory along the ceasefire line, in order to rectify 
the border line. Caradon had maintained that the 1967 line was unworkable as an 
international boundary because it was arbitrary and did not address the needs of the 
warring parties. The text of Resolution 242 required ―withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.‖ The Arabs were insistent that 
‗the‘ or ‗all‘ had to be inserted before ‗territories‘, but Caradon overcame their 
protests. According to Brenchley, Caradon and the FCO believed that the ambiguity 
in the text worked to the advantage of both Arabs and Israelis, and would ultimately 
encourage both sides to accept mutual concessions which would improve the 
situation on the border.
90
  
 
A significant indication of a shift in British policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict 
came during the early 1970s, when Edward Heath was Prime Minister. Heath 
oversaw the establishment of a task force on oil supplies. Under its auspices, Sir 
Colin Crowe (a former British Ambassador to the UN) was responsible for the 
publication of a report recommending the halting of arms sales to Israel. In essence, 
it was argued that if Britain wished to improve its relations with Arab states and 
thereby preserve its oil supplies, this policy had to be applied. The report also 
concluded that a Middle East settlement would not be achieved without an Israeli 
withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and that Britain should be seen to be 
pushing for such a withdrawal. The report reflected the arguments of three key FCO 
officials involved in shaping policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict: Anthony 
Parsons, James Craig and Colin Crowe.
91
 This line of thinking held sway in the FCO 
through much of the 1970s and 1980s. 
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During the early 1970s, the British Government was increasingly reluctant to 
sanction the sale of weapons to Israel, in view of two factors: the British frustration 
over the inflexibility of the Meir Government, and the belief that public knowledge 
of British arms sales to Israel would harm Britain‘s interests. In fact, the Heath 
Government did approve the sale of three mini submarines to Israel, although this 
deal would be an exception to the rule during Heath‘s time in office.  Foreign 
Secretary Douglas-Home angered the Israelis with his Harrogate speech of 
November 1970, in which he spoke of ―putting Britain‘s relations with the Arab 
world on a new footing‖, and called for Israeli withdrawal from captured lands in 
return for peace. Israel appeared increasingly concerned not only about British 
diplomatic activity within the UN, but also about the Heath Government‘s desire for 
stronger ties with Europe, fearing that this would result in a cooler attitude towards 
the Jewish State. From Israel‘s perspective, a British decision to align itself more 
closely with Europe would bring London into line with the European position, which 
was less favourable towards the Jewish State than the American position. In the 
meantime, the FCO was gradually moving towards promoting stronger ties with 
Arab states, if necessary, at the expense of relations with Israel.
92
  
 
Thus, during the October War of 1973, Prime Minister Heath refused to supply spare 
parts for Israel‘s Centurion tanks. A statement by Douglas-Home indicated that 
having called for a ceasefire, it would be ―inconsistent‖ to supply arms to the 
battlefield.‖93 Indeed, the Heath Government also refused to provide landing rights 
to US military supply planes en route for Israel, reflecting the British reluctance to 
be identified as a supporter of Israel at a time when European Governments were 
dependent on Middle East oil. The Heath Government‘s policy could be viewed as a 
classic example of the Diplomatic orientation.
94
 
 
Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, the Shadow Foreign Affairs Spokesman, 
attacked such decisions and stated that ammunition and spare parts should be sent to 
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Israel to ―preserve the neutral position.‖ Since the Arabs were being armed by the 
Soviets, there were no grounds for depriving the Israelis of arms. Wilson also 
attacked Heath in a House of Commons speech for supporting three resolutions 
condemning Israel for military raids while ―remaining silent‖ in condemning ―the 
vastly greater act of aggression on the Day of Atonement.‖ The Heath Government 
was also criticized for ―dishonouring contractual obligations at the very moment of 
Israel‘s greatest need.‖ 95  
 
There is support for the idea that Heath‘s arms embargo helped British interests in 
the Middle East. The mobilization of Arab countries to take full advantage of the ‗oil 
weapon‘ had forced a change in the calculations of the British Government. 
Brenchley claims, for example, that Heath‘s Britain was rewarded with a regular 
supply of oil from Arab countries (notwithstanding the fact that general production 
was cut by 5 per cent per month) because of its ‗satisfactory‘ position on Israel. 
Linking in with this, on November 6, 1973, EEC members issued a reinterpretation 
of Resolution 242 in the Arabs‘ favour – arguably, a response to Arab oil pressure.96 
This would suggest that by the early 1970s, Arab countries were prepared to give 
Britain the benefit of the doubt, and would be less likely to suspect that it was taking 
Israel‘s side. The efforts invested by both the Wilson and the Heath Governments in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s to review policy towards Israel and rebuild ties with 
the Arab world had arguably paid dividends. 
 
According to Lochery, the Israelis had wrongly blamed the Conservative Heath 
Government for adopting a tougher policy on arms sales to the Jewish State. They 
had overlooked the fact that the stricter arms sales policy had actually been overseen 
by the Government of Harold Wilson
97
 who was considered a steadfast friend of the 
Israelis.  In a similar vein, during the Thatcher period, this thesis will demonstrate 
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that the Israelis were quick to blame the FCO for policies which they disliked while 
overlooking the role of 10 Downing Street in the advancement of these policies.
98
   
 
The Thatcher Period 
 
Rynhold and Spyer maintain that Margaret Thatcher was among those British Prime 
Ministers who adopted, at least to some extent, the Strategic orientation, in her 
policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. In doing so, she took a similar position to 
that of Winston Churchill and Harold Wilson. The authors point out that the 
Conservative Party had been influenced by the patrician class which tended to have 
close ties with the Arab world. They argue, however, that Thatcher was closely 
linked to the new forces within the Conservative Party, exemplified by Jewish 
associates such as Sir Keith Joseph and Leon Brittan, who closely identified with 
entrepreneurial values and self help. Thatcher‘s Finchley constituency with its 
relatively large Jewish population, her strong anti-communist position and 
opposition to terrorism, as well as her solid pro-American orientation were elements 
that naturally influenced her support for Israel.
99
   
 
Rynhold and Spyer accept that none of the ―Strategic-minded‖ occupants of Number 
Ten took action to permanently change the Whitehall consensus on the Arab-Israel 
issue. At the same time, however, they argue that Prime Ministers can determine 
policy when they decide to intervene, as we saw in the case of Harold Wilson. They 
argue that in 1986, Thatcher took steps that moved British policy towards the more 
pro-American Strategic orientation, by breaking off relations with Syria, supporting 
the US air strike on Libya and expressing skepticism over the viability of an 
independent Palestinian State.
100
 Thus, the implication is that Thatcher did intervene, 
at least to some degree, to counter the FCO policy towards the Middle East. This 
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corresponds to the image that Thatcher herself tried to project regarding the 
disagreement between her and the FCO on the Middle East.
101
   
  
Parsons counters the view that the Thatcher Government adopted a policy that was 
inclined towards Israel. Between 1979 and 1982, he points out, it was the Israelis 
who complained about the ―pro-Arab bias‖ of the British Government. The only 
serious disagreement with the Arab side was the refusal to receive PLO leaders at 
cabinet level. Parsons points out that previous British Governments had more at 
stake in the Middle East, largely because of military bases in the region and the need 
for supplies of oil. From the outset, the Thatcher Government had been free from this 
difficulty.  Under Thatcher, for the first time in history, Britain had become a major 
oil producer. Parsons maintains that this development, together with an eventual 
worldwide oil boom and a steep fall in oil prices, had significantly changed Britain‘s 
relationship with the Middle East.  Britain no longer had to worry about the threat of 
oil being used as a political weapon against it. Thus, Parsons maintains that the 
Thatcher Government found itself ―in calmer and less reef-infested waters than those 
experienced by its predecessors.‖102  
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The Policy Process 
 
In describing the foreign policy process, John Coles maintains that policy advice can 
be moved either up the FCO chain of command to ministerial level or else from the 
top down.  The principle governing policy is that ―officials advise while ministers 
decide‖, but in situations of urgency, the Foreign Secretary can circumvent the 
process by simply holding a meeting, hearing advice and making a quick decision. 
However, the FCO is not the only ministry in Whitehall to make foreign policy. 
Coles maintains that there has been an increase in the involvement of disparate 
Whitehall departments in the process of shaping foreign policy.
103
 Indeed, as will be 
made clear below, the Department of Energy and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), 
for example, played a decisive role in strategic decisions of relevance to Britain‘s 
position on the Arab-Israeli question during the Thatcher period. Thus, an important 
element in the formulation of foreign policy advice involves active coordination 
between various Whitehall departments. The search for agreement among the 
departments is designed to bring about a policy which is accepted by the entire 
government as opposed to an individual minister or department. Coles concludes that 
―foreign policy is or should be the government‘s policy, not the policy of the FCO or 
some other department.‖104  
 
Politicians rely heavily on FCO experts in regard to advice and guidance on a 
multitude of foreign policy questions many of which rarely receive public attention. 
FCO officials seek to institutionalize continuity in foreign policy. As a result, the 
bureaucracy produces pressures for conservatism in this arena. This can lead to 
frustration among politicians who seek change in policy only to be confronted with 
organizational inertia. In the foreign policy arena, bureaucrats are reluctant to take 
risks and prefer to adhere to policies that have worked in the past.
105
 Indeed, 
Margaret Thatcher‘s distrust of Whitehall was linked to her perception that it was an 
institution that was averse to change.     
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Michael Clarke maintains that British foreign policy always has been and remains in 
the hands of the executive, whether controlled by a monarch or Prime Minister. In 
effect, this means that the FCO is one of the most senior ministries in Whitehall, and 
that the management of foreign policy is concentrated around the centre of 
government and conducted through the cabinet system. Clarke concludes that for 
purposes of determining foreign policy, the personality of the Prime Minister is vital 
for two reasons. Different Prime Ministers have shown varying degrees of 
involvement in foreign policy. The relationship between a Prime Minister and his or 
her Foreign Secretary is always important.  The Prime Minister may grant the 
Foreign Secretary a certain amount of policymaking initiative and this can have a 
significant bearing on policy. The problem for the analyst is to define how 
personality is having an impact on policy at a given moment.
106
 
 
Hill puts forward three possible models relating to the relationship between a head of 
government and his or her foreign secretary, along with the strengths and 
weaknesses of each model. The first one presented is defined as the ‗Equality‘ 
model. This applies to a situation where there is trust and an element of mutual 
respect which fosters teamwork and continuity. However, there is also a risk that the 
team can become distant from other colleagues.  The second model presented is the 
‗Subordinate Foreign Minister‘. In this situation, a politically weak individual is 
appointed as Foreign Secretary, providing the head of government with considerable 
freedom of movement. There is a danger here that power will be centralized in the 
hands of the leader.  The third model presented is the ‗Established Foreign Minister‘. 
This model can be successful where there is ―a clear division of labour‖ and good 
communications. It can be problematic, however, where a political rivalry develops 
between the two personalities.
107
  As will be made clear below, each model has some 
validity in regard to the Thatcher period where the Prime Minister was served by five 
Foreign Secretaries.  
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Clarke identifies Thatcher as a Prime Minister who became heavily involved in 
foreign policy issues, much like Winston Churchill and Harold Wilson before her.
108
 
In the case of Thatcher, however, there is a view that policy was controlled by 10 
Downing Street in a manner which was unprecedented in the British post-war 
landscape. William Waldegrave, a Foreign Office Minister during the late 1980s, has 
claimed that Britain had not had such an all-encompassing personal government 
since Churchill had been a war leader.
109
 Under Thatcher, the private office in 10 
Downing Street became progressively stronger during her second and third terms in 
office. The Prime Minister was increasingly inclined to cultivate her own alternative 
sources of advice at the expense of the FCO and other Whitehall departments. 
Thatcher was not the first to bring private advisers into 10 Downing Street.
110
 
Nevertheless, Hennessy points out that once Charles Powell was secure in his 
position as Private Secretary alongside Foreign Affairs Advisor Percy Cradock and 
Bernard Ingham in the Press Office, it was clear that Thatcher had assembled a 
policy unit the likes of which had never been encountered in peacetime.
111
 
 
Coles argues that whatever the interest of the Prime Minister in foreign affairs, by 
the 1980s, the degree to which he or she was obliged to become involved in this 
sphere had increased substantially. The increase in international summitry demanded 
that Prime Ministers would become more involved in international affairs issues. 
This was already the case when Coles served as a Private Secretary to Thatcher in 
the early 1980s.
112
 Thus, from this perspective, Thatcher‘s growing involvement in 
foreign policy was also a function of changes in the international arena and not 
simply a result of her presidential style of government. 
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Summary  
 
Britain‘s post-war policy towards the Middle East was strongly influenced by the 
legacy of the Balfour Declaration. Among the foreign policy elite, there was acute 
concern that Britain‘s interests in the region would be compromised as a result of 
Arab resentment over its role in the creation of the Jewish State. It was perceived 
that the Arab-Israel conflict was at the core of the difficulties facing Britain in the 
Middle East.   
 
In the decades following Israel‘s establishment, Britain worked actively to 
strengthen its ties with conservative Arab states, with a view to securing oil supplies, 
fending off Soviet influence and maintaining stability in the region.  At the same time, 
successive governments sought to avoid a close relationship with Israel. This was 
reflected, for example, in the policy of withholding arms supplies to the Jewish 
State. While Whitehall exerted a strong influence on this policy, the occupants of 10 
Downing Street largely cooperated with it, including Thatcher.  Thus, this thesis 
questions the exaggerated emphasis that has been placed on differences between the 
FCO and 10 Downing Street on the Arab-Israel conflict.  
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Section One 
Chapters 1-3 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Margaret Thatcher‘s policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict presents an interesting 
paradox. On entering office in May 1979, one would have expected Thatcher to 
adopt a policy that was supportive of the Israeli Government. The new Prime 
Minister entered 10 Downing Street with a reputation as a strong friend of Israel.
1
  
Thatcher represented a constituency with a substantial Jewish population. She had 
considered the FCO to be prejudiced towards the Arab viewpoint, and had been 
suspicious of the institution.
2
 Thatcher had close links to pro-Israeli organizations 
and came under considerable pressure from supporters of Israel within and beyond 
her constituency to adopt a policy that was supportive of the Israeli Government. 
Britain was now less reliant than before on Middle East oil supplies
3
 which would 
have reduced the pressure on the Thatcher Government to placate the Arab world on 
the Palestinian question. This would have been one area of foreign policy where 
Thatcher might have been expected to counter the Whitehall line. Interestingly, 
though, this did not occur.  
 
It is true that the Prime Minister initially opposed the attempts of the FCO to 
advance a policy shift on Palestinian self-determination and the PLO.
4
 She expressed 
reservations over self-determination for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Nevertheless, Thatcher‘s public support for the EEC Venice Declaration of June 
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1980 demonstrated that the FCO had successfully exerted decisive influence on the 
Prime Minister. Thatcher had initially viewed Israel as a bulwark against the threat 
of an expansion in Soviet influence in the Middle East.
5
 Thatcher remained 
sympathetic towards the State of Israel but was increasingly unhappy about the 
policy of the Likud Government.
6
 As a result, the Prime Minister supported the FCO 
position on the Arab-Israel conflict. The exception to this rule was Thatcher‘s refusal 
to sanction high-level contacts with the PLO.  The FCO was accepting of the 
constraints in this realm and was still free to pursue lower-level contacts with the 
organization.  
 
The policy of the Thatcher Government towards the Middle East was influenced 
largely by factors in the international system rather than domestic elements such as 
interest groups.  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution in 
1979 were central factors which lay behind the determination of the FCO to pursue 
an Israeli-Arab settlement during the early years of the Thatcher Government. The 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was viewed by many as the first phase of a push 
south to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
7
  The Prime Minister was concerned that the 
Soviet Union would take advantage of instability in order to expand its influence in 
the region
8
, and saw the advancement of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-
Israel conflict as a means of winning over the moderate Arab States to the West.  In 
the FCO, it was noted that the Soviet Union was exploiting the Arab-Israeli conflict 
for its own ends, posing as an advocate of the Palestinians and supporting radical 
regimes in the region.
9
  
 
Domestic factors were a secondary influence on British policy. Pro-Israel interest 
groups exerted a very limited influence over policy, but they ensured that ministers 
and officials were aware of their presence. During the first term of the Thatcher 
Government, the Conservative Party was influenced to some degree by the patrician 
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class which tended to have close ties with the Arab world.  Four key figures from 
this wing of the Conservative Party were Edward Heath, Lord Carrington, Ian 
Gilmour and Douglas Hurd. The latter three played a significant role in the British 
policy shift on the Palestinian question. However, the influence of this wing of the 
party declined towards the end of Thatcher‘s first term with the resignations of 
Gilmour and Carrington. More significant was the declining public understanding for 
Israel which made it increasingly difficult for 10 Downing Street to provide any kind 
of support for the Begin Government.  
 
The appointment of Anthony Parsons as Foreign Policy Advisor in November 1982 
provided a first clear indication that the Prime Minister was exerting greater control 
over foreign policy towards the end of her first term. The incrementally tighter 
control of Number Ten over foreign policy only had a marginal impact on Britain‘s 
position on the Arab-Israel conflict. The only significant difference to emerge 
between 10 Downing Street and the FCO during Parson‘s service as adviser revolved 
around Thatcher‘s refusal to host an Arab League delegation in London because it 
included a PLO official. By the summer of 1982, in the wake of the British victory in 
the Falklands War, Thatcher‘s robust leadership style was very much in evidence.10 
Nevertheless, in spite of her scepticism towards the FCO as an institution, Thatcher 
largely accommodated the policy it promoted in the Arab-Israel arena.   Indeed, this 
thesis contends that over time, Thatcher was prepared on occasions to use her 
growing influence to outflank the FCO, supporting positions which were designed to 
strengthen ties with moderate Arab countries but were strongly opposed by the 
Begin Government.         
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Chapter One 
 
Thatcher and the Begin Government 
 
Thatcher‘s instinctive support for the State of Israel faced strong challenges within a 
very short time of her entry into 10 Downing Street. Thatcher had viewed Israel as a 
bulwark against the threat of Soviet expansion in the Middle East.
1 
Thatcher would 
also have been influenced at the outset by the pro-Israel views she was exposed to in 
her Finchley constituency.
2
 Initially, Number Ten had tried to resist a decisive policy 
shift on the Palestinian question which was being formulated within the FCO headed 
by Lord Carrington. However, Thatcher‘s personal experience of Begin‘s strong 
ideological stand over a Greater Israel was a highly significant factor which 
highlighted the constraints she faced in the realm of Middle East policy. It quickly 
became clear to the Prime Minister that Begin‘s inflexible position ruled out any 
possibility of a comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and her neighbours.
3
 
Thatcher was concerned that the absence of a peace settlement would result in 
greater instability in the Middle East which would be exploited by the Soviets.
4
 
Thatcher would also have been uneasy over the threat to British political and 
economic interests in the region.  
 
Thus, under Thatcher, 10 Downing Street had effectively made a strategic choice to 
maintain a certain distance from the Likud Government. In doing so, Thatcher was 
reinforced by a Conservative Party which was influenced strongly by personalities 
such as Lord Carrington and Edward Heath who enjoyed strong ties with the Arab 
world.  Over time, British policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict became 
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increasingly cohesive as Number Ten and Whitehall shared a common perspective 
on the need to protect British interests in the Middle East, irrespective of any 
pressures that Thatcher may have faced from local constituents or pro-Israel interest 
groups.   
 
The Influence of the Patrician Conservatives 
 
Thatcher entered 10 Downing Street on Friday 4 May 1979 following the electoral 
triumph of the Conservative Party over James Callaghan‘s Labour Party. Within 48 
hours, a new British cabinet had been announced, including the appointment of Peter 
Carrington as Foreign Secretary. Since Carrington was a member of the House of 
Lords, it would also become necessary for the new Conservative Government to 
appoint a Deputy Foreign Secretary to represent the party in the House of Commons. 
Thus, Ian Gilmour was appointed as Lord Privy Seal, and was the principal 
spokesman for the Government on foreign affairs in the House of Commons. A third 
significant appointment was that of Douglas Hurd as Minister of State at the FCO. 
During the first term of the Thatcher Government, the Conservative Party was 
influenced, to some extent, by the patrician class which tended to have close ties 
with the Arab world.  Carrington, Gilmour and Hurd were three key figures from this 
wing of the Conservative Party, all of whom played a significant role in the British 
policy shift on the Palestinian question.  
 
Those Conservative MPs with interests in Middle Eastern affairs would occasionally 
meet with Thatcher as a group to address their misgivings on policy towards the 
Palestinians. Within the Conservative Party as a whole, those with pro-Arab 
sympathies carried more weight than those with an allegiance towards Israel. At the 
same time, neither the pro-Arab nor the pro-Israel lobby carried much weight with 
the Prime Minister.
5
 Nevertheless, Carrington, Gilmour and Hurd were in the right 
place at the right time to exert a strong influence on Middle East policy during the 
first term of the Thatcher period.   
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The Contrasting Records of the Conservative and Labour Governments 
 
Thatcher had a reputation as a long-standing friend of the State of Israel and had 
links with pro-Israeli organizations when she entered 10 Downing Street. 
Nevertheless, this had to be set against the recent record of the Conservative Party on 
policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Significantly, the Heath Government‘s 
decision to impose an arms embargo against Israel during the October 1973 War 
meant that the Jewish State did not view Britain as a reliable arms supplier. 
Carrington made this point to the Iraqi Foreign Minister after the Thatcher 
Government was in power.
6
 Furthermore, Carrington and Reginald Maudling, the 
two senior Conservative personalities dealing with Middle East issues in the shadow 
cabinet were very sympathetic towards the Palestinian position. The Conservative 
Party under the leadership of Heath and Thatcher was closer to the FCO line on the 
Arab-Israel conflict than was the Labour party, under Wilson and Callaghan.  
 
There was a belief in some Arab circles that a Conservative Government would have 
a fairer approach on Middle East questions than the Labour Party. This would have 
stemmed from displeasure over the close ties between Israeli leaders and the Labour 
Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. Historically, the Arabs had viewed the Labour Party 
as being closer to Israel than the Conservative party. They were particularly 
suspicious of the Wilson Governments of the 1960s and 1970s.
7
 Wilson had replaced 
Heath as Prime Minister in 1974, and helped to bring about a somewhat closer 
relationship between Britain and Israel. In particular, Wilson‘s readiness to meet 
with Israeli leaders in secret had helped to improve the atmosphere of bilateral ties.
8
 
The contrasting attitudes of Heath and Wilson towards Israel could be seen during 
the October War of 1973. Wilson had telephoned Heath to tell him that there were 
spare parts for Centurion tanks on the docks of Liverpool ready for despatch to 
Israel. Wilson requested that the spare parts be exempted from any arms restrictions 
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on Israel. Wilson‘s request merely convinced Heath to catch the Centurion spares 
and impose an embargo on Israel.9 
Kieran Prendergast who had served as a Private Secretary under Labour Foreign 
Secretary David Owen has noted the perceived differences between the Labour and 
Conservative Governments on policy towards Israel: 
As a general proposition, the appearance was always given going back to Alec 
Douglas Home and previous Labour Governments that Labour was more 
sensitive to Israeli concerns and more pro-Israel than Conservative 
Governments. Conservative Governments were more sensitive to Arab 
concerns and the potential for exports to the Arab world. The Harrogate speech 
of Alec Douglas Home was by a Conservative Government... Labour had 
much more of an Israeli-sympathetic hinterland than the Conservatives seemed 
to have.
10
  
 
Thatcher and the ‘Finchley Factor’ 
 
On 11 February 1975, Thatcher became the new leader of the Conservative Party. 
Thatcher‘s instinctive support for Israel was most clearly reflected through her 
position as President of the Finchley Anglo-Israel Friendship League. The FCO was 
particularly concerned that her involvement in the organization would harm Britain‘s 
relations with the Arab world. Lord Carrington, later to become Foreign Secretary 
during Thatcher‘s early years as Prime Minister, travelled abroad often in his 
capacity as a shadow minister. During a trip to Jordan in February 1975, Carrington 
asked for the advice of Britain‘s Ambassador to Jordan on Thatcher‘s role in the 
Anglo-Israel Friendship League. The Ambassador responded that such connections 
would damage British interests in the Arab world. It was suggested that Thatcher 
might sever her connection with the group and Carrington agreed with the 
Ambassador‘s advice. The FCO concern on this issue was best summed up by 
Michael Tait of the British Embassy in Amman, who wrote: ―it is presumably in the 
national interest to do what we can to counter Arab fears and suspicions that the 
leader of HM opposition is already a prisoner of the Zionists.‖11    
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There were a range of reasons for Thatcher‘s sympathies towards Israel. Her philo-
Semitic outlook would certainly have influenced her views on Israel. It has been 
claimed that her warm feelings towards Jews went back to the 1930s when she 
shared her childhood home with her sister‘s pen pal, Edith, an Austrian Jew who 
escaped the Nazis. Edith‘s experience would have strengthened Thatcher‘s 
identification with the plight of Jews.
12
 She had tremendous admiration for what she 
saw as traditional Jewish values such as family, responsibility and self-help.
13
 
Thatcher was a great admirer of the Chief Rabbi of Great Britain and the 
Commonwealth, Sir (later Lord) Immanuel Jakobovits, and shared his belief in self-
help and individual responsibility. There had been a remarkable number of Jews 
serving in the various Thatcher governments. It has been claimed that one of the 
reasons behind the appointment of the relatively large number of Jewish cabinet 
ministers was that they provided a much needed counterweight to the paternalistic 
Conservatives of the old school.
14
  
 
Thatcher viewed Israel as a democratic and Western place surrounded by countries 
that were not noticeably the same.
15 
Her daughter Carol had been a volunteer on a 
Kibbutz.
16
  Thatcher‘s admiration for Israel is expressed clearly in her memoirs: 
―The political and economic construction of Israel against huge odds and bitter 
adversaries is one of the heroic sagas of our age. They really made the desert 
bloom.‖17   There were even those in Israel‘s Foreign Ministry who believed that 
Thatcher‘s admiration for Israel was influenced by her own personality traits. 18  
 
Thatcher‘s Finchley constituency which she represented from 1959 to 1992 was also 
a factor in her pro-Israeli sympathies. When Thatcher first became the local MP in 
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1959, it was believed that about 20 per cent of the constituency was Jewish.
19
 The 
views of the local constituency on the Arab-Israel issue would not have gone 
unnoticed by Thatcher. Cyril Townsend, a former Chairman of the Council for the 
Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) and a leading Conservative 
MP during the Thatcher period believed that the Finchley constituency exerted a 
significant influence on her: 
Margaret Thatcher had the Finchley constituency which is a very strong 
Jewish constituency. I think, if anything, the Jewish community was over 
represented amongst the officers of the association. She was not strong on 
foreign affairs and defence when she started. Under Heath, she had been 
involved in transport and education. She didn‘t have a background in foreign 
affairs and defence. Understandably, she was much influenced by the views 
of the Conservative Association and her constituency in Finchley.
20
 
 
Nevertheless, Thatcher did not view the Arab-Israel conflict in black and white 
terms. While she was sympathetic to the State of Israel, she was from the generation 
that had lived through the mandate period. She was aware that the Arab-Israel 
conflict was a complex issue.
21
 Her hostile attitude towards Israeli leaders who had 
been involved in violence against the British during the mandate period was a 
reflection of this.  
 
Pro-Israeli groups expected Thatcher and her Conservative Party to support a 
position that was sympathetic to the Israeli Government.  However, Carrington and 
the Conservative Shadow Foreign Secretary, Reginald Maudling, adopted positions 
that brought them into occasional confrontation with the Jewish community. During 
Carrington‘s tour of the Middle East in February 1975, he met with PLO leader, 
Yasser Arafat, incurring considerable displeasure both in Israel and among 
Conservative supporters of the country. Michael Fidler, the Chairman of the 
Conservative Friends of Israel (CFI), wrote to Thatcher, arguing that the 
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Conservative Party would have to issue a clear statement of support for Israel 
following Carrington‘s visit to the Middle East which had caused ―local agitation‖.22   
 
More controversially, Maudling declared that Carrington had been ―absolutely right‖ 
to meet with Yasser Arafat during his Middle East tour, since the entire Arab world 
viewed the PLO as representatives of the Palestinian people.
23
 Maudling expanded 
on this theme on November 10, 1975 when he declared in the House of Commons 
that ―the PLO was a fact of international life that no one can ignore.‖  Maudling 
added that ―the Palestinians should have a country of their own‖ as part of an Arab-
Israeli agreement.
24
 In its time, this was a groundbreaking statement on the 
Palestinian question. This was the approach favoured by the FCO.   
 
Thatcher soon felt the impact of Maudling‘s statement as protests poured in from the 
local Jewish community.  Fidler wrote to Thatcher informing her that ―deep disquiet 
and concern has been expressed in all parts of the British Jewish community.‖ He 
warned her that the episode could cause harm to the Conservative Party by depriving 
it of Jewish support and called on her to issue a statement indicating that there was 
no change in Conservative policy towards Israel or recognition of the PLO.
25
 
Maudling realized that his statement had caused Thatcher some difficulties but he 
held firm. In a private letter to Thatcher, he wrote: ―I am sorry you are having 
trouble with your Jewish Community, but I am afraid that from time to time, this is 
unavoidable.‖ Maudling insisted in his letter that there was no change in 
Conservative policy and reiterated that ―the PLO were a major fact of life in the 
Middle East, and to ignore this would be foolish.‖26 Thus, at an early stage, it was 
clear that there were pressures on Thatcher from both sides: supporters of Israel 
within her constituency and in the wider Jewish community sought to persuade her 
to adopt policies that were favourable towards Israel. However, Thatcher also faced 
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pressure from senior politicians within the Conservative Party to show flexibility on 
the Palestinian question. Although Thatcher was instinctively sympathetic to the 
views she heard in her constituency, it was the position favoured by Maudling and 
Carrington which Thatcher eventually adopted.  
 
Thatcher Wins the Respect of the FCO 
 
During her years as leader of the opposition, there were some early indications that 
Thatcher was slowly winning the respect of some Arabists within the FCO. Thus, in 
the early months of 1976, Thatcher embarked on a tour of the Middle East which 
included visits to Syria and Israel. Thatcher‘s visits enhanced her reputation in the 
international affairs arena. Britain‘s Ambassador to Syria, David Roberts, reported 
that Thatcher had made a very positive impression on Syrian President Hafez 
Assad.
27
 Indeed, Assad had even invited her to his family home for a private dinner 
which she accepted. The British Ambassador described this as a ―signal honour‖ – 
the only previous recipient of such an invitation during his tour of duty was US 
President Richard Nixon. Roberts described her visit to Syria as ―a most useful prise 
de contact‖.28 It appeared that Thatcher‘s links to pro-Israeli organizations did not 
prevent her from establishing a rapport with Arab governments including the 
Baathist regime in Damascus. FCO mandarins would arguably have been impressed 
by the fact that the Conservative leader was adept at building strong ties with Arab 
leaders, irrespective of her sympathies for Israel. This would prove an asset for 
Thatcher in her relationship with the FCO. 
 
At a meeting of the Board of Deputies of British Jews in May 1978, Thatcher 
defended the British ban on arms sales to Israel in 1973: she claimed that since arms 
had also been denied to the Arab side, the 1973 embargo was not directed against 
Israel. Thatcher also praised Lord Home‘s Harrogate speech of 1970. An Israeli 
embassy official noted that Thatcher‘s responses had provided ―little 
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encouragement‖ to her audience.29 Thus, even before she had become Prime 
Minister, there were some indications that Thatcher was not going to deviate 
significantly from policies favoured by the FCO in the Arab-Israel arena.  
 
FCO Concerns over Callaghan Government Policy 
 
There was some unease expressed within the FCO over the position adopted by the 
Labour Government. James Callaghan who took over as Prime Minister from Harold 
Wilson in April 1976 established a friendly relationship with the new Likud 
Government in Israel. The FCO was increasingly concerned that Britain would face 
a backlash in the Arab world as one of the few countries within Europe to be taking 
Israel‘s side. These anxieties were exacerbated by the victory of Menachem Begin‘s 
Likud party in the Israeli general election of June 1977. The Likud victory had put an 
end to 29 years of Labour party domination in Israel. Begin had long been viewed as 
beyond the pale by the British Government for his record of violence against the 
British prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. As recently as 1976, Britain‘s 
Ambassador in Israel, Anthony Elliott, had advised against inviting Begin, as leader 
of Israel‘s opposition, to a dinner at the British Embassy during Thatcher‘s visit to 
Israel, in view of his ―notorious anti-British activities.‖30 Begin was also known for 
his strong ideological attachment to a Greater Israel encompassing the lands of Judea 
and Samaria or the West Bank and Gaza, which Israel had captured in the 1967 War. 
Although previous Labour governments in Israel had approved settlement building 
on the West Bank, the new Likud Government was far more uncompromising over 
the possibility of territorial concessions in the West Bank.
31
  
 
There were concerns in the FCO that the Callaghan Government‘s close relationship 
with Israel would harm British interests. Willie Morris, Britain‘s Ambassador in 
Cairo, argued that London should avoid encouraging Arab suspicions that Britain 
was Israel‘s leading advocate within the European Community. These suspicions had 
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been roused by statements that Begin had made about his recent visit to London.32 
Ephraim Evron, the Director General of Israel‘s Foreign Ministry had told Britain‘s 
Ambassador to Israel, John Mason, that it would be difficult to over-estimate the 
value which Begin placed on his friendship with Prime Minister Callaghan, whom he 
viewed as a trusted friend.33 Morris was concerned that Britain had tied itself too 
closely to the United States in promoting the Camp David Accords. Only the Danes 
and the Dutch had supported Britain‘s role within the EEC, while the French and 
Germans were hostile.34  
 
David Owen, Foreign Secretary under Callaghan, was opposed to what he viewed as 
the Arabist orientation of the FCO and its overly strong commitment to the European 
Community. He believed that the institution had for too long been hobbled by a 
penchant for appeasement. Indeed, he has claimed that the FCO‘s ―tendency towards 
appeasement‖ was on occasions prevalent within the institution between the 1920s 
and 1980s. 
35
 Owen also had little patience for the FCO hierarchy which he felt was 
too rigid and conservative. As a result, he was very unpopular within the office he 
served.
36
 Owen felt strongly that it was the duty of the Foreign Secretary to counter 
the institutional prejudices and attitudes of his or her office in order to shape foreign 
policy.
37
 Owen sought to counter the FCO on the Arab-Israel issue by promoting 
Britain‘s cooperation with the United States in the Middle East at the expense of its 
coordination with Europe, while also building closer ties with the Begin 
Government. Arguably, this enabled Britain to exert greater clout than other 
European countries in the Arab-Israel arena, through its role as a junior partner to the 
United States in the diplomatic efforts with the Israelis and the Egyptians.
38
 His 
decision to overrule the FCO in inviting Begin to London and his determination to 
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resist French and German hostility to the Camp David Accords
39
 was a perfect 
illustration of his readiness to counter the predispositions of his office.  
 
The Labour governments of the 1970s posed difficulties for some Middle East 
specialists within the FCO. The Arabs were suspicious of Wilson‘s links with the 
Israeli Government.
40
 There was also some unease over Callaghan‘s advocacy for 
the Begin Government and his role in the Camp David process. Arabists did not like 
the Camp David Accords since they felt that they were sowing division in the Arab 
world, while pushing away the prospects of a comprehensive settlement in the 
Middle East.
41
 It was feared that Britain could be exposed to an Arab backlash over 
the Callaghan Government‘s support for Begin.42 The situation was hardly helped by 
the fact that the Foreign Secretary himself was openly hostile to FCO attitudes 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.  These concerns swiftly evaporated after the 
Thatcher Government came to power.   
 
Israeli Concerns over a Future Conservative Government 
 
In turn, there were concerns within Israel‘s Foreign Ministry over a future 
Conservative Government. In a paper written ahead of Britain‘s General Election of 
1979, it was noted that that the Middle East policies of previous Conservative 
governments had generally been worse from Israel‘s perspective than those of 
Labour governments.
43
 In the wake of the Conservative Party‘s election victory of 
1979, a note of caution was sounded within Israel‘s Government. The most revealing 
and prescient perspective was that of Yoav Biran, a Minister serving in the Israeli 
Embassy in London. He maintained that while Labour support for Israel had been 
based upon an emotional dimension, positive sentiment towards Israel among 
Conservatives, including Margaret Thatcher, was more rational in nature, and based 
upon a strategic perspective influenced by hostility to the Soviet Union. The 
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disadvantage was that a rational view could be changed more easily in line with 
reassessments of self-interest. Biran warned that the new Conservative Government 
would be subject to greater pressures from politicians with economic interests (such 
as Carrington) which could influence Middle East policy. He also maintained that 
professionals within the FCO would be able to exert greater influence under a 
Conservative Government since the Conservative political class and FCO mandarins 
shared a common Oxbridge background. Biran concluded that while Arabists had 
been restrained, on occasion, under Callaghan, it was likely that they would now 
have a greater say over the shaping of policy.
44
  
 
Biran‘s paper reflected the suspicions within Israel‘s Foreign Ministry regarding the 
Middle East policy of a future Conservative Government and the likely influence of 
the FCO over this Government. While Thatcher was certainly viewed as a friend, 
there were concerns that pro-Arab sympathies within the Conservative Party and the 
FCO would tip the balance away from support for Israel. However, according to 
another Foreign Ministry view, the anti-Soviet position of Thatcher and the 
convergence of interests between Britain and Israel on policy towards the Soviet 
Union were likely to serve as a counterweight to anti-Israel trends within British 
policy.45 
 
 The Israelis were not alone in believing that the Callaghan and Wilson Governments 
had been more sympathetic towards them than previous Conservative governments. 
In a discussion with Thatcher after she had become Prime Minister, French President 
Giscard D‘Estaing had told her that he had been surprised by the extent of support 
which the Labour Government had given Israel. He could understand the emotional 
reasons for this since they were applicable to France as well - it had the largest 
Jewish community in Western Europe. However, Giscard added, one had to be 
realistic about the situation. He remarked to Thatcher that ―it was impossible for 
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Israel to keep the Occupied Territories and their attempts to do so were an 
embarrassment for everybody.‖46     
 
The Appointment of Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary 
 
The appointment of Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary was to carry great 
significance for Thatcher‘s foreign policy during her first term of office in general, 
and for her policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict specifically. Carrington had 
coveted the role of Foreign Secretary for much of his life and was delighted to be 
offered the position.
47
 Coker argues that Thatcher allowed both the FCO and the 
conduct of British foreign policy to continue largely as before. He maintains that on 
entering 10 Downing Street, Thatcher sought to focus on running domestic policy 
and was not interested in diplomacy. As a result, Thatcher had to ―defer to the 
FCO.‖48  Carrington‘s appointment was significant for a number of reasons. On 
entering 10 Downing Street, Thatcher knew that she lacked experience in certain 
areas of foreign affairs and came to depend on Carrington who was a veteran in the 
field.
49
  Indeed, the new Foreign Secretary viewed Thatcher‘s inexperience as ―quite 
useful‖, providing him with an opportunity to take the lead in the realm of 
international affairs.
50
 Carrington was also able to enhance his influence in foreign 
affairs by restricting his involvement in domestic issues.
51
 Thus, as Coker points out, 
in the early years of the Thatcher Government, the FCO was very much in control of 
British foreign policy by virtue of the role of Foreign Secretary Carrington.‖ 52  
 
Although Thatcher had substantial disagreements with Carrington over numerous 
issues, including the Arab-Israel conflict and Rhodesia, she admired and respected 
him. Notwithstanding her well-known suspicion of the FCO, she did not have the 
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capacity or confidence in the first term to make the changes there that she made 
elsewhere in government. Hence, Carrington with his great experience in 
international affairs was an appropriate choice as Foreign Secretary.
53
 Not only was 
Carrington very knowledgeable in his field. He also knew how to win over the Prime 
Minister, and was not averse to flattery and flirtation as a means to gain support for 
his positions. As a result, Thatcher was content to let Carrington make the running in 
the field of foreign affairs. 
54
 
 
The appointment of Carrington was particularly significant in relation to the 
Thatcher Government‘s Middle East policy. Carrington viewed the Arab-Israeli 
dispute as an issue of the highest priority, and was concerned by the dangers of 
renewed conflict in the region which could drag in other powers.
55
 Carrington had 
direct access to the Prime Minister and would hold a weekly seminar with her. They 
would frequently discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict.
56
  Carrington believed that the 
Palestinians had suffered an injustice, as a result of the establishment of the State of 
Israel. He believed that the Palestinians had ―a strong case‖ and had some 
understanding for the oft repeated Arab claim that the European expiation of guilt 
over centuries of anti-Semitism was obtained through the creation of the State of 
Israel which had occurred at the expense of the Arabs.
57
 As Defence Secretary in the 
Heath Government, Carrington had declined to send spare parts to Israel during the 
1973 War
58
 which did not make him popular among the local Jewish community or 
the Israeli Government.
59
 Israel‘s Ambassador to London had noted in February 
1979 (before the Conservative Party election victory) that Carrington ―was not a 
friend of Israel‖, and claimed that his pro-Arab leanings were influenced by his links 
to numerous British companies which had business interests in the Arab world.
60
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Friends of Israel within the Conservative Party were dismayed that Carrington had 
chosen Gilmour as his deputy in the House of Commons.
61
 Gilmour was known for 
his strong pro-Palestinian sympathies and was a trenchant critic of Israel. He had 
once written that ―political Zionism [was] founded on a myth similar to Hitler‘s 
Aryan nonsense.‖62 Carrington was very close to Gilmour and was saddened when 
his deputy had to resign in September 1981, following his recurrent dissent against 
the Prime Minister.
63
 Gilmour had little influence within the Conservative Party and 
his views on the Arab-Israel issue were considered extreme even by Carrington.
64
 
However, the fact that Gilmour had been appointed Deputy Foreign Secretary 
signified that Thatcher was not beholden to pro-Israeli supporters within her party. 
The fact that she had appointed a man with strong pro-Palestinian views to such a 
sensitive post suggested that she was more open-minded than many had supposed on 
the Israeli-Arab conflict.    
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Begin’s Visit to London 
 
The visit of Begin to London on 23 May, barely two weeks after the Conservative 
Party‘s election victory, provided early evidence that Thatcher shared the FCO‘s 
hostility towards Likud Government policy. Thatcher hosted a lunch for the Israeli 
Prime Minister, and was accompanied by her Foreign Secretary, among others. 
Thatcher wasted little time in emphasizing the importance of helping Egypt‘s 
President Anwar Sadat by making it clear that the Peace Treaty with Egypt was only 
a first step. She expressed her strong support for a comprehensive peace settlement, 
maintaining that this was both in the interest of Israel and the West as a whole. 
Thatcher said to Begin that Israel and the United Kingdom were both small countries 
of which higher standards were expected than of others. Thatcher added that the 
concern for a peace settlement stemmed from a determination to counter the Soviets 
who had thrived on conflict.
65
 Thatcher‘s remarks to Begin appeared to indicate that 
her overriding concern in the Middle East was to prevent the Soviets consolidating 
their influence. The British leader added that in the wake of the revolution in Iran, 
she was now worried about the stability of the entire region, emphasizing that the 
Russians were ―the biggest threat‖ in the Middle East: 
 
...What we are worried about is that the whole thing could blow up again and 
you would be in the centre of it. We all face the threat and the tyranny of the 
Soviet Union. I am concerned that the next stage be genuine consolidation of 
the peace process.  Therefore, we ask you to bear in mind Sadat‘s 
difficulties.
66
 
 
Nevertheless, Begin would give little ground. He stated that Israel would grant full 
autonomy to the Palestinians in the election of their representatives, but could never 
agree to the establishment of a Palestinian State. Carrington argued that the kind of 
autonomy envisaged by Begin would not work. Thatcher, in turn, asserted that she 
had never heard of political autonomy without sovereignty. Begin then stated that the 
West Bank Arabs could be offered a choice of Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. In the 
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event that the Arabs chose Israeli citizenship, they could vote to the Knesset.  
Thatcher pointed out that the Arabs would have a majority if the inhabitants of the 
West Bank were able to vote in the Knesset.
67
 She suggested to Begin that the Jews 
in Israel were facing a demographic threat and were likely to find themselves 
―outnumbered‖. Begin responded that there was no danger of being outnumbered 
since Israel was ―a country of immigration.‖ 68  
 
Carrington and Begin clashed on several occasions on the question of settlements. 
The British Foreign Secretary expressed his concerns over the growth of settlements 
which the UK viewed as an obstacle during negotiations. Begin responded that 
settlements had been approved by Israel‘s Supreme Court and were in accordance 
with international law. Faced with repeated criticism on the issue by Carrington, 
Begin retorted that he was aware that the Lord Privy Seal had criticized settlements 
in parliament but he would obey the Israel Supreme Court judges on the issue and 
not the Lord Privy Seal. The Israeli Prime Minister argued that settlements provided 
Israel with security. 
69
 
 
During the meeting, Thatcher had made several references to her Finchley 
constituency. She told Begin that her constituency was twinned with the Israeli 
municipality of Ramat Gan. At one point, she said to Begin, ―I want you to know 
that from my own constituency, they all go to fight for Israel!‖ Thatcher was trying 
to reassure the Israeli Prime Minister and added, ―We only think of the good of 
Israel. We are friends.‖70 Begin, however, was in combative mood.  He turned to the 
British leader and remarked that the allies had been asked to bomb the railway lines 
leading to the death camps during the Second World War. Yet nothing had been 
done.  Begin asserted that the Jews could only rely on themselves to survive, and 
Israel‘s views on security had to be judged against that background. Thatcher‘s 
response was forthright: 
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I must tell you that if I had then been Prime Minister, I am not certain what 
decision would have been made. The supreme goal then was to mobilise the 
total war effort in order to destroy as quickly as possible Hitler‘s war 
machine. I would not, I think, have agreed to any diversion from that 
supreme goal.
71
  
 
Thatcher had been unsympathetic towards Begin because of his record of violence 
during the British Mandate.
72
 Nevertheless, Thatcher‘s meeting with Begin was 
particularly significant in relation to her own position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The encounter instilled in her a strong distaste for the policies of the Likud Party.  
Shortly afterwards, the Prime Minister would tell Egyptian Vice-President Hussni 
Mubarak that her meeting with Begin was one of the most difficult she had 
experienced.
73
 Thatcher was particularly concerned about his attitudes towards the 
West Bank. In a letter to the FCO from the Prime Minister‘s Private Secretary, it was 
disclosed that Thatcher feared that "Mr Begin‘s attitude could kill the whole process 
of the search for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.‖74  
 
During her meeting with President Giscard D‘Estaing, a few months later, Thatcher 
had agreed entirely with her French counterpart that Begin‘s approach had been 
―fanatical and unrealistic.‖ Thatcher told Giscard that Begin‘s policies were making 
life difficult for President Sadat. Indeed, in her opinion, Sadat had been too generous 
towards Begin. The Prime Minister lamented the fact that all Britain‘s efforts to 
convince Begin to stop his ―absurd‖ settlement building policy in the West Bank had 
come to nothing.
75
  
 
David Wolfson, Thatcher‘s Chief of Staff, revealed to Israeli diplomat Yoav Biran, 
that the British were very disappointed with the discussion between Thatcher and 
Begin. The Israeli leader lectured his hosts on ―the facts of life‖, and would not 
                                                          
71
 Ibid. 
72  
Interview with Lord Hurd, 30 April 2009 
73
 TNA/FCO 93/1683, Discussion between M Thatcher and H Mubarak, 15 June 1979 
74
 TNA/FCO 93/1683, Letter from B Cartledge to P Lever, FCO, 23 May 1979 
75
 TNA/FCO 93/2061, Discussion between M Thatcher and President Giscard, 21 November 1979 
68 
 
allow a dialogue to take place. Wolfson added that the Prime Minister‘s basic 
support for Israel remained. Nevertheless, he could not conceal that there was no 
rapport between her and Begin. Furthermore, Thatcher and Carrington both rejected 
the Israeli perspective on the West Bank and Gaza. Wolfson sought to reassure Biran 
that there was nothing to fear from the new political constellation dealing with 
foreign policy or indeed the growing influence of the Arabists in the FCO. Wolfson 
made it clear that Carrington set the tone in the FCO, and had the trust of his Prime 
Minister. Wolfson stated that Carrington was not unfriendly towards Israel even if 
there were disagreements, and it would be worthwhile to enhance contacts with 
him.
76
 
  
Israeli diplomat Avraham Milo was warned by Charles Powell, the Deputy Head of 
the Near East and North Africa Department of the FCO (NENAD)  that within the 
Conservative Government, ―emotions [were] running high‖ against Israel. The 
Conservatives had a significant reserve of goodwill towards Israel, but they were fast 
becoming disappointed with the Likud Government position. Milo asked if Powell 
was referring to Ian Gilmour. Powell responded that he was referring, first and 
foremost, to the Prime Minister. Thatcher‘s disappointment had grown following her 
meeting with Begin. She was further dismayed by   his authorization of construction 
in the new settlement of Eilon Moreh, as well as the reports of Israeli plans to 
establish two additional settlements. Powell claimed that he had previously enjoyed 
a reasonably free hand in providing assessments and instructions that were 
sympathetic towards Israel. However, Powell warned, events were now ―spinning 
out of [his] control.‖ He advised his Israeli interlocutor to pay attention to the 
prevailing mood of the British Government.
77
 
 
Prior to the Prime Minister‘s meeting with Begin, she had met with the US Secretary 
of State, Cyrus Vance, accompanied by Carrington and Gilmour. Thatcher asked 
Vance for advice on the position she should take during her meeting with the Israeli 
Prime Minister. Vance stated that an emphasis should be placed on a settlement 
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freeze in the West Bank. Thatcher responded that this was ―a very modest 
requirement.‖ She believed that Begin‘s view of a Greater Israel was ―illogical‖, and 
asserted that those who claimed sovereignty over land that had been acquired 
through hostilities would have ―no leg to stand on‖ when that land was regained 
through the same means.
78
 Later on, following a discussion she held with Jordan‘s 
King Hussein who had expressed his support for Palestinian self-determination, 
Thatcher had indicated that she would ask President Carter to exert pressure on 
Begin to accept the principle of Palestinian sovereignty for the West Bank.
79
 
Thatcher‘s anger and frustration over the Likud settlement policy would arguably 
have been a significant factor in the growing detachment of the British Government 
from Begin‘s Israel. 
  
Thatcher‘s strong desire to see a peace settlement between Israel and her Arab 
neighbours was in line with her strategic view of the possible threats to Western 
interests in the Middle East. She feared that the absence of a peace settlement would 
create growing instability in the region which would be exploited by the Soviet 
Union. These concerns over Soviet actions were exacerbated by the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in late 1979. The Prime Minister would later write in her memoirs 
that ―detente had been ruthlessly used by the Soviets to exploit western weakness 
and disarray. I knew the beast.‖80 Thatcher was concerned that the Soviets would 
exploit such weaknesses in the Middle East. During the 1980s, as in earlier decades, 
the FCO viewed the containment of Soviet ambitions in the Middle East as a British 
interest.
81
 However, during this period, there were still divergences between Number 
Ten and the FCO over how to achieve such a peace settlement.  
 
                                                          
78
 TNA/FCO 93/1683,  Discussion between M Thatcher and C Vance, 23 May 1979 
79
 TNA/FCO 93/2061,  Letter from G Walden to B Alexander, 23 September 1979 
80
 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years,  p.87 
81
 Hollis, Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 Era, p.24 
70 
 
The Role of the FCO 
  
Israel‘s outgoing Ambassador to London, Avraham Kidron, cabled Jerusalem 
following a meeting with Thatcher. Kidron noted that while Thatcher had been very 
friendly, he left the meeting with a sense of disappointment. He expressed concerns 
over a number of issues during the meeting, including his unease that Britain was 
falling into line with the French position. Thatcher was unresponsive. Kidron sensed 
that she wished to avoid any commitments which would undermine her Foreign 
Secretary.
82
 His comments betrayed an Israeli concern that Thatcher was working in 
close coordination with Carrington and the FCO. Arguably, Kidron‘s unease would 
have been exacerbated by a meeting he held with Callaghan.  The former Labour 
Prime Minister had remarked to Kidron that he feared that Carrington would be 
―very independent‖, adding that the FCO staff ―would not be helpful to you.‖ 83 
   
While Thatcher was clearly hostile towards Begin from the very outset, this did not 
mean that she was in full agreement with new FCO initiatives on the Arab-Israel 
conflict. Within three months of Thatcher taking office, the FCO and its ministers 
were working intensively behind the scenes to advance a significant shift in British 
policy towards the Palestinians. Roger Tomkys, the Head of NENAD, sent a minute 
to Douglas Hurd, claiming that a confrontation with Israel was inevitable as a result 
of the new British position on Palestinian self-determination. Tomkys added that the 
Prime Minister‘s meeting with Begin may have prepared the ground for a row with 
the Israelis.
84
  Yet, at this stage, the Prime Minister was opposed to the idea of self-
determination for the Palestinians.
85
  The one thing which did unite Thatcher and the 
FCO, however, was their opposition to Begin and his settlement policies.  
 
Anthony Parsons was an important player in the policy process. Parsons had been 
appointed as Deputy Under-Secretary for the Middle East under the Callaghan 
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Government. Parsons wrote to Hurd that it was in the British national interest to have 
a firm position on the issue of Palestinian self-determination. Parsons believed that 
Britain had benefited from Home‘s Harrogate address of 1970 in terms of its 
relations with the Arabs. The Israelis might have been annoyed by the Harrogate 
address, but British oil supplies were left unscathed during the 1973 crisis. Parsons 
maintained that Britain had to put forward a more sympathetic policy on the 
Palestinian question. This would serve as ―a valuable insurance of [British] interests 
against a worsening of the general situation.‖  He passionately argued that the 
Palestinian right to self-determination was stronger than that of many Arab states 
which had already won independence.
86
   
 
Hurd strongly approved of Parsons‘s minute. He wrote to Carrington that the 
Palestinians had a very strong case, and there would not be peace in the region until 
it was recognized. He was concerned that Britain was being ―outmanoeuvred‖ by the 
French, as well as the Germans and Italians, to the detriment of its political and 
commercial interests in the Arab world. Britain had to vote in favour of a 
forthcoming UN Resolution on Palestinian self-determination if the other Europeans 
did. A common European position on the Middle East would provide greater 
effectiveness, give Britain cover and even help to ―rein back‖ the French. Hurd noted 
that the change of position might upset Jewish opinion in the UK, but it was 
important to distinguish between those views and general public opinion. He added 
that Israel used to be seen as an underdog whose existence was threatened, but this 
was no longer the case. Nevertheless, Hurd emphasized, it was very important to 
ensure that the shift of position was not perceived in terms of ―panic over oil 
supplies.‖87  Hurd‘s comments suggested that British policymakers were not overly 
concerned about pressure from Israel‘s supporters in the UK. Moreover, it appeared 
that British public opinion was gradually becoming less supportive of Israel. In such 
an environment, it would be easier to advance a policy shift on the Palestinian 
question.   
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Carrington pointed out that international opinion supported Palestinian self-
determination, and that Britain risked isolation within Europe and the UN if it 
opposed it. Carrington sought Thatcher‘s consent for a vote in favour of a 
moderately worded resolution supporting Palestinian self-determination. Cartledge 
had written to the FCO indicating that Thatcher was content to give Carrington ―a 
free hand‖ in the forthcoming UN Security Council debate and vote on Palestinian 
self-determination.
88
 The freedom granted to Carrington by Thatcher was a reflection 
of the considerable influence which the FCO had over policy towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Indeed, Thatcher had yet to put her personal stamp on foreign policy, 
and this enabled Whitehall to have a considerable influence in this sphere.  
 
Nevertheless, Thatcher was sceptical regarding many of the arguments put forward 
by the FCO. While she agreed with Parsons‘s line of reasoning that the Palestinians 
had at least as much right as other Arab States to be treated as a ―people‖, she 
believed that this could not be the only factor behind a UK vote on self-
determination. Thatcher expressed concern that the oil-producing states could fall 
under direct or indirect Soviet influence. In such a scenario, the Prime Minister 
believed that only Israel could be expected to confront the extension of communist 
influence. Furthermore, in the event of an East/West confrontation in the region, 
Thatcher believed that Israel would be the West‘s only ally. While Thatcher 
acknowledged that such a scenario appeared farfetched, she noted that the same 
could have been said about recent developments in Iran. Thus, at this early stage in 
her premiership, Thatcher viewed Israel as a strategic asset in the struggle against the 
Soviets.  The Prime Minister also doubted whether the practicalities and implications 
of a ―Palestinian homeland‖ had been thought through.89  
 
In view of Thatcher‘s scepticism regarding the FCO position on Palestinian self-
determination, it was all the more surprising that she gave Carrington a free hand on 
the issue. Her willingness to do so was a reflection of her trust in the Foreign 
Secretary. A second factor, arguably, was her attitude towards Begin. Cartledge 
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pointed out in a letter to Carrington‘s Private Secretary that Thatcher believed that 
the main problem with Israel at present was Begin himself. She believed that his 
departure would significantly change the situation in the Middle East and Britain‘s 
approach to it.
90
 However, Begin was not about to relinquish power.  It is likely that 
Thatcher‘s readiness to support Israel‘s position and rein in the FCO was 
compromised by her antipathy towards Begin and his policies. Indeed, Thatcher‘s 
growing impatience with Begin would have been an important element in her later 
change of heart over the FCO policy on the Palestinian question. 
   
The Israelis became very concerned about the changes in Britain‘s position on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Biran met with Wolfson to discuss the shift in Britain‘s policy. 
Wolfson maintained that the Thatcher Government believed that Israel was being 
―intransigent and impossible.‖ Wolfson added that it had reservations about the 
Camp David autonomy plan. He expressed his readiness to bring Israel‘s concerns to 
the attention of the Prime Minister. However, he added that the British 
Government‘s current focus on the Rhodesia issue and Thatcher‘s tendency to rely 
on Carrington in the foreign affairs sphere meant that she was unlikely to take an 
independent position on the issue.
91
 Thus, it was clear that even if Thatcher had 
doubts at this stage about Palestinian self-determination, she was not prepared to 
confront the FCO on the issue.   
 
Thatcher‘s readiness to allow her Foreign Secretary to take the initiative in foreign 
policy was not insignificant. Powell has stated that she greatly distrusted the FCO as 
an institution, believing that it was too accommodating to the views, perspectives 
and interests of foreigners, as opposed to British interests.
92
 Thatcher has 
emphasized in her memoirs that the FCO viewed compromise and negotiations as 
―ends in themselves.‖ 93 Campbell claims that Thatcher had a deep distrust of the 
Civil Service as a whole, based upon her experiences of the departments of 
education, science and pensions. She believed that Whitehall had a defeatist ethos, 
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viewing this as one of the causes of Britain‘s decline.94 Nevertheless, these 
arguments overlook the fact that Thatcher was ready to embrace compromise in 
some areas of foreign policy: the Arab-Israel conflict is one clear example of this. 
Thus, Thatcher‘s tendency to distance herself from the FCO‘s Middle East policy95 
was arguably designed to enhance her reputation as a woman of principle. However, 
as this thesis makes clear, Thatcher‘s position on the Arab-Israeli question became 
closely aligned with that of the FCO.  
   
Carrington, in contrast, was openly supportive of the FCO as an institution and had 
only the greatest respect for its staff. It is therefore not surprising that he was very 
popular in the Office, and was particularly welcome after the bruising experiences 
with David Owen.
96
  Cosgrave points out that while Carrington served as Foreign 
Secretary, there is barely a single instance of him taking a position at odds with the 
FCO bureaucracy.
97
  As a result, in spite of the Prime Minister‘s attitude, the 
relationship between 10 Downing Street and the FCO was a relatively harmonious 
one during Carrington‘s service as Foreign Secretary. 98  
 
The Israeli Government and its supporters in Britain were exerting efforts to try and 
counter the influence of the FCO on policy. Following the general election of 1979, 
twenty-four MPs had joined the CFI. There were now 128 MPs in the organization, 
as well as 21 peers.
99
 The Deputy Prime Minister, William Whitelaw, a member of 
the CFI, had been viewed by the Israeli Embassy in London as a reliable friend who 
could intercede on their behalf.
100
 Nevertheless, in a dispatch to Jerusalem, Biran 
maintained that there could be no illusions that public pressure would change 
government policy. He pointed out that the Conservative Government had a stable 
majority in parliament, and no ―lobby‖ or public pressure would lead to a change in 
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policy. However, he added that public pressure had an accumulating ―nuisance 
value‖ which could result in a certain degree of sensitivity and caution on the part of 
the Thatcher Government.
101
 Although the Conservative Government could not 
ignore such domestic influences, the impact they had on Middle East policy was 
negligible. 
  
In contrast to her predecessor Callaghan, Thatcher was very dissatisfied with Begin‘s 
autonomy plan for the Palestinians. She was fiercely opposed to the building of 
Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, and viewed the Likud Prime Minister 
as a fanatic. This alone was a positive development for those FCO officials who had 
fretted over Callaghan‘s close relationship with Begin.  It signified that the new 
Prime Minister could be persuaded to adopt the policy shift being formulated in the 
FCO.   
 
Thatcher’s Initial Scepticism over FCO Policy 
  
By September 1979, clear differences had emerged between Thatcher and Carrington 
over both the PLO and Palestinian self-determination. In the wake of the intensive 
activity in the FCO on the Palestinian question, Carrington had sent the Prime 
Minister a minute in which he argued that Britain would be better placed to help 
bring about a Middle East settlement if it supported the principle of Palestinian self-
determination and closer contacts with the PLO. He added that such a policy would 
bring Britain into line with its other European partners such as France and Germany, 
it would protect British economic interests in the Arab world while enabling London 
to provide more effective support to Washington.  Furthermore, a British policy of 
this kind would help the position of moderate Palestinians and the conservative Arab 
regimes where growing anger with US policy was causing regional instability.
102
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The Prime Minister‘s Private Secretary wrote to Carrington‘s office, stating that 
Thatcher was ―deeply opposed‖ to Carrington‘s minute. In particular, she was 
unhappy about upgrading contacts with the PLO.
103
 In a private conversation with 
the French President, Thatcher expressed a reluctance to recognize the PLO.  She 
stated that recognition of the PLO would have to be accompanied by the 
organization‘s acceptance of Israel‘s right to exist.104  Thatcher also believed that a 
solution based on Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza was not 
viable, and continued to express doubts about a Palestinian ―homeland‖.105 The 
Permanent Under-Secretary of the FCO, Michael Palliser, expressed his concern that 
Thatcher‘s position would damage British interests in the Arab world.106  
 
During the autumn of 1979, with the possible exception of the Rhodesia question, 
Thatcher was relatively uninvolved in foreign policy issues. Moreover, the Prime 
Minister had not yet established a strong policy unit in 10 Downing Street. Thatcher 
had yet to acquire an imperious leadership style. Interestingly, though, it was during 
this period that Thatcher appeared to be most resistant to the FCO line on the 
Palestinian question.   
 
Areas of Cooperation between the FCO and Downing Street 
 
Thus, during her first six months in power, Thatcher was resisting FCO efforts to 
bring about a comprehensive shift in position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. There 
were disagreements between 10 Downing Street and the FCO on the issues of 
Palestinian self-determination and the PLO. Nevertheless, there were other areas of 
policy in which cooperation was evident. Thatcher had shown a readiness to 
cooperate on the issue of a new Security Council resolution. In the course of a 
meeting in July 1979 at 10 Downing Street with the UN Secretary General, Dr. Kurt 
Waldheim, Parsons proposed a new Security Council resolution which would 
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formally enshrine Palestinian rights. This had to be done in such a way that the 
Americans would not oppose it. Thatcher supported the initiative, but pointed out 
that it would be difficult to secure Begin‘s agreement. 107  
 
There was also some cooperation between Thatcher and the FCO in the nuclear 
sphere. In the FCO, it was noted that Britain had never made an effort ―to attract 
Israel to the NPT.‖ However, the ratification of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty 
provided a good opportunity for taking action. While it was felt that the chances of 
success were low, NENAD agreed that an approach should be made to Israel.
108
 The 
opportunity arose to take action following a letter from Begin to the Prime Minister 
in which he warned of the dangers of nuclear cooperation between Libya‘s 
Muammar Gaddafi and Pakistan.
109
 Thatcher responded that Britain shared Israel‘s 
concern about Pakistan‘s plans to acquire nuclear weapons. However, she added that 
Israel could do her part to stop the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. 
The developments in Pakistan and the threat of an arms race strengthened the need 
for Israel to take action to reach a political settlement with her neighbours. In turn, 
Thatcher concluded, Israel and other states in the region should also adhere to the 
NPT.
110
   
 
On issues such as the sale of North Sea oil and the Arab Boycott, Thatcher and the 
Whitehall bureaucracy were also in full agreement. The boycott extended to third 
party suppliers, and demanded that the companies concerned should not have 
investments or partnership agreements in Israel, and that firms should not include 
Israeli components in exports. The Israeli Government was unhappy about the 
FCO‘s readiness to authenticate undertakings that companies gave to their Arab 
clients. The FCO‘s participation in the process suggested that it was an active 
accomplice in the boycott.
111
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Following various approaches from Israeli officials in 1976 and 1977, Begin had 
raised the issue of the sale of North Sea oil to Israel during a meeting with Callaghan 
on 4 December 1977. Begin had requested half a million tonnes of oil per annum. 
Callaghan made no commitments but offered to review the situation once Britain 
was self-sufficient.
112
 The FCO was firmly opposed to the supply of oil to Israel out 
of concern for Britain‘s relations with leading Arab countries.113 Israel‘s Energy 
Minister, Yitzhak Moda‘i, met with Hurd in December 1979. Hurd was asked how 
he expected Britain to exert influence over Israel if it could not help the country with 
oil supplies during her time of need. Begin also called on Hurd to ask Thatcher if she 
could help Israel with oil supplies. Hurd undertook to do so without holding out any 
hope of a positive reply.
114
 The Israelis compared the polite but cold approach of 
Hurd on the issue to the sympathetic attitude adopted by the Labour Party‘s James 
Callaghan and Tony Benn.
115
 
 
During a meeting with a delegation of the Board of Deputies, Thatcher was asked 
about the sale of North Sea oil to Israel. The Prime Minister responded that North 
Sea oil production was ―committed‖ in the coming period, and that half of exports 
were going to Europe. The Board of Deputies delegation also expressed 
disappointment over the Thatcher Government‘s approach to the authentication of 
documents required under the Arab boycott.
116
 The Board had asked the Thatcher 
Government to disassociate itself from the authentication process. The Prime 
Minister said to the delegation that she could not promise any movement on the 
matter.
117
 Thatcher added that it was essential to give consideration to British 
economic interests.
118
 Thatcher ultimately was a realist who attached great 
importance to Britain‘s political and commercial interests in the Arab world.119 It 
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was therefore not surprising that Thatcher agreed with Whitehall policy in this realm, 
even at this early stage.    
 
The Board had also asked Thatcher about the Government‘s attitude towards the 
PLO. While accepting the organization‘s links with terror, Thatcher would not rule 
out dealings with the PLO. Thatcher stated that ―she had an intellectual problem‖ 
when she spoke of no recognition of the PLO. She implied that her own position on 
terrorism was inconsistent since she was talking to terrorists in Rhodesia in a bid to 
achieve peace. Thatcher told the delegation that she might one day have to deal with 
the PLO for the same reason. The Prime Minister also appeared to believe that King 
Hussein was having a moderating influence on Arafat.
120
 The delegation left the 
meeting in a mood of disillusionment.
121
 
  
Thus, during Thatcher‘s early months in office, she conducted an ambivalent policy 
on the Arab-Israel question. On the one hand, she was unhappy about the swift 
movement of the FCO on Palestinian self-determination and the PLO. Thatcher‘s 
opposition to Palestinian self-determination was linked to her concern that it would 
enable the Soviets to expand their influence in the region. She also had doubts about 
the viability of a Palestinian homeland. 
122
 On the other hand, she had been very 
critical of Begin‘s autonomy plan for the Palestinians since it ruled out Palestinian 
sovereignty over the West Bank.
123
  Furthermore, Thatcher oversaw a gradual 
cooling of ties with the Likud Government. 
 
Paradoxically, it was during Thatcher‘s early months in power, when she was 
relatively inexperienced in foreign affairs and without the backing of a strong foreign 
policy unit, that she appeared to show the strongest resistance to the FCO policy on 
the Palestinian question. This may have been due partly to an unwillingness to 
offend friends of Israel within her constituency and beyond it, at an early stage in her 
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premiership. Nevertheless, there is also clear evidence to show that her opposition to 
Palestinian self-determination was linked to her view of Israel as an asset in the 
struggle against the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.
124
 In the wake of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, however, there was concern that a 
failure to obtain an Arab-Israeli peace settlement would result in a growing threat to 
Western interests in the region. It was in this context that the Thatcher Government 
eventually supported a policy shift on the Palestinian question. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 A British Policy Shift on the Palestinian Question 
 
Thatcher‘s wholehearted support for the British policy shift on the Palestinian 
question, contained within the EEC Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980, represented 
a triumph of pragmatism over principle. Thatcher had been rather uneasy about the 
Venice Declaration
1
 before she finally endorsed it at the European Council Heads of 
State summit. Thatcher had earlier expressed strong misgivings over the FCO‘s 
support for Palestinian self-determination and higher-level contacts with the PLO.
2
 
In this chapter, however, it will be argued that the Prime Minister‘s decision-making 
in this sphere was driven by geopolitical concerns rather than any fears over a 
backlash from Israel and its supporters in the UK. The twin factors of the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had merely strengthened 
the conviction of the British Government that strong Western backing for a 
resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict was the key to restoring stability in the region
3
 
as well as a means to weakening Soviet influence.
4
 Thatcher would also have been 
influenced by Whitehall concerns that a British failure to fall into line with its 
European partners on the Palestinian question would have implications for Britain‘s 
political and economic interests in the Arab world. 
 
In endorsing the Venice Declaration, Thatcher had effectively set the seal on a 
decade of cooperation with the FCO on Middle East policy: her support for the 
Palestinian right to self-determination and the belief that the PLO had to be 
associated with a Middle East peace settlement signified that Number Ten was 
firmly aligned with the FCO on policy in the Arab-Israel arena. It was significant 
that Carrington and other FCO ministers were fiercely attacked by the Israeli 
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Government, but Thatcher was not despite her public support for the British policy 
shift. This merely underscored the fact that there was a strong discrepancy between 
the Israeli perception of Thatcher‘s position on the Arab-Israel conflict and her 
actual policy which was now closely aligned with the FCO.  
   
The Leading Role of the FCO in the Venice Declaration 
 
The summer of 1980 reflected the growing convergence between Thatcher and the 
FCO. Nine months after the Prime Minister had rejected Carrington‘s policy 
recommendations on Palestinian self-determination and the PLO, she now endorsed 
the British policy shift. At the European Council meeting in Venice on 12 and 13 
June 1980, Thatcher endorsed the final communiqué which reaffirmed the rights of 
all states in the region - including Israel - to existence and security, and demanded 
justice for the Palestinian people which implied the right to self-determination. 
Perhaps the most controversial element of the Venice Declaration was the call for the 
PLO to be associated with peace negotiations. It also included a condemnation of 
Israeli settlements which were viewed as ―a serious obstacle to the peace process in 
the Middle East.‖5 In her memoirs, Thatcher writes that the communiqué struck ―the 
right balance‖.6  Indeed, days after the European Council meeting, the Prime 
Minister made it clear that she wholeheartedly supported the Venice communiqué.
7
 
Thatcher had signalled that she now supported the FCO policy on the Palestinian 
question.  The policy shift would not have come about, however, without intensive 
behind the scenes activity of FCO mandarins.  
 
During the autumn of 1979, the FCO engaged in extensive deliberations over the 
future direction of British policy towards the Middle East. During the last week of 
October 1979, the FCO hosted a Conference of British Heads of Missions in the 
Middle East. The discussions provided a unique insight into the FCO‘s leading role 
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in the formulation of the landmark EEC Venice Declaration.
8
 There was wide 
agreement among participants that the British position on the Palestine issue had 
been seen in the Arab countries as ―less satisfactory‖ than that of the other EEC 
countries.
9
 Sir John Moberly, an Associate Under-Secretary of State, remarked that 
Britain was seen as ―among the back markers in the Nine [EEC countries]‖ and 
suggested that this could affect its oil interests. Sir John Wilton, a former 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, maintained that Palestine was the key issue in 
Arab/Western relations. Western responsibility for Israel‘s creation was still the 
greatest weakness for the West. The French had gained a good reputation in the Arab 
world for their pro-Palestinian and anti-American position.  Britain would be 
―greatly helped‖ by a move on Palestine for which it was still held responsible.  
Wilton argued that Britain‘s reputation would be enhanced in the Arab world if it 
could shift its public position by the spring of 1980. The fact that the UK was now a 
net exporter of oil would mean that Britain could make a move without being 
accused of having its ―arms twisted‖ by the Arabs. Failure to act could mean that 
Britain would be left behind by Germany and France.  Tomkys argued for Britain to 
move ahead of the Americans, and support the Palestinians through a declaration 
covering the PLO, self determination and the settlements.
10
 
  
James Craig, a former Ambassador to Syria, maintained that the Camp David talks 
would not produce a settlement but a European initiative would not do so either. 
Craig argued, however, that a European policy shift would improve Britain‘s image 
in the Arab world and protect its interests. Craig called for a move towards the PLO, 
an acknowledgment of the Palestinian right to self-determination and even 
recognition of an independent Palestinian State.
11
 The Heads of Missions called for 
strong criticism of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. A number of 
participants expressed their preference for a European initiative over a British one, 
though it was noted that French attitudes on the Palestinian question would dilute 
any British gains. The participants viewed a European initiative as a means of 
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generating new momentum in the peace process in the event of difficulties in the 
Camp David talks. 
12
  
 
By the beginning of 1980, Britain was playing an increasingly active role in 
promoting an initiative. Senior officials such as Tomkys believed that the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 had provided an opportunity for the West 
to build better relations with the Arab States. Nevertheless, Arab attitudes were 
adversely affected by the Arab/Israel issue. Since the United States was still 
committed to the Camp David framework, Tomkys believed that it was up to Europe 
to act quickly to ―show the way forward‖.13  
 
The intensive FCO activity came to fruition in the early summer of 1980 with the 
Venice Declaration. The statement of the EEC Heads of Government on 13 June 
1980 was unquestionably a landmark in European involvement in the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. A reading of the Venice Declaration text reveals a convergence between the 
ideas put forward by leading FCO mandarins over previous months and the final 
statement of the European Heads of State. In particular, the emphasis on the 
Palestinian right to self-determination and the association of the PLO with Middle 
East negotiations were fundamental elements of a policy that had been promoted by 
the FCO.
14
 While the Venice Declaration was a common EEC position, Carrington 
and Gilmour had played an important role in advancing it. Not only were they 
proponents of the FCO view that Europe had to move up front in advancing a 
balanced Middle East settlement– they had an important input in translating this into 
policy and placing Britain at the heart of it.
15
 
 
The leading role of the FCO in the Venice Declaration clearly reflected its ability to 
exert a decisive influence over the Thatcher Government‘s policy towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict. As a participant in the EEC Heads of Government communiqué, 
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Thatcher had given her full backing to the Middle East initiative. Only a few months 
earlier, however, the Prime Minister had been rather less enthusiastic about the shift 
in British policy. In November 1979, Thatcher had told the French President that she 
doubted whether Britain could take further initiatives on the Middle East ―until the 
Camp David talks had finally run into sand.‖16  
 
Hurd reveals in his memoirs that he had been summoned along with a number of 
FCO officials to Chequers on 30 May 1980 to discuss the Middle East with the 
Prime Minister. The FCO wanted the Prime Minister to be more flexible on the right 
of Palestinians to self-determination. There was some reluctance on her part.  
However, Thatcher was distracted. She had left Carrington and Gilmour behind in 
London to fight for a reduction of Britain‘s contribution to the EEC budget, and was 
disturbed by what she had heard of their work. Carrington arrived exhausted at 
Chequers after midday accompanied by Gilmour and other officials. Thatcher broke 
off her discussion with Hurd on the Middle East, and hurried Carrington and 
Gilmour into a separate room to discuss the EEC budget. Hurd waited while FCO 
officials drafted a minute for him to sign, encapsulating the flexibility sought by 
Hurd on the Arab-Israel conflict.
17
  
 
In the meantime, Thatcher harangued Carrington and Gilmour over the EEC budget, 
and accused them of selling the country down the river.
18
 The three emerged some 
two hours later and attended a tense lunch. To Hurd‘s surprise, Thatcher then 
returned to discuss the Middle East with him and the other FCO officials. Even more 
unexpectedly for Hurd, she accepted his minute on the Middle East. Hurd concluded 
that Thatcher accepted the minute possibly as a result of ―a conciliatory twinge 
towards the FCO‖ in the wake of her treatment of Carrington and Gilmour.19  
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Nevertheless, there were other important conclusions that could be drawn from this 
episode. It appeared that Thatcher was far more exercised over the issue of Britain‘s 
contribution to the EEC budget than she was over recognizing Palestinian self-
determination.  The Arab-Israeli conflict was not a burning ideological issue for her 
which made it easier to adapt her position. Robin Butler, a Private Secretary to the 
Prime Minister, maintains that Thatcher was ―very balanced‖ and ready to take 
advice except in areas where she had very strong prejudices. Although Thatcher was 
influenced by her Finchley constituents on Middle East policy, she did not enter 
office with a very strong ideological position on the Arab-Israel conflict, unlike on 
the issue of Europe. Thatcher was fiercely anti-communist and had strong prejudices 
on the issue of South Africa. This did not apply to the same degree on the Arab-
Israel issue.
20
 
 
Thatcher could be more easily influenced by developments on matters on which she 
was not primarily engaged. She was considerably more pragmatic on issues such as 
the Middle East. Thatcher would accept that her Foreign Secretaries knew what 
Britain had to do in this sphere of policy, even if this conflicted with her gut feeling. 
Thatcher tended not to interfere with the detail of policy, and was aware that the 
Middle East was a complex issue.
21
  
  
A second conclusion was that Thatcher did not yet have the backing of a powerful 
policy unit which would exercise considerable control over foreign policy only 
during her second and third terms. Thus, it would have been easier for FCO 
mandarins to exert influence over the Prime Minister in such an environment. While 
Thatcher felt that the FCO was instinctively pro-Arab, individuals such as Parsons 
would have gradually influenced her. Thus, over time, Thatcher accepted the merits 
of the Palestinian case.
22
  The difficulty with this argument, however, was that 
Thatcher had resisted the FCO policy on the Palestinian question some months 
earlier when she was also without the backing of a strong private office. By June 
1980, however, Thatcher would have taken a more realistic view of the international 
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constraints facing Britain, and the possible damage to British strategic interests in the 
region incurred through withholding support from the Palestinians. Furthermore, this 
thesis contends that even when the Number Ten private office had amassed stronger 
control over foreign policy issues during the mid 1980s, there was only a short-term 
and marginal difference to the outcome of policy in the Arab-Israel arena.    
 
Begin’s Response to the Venice Declaration 
 
The Begin Government responded with great bitterness and anger to the European 
initiative. The Israeli Prime Minister delivered a harsh accusatory address before the 
Knesset on 2 June, some days before the EEC Middle East statement had even been 
issued. Begin claimed that the European move threatened the very existence of the 
State of Israel, arguing that those European nations that had collaborated with the 
Nazis or remained indifferent to the murder of Jews had no right to lecture Israel on 
security or ―recognize the organization of murderers‖ – a reference to the PLO. 
Many European leaders had failed to heed the warnings signs of Nazism in the 
1930s, and were now making the same mistake with the PLO today, he argued. 
Begin also implied that Britain was among those who had allowed the Nazis to 
exterminate the Jews.  He maintained that by offering self-determination to the 
Palestinians, the Europeans were establishing a State in Judea, Samaria and Gaza 
that would endanger the State of Israel.
23
  
 
The day after the Venice Declaration was issued, Thatcher had written to Begin to 
reassure him that the European initiative had Israel‘s best interests at heart. She 
wrote that Europe had no intention of interfering with the Camp David process or 
imposing terms on Israel. Thatcher expressed her understanding that some aspects of 
the Venice Declaration would be ―very difficult for [Israel] to accept‖, but felt that it 
was necessary to make clear ―[Britain‘s] view of how a lasting peace settlement can 
best be reached.‖ The Prime Minister added that the aim was to create an improved 
atmosphere for peace efforts. In conclusion, Thatcher expressed her hope that 
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Begin‘s Government would cooperate with the EEC-backed mission which was 
visiting the region to consult with the parties to the conflict.
24
 
 
Begin responded forcefully and candidly to Thatcher‘s letter. Begin began by 
expressing his appreciation for her ―kind and friendly words‖ in the wake of the 
Venice meeting. However, he emphasized to Thatcher that the Venice Declaration 
was deeply hurtful to his country, and that elements of the EEC communiqué were 
―impossible for [Israel] to accept.‖ Begin was particularly unhappy about the call for 
the PLO to be associated with the peace process. Begin drew Thatcher‘s attention to 
the fact that Fatah, the main component of the PLO, had just convened in Damascus, 
days before the EEC meeting, and had called for Israel‘s destruction. He wrote: 
Madam Prime Minister, 
Did anybody since the days of Hitler and Goebbels, Goering, Rosenberg and 
Streicher ever declare more plainly and more precisely that the endeavour is 
to destroy both our people and our state again...And yet, the great, free, 
democratic countries of Europe assembled and asked us, the elected 
representatives of the people of Israel, the United States of America, and all 
other nations to recognize that organization as a future partner in ―peace‖ 
talks. This is not only astonishing: As I said, it hurt us deeply.
25
     
  
In the same letter to Thatcher, Begin raised a completely different issue: arms sales 
to Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister wrote that he could not understand how Britain 
could deny his country defence equipment when it was selling hundreds of 
sophisticated Chieftain tanks to Jordan. Begin stated that Israel had been refused 
Scorpion armoured vehicles, electro-optical equipment and information on the RB-
199 engine which would have matched Israel‘s new aircraft requirements. Begin 
called on Thatcher to reconsider the Israeli defence requests.
26
 However, Begin 
received no response from Number Ten.
27
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Thatcher Endorses British Policy Shift on the Palestinian Question 
 
On 16 June 1980, the Prime Minister gave the clearest indication yet that she shared 
the view of the FCO on the Arab-Israeli conflict during a parliamentary address. The 
Leader of the Opposition, James Callaghan, attacked the Prime Minister for her 
acceptance of the EEC Middle East communiqué. In particular, Callaghan suggested 
that Thatcher was deviating from the established British policy on the Palestinian 
question by endorsing the Palestinian right to self-determination. In doing so, the 
Prime Minister was providing support to the establishment of an armed independent 
Palestinian State on Israel‘s border. The Labour leader suggested that European 
actions were motivated by oil. He also attacked the EEC Heads of State for 
providing the PLO with a propaganda triumph only days after the organization had 
declared that it would destroy Israel.
28
  
 
Thatcher responded by reminding the Leader of the Opposition that he himself had 
agreed to the idea of a ―homeland for the Palestinian people‖ at the European 
Council meeting of June 1977 when he served as Prime Minister.  Nevertheless, the 
European communiqué of 1977 was not as far-reaching as the Venice Declaration 
(there was no reference to Palestinian self-determination or the PLO), and had taken 
place before the Camp David Accords. The Leader of the Opposition took great 
pride in his minor role in the Camp David process, and was unhappy that the Venice 
initiative appeared to be undercutting it. Indeed, this was a significant factor in his 
criticisms of the Prime Minister. Thus, Callaghan strongly criticized the Prime 
Minister for adopting the position of President Giscard d‘Estaing in apparently 
supporting an independent Palestinian State. Callaghan noted that the Frenchman 
had never supported the Camp David process.
29
    
 
Thatcher‘s robust response to Callaghan revealed the extent of the Prime Minister‘s 
movement on the Arab-Israel issue:  
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The words in the communiqué I support entirely. They concern the right of 
the Palestinian people to determine their own future. If one wishes to call that 
‗self-determination‘, I shall not quarrel with it. I am interested that the right 
hon. Gentleman appears to be attempting to deny that right. I do not 
understand how anyone can demand a right for people on one side of a 
boundary and deny it to people on the other side of that boundary. That 
seems to deny certain rights, or to allocate them with discrimination from one 
person to another.
30
  
 
The Prime Minister‘s new pronouncement on the Palestine issue was that the Israelis 
could not deny to the Palestinians what they had sought for themselves.  Sir David 
Gore-Booth, a leading Arabist within the FCO, would later remark that this was ―the 
best dictum for the Middle East‖ which he knew of.31 During the debate in the House 
of Commons, Thatcher repeated the line from the Venice Declaration that there 
would be no comprehensive settlement in the Middle East unless the PLO was 
associated with it. Also, echoing the remarks she made during her meeting with 
Begin, Thatcher asserted that the failure to achieve a Middle East settlement would 
be disastrous for the entire Western world. She stated that it was wrong to conclude 
that the Venice initiative would necessarily lead to an independent Palestinian State. 
Rather, she maintained, it was up to the peoples in the region to determine their own 
future. While the Prime Minister did not endorse the idea of an independent 
Palestinian State, she did not appear to rule it out either.
32
  
 
Having registered her deep opposition to Palestinian self-determination and a policy 
shift on the PLO only months earlier, it was significant that Thatcher was now giving 
her full backing to the new policy. There were a number of reasons for Thatcher‘s 
change of heart. Unquestionably, since she had come to power, the FCO had been 
working up a head of steam in a bid to bring about a shift in the British position on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Thatcher‘s opposition was slowly worn down by 
Carrington, and to a lesser extent by Hurd and Parsons.
33
 The FCO‘s success in 
exerting its influence over the Prime Minister was reflected in Thatcher‘s shift on the 
Palestinian question. It is unlikely that this would have happened without the efforts 
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of Carrington, Hurd and Parsons. Thatcher eventually appointed Parsons as her 
special adviser which indicated the trust that she had in him. Thus, the Prime 
Minister was now in full agreement with the policy shift which the FCO had tried to 
bring about almost a year earlier.  
 
The Israeli Government viewed Britain as the leading power behind the EEC Venice 
Delegation. In a cable to Jerusalem, Israel‘s Ambassador, Shlomo Argov, wrote that 
there was a ―chill‖ in Anglo-Israeli ties, and that this was the fault of the 
Conservative Government. He wrote that while Britain had once been a leading force 
in support of the Camp David Accords, it was now the chief instigator of the 
European initiative and the attempts to change Security Council Resolution 242.
34
  
 
Thatcher‘s robust defence of the Venice Declaration in parliament was an asset for 
the FCO. Britain‘s Ambassador to Israel, John Robinson, was subjected to a barrage 
of criticism during a stormy meeting with Israeli officials Moshe Sasson and Yosef 
Ciechanover. The Israeli side rejected the basic principles of the Venice Declaration, 
viewing them as a deviation from the Camp David agreements and Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. Sasson was upset that there was no consultation on issues 
that touched on Israel‘s very existence. In response, Robinson quoted Thatcher‘s 
statement in parliament regarding the need for the Israelis to respect the Palestinian 
right to self-determination which they enjoyed for themselves. Sasson retorted that 
the Venice Declaration and Thatcher‘s parliamentary statement on self-determination 
were actually ―a one-sided predetermination relating to Israel‘s existence.‖ 35   
 
Britain and the Oil Question 
 
The difficulties in the bilateral relationship were exacerbated by Israel‘s insistence 
that the European initiative was dictated by a self-centred thirst for oil. Argov had 
insisted in his cable to Jerusalem that the Middle East policy of Europe and Britain 
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was fed by ―narrow self interest involving the supply of oil and the disgraceful 
surrender to the dictates of Arab oil producers.‖36 Furthermore, in an impassioned 
address at the Institute for Jewish Affairs on 3 July 1980, Argov had accused the 
EEC of betraying fundamental Israeli interests in return for Arab oil.
37
  Argov‘s 
point was not without some justification. There was certainly a British concern over 
the rise in oil prices which posed a threat to the economic well-being of Western 
countries – a factor that Carrington refers to in his memoirs.38 For many months 
leading up to the landmark European initiative of 13 June, FCO mandarins had 
warned that Western oil interests would be damaged unless a new policy was 
introduced that was more helpful to the Palestinian cause.
39
 Since it was believed 
that certain Arab countries would possess greater bargaining power as a result of oil 
price rises, EEC member states could win favour in the Arab world by taking a more 
sympathetic position on the Palestinian question. It was also important for the FCO 
that Britain could match the position of its European partners on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and therefore reduce the risk of Arab retaliation on the Palestinian issue.
40
     
 
The FCO took great exception to Argov‘s accusations at the Institute for Jewish 
Affairs. Carrington summoned the Israeli Ambassador to the FCO the following day 
where he was reprimanded for ―tendentious and inaccurate remarks‖ as well as 
―objectionable emotive innuendo‖ on the EEC Venice Declaration. The strongest 
criticism was reserved for Argov‘s ―totally unacceptable‖ suggestion that the 
Europeans had traded Israel‘s security for Arab oil.41  During a meeting with Argov, 
John Moberly rejected his claim that European policy was dictated by oil supply 
considerations, adding that Britain now had an independent source of oil supplies.
42
 
Certainly, Britain was more self-sufficient by the 1980s, partly because of North Sea 
oil.
43
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Nevertheless, Britain would remain dependent on Arab oil during the 1980s. James 
Craig, for example, had pointed out in 1972 that while the importance of Arab oil to 
the British economy would decline as North Sea oil production was advanced, 
Britain was likely to remain heavily reliant on energy supplies from the Middle East 
well into the 1980s and possibly beyond. Craig concluded therefore that it was ―a 
vital national interest to stay on the best possible terms with the Arabs.‖44 
 
In contrast, Parsons has maintained that the production of North Sea oil resulted in a 
situation where the British Government was less vulnerable to the threat of oil being 
applied as a political weapon.
45
  However, if the Thatcher Government had become 
somewhat less reliant on Middle East supplies of crude oil, there would arguably 
have been less pressure on Britain to move into line with other European countries 
on the Palestinian question. After all, the fear of Arab retaliation against Britain on 
the oil issue had been one of the major determinants of British policy towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. However, as this thesis makes clear, the Thatcher Government 
took active steps to bring Britain into line with its European partners on the 
Palestinian question during the early 1980s. Oil was clearly a factor in British policy, 
but it was certainly not the only one.  
 
                                                          
44
 William Roger Louis, ‗Legacy of the Balfour Declaration: Palestine, 1967-1973‘ in Zach Levey and Elie Podeh (eds), 
Britain and the Middle East: from Imperial Power to Junior Partner, (Sussex Academic Press: Brighton, 2008), p. 125   
45
 Parsons, ‗The Middle East‘, pp.83-95 
94 
 
Afghanistan and Iran 
 
There were, however, other considerations that dictated the British push for a 
European initiative which the Israelis overlooked. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979, as well as the Iranian revolution of that same year, 
had given Carrington an even stronger motivation to push for a shift in Middle East 
policy. The Foreign Secretary appeared before the Board of Deputies in September 
1980, and told his audience that there was a link between Afghanistan, Iran and the 
Palestinian problem.
46
 The British Government believed that the Arab-Israeli conflict 
was the key to restoring stability to the region.
47
 This echoed the approach of British 
policymakers during the mid 1950s when the Alpha Plan was adopted as a means of 
defusing Arab hostility to Britain.  
 
There was great concern within the British Government over the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism which was reflected in the overthrow of the Shah in Iran. It was 
believed that a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would help to enhance stability 
in the region, while reducing the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to moderate Arab 
States. Carrington was very concerned by the dangers of renewed conflict in the 
region, and believed everything had to be done to prevent such an eventuality.  He 
also believed strongly that it was necessary to show moderates that they could get 
results in accepting a fair settlement with Israel. If moderate leaders could not show 
progress, there was the danger that they could be replaced by extremists.
48
 The 
achievement of progress in the Arab-Israeli dispute would also make it more difficult 
for the Soviets to build influence in the Middle East, while helping also to rally Arab 
opinion to the West on the issue of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
49
  
 
During a meeting with Israel‘s Ambassador to the UN, Yehuda Blum, Parsons 
remarked that the Israelis were mistaken in believing that an energy crisis was 
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responsible for the shift in the European position. Rather, it was the Iranian 
revolution which had clarified for the Europeans the danger of instability in the 
Middle East. As in the past, the intention was to block the spread of Soviet influence 
in the Middle East and even to repel it. The Israeli Ambassador countered that Israel 
was being asked to pay a price for this, implying a parallel with Czechoslovakia in 
1938. Parsons responded that Middle East stability was also an Israeli interest. 
Parsons added that a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would weaken Soviet 
influence in the region. However, the British official was pessimistic about the 
possibilities of a regional settlement in the near future, and wondered whether the 
absence of a settlement would mean greater difficulties thirty years down the line.
50
  
 
Thatcher‘s support for the Venice Declaration was arguably linked to the 
aforementioned geopolitical factors. Thatcher‘s position on Israel was influenced 
very strongly by her attitude towards the Soviet Union. During her early months in 
power, it was clear that she viewed the Jewish State as a bulwark against the spread 
of Soviet influence through the Middle East. Thus, she had initially been suspicious 
of FCO initiatives on the Palestinian question which she believed could have proved 
detrimental to Western interests.
51
 Nevertheless, over time, there would have been 
concerns that Israeli intransigence over the West Bank and Gaza was becoming a 
liability in the struggle against communist influence. Thatcher had stated to Begin 
during their lunch in May 1979 that the British interest in a comprehensive 
settlement in the Middle East had ―stemmed from a determination to oppose the 
tyranny of the Soviet Union, which thrived on disunity and dissension.‖52 Since 
Thatcher believed that Begin was blocking any chance of a comprehensive 
settlement in the region, it is perhaps not surprising that she gave her approval to an 
initiative which held out a possibility of progress.  Furthermore, in the wake of the 
revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Thatcher‘s support for the 
European initiative was arguably reinforced by the fact that it was designed to win 
over the moderate Arab States to the West.  Thatcher would certainly have been 
sympathetic to arguments from Carrington and Parsons on the need for a resolution 
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of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a means of eroding Soviet influence in the Middle 
East, since she later used this argument herself with the Americans on a number of 
occasions.
53
 It is these factors in the international system which best explain 
Thatcher‘s agreement to the initiative promoted by the FCO.  
  
The role of King Hussein may also have been a factor in encouraging the Prime 
Minister to support the Venice initiative. According to a senior source in the 
Conservative Party, one of the most persuasive arguments used by Carrington to win 
Thatcher‘s support on the Venice Declaration was that Europe and Britain, in 
particular, would be better placed than the United States to explore the possibility of 
Jordan‘s involvement in the peace process.54 It appears that at this early stage in her 
premiership, the role of King Hussein was an important factor in Thatcher‘s 
thinking. She had already met with the Jordanian monarch on a number of occasions.  
 
The intensive FCO activity on the Palestinian question was dictated in part by the 
US Presidential election campaign of 1980. It was clear to Carrington that the Carter 
Administration would not be supporting any initiatives in the Middle East during this 
period.
55
 The White House continued to pledge its support to the Camp David 
Accords. The FCO had been sceptical about the Camp David Accords, however, and 
Thatcher appeared to share this scepticism. During her talks with President Giscard, 
she had stated that Begin‘s policies on the West Bank were ―unrealistic‖ and that she 
did not know of any arrangement where people had autonomy over their political 
future but no autonomy over their own land.
56
 Thatcher‘s impatience over Begin and 
his plan for Palestinian autonomy provided an opening for the FCO to win her 
approval for its Middle East initiative. 
  
As Thatcher became increasingly impatient with the policy of the Begin 
Government, there was little or no discernible difference between her position on the 
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Arab-Israel conflict and that of the FCO. On 30 July 1980, the Israeli Government 
voted in favour of the Basic Law for Jerusalem which declared that ―Jerusalem 
united in its entirety is the capital of Israel.‖ 57 The bill formalized Israeli law over 
east Jerusalem. In his meeting with the Board of Deputies, Carrington had 
condemned the Israeli decision on Jerusalem as ―wrong, provocative and badly 
timed.‖ 58  Thatcher shared the position of her Foreign Secretary. During a lunch 
which she hosted for Egypt‘s Deputy Prime Minister Mubarak, she   fiercely 
condemned Israel‘s ―provocative‖ policy on east Jerusalem.59 Indeed, on the 
controversial issue of east Jerusalem, Thatcher followed the line of the FCO with 
consistency during her eleven years in Number Ten.  
 
Israel Mobilizes Opposition to the New Policy 
 
Israel‘s diplomatic representatives sought to mobilize the local Jewish community 
and pro-Israeli groups in a bid to apply pressure on the Thatcher Government. Argov 
claimed that  Conservative MPs were having to deal with protests from Jewish 
constituents, and were now registering reservations over the new Middle East policy.  
He noted that Carrington and Hurd were initiating meetings with the Board of 
Deputies.  He viewed this as a sign that they were under pressure from Israel‘s 
supporters. Argov maintained that in spite of all the British Government‘s efforts, 
Israel had managed to highlight the existence of public constraints which could not 
be ignored. The Israeli Ambassador was aware that public pressure was unlikely to 
bring about a significant change in policy. Nevertheless, he viewed Israel‘s 
supporters in Britain as an asset that had to be employed in order to repel policies 
that were detrimental to Israel. Indeed, the Ambassador emphasized, this appeared to 
be the only option left in confronting such policies:  
We should not be afraid of making noise – it will embarrass the British more 
than it will embarrass us...It would be easier and more convenient to limit the 
campaign to the diplomatic sphere. It would be a lot more complicated and 
arduous to conduct a public campaign but this is the only sphere where we 
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have room for manoeuvre and action, including the need for the mobilization 
of the Jewish community.
60
  
 
The Israeli Government and its supporters in London were certainly exerting efforts 
to fight the new Middle East policy of the Thatcher Government. Hurd had drawn 
Argov‘s attention to the fierce Israeli rhetoric aimed at the British Government. Hurd 
complained that British ministers had been ―exposed to considerable public pressure 
by friends of Israel [in Britain].‖ The Minister of State remarked that both he and 
Carrington had faced some very uncomfortable experiences during various meetings. 
The Israeli Ambassador countered that the ―expressions of deep concern‖ by Israel‘s 
friends were not without some justification.
61
 Hurd‘s remarks indicated that both the 
Israeli Government and its supporters in Britain had been working to neutralize the 
shift in British policy embodied by the Venice Declaration. Hurd and Carrington 
were clearly feeling the pressure from pro-Israel organizations.  
 
It was significant that Carrington and Hurd were attacked but Thatcher was not, in 
spite of her public support for the policy shift. Indeed, throughout the entire Thatcher 
period, the Israeli Government and its supporters in the UK tended to overplay the 
differences between the FCO and Number Ten. For understandable reasons, 
Thatcher was viewed as a friend of Israel because of her links to pro-Israel 
organizations and her warm ties with the Jewish community. The FCO, on the other 
hand, had historically shown a cool attitude towards the State of Israel. It was 
perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the Foreign Secretary, rather than Thatcher 
herself, was roundly criticized by representatives of the Jewish community.    
 
Nevertheless, the local Jewish community was far from united in its support for the 
Begin Government. In this context, Biran had written to Jerusalem with details of a 
discussion he had held with a German counterpart, Dr Becker, who had previously 
headed the Middle East Department of the West German Foreign Ministry.  Becker 
had told Biran that the British Government found it easier to promote its policy on 
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the Arab-Israeli conflict in the knowledge that support for Israel had declined in the 
Western world. Becker added that even among the Anglo-Jewish community, 
support was patchy. The Thatcher Government was hearing dissenting voices from 
elements within the community, including the Board of Deputies. These reservations 
were giving the British Government more room for manoeuvre. The Zionist 
Federation was more supportive of the Israeli position, but the British Government 
attached far more importance to the Board of Deputies than the Zionist Federation.
62
  
Thus, public opinion was an influence, albeit a marginal one, on British policy 
towards the Arab-Israel conflict at the beginning of the 1980s.  
 
Thatcher Hardens Position against the Begin Government 
 
In early October 1980, Argov met with Michael Palliser, the FCO Permanent Under-
Secretary. The Israeli Ambassador had told Palliser of his dismay over the fact that 
Begin had not received a response to his personal letter to Thatcher. Palliser was 
well aware of the matter, and responded that Downing Street had reservations over 
Begin‘s recent ―very difficult‖ remarks which were aimed at British ministers.63 The 
implication was that Thatcher resented Begin‘s attacks on Carrington. The Prime 
Minister was invariably supportive of those who were carrying out her policy under 
pressure.
64
 It is likely that Begin‘s fierce criticism of the FCO only encouraged 
Thatcher to give it greater support.  
 
Indeed, this was borne out by a letter from the Israeli Ambassador to the Director 
General of the Foreign Ministry. Argov was particularly upset with Carrington 
whom he viewed as the chief culprit behind the European initiative. However, he 
warned that it would be counter-productive to launch personal attacks on Carrington. 
Argov believed that such attacks would lead to a ―closing of the ranks‖ around the 
Foreign Secretary. Significantly, he sensed that it would lead to an increase in the 
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support which Carrington already had from the Prime Minister.
65
 This was a 
reflection of the close cooperation between Thatcher and the FCO. Argov‘s warning 
against personal attacks on the British Foreign Secretary was almost certainly linked 
to conversations he had held both with FCO officials and ministers. 
  
While Israel‘s supporters in the UK were exerting pressure on the British 
Government, it made little difference to the actual policy on the Arab-Israel conflict. 
The difficulty for Israel was that the Whitehall bureaucracy was setting the tone of 
the British policy, and was largely impervious to public pressure. By this stage, 
Thatcher had accepted the policy set down by the FCO. There was no sign of any 
retreat by the Prime Minister on Britain‘s policy on the Palestinian question. If 
anything, the Thatcher Government was hardening its attitude towards the Israeli 
Government. One example of this was the policy on arms sales to Israel. Argov had 
complained to Hurd that Britain was supplying 275 Chieftain tanks to Jordan while 
Israel‘s requests for Scorpion armoured vehicles had been rejected. Begin had 
personally written to Thatcher to place a request for the Scorpions, but had not 
received a reply. Argov was unhappy to finally receive a rejection from a junior 
official in the FCO.
66
 The following month, an MOD official informed his Israeli 
counterpart that a decision had been made not to supply any offensive weaponry to 
Israel.
67
   
 
The FCO and MOD would not have been able to refuse Israel offensive weaponry 
without the clearance of Number Ten.
68
 Since the Begin Government had taken such 
a confrontational stance in response to the Venice Declaration, there seemed little 
reason for Thatcher to agree to such a request for arms. Thatcher had earlier 
expressed her understanding for Heath‘s decision to place a ban on arms sales to 
Israel during the October 1973 War.
69
 Furthermore, during her second term, she had 
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agreed with Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe on the need to maintain restrictions on 
arms sales to Israel.
70
  
 
A further sign of the shift in the British policy towards the Palestinians came with 
the meeting in December 1980 between Sir John Graham, a FCO official, and PLO 
leader Yasser Arafat. Carrington met with the Board of Deputies, and explained that 
the meeting with Arafat had taken place in order to persuade the PLO to accept the 
Venice formula. Carrington remarked that if Arafat were to invite him for a meeting, 
he would see the PLO leader. The Board President, Greville Janner, responded that if 
this were the case, ―there would be no choice but to take to the streets.‖ 71   Graham 
would have required the authorization of Number Ten before such a meeting with 
Arafat. The fact that the meeting had taken place was proof of the fact that there was 
greater understanding between 10 Downing Street and the FCO on policy towards 
the PLO.    
 
The Venice Declaration has been viewed widely as a landmark document that set a 
benchmark for European policy on the Arab-Israel conflict until the early 1990s.
72
 
Furthermore, it came to define Thatcher‘s policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict for 
the rest of her time in power. However, it failed to make any serious headway in 
advancing a solution to the conflict because the Israeli Government rejected it out of 
hand. Equally, the PLO at this stage was not prepared to reject terrorism or recognize 
the existence of the State of Israel. Moreover, the European initiative was not likely 
to succeed in view of the lack of support from the Carter Administration. The United 
States would have been the only country with any serious influence over the Israelis. 
There was a danger that wholehearted American support for the EEC Middle East 
initiative could have resulted in the withdrawal of Begin from the Camp David 
negotiations on Palestinian autonomy. President Carter had staked his political 
prestige on the Camp David process, and was not willing to undermine it through a 
gesture to the Europeans. 
                                                          
70
 FCO/FOI  351-09,  Minute from DESS 2 to FCO, 14 May 1986  
71
 ISA 7308/6, Cable from E Lador, London, to MFA,  21 December 1980 
72
 Robin Shepherd, A State Beyond the Pale: Europe‘s Problem with Israel, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London), 2009, p. 207 
102 
 
 
Thatcher was in agreement with the FCO in recognizing that by addressing the 
Palestinian issue, there was a greater likelihood of achieving stability in the region. 
Indeed, she has articulated this very argument in her memoirs: 
It is...right that the Palestinians should be restored in their land and dignity: 
and, as often happens in my experience, what is morally right eventually 
turns out to be politically expedient. Removing, even in limited measure, the 
Palestinian grievance is a necessary if not sufficient condition for cutting the 
cancer of Middle East terrorism out by the roots. The only way this can 
happen, as has long been clear, is for Israel to exchange ‗land for peace‘, 
returning occupied territories to the Palestinians in exchange for credible 
undertakings to respect Israel‘s security.73  
    
Thus, just over a year after entering 10 Downing Street, it was clear that the position 
of the Prime Minister on the Arab-Israeli conflict was now in line with that of the 
FCO. Thatcher had recognized the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, and 
had also emphasized that the PLO had to be associated with Middle East 
negotiations. Thatcher was no less hostile than the FCO also in regard to Begin‘s 
settlement policy. Nevertheless, the FCO and its ministers had to exert considerable 
influence on Thatcher in order to win her approval for the policy shift in the first 
place. It was easier for the FCO to do so since the policy unit in 10 Downing Street 
did not yet possess the authority that it would acquire during the second and third 
terms of the Thatcher Government.  Carrington and Gilmour were still in a position 
to exert a modicum of influence over policy. Most importantly, it is likely that 
Thatcher would have been persuaded by arguments on the need for a resolution of 
the Arab-Israel conflict, as a means to fending off the Soviets and radical elements in 
the Middle East.    
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Chapter Three 
 
The Convergence between the FCO and Downing Street 
 
It is argued in this chapter that the differences between Number Ten and 
Whitehall were increasingly blurred. Thatcher took a tougher line with the Begin 
Government, while the FCO adopted a more conciliatory tone for a time, as Lord 
Carrington sought to promote a political dialogue with the Israeli leadership. 
Thatcher‘s harder line was reflected through her outspoken condemnations of 
Israel over its raid on Iraq, its annexation of the Golan Heights and its invasion of 
Lebanon. Thatcher‘s tougher stance on Israel had to be seen within the context of 
her growing unease over the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East, 
and the fear that Israeli policies were a liability for Western interests in the 
region.    
 
As the Prime Minister became more confident in international affairs, she was 
even prepared to outflank the FCO. This was reflected in the role she played in 
attempting to persuade the Reagan Administration to conclude the AWACS deal 
with Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding the strong Israeli attempts to block the sale 
on security grounds.  As relations between Britain and Israel reached a new low, 
it was the FCO and not 10 Downing Street which initiated a political dialogue 
with the Begin Government, reflected through Carrington‘s visit to Israel in 
March 1982. The dialogue was curtailed following Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon 
in June 1982, but was resumed by the FCO during the second term of the 
Thatcher Government.   
 
In this chapter, it will be demonstrated that Thatcher‘s growing self-confidence 
and control over foreign policy, reflected in her appointment of a Foreign Policy 
Advisor in late 1982, did not lead to changes in the Middle East policy.  Indeed, 
even on policy towards the PLO where Thatcher was most resistant to the 
104 
 
position of the FCO, she had authorized higher-level contacts with the 
organization.   
 
The Bombing of the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor 
  
As Thatcher acquired greater control over foreign policy during the mid 1980s, 
she was increasingly inclined to seek independent advice from outside the FCO. 
In 1981, however, there were clear indications that she was highly dependent on 
the Whitehall machine. For example, on visiting President Ronald Reagan in 
1981, she took with her a large team of FCO officials. In later years, she would 
often travel with no FCO presence at all.
1
 Arguably, this dependence on the FCO 
was a factor in the difficulties which affected the Anglo-Israeli relationship 
during this period, as the Prime Minister was inclined to adopt the FCO line on 
sensitive issues in this arena. One clear example of this was Israel‘s bombing of 
the Iraqi nuclear reactor. However, even where Thatcher took a more 
independent line on Israel during the mid 1980s, she was still quick to condemn 
the Jewish State when it carried out operations across its borders (for example, 
during its raid on Tunis in October 1985).  
 
On 7 June 1981, Israeli aircraft bombed and destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 
Osirak, about ten miles outside Baghdad. The Israeli Government believed that 
the reactor was being used to conduct nuclear weapons research, and could have 
produced nuclear weapons within five years if it had not been destroyed. The 
Osirak operation was directly relevant to the US decision to sell airborne warning 
and control systems (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia since the Israelis had flown over 
the Kingdom on their way to bomb the reactor. Had the Saudis been in 
possession of AWACS prior to the raid, Israel would have had greater difficulty 
in launching such an operation.
2
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Britain played a significant role in the deliberations at the UN Security Council 
which led to the unanimous adoption of a resolution condemning the Israeli 
operation.
3
  Thatcher herself had little sympathy for Israeli claims of self-defence 
in the wake of the Osirak raid, condemning it as ―an unprovoked attack‖ and ―a 
grave breach of international law‖ during an appearance in the House of 
Commons on 9 June. On being asked by Greville Janner MP, a leading member 
of the Jewish Community, whether she was not relieved that the Iraqi regime had 
been deprived of a potential for nuclear weapons, she replied:  
Had there been an attack on Israel of the kind that there has just been on 
Iraq, I should totally and utterly have condemned it. I, therefore, totally 
and utterly condemn the attack on Iraq.
4
 
 
A short time afterwards, Ivan Lawrence, a Conservative MP and a leading 
supporter of Israel, met with the Prime Minister and expressed his 
discontentment over her condemnation of Israel‘s strike against Iraq‘s nuclear 
reactor. He asked the Prime Minister why she had condemned Israel, and why 
she was so certain that Iraq was not building nuclear weapons facility. Thatcher 
replied, ―Because I have been into the matter with a tooth-comb and there is no 
jot or tittle of evidence to back the claim.‖ Lawrence asked Thatcher whether she 
had seen the evidence that Israel had on the issue. The Prime Minister repeated 
her claim that there was no justification for Israel‘s air strike. Lawrence believed 
that Thatcher‘s condemnation of Israel was linked to her reliance on an ―Arabist 
FCO‖. The Conservative MP had concluded that while Thatcher was always a 
supporter of Israel, she had been pressured on occasions by the FCO to act 
against the Jewish State. He believed that the Prime Minister was too reliant on 
FCO advice. 
5
 Thatcher‘s condemnation of Israel‘s strike against Iraq was a 
graphic illustration of this.   
 
Nevertheless, Lawrence‘s suggestion that Thatcher‘s condemnation of Israel was 
directly linked to her reliance on the FCO is somewhat simplistic. Ultimately, she 
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acted against Israel because she sincerely believed it was in the wrong, and not 
simply because the FCO had influenced her to do so. In an interview with The 
Jewish Chronicle, a newspaper which reflected the views of the local 
community, the Prime Minister was asked whether she had in fact given 
Carrington and ―the old Arabists in the FCO‖ freedom to carry out Middle East 
policies without her interference. Uncharacteristically, Thatcher defended the 
FCO, rejecting the claim that it was ‗Arabist‘ in the sense that it supported one 
cause.  While Thatcher emphasized that she would not talk to the PLO until it 
recognized Israel and accentuated the positive aspects of the Venice Declaration 
from Israel‘s perspective, she repeatedly criticized the recent Israeli raid on the 
Iraqi nuclear reactor. Thatcher also indicated that she was ready to allow 
Carrington, in his role as the new President of the EEC Council of Ministers, to 
hold talks with PLO representatives.
6
 The Jewish Chronicle interview indicated 
that Thatcher was now very much on the same wavelength as the FCO on policy 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
 
Thatcher had shown also that she had no inhibitions in condemning Israeli policy 
when appearing before a Jewish forum. Thus, the Prime Minister condemned the 
Israeli Government decision to annex the Golan Heights, when she addressed the 
Board of Deputies on 15 December 1981. Thatcher told her Jewish audience that 
the decision of the Israeli Government to extend Israeli law and administration to 
the ―occupied Syrian territory‖ was a violation of international law and was 
―invalid‖. She added that the move was ―harmful to the search for peace.‖ 7  
 
Nevertheless, as Lochery points out, the Prime Minister‘s well publicized 
identification with Israel and her previous public statements in support of the 
Jewish State tended to protect her from a backlash from the local Jewish 
community, while Carrington and the FCO were viewed as the chief culprits for 
the new policy towards Israel.
8
 Carrington had told Hurd of his despondency 
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over ―being savaged by Israelis‖.9  He was also angered by his perception that 
the Israelis treated him unfairly: Carrington believed that the new French 
President Francois Mitterrand had expressed similar views but had been well 
received in Jerusalem.
10
 The Foreign Secretary was heckled throughout his 
address to a Jewish audience at Caxton Hall in London.
11
 Dr. Lionel Kopelowitz, 
a former President of the Board of Deputies, recalls his own words to Carrington 
after he addressed the Board in the autumn of 1981. In the course of offering the 
vote of thanks, Kopelowitz said to the Foreign Secretary:  
―I would be far from honest and less than sincere were I not to say that much of 
what you said made us shiver in our bones.‖12  
 
The Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia 
 
In the wake of Ronald Reagan‘s entry into the White House in January 1981, 
Thatcher became increasingly mindful of Washington‘s position on the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The Prime Minister was careful not to run too far ahead of the 
position favoured by Reagan and his White House. Thatcher had little rapport 
with Reagan‘s predecessor, Jimmy Carter, viewing him as a President who was 
out of his depth. In contrast, she saw Reagan as an intellectual soul mate, and 
was elated when he was elected President.
13
  Thatcher had an excellent 
relationship with Reagan. The platforms upon which they came to power were 
similar (tax cuts and strong defence), and they carried the same convictions when 
it came to the Soviet threat and the need to confront it.
14
 Reagan viewed Thatcher 
as “a tower of strength and a solid friend of the US.‖15 Young describes the 
Reagan-Thatcher relationship as ―the most enduring personal alliance in the 
Western world throughout the 1980s‖.16  
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The Reagan Administration provided strong and unwavering support for 
successive Israeli Governments. Reagan‘s warm friendship towards the Jewish 
State was based on his identification with Israel‘s democratic ideals. He also 
perceived it as an asset in the struggle against the expansion of Soviet influence 
in the Middle East. From this perspective, Thatcher and Reagan shared a 
common attitude towards the State of Israel. However, the British Prime Minister 
showed a greater readiness to confront the policies of the Likud Governments 
which she ultimately believed could pose difficulties for Western interests in the 
region.  As a result, Thatcher was prepared on occasion to approve policies and 
measures which were deeply resented by successive Israeli Governments. The 
US President, in contrast, was deeply reluctant to confront Begin and his 
successor Yitzhak Shamir, even though he had occasionally expressed private 
misgivings about their policies.   
 
As a result of the hardening of the cold war atmosphere, the Prime Minister 
became increasingly concerned that the Soviet Union would expand its influence 
in the region through exploiting Arab dissatisfaction over Washington‘s attitude 
towards the Arab-Israel conflict. This was a factor in Thatcher‘s strong 
encouragement for the American AWACS deal. It was believed that the sale of 
AWACS would consolidate the security of the Saudi oil fields, deter external 
attacks against moderate Arab countries and strengthen US relations with the 
Arab world. The Reagan Administration sought to utilize the AWACS deal as an 
opportunity to advance a strategic dialogue with moderate Arab states.  The 
Israeli Government was fiercely opposed to the strengthening of the offensive 
capacity of any Arab state. During a visit to Washington in September 1981, 
Begin expressed his opposition to the AWACS sale in the strongest terms, 
describing it as a grave threat to Israel‘s security. Pro-Israeli organizations 
lobbied intensively in Congress to thwart the sale.
17
 Reagan was surprised by the 
vehemence of Jewish opposition to the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, and wrote 
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in his diary: ―It must be plain to them, they‘ve never had a better friend of Israel 
in the W.H. than they have now.‖18 
 
In September 1981, Crown Prince Fahd held talks with Thatcher in London. The 
British Prime Minister expressed her support for the American sale of AWACS 
to Saudi Arabia. She also welcomed the possibility of the sale of British Nimrod 
surveillance to the Saudis, in the event of the US Congress blocking the AWACS 
deal.
19
 In the wake of her talks with the Saudi Crown Prince, Thatcher wrote a 
letter to President Reagan. In her letter, she informed him of the talks with her 
Arab interlocutors. She told the President that ―a mood of disappointment and 
alienation‖ had now permeated moderate Arab thinking about the Americans. 
Moreover, there was the sense that the West neglected the Palestinians, and was 
―one-sidedly committed to Israel.‖ She warned the President that the AWACS 
issue had now become a matter of critical importance throughout the Gulf area, 
and that a failure to conclude the sale would result in considerable damage to 
US-Arab relations.
20
 The Prime Minister‘s ability to exert influence in 
Washington on such an issue could only boost Britain‘s standing in the Arab 
world. The FCO viewed Thatcher‘s positive attitude to the Saudis as an asset. It 
was helpful to the FCO that she had friendly ties with King Fahd and Jordan‘s 
King Hussein, as well as the various Arab rulers in the Gulf region.
21
  
 
In the course of October 1981, Reagan exerted all his efforts to ensure that the 
sale went ahead. On 29 October, the US Senate narrowly approved the AWACS 
deal. Thatcher wrote to the President a few days later to congratulate him on the 
successful outcome.
22
 The Prime Minister had seen a valuable opportunity to 
enhance Britain‘s prestige in the Arab world, and would not let it slip, even at the 
expense of Israeli security concerns. Notwithstanding Thatcher‘s considerable 
admiration and sympathy for the State of Israel, she was a realist who was 
concerned also with threats to the stability of Britain‘s Arab allies.  The Prime 
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Minister had encouraged Reagan to follow through with the sale of AWACS to 
the Saudis since she believed it was essential to strengthen moderate Arab forces 
in the region. Crucially, though, it is likely that Thatcher also saw the AWACS 
deal as a means of boosting Western influence in the region at the expense of the 
Soviets. Thatcher‘s intervention in this sphere indicated that she was ready, on 
occasions, to use her growing influence to outflank the FCO in approving an 
arms deal which was fiercely opposed by the Begin Government.  
 
Carrington’s Resignation 
  
The FCO was jolted by the resignation of Lord Carrington in April 1982. 
Carrington had just embarked on a visit to Israel in a bid to initiate a political 
dialogue with the Begin Government. The very poor state of bilateral relations 
was encapsulated by the new British Ambassador, Patrick Moberly, who wrote 
the following in his Annual Review for 1981: 
We have not had a good year here. Britain‘s attitude has been roundly 
criticized by politicians, journalists and ordinary Israelis alike. We were 
represented as leading the European pack in ways unsympathetic to 
Israel. Venice remained a dirty word.
23
 
 
Carrington had initiated the visit with a view to improving Britain‘s relations 
with Israel,
24
 and believed that it had been a success. Carrington met with Begin, 
Shamir, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon (whom Carrington had 
been most impressed with), and believed that his visit had helped to improve 
bilateral relations.
25
 The Israelis also believed that the visit had achieved its main 
purpose which was to renew the dialogue between the two countries at the level 
of Foreign Secretary. It was felt that the visit had taken place in a good 
atmosphere, and the discussions were open. One official concluded that in spite 
of remaining disagreements, it was possible that there was a better understanding 
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of Israel‘s political perspectives and positions.26 Carrington‘s visit was 
significant as it indicated that the FCO was beginning to soften its position on 
Israel.  This would have benefits for a Prime Minister who was only too aware of 
the discontent of some of her constituents when it came to the Thatcher 
Government‘s policy on Israel. 
 
Carrington‘s visit was cut short, however, following reports that an Argentinean 
invasion of the Falkland Islands was imminent.  Carrington had been strongly 
criticized for the timing of his journey to Israel. The Foreign Secretary later 
admitted that he regretted embarking on the visit. On 2 April 1982, Argentina 
invaded the Falkland Islands. Three days later, Carrington resigned as Foreign 
Secretary. He felt that he had to shoulder a large part of the responsibility for 
what had occurred. There was also the fact that Carrington, as a member of the 
House of Lords, would not be able to defend the Prime Minister in the House of 
Commons during her time of need.
27
 
 
Losing Carrington was a blow for Thatcher since she had established a strong 
working relationship with him. She liked and trusted him in spite of their 
ideological differences. The Prime Minister had initially been very sceptical 
about Carrington‘s policy perspective on the Arab-Israeli conflict. She had 
opposed his policy on the PLO, and had serious doubts about the viability of a 
Palestinian homeland.
28
 Furthermore, during a trip to Washington, Thatcher had 
remonstrated to Carrington that his policies could lead to possible electoral 
defeat and even the loss of her Finchley constituency.
29
 This demonstrated that 
Thatcher was mindful of the views of Israel‘s supporters within her constituency 
and the wider Jewish community. At the same time, this had not been the 
determining factor in her policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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Notwithstanding her initial concerns on the Palestinian question, Carrington 
quickly exerted an important influence on the thinking of the Prime Minister, not 
only on the Arab-Israel question but also, for example, on policy towards 
Rhodesia. It is likely that Thatcher‘s antipathy towards Begin and his policies 
gave Carrington an opening which he quickly exploited.  Thatcher ultimately 
gave her Foreign Secretary free rein in the realm of Middle East policy, and 
ultimately adopted his policies as her own. The paradox was that in spite of 
Thatcher‘s apparent hostility towards the FCO, she tended to share the views of 
that institution on the Arab-Israel issue through the rest of her time in 10 
Downing Street. Carrington was an important force in bringing this about. He 
was able to apply considerably more influence on Middle East policy than his 
successors in the position, with the possible exception of Hurd. As 10 Downing 
Street amassed greater control over foreign policy during later years, 
Carrington‘s successors would not exert quite the same degree of authority that 
he had enjoyed.     
 
Carrington‘s resignation was also significant in that the patrician wing of the 
Conservative Party had now lost two important and influential voices within the 
cabinet. Gilmour had already resigned in the autumn of 1981. By June 1984, 
Carrington had left domestic politics in order to become the Secretary General of 
NATO.
30
 The patrician wing of the Conservative Party had played a role in the 
shift on the Palestinian question, but would gradually lose its influence over 
British policy. 
 
In the wake of Carrington‘s resignation, Francis Pym was appointed as Foreign 
Secretary. He was in the post for just over a year, and had little opportunity to 
formulate Middle East policy, in stark contrast to his predecessor. The 
appointment was considered by some in the FCO to be a very poor one. He had 
no qualifications for the position except that he was an able, decent and 
experienced Conservative politician. According to one FCO view, Pym had not 
been appointed to serve as Foreign Secretary. Rather, he was appointed as a 
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―dummy‖ to enable Thatcher to run foreign policy.31 Thatcher disliked Pym 
intensely from the outset, and the feeling was mutual. The mutual antipathy had 
been strengthened by developments in the Falklands conflict. Thatcher had 
strong disagreements with Pym over his preference for a negotiated settlement 
with the Argentineans. Indeed, most of Pym‘s own FCO ministers disagreed with 
him on the issue, believing that a negotiated settlement was unworkable because 
the Argentineans would not agree to anything that would require them to leave 
the Falkland Islands.
32
   
 
The Impact of the Falklands War 
 
The Falklands Conflict cast a shadow over Britain‘s ties with Israel, partly 
because of persistent allegations over Israeli arms sales to the Argentineans. 
Britain had received intelligence that the Israelis were supplying military 
hardware to Argentina during the war. There had also been extensive reports in 
the British media referring, among other things, to the sale of Israeli Gabriel 
missiles to Argentina via third countries.
33
 The Gabriel missile was a particularly 
advanced anti-ship missile, and was a significant export item for the Israelis at 
the time.
34
 The FCO summoned Israel‘s Ambassador to demand that Israel end 
its weapon sales to Argentina.
35
 The allegations regarding the sale of Israeli 
weapons to Argentina raised some unwelcome reminders of a difficulty that had 
long afflicted Anglo-Israeli relations. Argov referred to the issue in a public 
address, attacking Britain for ―picking on‖ Israel when it was his country that had 
a grievance in the matter of arms supplies – Israel, after all, had been singled out 
for an arms embargo since 1973, while Israel‘s enemies had been lavished with 
some of the most dangerous and sophisticated weaponry.
36
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 There was an additional reason why the Falklands War had an adverse impact on 
Britain‘s relations with Israel. The Thatcher Government and the Prime Minister, 
in particular, framed Britain‘s response to Israeli military actions increasingly 
through the prism of its own experience of Argentina‘s invasion of the Falklands. 
The American diplomat Philip Habib had brokered a ceasefire between Israel and 
the PLO in Lebanon in July 1981, following a sustained period of hostilities 
between the two parties. Nevertheless, the ceasefire became increasingly fragile 
in the intervening months, breaking down eventually in the early summer of 
1982.
37
 On 17 May 1982, following Israel‘s shelling of PLO bases in southern 
Lebanon, Israel‘s Ambassador Argov complained in a public address at the 
London Hilton that the British condemnation of the air attacks was the sharpest 
of all the EEC countries.
38
  Argov‘s address at the London Hilton was tragically 
to be one of his last. He was shot a few days later at point blank range by a 
gunman from the Palestinian splinter group Abu Nidal, and was left permanently 
paralysed.  
 
Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon 
 
The shooting of Argov was the trigger for Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon which 
took place on 6 June 1982, while Britain‘s war with Argentina was still at its 
height. Although Israeli intelligence officers had provided Begin and his cabinet 
with clear evidence that the shooting had been carried out by a terrorist group 
headed by Abu Nidal, a sworn enemy of the PLO, the Israeli Prime Minister 
ignored the evidence. A decision had been made to strike at the PLO.
39
   The 
Begin Government codenamed Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon ‗Operation Peace 
for Galilee‘, with a view to placing Israel‘s civilian population of northern Israel 
out of the range of terrorist fire from Lebanon.
40
 The FCO was not exclusively 
responsible for the strong line taken against Israel. The Prime Minister set the 
tone for Britain‘s response to Israel‘s action in Lebanon. If anything, Britain‘s 
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experience in the Falkland Islands meant that it judged Israel in a harsher light 
than it would otherwise have done. Thatcher was no exception to this rule. In an 
interview with ITN, the Prime Minister was asked why she had joined with EEC 
Ministers to ―vigorously condemn‖ Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon. Her response 
was unequivocal: 
 
Because she has gone across the borders of Israel, a totally independent 
country, which is not a party to the hostility and there are very very great 
hostilities, bombing, terrible things happening there. Of course one has to 
condemn them. It is someone else's country. You must condemn that. 
After all that is why we have gone to the Falklands, to repossess our 
country which has been taken by someone else...41  
 
However, Begin criticized what he perceived as Thatcher‘s double standards in a 
lengthy address to the Knesset. He charged that Thatcher had sent troops to war 
thousands of miles from British shores, on grounds of self-defence. Yet Israel 
was taking defensive measures a few kilometers away, and was told that it had 
no right to base its actions on self-defence.
42
 Certainly, Israel‘s perception of the 
Falklands War through the prism of their own experience in Lebanon resulted in 
greater misunderstandings and turmoil, as Moberly reported in his end of year 
review:  
Israelis inevitably saw the Falklands campaign through the glass of their 
preoccupation with Lebanon. If Britain was prepared to fight thousands 
of miles from home, Israelis thought we should understand their 
obsession with security across their own frontier. They side-stepped the 
fact that invasion was invasion wherever it took place, and that we were 
bound to condemn Israel just as we condemned Argentina. This 
difference in perspectives was made worse by the wrangle, partly public, 
partly private, over Israeli arms supplies to Argentina, in which the 
Israelis seemed chiefly concerned to keep their balance between both 
parties but succeeded in annoying Britain the most.
43
 
 
Thatcher‘s attitude to Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon also had to be seen in the 
context of her fierce anti-Soviet position. Thatcher would undoubtedly have been 
concerned that the Soviets would exploit Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon as a means 
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to win the support of the Arab world, to the detriment of Western strategic 
interests.  From this perspective, a forthright British condemnation of Israel‘s 
actions was part of a general attempt to maintain the goodwill of moderate Arab 
states and protect British interests in the region.  
 
Britain Imposes an Arms Embargo on Israel 
 
Moberly cabled London, stating his view that an arms embargo would be ―the 
readiest means to hand of signalling the strength of Community disapproval of 
Israeli actions.‖ Nevertheless, he added that in military terms, an embargo was 
unlikely to worry Israel as it would be mainly symbolic and designed for Arab 
opinion. In the event of such an embargo, there was the fear that Britain along 
with France would be singled out as the ―ringleaders‖. Moberly warned that the 
British embargo of 1973 would receive emphasis while the French would be 
protected to some extent by their better standing in Israel. Moberly‘s concern 
was that Israel could make life difficult for Britain by increasing arms supplies to 
Argentina, including aircraft and missiles. The Ambassador expressed his 
preference for holding the embargo in reserve in the event of an all-out Israeli 
assault on west Beirut.
44
 
  
As the Israeli military offensive in Lebanon intensified through June, pressure 
grew within the EEC for sanctions against Israel. In the days following Israel‘s 
invasion of Lebanon, the Prime Minister was asked for her position on the 
possibility of sanctions against the Israelis. She stated that she was ―very 
hesitant‖ about applying sanctions since they were likely to be unproductive over 
a long period. However, she noted that they could work in the short term.
45
  This 
suggested that Thatcher was at least open to short-term measures against the 
Israelis. Indeed, Number Ten had made an enquiry with the FCO in regard to 
European attitudes towards an arms embargo.
46
  At the end of June, the EEC 
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Heads of State convened in Brussels where the Middle East crisis was discussed. 
The leaders of the ten European countries agreed that the Second Financial 
Protocol between the Community and Israel would be suspended.
47
 The Protocol 
would have enabled Israel to borrow money from the EEC. During a press 
conference at the UN, Thatcher confirmed that the EEC had approved the 
measure which stopped the financial arrangement.
48
 
  
It was also noted during the European Council meeting that no sale of military 
equipment to Israel by member states was taking place.
49
 However, British 
restrictions on arms sales to Israel had already been applied for a number of 
years. This was exemplified by the rejection of Begin‘s request to Thatcher in 
1980 for Scorpion armoured vehicles.
50
 By 1982, British arms sales to Israel 
were running at no more than £3 million a year.
51
 Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon 
resulted in a formal British decision in 1982 to ban arms sales to Israel. While the 
ban was relaxed somewhat over time, it remained in place throughout Thatcher‘s 
period in 10 Downing Street.  
  
The Israelis viewed the FCO as the leading force behind the decision not to 
authorize arms sales to Israel. The MOD was largely in agreement with the FCO 
on the issue of restricting arms sales to Israel, although elements within the MOD 
were arguably a little more flexible towards Israel on dual use equipment which 
had a civilian use.
52
 Either way, the restrictions on defence equipment to Israel 
could not have remained in effect without the cooperation of 10 Downing Street. 
The Whitehall bureaucracy was not in a position to make sensitive decisions 
relating to Israel without the clearance of the Prime Minister. Any decision on an 
arms embargo would certainly have required the approval of Number Ten.
53
 This 
was a further illustration of the cooperation between the various Whitehall 
departments and Prime Minister Thatcher.  
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The Growing Influence of Douglas Hurd 
     
Following the resignation of Carrington in the wake of the Falklands debacle, 
Hurd rose up the ladder. He shouldered significantly more responsibilities than 
was normal for an FCO Minister of State. He debated with Thatcher over 
contacts with the PLO, and argued that the Palestinian organization had to be 
distinguished from the IRA because it represented a majority.
54
    In July 1982, 
Thatcher agreed to a higher level dialogue with the PLO.  Hurd was to meet with 
Farouk Kaddoumi, the Head of the PLO political bureau, who was visiting 
London as part of an Arab League delegation. Hurd noted that this was a ―shift in 
policy only dragged out of a reluctant Prime Minister.‖55  Hurd maintains that he 
was able to gradually reconcile Thatcher to the need for movement on the PLO. 
While she had a strong personal dislike of Arafat because of his conduct and his 
involvement in violence, Thatcher did show flexibility on the PLO and realized 
that the Palestinian cause was moving forward.
56 
 
 
Moberly had warned London that the meeting of a British minister with 
Kaddoumi could result in a ―severe Israeli reaction‖ in the present climate.  He 
noted that Britain was ―already in the dog house with the Israelis.‖ Britain was 
accused of ―leading the European pack‖ after the invasion of Lebanon, and of 
issuing statements more hostile than those of European counterparts. 
Significantly, the British Ambassador stated that the Israelis believed that Britain 
had pressed for an arms embargo by the ten EEC members at the European 
Council meeting in Brussels. There was bitterness over restrictions imposed on 
defence links with Israel.
57
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Moberly noted that French Ministers had already met with the PLO 
representative, and had been subject to angry Israeli protests. Nevertheless, he 
believed that the Israelis did not regard the underlying friendship between the 
Israeli and French Governments as having been compromised, and that the 
relationship would recover. Moberly feared that the same would not apply to 
Britain, as he summed up the underlying crisis afflicting Anglo-Israeli relations: 
There is a legacy of suspicion here towards Britain. Relations are already 
at a low ebb. For a British Minister to receive a leading official of the 
PLO could, I suspect, be just about the last straw… I hesitate to predict 
the consequences.
58
 
 
In spite of Moberly‘s warning, Hurd‘s meeting with Kaddoumi and the Arab 
League delegation took place as planned. Saudi Arabia‘s Foreign Minister, 
Prince Saud Al-Faisal, had also requested that the Thatcher Government receive 
Kaddoumi as part of the Arab League delegation.
59
  Thatcher authorized the 
meeting between Hurd and Kaddoumi who was accompanied by Sheikh 
Muhammad bin Mubarak, the Foreign Minister of Bahrain. Hurd‘s achievement 
in cajoling Thatcher to agree to his meeting with Kaddoumi reflected 
Carrington‘s earlier success in encouraging the Prime Minister to agree to a shift 
in British policy on Palestinian self-determination. The FCO retained significant 
influence over Thatcher on policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The Prime 
Minister‘s cooperation with the FCO was reflected by her authorization of 
Hurd‘s meeting with Kaddoumi and her agreement to impose an official ban on 
arms sales to Israel.  
 
Growing Disquiet in Israel and within the UK Jewish Community  
 
Although Thatcher had initially taken a firm stand on Israel‘s invasion of 
Lebanon, in the months that followed, the FCO would set the tone on Britain‘s 
policy towards the region with an increasingly robust response to events. On 17 
September 1982, Christian Phalangist militiamen entered the Palestinian refugee 
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camps of Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon, and killed many hundreds of civilians.
60
 
Israel faced a barrage of unprecedented criticism from the international 
community, as it was claimed that the Israeli forces had allowed the massacre to 
happen under its control.
61
 The FCO instructed Moberly to seek a meeting with 
the Israel Foreign Ministry at the highest level, and communicate the views of 
the Government on recent events in Beirut. He was instructed to tell his Israeli 
counterpart that ―British opinion [was] universally appalled at the cold blooded 
killing of Palestinian civilians.‖ In view of the fact that there had been nine 
months of relative peace on the Israel-Lebanon border, the Israelis had to be told 
that Britain found the events since 4 June ―sickening‖.62 
  
The Israeli Government was dismayed by the strong British condemnations of 
the events in Lebanon. In the wake of the assassination attempt on Argov, Biran 
became Israel‘s Charge D‘Affaires in London. Biran was deeply unhappy with 
the fierce criticism and the perceived hostile attitude of the FCO.
63
 Alfred 
Sherman, a confidante of the Prime Minister who had been a significant mentor 
and speechwriter while she had been in opposition, corresponded with Thatcher 
on a great many subjects. On this occasion, he questioned the wisdom of a policy 
that was dictated by the FCO. He wrote:  
For understandable reasons, I have never pressed my views on the Arab-
Israeli dispute, in general or particular. But since you mentioned the 
issue, en passant, last week, I think I should let you know that I regard 
Israel‘s incursion into the Lebanon with the aim of ousting the PLO and 
restoring the status quo ante as generally justified, in terms of Israel‘s 
security, Lebanon‘s well-being and the area‘s relative tranquillity.  
It follows that I consider the British government‘s response as wrongly 
conceived, both in terms of international morality and British interests...I 
fear that the FCO vendetta over-rides other considerations...I fear that the 
FCO‘s obsession has led them to under-rate the dangers inherent to us in 
the Iran-Iraq war...  
64
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The implication in Sherman‘s letter was that Thatcher had allowed the FCO‘s 
―obsession‖ with Israel and its apparent hostility towards that country to distort 
British policy in the region. Both Biran and Sherman viewed the FCO as the 
source of the hostile attitude towards Israel, and ignored the role that Number 
Ten had played in the policy. Not for the first time, there was a discrepancy 
between the perception of Thatcher‘s position on the Arab-Israel conflict and her 
actual policy which was almost indistinguishable from the FCO‘s policy. 
  
The strong British criticism of Israel‘s actions in Lebanon had a deleterious 
impact on Anglo-Israeli relations which had shown signs of recovering in the 
wake of Carrington‘s visit to Jerusalem some months earlier. The very poor state 
of Anglo-Israeli relations was illustrated by the stormy meeting between Foreign 
Secretary Pym and Israel‘s Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir in October 1982. 
Pym described Israeli policy as ―provocative‖ and its Government as 
―intransigent‖. Shamir recalled that the previous Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Carrington, had visited Israel in an attempt to improve the tone and put an end to 
the arguments between Israel and Britain. Yet now, complained Shamir, the FCO 
under its present leadership was using ―confrontational language‖ against Israel. 
Pym admitted that since his predecessor had visited Jerusalem, the gap between 
the two countries had widened significantly.
65
  
 
Pym did not appear to be particularly sympathetic to Israel‘s security concerns. 
Later, he wrote in his book, ‗The Politics of Consent‘ that Israel had a ―sense of 
insecurity that borders on the paranoid.‖ 66  His impatience with Israel in the 
wake of its invasion of Lebanon was arguably a factor in the fierce criticisms 
emanating from the FCO.  Pym had angered Begin by his reference to 500,000 
homeless in south Lebanon. Kieran Prendergast, a senior British diplomat 
serving in Israel was informed of this during a lunch in Jerusalem with Israeli 
official Amos Ganor. The Israeli told Prendergast that Begin had considerable 
respect for the professionalism of the FCO: in his opinion, the British would not 
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get their facts wrong; if Pym had started an ―absurd rumour‖, Begin would 
assume that this was done deliberately.
67
  
 
There was great disquiet in the Jewish community over the stance of the FCO. 
During the summer months of 1982, senior representatives of the Jewish 
community and pro-Israeli MPs charged that the FCO attacks on Israel were 
encouraging an atmosphere of anti-Semitism.
68
  Hurd later sent a note to the 
President of the Board of Deputies, Greville Janner, stating ―let us have no more 
talk of anti-Semitism!‖ The Israeli Embassy in London was aware of Hurd‘s note 
to Janner, and viewed it as evidence that the Conservative Government was 
sensitive to charges of anti-Semitism.
69
 
 
 The Israeli Government naturally viewed the FCO as the source of the hostile 
British Government position on the invasion of Lebanon. However, Thatcher‘s 
condemnations immediately following Israel‘s invasion were also firm and 
unequivocal. Furthermore, Oliver Miles, the Head of NENAD between 1980 and 
1983, maintains that the FCO was careful to coordinate its statements on Israel 
with 10 Downing Street:  
 
We knew that the Prime Minister was very interested in this issue and we 
were constantly taking the temperature, so to speak... Every time that we 
wanted to say something which could be regarded as critical of Israel, we 
would have taken the temperature in Number Ten first.
70
   
 
This indicates that the Prime Minister‘s position on Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon 
was largely the same as that of the FCO. Any fierce condemnations of Israel 
from the FCO would have been made with the knowledge of Downing Street. 
However, the FCO was setting the tone during the Lebanon crisis, while 
Thatcher had exerted little impact on policy aside from her early condemnations.    
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Nevertheless, there were differences in approach on the steps to be taken to end 
the carnage. Thatcher had sent a letter to President Reagan on 29 July, 
emphasizing the need to take account of the wider Palestinian problem and the 
risks involved with Israel driving the PLO from Lebanon into Syria. However, in 
the wake of Israel‘s attack on West Beirut, the FCO submitted an additional draft 
message calling on President Reagan to make it clear that Israel‘s action was 
unacceptable, and that further American financial and military assistance would 
be jeopardized. Thatcher decided not to send the draft message, expressing 
doubts that it would lead Reagan to take action.
71
 Thatcher would have given 
careful consideration as to whether she was prepared to irritate the United States 
by pushing for an action which was not likely to be implemented.
72
 The Prime 
Minister knew Reagan‘s mind better than the FCO, and had a realistic view of 
what could be achieved. 
   
The Shift in British Public Opinion 
 
Thatcher‘s position on the Arab-Israel conflict would have been influenced to a 
certain degree by the changing climate of British public opinion. An official in 
NENAD had noted that the post bag which normally ran strongly in Israel‘s 
favour had expanded considerably since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
However, since 1 July 1982, letters critical of Israel had consistently 
outnumbered those in favour by about two to one.
73
 Within British Jewry itself, 
the consensus on Israel had been seriously eroded with the invasion of Lebanon. 
Organizations such as the British Friends of Peace Now were established, 
representing the views of leading Jewish intellectuals, writers and academics 
who were questioning the blind acceptance of Israeli policies by mainstream 
Jewish communal institutions. The rifts within Anglo-Jewry over Israel‘s 
invasion of Lebanon reflected divisions within Israeli society itself on the issue.
74
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Significantly, the British Labour Party was shifting its position on Israel. In the 
course of the early 1980s, there had been a marked collapse of support for Israel 
within all sections of the Labour Party. This had been caused by the rise of the 
Labour left, the increase in Palestinian activism in Western political circles, the 
rightward shift in Israel and the growing support of British Jews for the 
Conservative Party. Undoubtedly, Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon had accelerated 
this shift among the British left. The invasion sparked a wave of condemnation of 
Israeli policy among the grass-roots of the Labour Party.
75
 Thus, there had been a 
significant shift in attitudes towards Israel within the Labour Party since 
Callaghan‘s criticism of Thatcher over her support for the Venice Declaration. It 
was easier for the Thatcher Government to condemn Israeli policy over Lebanon 
in the knowledge that there was a bipartisan consensus on the issue.       
 
The Reagan Plan 
 
On 1 September 1982, President Reagan unveiled his own Middle East peace 
initiative. He endorsed the idea of a five-year period during which the Palestinian 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza would have ―full autonomy over their 
own affairs.‖ A self-governing Palestinian authority would be established 
through free elections in association with Jordan on the West Bank. The initiative 
also called for an immediate settlement freeze by Israel in the territories. Reagan 
emphasized, however, that the United States would not support the establishment 
of an independent Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza, and would not 
support annexation of the territories by Israel.  Jerusalem would remain 
undivided, but its final status would be decided through negotiation.
76
 This was 
the first American peace initiative in the Middle East since the Camp David 
Accords of 1978. Israel swiftly rejected the Reagan Plan outright. Begin had 
written to President Reagan on the subject, stating that ―a friend does not weaken 
his friend; an ally does not put his ally in jeopardy‖.77 Yehuda Avner, an aide to 
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the Israeli Prime Minister, conceded during discussions with Moberly that 
Begin‘s hasty rejection of Reagan‘s initiative had been tactically unwise.78  
 
Thatcher warmly welcomed the Reagan initiative, describing it as a ―constructive 
and imaginative approach to the Palestinian problem.‖ 79 She was also 
encouraged by the position of Shimon Peres, the Israeli Labour Leader, on the 
Reagan Plan. During Thatcher‘s meeting with US Secretary of Defence 
Weinberger, she joked that it was ironic that both she and the US Secretary were 
encouraged by a position taken by a Labour party – that of Mr. Peres.80 Indeed, 
over time, Thatcher and the FCO came to share the view that it would become 
necessary to strengthen the domestic position of Peres in the light of his dovish 
approach to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. 
 
Thatcher and the FCO were in close agreement over the need to support the 
Reagan initiative. Thatcher had stated in the House of Commons that only the 
United States would be able to bring pressure to bear upon Israel. She added that 
a proper solution of the Lebanon problem would only be achieved with the 
resolution of the Palestinian problem.
81
 Thatcher had been using her influence 
with the Reagan Administration to try and persuade the American President to 
advance a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. A State Department briefing had 
mentioned that Thatcher would be interested in American intentions with regard 
to resolving the Palestinian question. It stated that ―we must impress upon 
[Thatcher] our resolve to make early progress on this through intense efforts to 
build on progress already made through the Camp David framework.‖82 
 
In a similar vein, Pym accepted that Europe did not have sufficient influence 
over the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that the United States held the 
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key to the solution of the conflict.
83
 In a letter to Shamir a short time before the 
general election of June 1983, he expressed his great concern at the lack of 
progress in the Arab-Israel dispute, and urged the Israeli Government to 
reconsider its rejection of the Reagan initiative which offered the best hope for a 
negotiated settlement.
84
    
 
Convergence between the FCO and 10 Downing Street 
 
Thatcher had believed that the FCO was prejudiced towards the Arab 
viewpoint.
85
 Malcolm Rifkind recalled that Thatcher had summoned him to her 
office during the Falklands campaign. There had been a reshuffle. Rifkind had 
been serving as a minister in the Scottish office. She told Rifkind that she wanted 
him to serve in the FCO. He was delighted.  She said to him at one stage, 
―You‘re Jewish aren‘t you?‖ He said yes. She said, ―That won‘t do any harm at 
the FCO!‖ Rifkind viewed this as a reflection of Thatcher‘s suspicions of the 
FCO ‗Camel Corps‘.86 Ultimately, however, Thatcher‘s suspicious attitude 
towards the FCO was not linked to any sense that it was pro-Arab: it was related 
to her belief that the FCO was pro-compromise on every issue.
87
 Yet over time, 
Thatcher was as determined as the FCO to achieve such a ―compromise‖ in the 
Arab-Israel arena. Since Britain stood to gain politically and economically from a 
settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, Thatcher expected to see Israel 
demonstrate greater flexibility on the Palestinian question.  
 
Lochery maintains that the regular direct communication between 10 Downing 
Street and the White House during the latter period of Thatcher‘s first term of 
office meant that the FCO was circumvented to some extent on the American-
British diplomatic track.
88
 This tendency was even more marked during the 
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Prime Minister‘s second and third terms of office.  The appointment of Parsons 
as Thatcher‘s Foreign Policy Advisor in November 1982 provided the first 
concrete indication that the Prime Minister was taking greater control over 
foreign policy towards the end of her first term.   
 
Parsons and Thatcher did not see eye to eye on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thatcher 
encouraged Parsons to disagree with her – she did not want a ‗yes man‘ in the 
position.
89
 In fact, Thatcher‘s appointment was a very interesting one in the 
context of policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict. Parsons was a diplomat in the 
Arabist mould. Parsons believed that Britain had to be very cautious in its 
dealings with Israel since this could damage important strategic interests. A short 
time before the Conservative Government had come to power, Parsons had 
issued the following warning: 
 
No country has a clearer perception of its own national interest than Israel 
has and no country pursues this interest more single-mindedly. Hence, 
when our interests diverge, there is bound to be a certain amount of blood 
shed… They are so convinced of the rightness and expediency of their 
own policies that they have a natural tendency to pocket favours from 
others and carry on regardless, with loud cries of resentment if any 
attempt is made to use the practical content of the relationship as any kind 
of leverage, however discreet.
90
    
 
Thatcher would have been aware of Parsons‘s position on the Arab-Israel 
conflict prior to appointing him. The fact that she appointed him as her Foreign 
Policy Adviser suggests that she had become more receptive to such views. 
Hennessy has suggested that Parsons may have been appointed because of his 
independent thinking on foreign policy, and the fact that he was ―not an 
establishment man‖. In fact, while Parsons believed that Britain had to support 
the United States in areas such as policy on NATO, he felt that scepticism was 
required on Washington‘s Middle East policy because of the role of domestic US 
lobbies which distorted the process.
91
 In view of Parsons‘s position on the Arab-
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Israel conflict, there are no grounds to suggest that Thatcher was about to forge 
an independent policy in this arena. However, the appointment did indicate that 
the policy unit in Number Ten was about to acquire a greater influence over the 
management of foreign policy.   
 
The fact that the FCO was marginalized to some degree, particularly on Anglo-
American cooperation on the Middle East, during the latter period of Thatcher‘s 
first term of  office did not mean that there were differences between the Prime 
Minister and the FCO on policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, the 
Prime Minister approved a policy that was carried out along the lines sought by 
the FCO. That Thatcher was now exerting greater control over policy had 
masked the reality that there was a considerable convergence between Whitehall 
and 10 Downing Street on policy towards the region. Even after Carrington 
departed from the scene, Thatcher continued to place great importance on a 
settlement in the Middle East in line with the FCO view.  
 
In the months prior to the general election of 1983, she spoke out against the 
building of settlements in the West Bank which she described as ―illegal‖. The 
Prime Minister made it clear that she stood by her belief in Palestinian self-
determination as well as the right of Israel to exist behind secure borders.
92
 
Thatcher had supported the FCO line on Israel‘s operation against the Iraqi 
nuclear reactor. The Prime Minister had vociferously protested Israel‘s decision 
to annex the Golan Heights and its invasion of Lebanon. She had also approved 
the imposition of an arms embargo against Israel. The FCO‘s hostility towards 
Begin and his policies was shared by the Prime Minister. Indeed, in working to 
strengthen ties with moderate Arab states, as reflected in her lobbying for the 
AWACS deal, it can be argued that Thatcher outflanked the FCO. The Prime 
Minister had exploited her close relationship with the Reagan Administration to 
promote an arms deal that was fiercely opposed by the Israeli Government.  
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Thatcher’s Differences with the FCO on the PLO 
 
Nevertheless, Thatcher‘s growing control over foreign policy was reflected in her 
readiness to push a stronger line which was occasionally at odds with the 
position of the FCO. One area where differences did exist was on policy towards 
the PLO. Thatcher had reluctantly allowed Hurd to meet with Farouk Kaddoumi 
in July 1982. More controversially, she had been a party to the Venice 
Declaration, and had therefore affirmed the right of the PLO to speak on behalf 
of the Palestinians in a negotiated peace settlement. Nevertheless, she remained 
very hostile towards the PLO. She had stated in Kuwait a year previously that the 
real aim of the organization was to ―drive Israel into the sea and wipe it off the 
face of the globe.‖93  
 
In December 1982, Thatcher had decided not to receive an Arab League 
delegation in London because it included a member of the PLO. During 
Parliamentary Questions, the Labour MP Andrew Faulds asked Thatcher if she 
had discussed with her European colleagues the damage she had done to 
Britain‘s ties with the Arab world through her ―misguided‖ interference in 
foreign affairs – namely, her refusal to meet with a PLO representative. Thatcher 
responded that Faulds knew very well that her Government did not receive 
members of the PLO, but this was not the same as receiving Palestinian 
representatives.
94
  
 
During a press briefing at the FCO in January 1983, Hurd stated that the PLO 
had determined that an Arab League delegation would visit the FCO and 10 
Downing Street with the inclusion of a PLO representative, or it would not visit 
at all. While Hurd made it clear that the FCO was not opposed to such a visit, he 
added cryptically ―but the sensitivities are here.‖ An Israeli diplomatic cable 
suggested that the FCO Minister was referring to Thatcher‘s ―sensitivities‖ on 
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the matter.
95
 Thatcher later made it clear in the House of Commons that she 
refused to host the Arab League delegation since neither she nor cabinet 
ministers would meet with the PLO.
96
 The Prime Minister would not entertain 
such meetings until the organization renounced terrorism and recognized the 
State of Israel. Thatcher‘s refusal to meet with the Arab League delegation was 
not a major difficulty for the FCO at that time since it was clear what the rules 
were on the PLO. The FCO would have liked ideally to have changed the rules 
but they accepted them as they were.
97
 Ultimately, the FCO adapted itself to the 
line of Number Ten on the PLO. This was equally true during Thatcher‘s second 
term as the Prime Minister exerted greater control over policy.    
 
Nevertheless, in return for her decision not to host the Arab League delegation, 
Thatcher later made a concession. She authorized Hurd to meet with the PLO‘s 
Kaddoumi, once again, in April 1983. Furthermore, Thatcher did finally receive 
an Arab League delegation on 18 March 1983 led by King Hussein. On this 
occasion, while no official PLO representative was present in the delegation, 
Walid Khalidi, a Palestinian academic, was included and was assumed by 
everybody to be a spokesman for the organization.
98
 Thatcher had been greatly 
impressed by Khalidi.
99
 Moberly was summoned to the Foreign Ministry where 
he was told of Israel‘s dismay and displeasure over Hurd‘s meeting with 
Kaddoumi.
100
  The Board of Deputies also sent a letter of protest in the wake of 
the meeting.
101
 
 
The PLO was one area of policy in the Arab-Israeli arena where the FCO was 
constrained by Number Ten. The FCO would ideally have pursued high-level 
ministerial contacts with the PLO, but the Prime Minister was opposed to this 
course of action.
102
 There were a number of factors behind Thatcher‘s stand on 
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the PLO. First, the Prime Minister had a reputation for firmness on the issue of 
terrorism. She refused to countenance talks with terrorists, whether it was the 
PLO, the IRA or the ANC.
103
 A second factor (which Faulds had referred to) was 
that the Prime Minister was reluctant to upset the Reagan Administration by 
approving high-level contacts with the PLO. The United States had been 
constrained by an undertaking that had been made in 1975 ruling out any 
political dialogue with the PLO until it recognized Israel‘s right to exist, 
renounced terrorism and accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 
338.
104
 A third factor was the views of Israel‘s supporters in Thatcher‘s Finchley 
constituency and beyond. Thatcher had previously remonstrated with Carrington 
that his policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict risked alienating her local 
supporters in Finchley. This indicated that Thatcher was mindful of the 
sensitivities of Israel‘s supporters within her constituency and the Jewish 
community in general. The Prime Minister might have calculated that a firm 
position on the PLO could be helpful in electoral terms. 
  
Thatcher‘s differences with the FCO on the PLO, however, were less significant 
than they appeared. Indeed, the FCO had persuaded the Prime Minister into 
making significant concessions. Thatcher allowed the PLO to hold an office in 
London, and FCO officials were able to meet freely with representatives of the 
organization both in the UK and abroad. The fact that Thatcher had twice 
authorized talks between Hurd and the PLO constituted a breakthrough in British 
policy towards the organization. In August 1977, during the Callaghan period, 
Britain‘s Ambassador in Damascus, James Craig, had met secretly with the PLO 
official Khaled Fahoum, and had to plead with the Palestinians not to publicize 
details of the meeting.
105
 Over five years later, such meetings were the norm. 
Thus, under Thatcher, British contacts with the PLO had actually been 
strengthened considerably.  It would therefore be misleading to present 
Thatcher‘s disagreement over the PLO as an example of her intervention against 
FCO policy.  
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Thatcher‘s stand over the Arab League delegation was made during a period 
when she was starting to assert a measure of independence on foreign policy.  
Her appointment of Parsons reflected this readiness to assert her authority in 
foreign affairs and question elements of FCO policy. Thus, her refusal to host the 
Arab League delegation in London could be seen in this context. However, 
Thatcher‘s stand over this question of policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict was 
the exception to the rule, and did not presage a significant shift in policy.  
133 
 
Summary 
 
During the first term of the Thatcher Government, it emerged that the Prime 
Minister‘s thinking on Middle East issues was driven primarily by geopolitical 
factors. Thatcher was concerned by the danger of a heightened Soviet presence in 
the Middle East, at a time of growing East-West tensions. There was also unease 
over the rise in Islamic fundamentalism, in the wake of the Iranian revolution.  
Thatcher had initially viewed Israel as a Western bulwark against the threat of 
Soviet expansion through the Middle East.
106
 She was therefore initially opposed 
to the FCO initiative on Palestinian self-determination, out of concern for Israel 
as a strategic asset.
107
  
 
Over time, however, Thatcher began to see the Begin Government as a liability 
rather than an asset for Western strategic interests. Like the FCO, Thatcher was 
anxious to see a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, because 
she believed that a prolonged stalemate would destabilize the region. Thatcher 
feared that the Soviets and other radical forces would gain greater influence in 
the Middle East, as a result of the regional deadlock.
108
 Thus, the Prime Minister 
embraced a shift in British Middle East policy, and pledged her full support for 
Palestinian self-determination, as part of a European bid to rally Arab support to 
the West. However, the Begin Government was not prepared to countenance 
territorial concessions in the West Bank or Gaza .Thus, the British unease over 
Soviet ambitions in the region tended increasingly to work against the Begin 
Government which was not prepared to show the flexibility demanded of it.  The 
FCO also sought to contain Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, and there was 
therefore a growing convergence between the FCO and Number Ten through 
Thatcher‘s first term of office.  
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In the Arab-Israel arena, Thatcher demonstrated that she was very much a 
pragmatist rather than an ideological crusader. This explains why there was a 
large degree of cooperation between Number Ten and Whitehall on Middle East 
policy. Indeed, her pragmatism extended even to policy on the PLO. In her 
public rhetoric, Thatcher expressed her fierce hostility to the PLO
109
, and took a 
stand over her refusal to meet with PLO officials. In private, however, she had 
indicated that she could not rule out dealings with the organization in a bid to 
achieve a peace settlement.
110
 Indeed, during her first term of office, the 
restrictions on contacts with the PLO were gradually lifted.  
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Section Two 
Chapters 4 – 6 
 
Introduction 
 
During the second term of the Thatcher Government, power shifted noticeably 
from Whitehall to 10 Downing Street. Thatcher herself played an increasingly 
dominant role in foreign policy during her second and third terms in office. As 
policy became concentrated in the hands of Number Ten, one would have 
expected policy to diverge significantly from the position of the FCO, in view of 
Thatcher‘s hostility to the Whitehall bureaucracy. However, to a large degree, the 
increasing involvement of 10 Downing Street in foreign affairs resulted in 
policies that closely accorded with Whitehall objectives, such as Thatcher‘s 
personal invitation to the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in 1985, her direct role 
in arms sales to Saudi Arabia during the same period, and the discreet support for 
the Peres-Hussein London Agreement in 1987. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
FCO was outflanked by the Prime Minister with the actions she took vis-a-vis the 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and arms sales.  
 
During the second term of the Thatcher Government, the convergence between 
10 Downing Street and the FCO in the Arab-Israel arena remained in place. The 
FCO viewed Thatcher‘s groundbreaking visit to Israel as an opportunity to 
strengthen the domestic position of Shimon Peres.
1
 Thatcher cooperated with the 
FCO as she too wanted to see Peres prevail over his Likud rival Shamir in 
Israel‘s National Unity Government. Geoffrey Howe, the new Foreign Secretary, 
and Thatcher had both welcomed the Hussein-Arafat Accord of 1985, and 
worked in close coordination over the visit of Shamir to London in June 1985, 
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and the invitation of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to London in October 
1985.  
 
Howe did not enjoy the same influence on the Prime Minister as Carrington, and 
eventually became sidelined with the appointment of Charles Powell as 
Thatcher‘s Private Secretary. However, the FCO was able to exert a subtle 
influence on policy during Thatcher‘s second term of office which was 
demonstrated in a number of key areas: a political dialogue with the Israeli 
Government was initiated as a means to acquiring leverage over the Israelis. 
Notwithstanding some initial Israeli suspicions over the dialogue, it led to a 
significant improvement in Anglo-Israeli ties over the next few years.  The FCO 
had also played a significant part in encouraging Thatcher to meet with a 
Palestinian delegation, and to call for an end to the Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza during her visit to Israel in May 1986.  The bureaucracy also 
determined that the restrictions on arms sales to Israel would continue. Thatcher 
agreed with this decision.  Thus, in spite of the growing control of the Number 
Ten policy unit over foreign policy, Thatcher remained a pragmatist and did not 
pursue an independent policy in the Middle East arena.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The FCO Initiates a Dialogue with Israel 
 
It is argued in this chapter that British policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict 
was remarkably cohesive, notwithstanding the growing involvement of 10 
Downing Street in foreign policy. The FCO had traditionally sought to 
discourage a close relationship between the British and Israeli Governments.
1
 
However, it was the FCO and not 10 Downing Street which took an initiative 
during the second term of the Thatcher Government to promote a political 
dialogue with the Likud Government. The dialogue was designed to enable 
Britain to acquire greater leverage over the Israelis and win their confidence. It 
helped to improve the atmosphere between the two countries. Thus, it was the 
FCO which adopted a more conciliatory policy towards Israel, while Thatcher 
gradually hardened her stance towards the Likud Government. Thus, she had 
urged the Reagan Administration to take a harder line with Israel,
2
 and came into 
confrontation with Shamir during his visit to London in June 1985.
3
  Thatcher 
was increasingly concerned that the Likud policy was perpetuating a regional 
stalemate which would benefit the Soviet Union and damage British interests in 
the Arab world.  
 
Thatcher Takes Control of Foreign Policy 
 
Following Thatcher‘s election victory in June 1983, the policy unit in Number 
Ten gradually assumed greater control over foreign policy. Parsons remained in 
his post for only a few more months before being replaced by Sir Percy Cradock, 
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another diplomat. The British Prime Minister was becoming increasingly 
involved in foreign policy issues during her second and third terms in office. 
That this was the case owed much to the appointment in June 1984 of Charles 
Powell, who took over from John Coles as Thatcher‘s Foreign Affairs Private 
Secretary. Powell‘s entry into 10 Downing Street marked a change as Thatcher 
exerted ever greater control over foreign policy, and sidelined Foreign Secretary 
Howe and the FCO. Howe was unhappy with Powell‘s appointment and wrote in 
his memoirs that he ―went on to serve Margaret well – perhaps too well.‖4 
 
Howe had been appointed Foreign Secretary a short time after the Conservative 
election victory of June 1983. He had not been Thatcher‘s first choice for the 
post. She had wanted to appoint Cecil Parkinson, but he was forced to decline in 
the wake of the revelations of his affair with his secretary Sarah Keays. Thatcher 
wrote in her memoirs that she had doubts about Howe‘s suitability as Foreign 
Secretary and that in retrospect, she had been correct about this. She felt that he 
was too easily influenced by practices fostered by the FCO, such as ―a reluctance 
to subordinate diplomatic tactics to the national interest.‖ 5 There emerged 
growing tensions between the Prime Minister and her Foreign Secretary which 
were based largely on her hostility towards the FCO. Significantly, though, there 
were few differences between them over the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result, the 
interaction between Number Ten and the FCO in the Arab-Israel sphere was 
characterized largely by cooperation rather than disagreement.  
 
The Emergence of Shamir 
 
During her first term as Prime Minister, Thatcher had despaired of the policies of 
the Begin Government, fearing that they could destabilize the region. She 
became convinced early on that Begin‘s departure from office had the potential 
to significantly change the situation in the Middle East and Britain‘s approach 
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towards it.
6
 Thatcher‘s dislike of the Likud‘s policies was a factor which helped 
to establish agreement between Downing Street and the FCO on most areas of 
policy in the Arab-Israel arena. 
  
Just over two months after the Conservative Party election victory of June 1983, 
Begin had indeed departed from office. On 28 August 1983, Begin resigned as 
Prime Minister on grounds of ill health. It later became clear that he had been 
suffering from deep depression, following the death of his wife Aliza, in 
September 1982. The political fallout from the Lebanon War also undoubtedly 
had an impact on him.
7
 The difficulty, though, for Thatcher was that the Likud 
Party had chosen Yitzhak Shamir as Begin‘s successor. Shamir shared Begin‘s 
ideological attachment to a Greater Israel, and was uncompromising on the right 
of Jews to settle in the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, he was arguably more 
inflexible than Begin, abstaining during the Knesset vote on the Camp David 
Accords because it involved the withdrawal of Jewish settlements in the Sinai.  
 
Prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, both Begin and Shamir had been 
involved in violence against the British authorities in Palestine. While Begin had 
instigated attacks against the British authorities as the Commander of the 
National Military Organization known as the Irgun, Shamir had become involved 
in an even more militant organization known as the Fighters for the Freedom of 
Israel or Lehi. As with Begin, Thatcher‘s attitude towards Shamir was influenced 
strongly by his violent past. William Squire, Britain‘s Ambassador to Israel 
between 1984 and 1988 believed that Shamir‘s background counted strongly 
against him in Thatcher‘s eyes since she regarded him as a terrorist.8 Richard 
Luce, Minister of State at the FCO between 1983 and 1985, recalled a 
conversation with Thatcher prior to his visit to Israel in October 1983. She had 
said to him: ―Don‘t be too nice to Shamir. He‘s a terrorist you know.‖ 9 
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By early 1984, Thatcher was increasingly unhappy with the policies of the 
Shamir-led Government towards the territories. In a meeting with US Defence 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger on 27 February 1984, Thatcher‘s remarks were 
noted by him as follows:  
Thatcher asked about Israeli views and policies, noting that the Shamir 
government appeared shaky. She wondered whether Israeli policies were 
acceptable to American-Jewish opinion. She recalled that the Sabra and 
Shatilla massacres had caused Begin to establish a commission of 
inquiry. She remarked that whenever there was a problem it seemed that 
Israel annexed what it wanted. She urged that there should be a 
reappraisal of Israeli policy.
10
 
 
Thatcher and the FCO shared a strong dislike of the Begin and Shamir 
Government policies. Thatcher‘s comments reflected her frustration that the 
Reagan Administration was treating the Likud Government with kid gloves. The 
Prime Minister‘s discussion with Weinberger indicated that she shared the view 
of the FCO that a tougher line needed to be adopted with Shamir. Thatcher was 
concerned that the Likud policy was perpetuating a regional stalemate which in 
turn would lead to greater instability that would be exploited by the Soviets. It 
was feared that the Reagan Administration‘s automatic support for most Israeli 
policies constituted a liability which helped the Soviets in their efforts to win 
influence among the Arab States.
11
 Thus, the cold war atmosphere remained a 
strong factor which shaped the Prime Minister‘s attitude towards the Arab-Israel 
arena. 
 
 
The Resumption of a Political Dialogue 
 
Later on during Thatcher‘s second term, her frostiness towards Shamir was 
exacerbated by her growing frustrations over his inflexibility on the Palestinian 
question. Yet in spite of these difficulties, the second half of 1983 saw the FCO 
make the first tentative moves towards the resumption of a political dialogue 
with Israel. Lord Carrington had originally intended to restore a dialogue with 
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Israel during his visit to Jerusalem in March 1982. Relations between the two 
countries had sharply deteriorated in the wake of Britain‘s leading role in the 
Venice Declaration. Carrington‘s visit had been seen by the Israelis as a great 
success, and it achieved its main purpose which was to renew the dialogue 
between the two countries at ministerial level.
12
 Nevertheless, all Carrington‘s 
hard work was undone a few months later with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 
as Anglo-Israeli relations hit a new low.  
 
The decision to initiate the bilateral dialogue came from Luce and Howe.
13
 
Unlike Carrington, Howe did not view the Arab-Israeli conflict as an issue of the 
highest priority. However, while he had few previous dealings with the Middle 
East, he took an interest and grasped the issues very quickly.
14
 There were 
concerns over the stagnation in the Arab-Israeli arena, and it was felt that a 
renewed dialogue with Israel would enable Britain to play a more meaningful 
role in the region. In addition, Luce was unhappy that Britain was perceived as 
one-sided by the Israelis.
15
 The FCO has traditionally been viewed as an 
institution which has sought to avoid a close relationship with the State of 
Israel.
16
 Yet during the middle period of the Thatcher years, it was the FCO and 
not Number Ten which took the initiative to develop a conciliatory policy 
towards Israel.  
 
During a strategy meeting in September 1983, ministers agreed that Britain‘s 
overall aim in its relations with Israel had to be based on the development of a 
political dialogue with a view to influencing Israeli policy. A second important 
objective was to give support to those in Israel who shared Britain‘s approach to 
a negotiated settlement.
17
 It was this particular objective which was to become 
the hallmark of the Thatcher Government policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict 
during its second and third terms.  
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The Visit of Richard Luce 
 
Luce visited Israel at the end of October 1983, in order to re-establish a political 
dialogue. The Israelis saw the Luce visit as the opening of a new chapter in 
Anglo-Israeli relations.
18
  Luce met with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, Defence 
Minister Moshe Arens and the Labour Party leader, Shimon Peres. The visit was 
marred by Israel‘s refusal to allow Luce to meet with Palestinian Mayors, 
although the issue was later resolved. Ultimately, though, both sides viewed the 
visit as a success. The Israelis were impressed by the sympathetic manner in 
which Luce put across his points even where there were disagreements, and his 
call for an ongoing dialogue was welcomed.
19
  For the British side, it was an 
opportunity to win the trust of the Israelis after the difficulties of recent years. 
 
The decision to build a political dialogue with Israel originated in the FCO, and 
not in 10 Downing Street. However, Thatcher stood to gain from such a dialogue, 
as it was designed to bring about an improvement in Anglo-Israeli relations. The 
Prime Minister would have been aware of the agitated mood of many of her 
Finchley constituents, at the height of the crisis in Anglo-Israeli relations in 
1980. At the same time, the FCO was not interested in establishing a dialogue 
simply to improve relations with Israel. Ultimately, a good bilateral relationship 
was necessary to advance British interests.
20
 The objective behind the new 
British policy was to acquire greater leverage over the Israelis, and to encourage 
them to act in a way that was not damaging to British interests, as an FCO paper 
prepared in advance of Luce‘s visit made clear: 
 
There would be no harm in gently reminding the Israelis that while, as 
always, we want a dialogue even (or especially) on subjects on which we 
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disagree, the bilateral relationship cannot be divorced from Israeli policy 
or actions in areas of importance to us.
21
 
 
The resumption of a political dialogue with Britain presented the Israelis with an 
opportunity to raise certain issues at ministerial level that had become an 
increasing source of resentment. One of these irritants was the British refusal to 
sell North Sea Oil to Israel. In October 1983, the Israeli Energy Minister, Yitzhak 
Modai, met in London with his British counterpart, Peter Walker, to raise the 
issue of the sale of North Sea oil to Israel. Walker stated that he could see no 
prospect of a change in the British Government‘s policy: companies exporting 
UK crude were expected to do so only to countries in the EEC and IEA.
22
  This 
was the stock answer of the British Government to Israeli requests on the matter. 
The issue had also been raised during the visit of Luce to Israel. While Israel did 
have a number of oil suppliers, it sought to diversify its sources of supply, and 
looked increasingly to Europe for solutions in this area. Norway was already 
supplying oil to Israel, and Britain‘s refusal to do so appeared baffling to the 
Israeli Government.
23
 In fact, while the issue of energy security was not 
unimportant for the Thatcher Government, there was an overriding concern that 
the supply of oil to Israel would damage Britain‘s commercial interests in the 
Arab world.
24
 Notwithstanding the gradual concentration of powers in the private 
office, the policy on North Sea oil suggested that there was still close 
coordination between Whitehall departments and 10 Downing Street.  
 
In a similar vein, the Israelis raised the issue of the Arab boycott during the Luce 
visit. Nevertheless, it was clear that the Thatcher Government was not prepared 
to change its practices on this matter. A short time after his return to London, 
Luce announced in the House of Commons on 28 November that the FCO would 
continue its practice of authenticating boycott documents.
25
 As early as 
November 1979, Thatcher had indicated that there would be no change in policy 
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on either the Arab boycott or North Sea oil, during a meeting with a Board of 
Deputies delegation. Thatcher had pointed out, for example, that there could be 
no adjustment to the Arab boycott policy since British economic interests had to 
be protected.
26
 Four years later, there was no sign that Thatcher was prepared to 
challenge the Whitehall bureaucracy on these issues. Indeed, the importance of 
protecting Britain‘s commercial interests in the Arab world was uppermost in her 
thinking.
27
 Furthermore, in view of Thatcher‘s dissatisfaction with the policies of 
the Likud Government, there was even less of a reason for her to gainsay existing 
policies in this sphere at the start of her second term in office. 
 
The Arms Restrictions 
 
In regard to arms sales, Britain had actually relaxed its policy somewhat in 1983 
to allow export licences for electronics and small non-lethal components. The 
relaxation was not announced publicly, but the Israelis were aware of it.
28
 The 
Israelis, however, remained resentful of the fact that there were extensive British 
restrictions on the sale of defence equipment to the Jewish State. It was claimed 
that Britain was now alone among its EEC partners in taking such a tough line on 
arms sales. Defence Minister Arens complained to Luce that the arms restrictions 
left a bad impression on the Israeli Government when Britain had no scruples 
about selling arms to Israel‘s Arab enemies.29   
 
Indeed, one important element of the developing relationship between Britain 
and the moderate Arab states was the steady increase in arms sales. During the 
first term of the Thatcher Government, Britain had sold tanks to Jordan, much to 
the consternation of the Israelis.
30
 During the second term, the issue of arms sales 
to the Saudis would become an even greater source of friction between Britain 
and Israel. The sale of arms was defined increasingly by the Thatcher 
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Government in terms of commercial benefits. The arms export revival could also 
be viewed in terms of the pursuit of British influence within the Arab world.
31
  
Related to this was the need to keep the Arab states out of the reach of the 
Soviets.
32
 
 
Thatcher‘s determination to develop closer ties with Arab countries such as 
Saudi Arabia had an impact on Britain‘s relationship with Israel. Britain‘s 
anxiety in trying to maintain good relations with the Gulf States and Saudi 
Arabia was a factor in its hesitation in reopening the possibility of extensive arms 
sales with Israel.
33
  This was made clear to Arens when he met with his British 
counterpart, Michael Heseltine, during the early period of the Thatcher 
Government‘s second term. Arens raised the issue of the ban on arms sales 
imposed following Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Arens remarked 
that Israel did not need any weapons from the United Kingdom since it had a 
very well developed defence industry. Nevertheless, he was still surprised to see 
that Britain had restrictions on the sale of arms to Israel. After all, Britain was 
selling arms to the Arabs. Arens asked Heseltine why there was still an embargo. 
Heseltine replied bluntly that the ban helped the sale of arms to Arab countries.
34
    
 
Britain‘s refusal to lift the restrictions on arms sales was a symbolic issue for the 
Israelis, but it rankled greatly, particularly since it implied that Israel was an 
aggressor.
35
 The Israelis tested the British policy by placing orders in 1983 and 
the beginning of 1984 but these were not successful.
36
  While the British 
Government linked the lifting of the restrictions to a complete Israeli withdrawal 
from Lebanon, this arguably served as a pretext. Britain eventually lifted the ban 
completely in 1994 in response to Israel‘s withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, as 
part of the Oslo process, and not because of Lebanon. Israel withdrew completely 
from Lebanon only in 2000.  
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Arguably, the Prime Minister provided tacit encouragement for the policy of 
restricting arms sales to Israel. Thatcher was actively involved in the campaign to 
sell British arms to Saudi Arabia. Within Whitehall, it was believed that the sale 
of arms to Arab countries would be helped by restrictions on sales to Israel.
37
 In 
spite of her affinity with the State of Israel, Thatcher was a realist who attached 
great importance to Britain‘s political and commercial interests in the Arab 
world.
38
 It was therefore not surprising that Thatcher cooperated with Whitehall 
policy in this realm. 
 
There was no change in policy on arms restrictions, North Sea oil or the Arab 
boycott through 1984 and 1985.  The FCO had noted the ―traditionally strident 
approach‖ of the Israelis towards the bilateral relationship:  
 
Our restrictions on arms sales to the Middle East, refusal to sell North Sea 
oil to Israel, and coexistence with the Arab boycott are perennial subjects 
of complaint, important not so much in substance but as symbolic 
irritants.
39
 
 
While the continuity on these issues was dictated by the Whitehall bureaucracy, 
10 Downing Street cooperated with this policy. The arms restrictions, the refusal 
to sell North Sea oil and the complicity with the Arab boycott were related to 
Britain‘s need to avoid complications in its ties with the moderate Arab 
countries, as Charles Powell makes clear: 
 
The reason we didn‘t sell things to Israel was for two reasons: the 
Americans sold them everything they wanted anyway. And secondly, 
why incur unnecessary trouble with the Arab boycott if Israel had no real 
need for British defence equipment. We always got the impression that 
when Israel did ask for minor items of equipment, it was just to rub our 
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noses in the fact of the Arab boycott rather than because Israel had any 
real need for the articles.40 
 
Since Powell tended to reflect the thinking of his Prime Minister, this suggests 
that Thatcher and Whitehall departments shared the overriding objective of 
preventing any potential harm to British political and commercial interests in the 
Arab world.    
 
In spite of these difficulties, there appeared to be a gradual improvement in 
Anglo-Israeli ties, reflected through the visit of Foreign Secretary Howe to Israel 
in October 1984. The Israelis felt that the tone and atmosphere of discussions 
was positive during Howe‘s visit, and there was now a better understanding 
between the two countries.
41
  The FCO was particularly satisfied with the visit, 
and believed it to be very successful.
42
 The visit of Luce to Israel in November 
1983 had been seen as the catalyst for a ―steady improvement in tone and 
content‖ in the bilateral relationship, fostering amicable disagreement rather than 
a change of views.
43
  
 
Nevertheless, there was a certain amount of suspicion within Israel‘s Foreign 
Ministry over Britain‘s real intentions. This was typified by the remarks of a 
senior Israeli diplomat who had recently completed his tour of duty in London. In 
the course of a meeting at the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, he told his 
colleagues that there was undoubtedly a change in the atmosphere in Anglo-
Israeli ties. Nevertheless, he warned that it would be a mistake to view the more 
positive atmosphere as a change in policy. There had been no change in the 
British policy on the arms embargo, North Sea oil and the Arab boycott. There 
was therefore a danger that optimism could ensnare Israelis in the trap that the 
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British had prepared. Time and again, the British had raised the issue of the joint 
dialogue but there had been no substance to it.
44
  
 
The policy on North Sea oil, arms sales and the Arab boycott attested to the 
existence of joined-up government on matters of strategic importance, even as 
Number Ten was acquiring greater control over policy.   In this case, the 
Department of Energy, the MOD, the Department of Trade and Industry and the 
FCO were working in coordination with Number Ten to protect Britain‘s 
political and commercial interests in the Middle East.  
 
The Emergence of the Israeli National Unity Government 
 
On 23 July 1984, a general election was held in Israel against the background of 
the Lebanon quagmire and hyperinflation. The election result was inconclusive: 
Although Labour had emerged as the strongest party with 44 seats while the 
Likud had 41 seats, Labour was not in a position to form a coalition government 
since the Orthodox parties preferred the Likud. After protracted negotiations 
between Shamir and Peres, the leaders of the two largest parties, a decision was 
made to form a National Unity Government. Such governments had existed in 
Israel before. The novelty, on this occasion, was that the two leaders had also 
agreed to a rotation arrangement: Peres would serve as Prime Minister for the 
first 25 months of the 50-month term, while Shamir would serve as the Deputy 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The two men would then swap 
positions for the following 25 months.
45
  The new Government was unveiled on 
13 September 1984. 
 
The most significant policy guidelines of the new Government were extending 
the peace process in the region in accordance with the Camp David formula, 
consolidating the peace with Egypt and withdrawing the IDF from Lebanon. 
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Significantly, Israel would not negotiate with the PLO, and would oppose the 
establishment of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza. Controversially, 
existing settlements in the territories would be developed, and five or six new 
settlements would be established within a year with the possibility of additional 
building if approved by a majority of cabinet ministers.
46
  The Likud and Labour 
parties both wielded the power of veto over certain policy proposals even if these 
were in accord with the basic policy guidelines. The National Unity Government 
provided a recipe for political paralysis since Peres and Shamir were so far apart 
in their ideological positions and thinking. Israel‘s Ambassador to London, 
Yehuda Avner, viewed it as a ―grotesque‖ arrangement.47  
 
Shamir was very suspicious of outsiders, and believed strongly in self-reliance. 
Shamir‘s firm opposition to the very notion of any territorial compromise in the 
West Bank and Gaza was based on his strong ideological conviction that the 
entire Land of Israel belonged to the Jewish people. Furthermore, he was an 
enthusiastic advocate of the establishment of Jewish settlements in the West 
Bank. Shamir was a patient man with nerves of steel who was happy to maintain 
the status quo.  
 
In contrast, Peres was a visionary who had shed his hawkish positions, and now 
viewed a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a matter of the 
highest priority for his country. He believed that the resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict was the key to achieving peace in the region. Peres has also 
claimed in his memoirs that the Palestinian question had to be resolved not only 
for political reasons but also as a ―moral imperative‖, maintaining that ―the 
Jewish people were not born to rule over other peoples.‖48 He believed that a 
solution of the Palestinian question had to go through Jordan. Thatcher shared 
this view.  Throughout the lifetime of the National Unity Government, Peres 
sought an agreement with King Hussein with a view to restoring the heavily 
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populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordanian rule, while leaving the 
strategically important areas under Israeli control. Since the end of the 1967 war, 
this had been the solution sought by many within Israel‘s Labour party. 49 While 
Peres clearly believed in territorial compromise in the West Bank and Gaza, he 
also made it clear during this period that he was opposed to a separate Palestinian 
State, and did not view Arafat‘s PLO as a peace partner.50   
 
Thatcher increasingly began to view Peres as the great hope for the achievement 
of a peace settlement in the region. Once Thatcher could see that Peres was 
serious about the urgency of finding a solution to the Palestinian problem, she 
gradually sought to strengthen his position. Thatcher knew that she had to work 
quickly since the National Unity rotation arrangement meant that Peres would 
have to step down as Prime Minister in October 1986 with Shamir replacing him. 
She viewed the Americans as the key to the success of this approach. Thus, 
during a meeting at Camp David with President Reagan and Secretary of State 
George Shultz on 22 December 1984, Thatcher stated that she personally knew 
Peres very well and had a favourable opinion of him. She added that Peres 
wanted to be constructive, and that if progress was to be made in the Middle 
East, action had to be taken while he was Prime Minister. The President replied 
that he shared Thatcher‘s view, and remained committed to his Middle East 
initiative of 1 September 1982. The Americans sought an equitable settlement, 
and agreed that it was important to get the peace process restarted while Peres 
was in power.
51
 Thatcher stressed the vital role of the United States in advancing 
the peace process, and urged Reagan not to place the Arab-Israeli conflict on the 
back burner.
52
 On this issue, Thatcher saw eye to eye with the FCO which sought 
to strengthen those in Israel who shared its approach to a negotiated settlement.
53
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King Hussein’s Diplomatic Initiative 
 
On 11 February 1985, King Hussein of Jordan signed an accord with the PLO to 
begin negotiations to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. The accord was based on 
the following principles: a complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories, the 
right of self-determination for the Palestinians within the framework of a 
confederation with Jordan and resolution of the problem of Palestinian refugees 
on the basis of UN resolutions. Negotiations would be conducted between Israel 
and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. In addition, an international 
conference would be convened with the participation of the PLO and the UN 
Security Council‘s permanent member states. Shlaim maintains that although 
Israel and Resolution 242 were not explicitly mentioned in the Accord, it 
represented a genuine triumph for Jordanian diplomacy since it marked the first 
time in the history of the conflict that the PLO leadership had agreed to a 
peaceful settlement of the dispute with Israel.
54
  
 
Thatcher swiftly endorsed King Hussein‘s initiative, viewing it as an opportunity 
to launch peace negotiations with Israel.
55
 Here as on numerous other Middle 
East issues, Thatcher was in full agreement with the FCO which welcomed King 
Hussein‘s initiative.56 The Israeli response to the initiative was mixed, reflecting 
the composition of the National Unity coalition Government. Foreign Minister 
Shamir viewed the Accord as a very unwelcome development, and was 
concerned that it would bring the PLO out of the cold.
57
 However, Peres kept his 
options open, and did not criticize the Amman Accord.
58
  
 
The United States was uneasy about the Accord. Shultz wrote in his memoirs that 
while King Hussein was in the driving seat and had put Yasser Arafat on the 
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backseat, he was concerned that Arafat would soon take over the wheel. Shultz 
believed that an international conference would be acceptable if it was merely a 
curtain-raiser that led immediately to direct Arab-Israeli negotiations.  The 
Israelis would not join a conference where they would face Arafat‘s PLO and a 
barrage of pressure.
59
  
 
While Thatcher‘s support for the Amman Accord was related to the possibility of 
a breakthrough in the Arab-Israel arena, it is possible also that she may have 
viewed it as an opportunity to undermine Soviet ambitions in the region. Indeed, 
Shlaim argues that the Soviets viewed the Accord as an attempt to remove the 
PLO from Moscow‘s hands. The Soviets were particularly upset about Jordan‘s 
proposal of a joint Jordanian-PLO delegation to the international conference. The 
Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, accused the Jordanians of 
undermining them by agreeing to a joint delegation. King Hussein had removed 
their trump card, the Palestinians, and had delivered the PLO to the Americans.
60
 
However, Shultz feared that the Amman Accord would hand the Soviets a 
propaganda victory, since the United States would be forced into a position 
where it was Israel‘s sole backer against increasingly resentful Arabs.61 The 
United States was also constrained by a pledge that had been made in 1975 
which ruled out the opening of any political dialogue with the PLO until it 
recognized Israel‘s right to exist, renounced terrorism and accepted UN Security 
Council resolutions 242 and 338.
62
 
 
The Visit of Shamir to London 
 
The Amman Accord loomed large during the visit of Shamir to London in June 
1985. Shamir had been invited to London by Howe during the Foreign 
Secretary‘s visit to Israel in October 1984. This would be the first official visit to 
Britain by a senior Israeli minister since the invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. 
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Under the leadership of Peres, Israel had begun the withdrawal of its forces from 
Lebanon in February 1985, and the process was completed by June of that year. 
Only a small number of forces remained in Lebanon to patrol a narrow security 
zone along the border. Nevertheless, concerns over possible damage to Britain‘s 
interests in the Arab world continued to serve as a constraint on Anglo-Israeli 
ties during this period. In an FCO briefing paper written ahead of the visit by 
Shamir, it was pointed out that Israel had a ―disproportionate impact on the 
British media and political life, and capacity to affect [British] interests‖. The 
paper continued:  
 
As long as Israeli policies play down the need for a settlement or even 
lead to further conflict, our political and economic interests throughout 
the region run the risk of severe damage. Our dealings with many of the 
Arab countries are soured by our historical responsibility for Israel‘s 
creation and what is perceived as continuing British support for an 
aggressive, expansionist Israel.
63
  
   
The difficulty was that Britain had little direct influence over Israel. In contrast, 
US military and financial aid to Israel was a source of potential leverage for 
Washington. Nevertheless, the FCO was confident that the Israelis still had 
reason to be grateful towards the British. It was claimed that they needed the 
British market for their exports, and London‘s support for their continued liberal 
access to the EC market for their agricultural products, following enlargement of 
the EC. Furthermore, the Israelis felt increasingly isolated and sought British 
support and sympathy in such an environment.
64
 Britain had been strongly in 
favour of maintaining agricultural trade access for Israel.
65
 Thus, from this 
perspective, a closer dialogue between the two countries was viewed by the FCO 
as a means of acquiring a measure of influence over the Israelis. This would also 
bolster Britain‘s influence in the Arab world.  
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Britain‘s Ambassador to Israel, William Squire, was not optimistic regarding 
Shamir‘s forthcoming visit. He described the Israeli Foreign Minister as ―an 
archetypal hardliner‖, and predicted that Shamir was unlikely to endanger his 
strong position in the Likud party by demonstrating flexibility while in London. 
Shamir was wedded ideologically to the concept of Eretz Israel and, at most, 
would be willing to grant local autonomy to the residents of the West Bank and 
Gaza, while Israel annexed their land. Squire also pointed out that Shamir‘s past 
involvement in the Irgun and Stern Gang would make him sensitive to his 
treatment while in London.
66
    
 
Shamir used his meeting with Howe on 3 June to raise the subject of the Arab 
boycott and other bilateral difficulties, while fending off pressures arising from 
the fresh regional developments. Shamir began by asking if there was any 
prospect of a change in policy on the Arab boycott. Howe stated that while the 
British Government deplored the boycott, positive action might be 
counterproductive. Shamir then raised the issue of restrictions on arms sales to 
Israel. He pointed out that since Israeli forces were withdrawing from Lebanon, 
there was no need to maintain an embargo.   Howe responded that the restrictions 
would be removed once the reason for their imposition had disappeared. Shamir 
countered that almost all Israeli forces had now withdrawn from Lebanon. The 
Israeli Foreign Minister also asked for a reconsideration of British policy on the 
sale of North Sea oil. Howe responded that Britain only supplied oil to EEC and 
IEA members, as well as those with whom the British had traditional energy 
ties.
67
  
 
Discussions eventually turned to the recent Amman Accord. Shamir claimed that 
the Jordan-PLO agreement of 11 February was not a constructive step since it 
tied King Hussein to the PLO. While Israel was ready to negotiate with King 
Hussein at any time, it would never agree to an international conference or talk 
with the PLO. Howe responded that Britain was firmly committed to Israel‘s 
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security but also to Palestinian self-determination. Britain welcomed King 
Hussein‘s agreement with the PLO. Howe asserted that diplomacy required 
moving from the unthinkable to the possible. Howe stated to Shamir that as a 
young army officer in the 1940s, he had dealt with members of the Irgun, and 
now he was meeting with its former members in the political leadership of Israel. 
Shamir was unmoved by this. He stated that if Palestinian Arabs sought self-
determination, they could move to Jordan where there was a Palestinian majority. 
He added that a Palestinian State in the territories would be a danger to Israel. 
Any solution would have to take account of Israel‘s rights to this territory.68 
 
Shamir‘s meeting with Howe had been described by the FCO as a ―friendly‖ 
discussion in which both sides had put their points across in a resolute but cordial 
manner.
69
  The same could not be said of Shamir‘s meeting with the Prime 
Minister. At the heart of Thatcher‘s concern was the view that Shamir‘s 
intransigence would lead to greater instability in the Middle East. There 
remained unease that the Soviets would profit from the regional stalemate. 
Thatcher expressed her concern over the rise of Shia terrorism, and claimed that 
the situation in Lebanon had deteriorated since Israel‘s invasion. She 
remonstrated with Shamir, asserting that ―Israel could not just sit back and do 
nothing.‖ The Prime Minister voiced her fears that other groups could emulate 
Shia tactics if they felt that negotiating options were blocked. This was why 
Britain had supported King Hussein‘s efforts to bring together a team of 
Palestinians to negotiate directly with Israel. Thatcher stated that while she had 
always been firm in refusing to have talks with the PLO, there were situations in 
which one had to negotiate with people whose previous activities one found 
abhorrent.
70
  
 
Shamir responded to Thatcher‘s criticism, and pointed out that the increase in 
Shia terrorism was linked to Iranian influence rather than the situation in 
Lebanon. As in his meeting with Howe, Shamir maintained that Israel was ready 
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to meet with King Hussein without preconditions but would not sit with the PLO. 
He added that it was unthinkable that the PLO would stay under King Hussein‘s 
control, and it would not accept a confederation between Jordan and the West 
Bank.
71
  
 
Thatcher reiterated that ―Israel could not just stand back.‖ Britain supported King 
Hussein‘s proposals since they offered the best hope for progress. Shamir 
repeated that Israel would not talk to the PLO. Nevertheless, it would be ready to 
meet with a delegation which included Palestinian Arabs on the basis of the 
Camp David framework. However, the Palestinians had to be acceptable to 
Israel. The Prime Minister asked Shamir whether Israel would ―unreasonably 
withhold consent‖ from certain Palestinians. He did not comment but repeated 
that Israel would not negotiate with the PLO.
72
  
 
Thatcher stated that whoever negotiated had to have the confidence of the 
Palestinians. King Hussein could not negotiate without the cooperation of the 
moderate Arab governments and the PLO. Warming to her theme, she warned 
Shamir that it would be ―a tragic mistake to alienate the PLO entirely and drive 
them into the arms of Moscow.‖73 As with Begin, Thatcher used her meeting 
with an Israeli leader to underline her concerns that an inflexible policy would be 
a gift for Soviet ambitions in the region. She stated her belief that talks between 
Israel and a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation would be a success. Israel had 
to look to its long term interests and be aware of the dangers of a disillusioned 
Palestinian population within its borders.
74
  
 
The meeting ended on a more positive note with the Prime Minister expressing 
her understanding for Israeli concerns over EEC enlargement and the 
implications for its agricultural exports. Shamir thanked the Prime Minister for 
Britain‘s efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry. Thatcher recalled her discussions 
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with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, on the subject, and asked whether 
there had been an increase in the number of Jews leaving the Soviet Union. 
Thatcher did not raise the issue of a forthcoming visit by Peres in January 1986.
75
 
Following the meeting between Thatcher and Shamir, the press office of 10 
Downing Street put out a communiqué stating that there had been ―a brisk and 
lively exchange about peace prospects in the Middle East.‖ This prompted media 
speculation about a row between Thatcher and Shamir which the FCO and the 
Israeli Embassy denied.
76
 
 
The Shamir visit highlighted the discreet cooperation between Number Ten and 
the FCO.  Howe and Thatcher used their separate meetings with Shamir to make 
it absolutely clear that there was no difference between the FCO and Downing 
Street on the Palestinian question. Indeed, it is likely that Thatcher had 
deliberately taken a tougher line towards Shamir, since the Prime Minister would 
be taken more seriously as a friend of Israel. The FCO also recommended the 
adoption of this approach during Shamir‘s visit to London in May 1989.77  
 
The meeting with Shamir in June 1985 merely provided confirmation to Thatcher 
that Likud policies were likely to perpetuate a regional stalemate which would 
ultimately threaten the moderate Arab states. In particular, she was anxious that 
the deadlock would strengthen the radical forces, and result in the expansion of 
Soviet influence in the region.  She was also concerned to keep the PLO out of 
the hands of the Soviets who had been providing financial and military support to 
the organization since 1967.
78
 Thatcher‘s meeting with Shamir merely reinforced 
her view that the status quo would be perpetuated if the Likud were in charge of 
Israeli policy. Such an eventuality would be inimical to British interests in the 
region.  
 
                                                          
75
 Ibid.  
76
 FCO/ FOI  698-09, Cable from FCO to Tel Aviv, 5 June 1985 
77
 FCO/FOI 698-09,  Minute from AF Goulty to DA Gore-Booth, 19 May 1989 
78 Bassam Abu Sharif, Arafat and the Dream of Palestine: An Insider‘s Account, (Palgrave Macmillan: United States, 
2009), p.93 
 
158 
 
For Thatcher and the FCO, the relatively flexible approach of Peres was clearly 
more promising in terms of breaking the regional stalemate. However, under the 
rotation agreement, he would only remain Prime Minister until October 1986. As 
a result, both the FCO and Thatcher saw the need to strengthen the hand of Peres 
while he was Prime Minister and even beyond, encouraging him to advance the 
peace process. Peres would become a regular visitor to 10 Downing Street in the 
coming years. In contrast, Thatcher was unwilling to host Shamir in London 
during the rest of her second term and for most of her third term, in spite of 
pressures from the Israeli side.
79
  
 
Shamir was disappointed by his visit to London. Before his return to Israel, he 
held a breakfast with supporters of Israel from the three main British political 
parties. Shamir complained that Britain was continuing with its arms embargo, 
notwithstanding the fact that ten European countries had agreed to end 
restrictions against Israel. He also criticized Britain‘s acquiescence in the Arab 
boycott. He claimed that this had political significance which was unheard of in 
any other European country. Furthermore, Britain‘s refusal to sell North Sea oil 
smacked of discrimination.  These issues had been raised by Israel on numerous 
occasions, but its requests had gone unanswered.
80
 Whitehall had encouraged 
such a policy, but Thatcher had also approved it and saw no justification in 
ending the bilateral restrictions.  
 
Avner told Squire that Shamir had been disappointed with his visit. There was 
little understanding for Israel‘s case that the PLO was a terrorist organization.  
The visit had produced nothing – not even on the arms embargo. Avner 
suggested that perhaps the British were saving up ―douceurs‖ for the forthcoming 
visit of Peres.
81
 The Israeli Ambassador was not so far from the truth on this 
point. It was only with the visit of Peres in January 1986 that the Thatcher 
Government began to make concessions in areas such as the Arab boycott.
82
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Nevertheless, Squire felt that from a British perspective, the visit had a positive 
angle.  He believed that Shamir would now understand that the views he heard 
through the diplomatic channels were indeed the positions of the Thatcher 
Government.
83
 The meeting with Thatcher would arguably have been designed, 
among other things, to make it clear to Shamir that there was no difference 
between the position of the FCO and that of 10 Downing Street on the Arab-
Israeli conflict.  
 
Thus, at the midway point of the Thatcher Government‘s second term, the Prime 
Minister was clearly on the same wavelength as the FCO in the realm of policy 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was illustrated during the visit of Shamir. 
The FCO and 10 Downing Street had been working in coordination to ensure that 
there was no misunderstanding of the British position. One example of this was 
Thatcher‘s readiness to tell Shamir that he would have to be prepared to talk to 
the PLO – a point that was echoed by Howe during his separate meeting with the 
Israeli Foreign Minister.
84
 Thatcher appeared to be demonstrating a new 
flexibility on the PLO which would become more apparent still in the coming 
months. Her concern over Likud policies and the negative impact they could 
have on regional stability overshadowed any pressures she may have faced from 
pro-Israeli groups. As her meeting with the Israeli Foreign Minister showed, 
Thatcher was ready to challenge these policies.  
 
The agreement between Thatcher and Howe over the Amman Accord and the 
Shamir visit, as well as the more general coordination between them over 
strategic matters such as restrictions on arms sales to Israel, indicated that the 
Prime Minister was no less a pragmatist than her Foreign Secretary on Middle 
East policy. In her memoirs, Thatcher has written dismissively of both Howe and 
the FCO, claiming that Howe ―fell under the spell of the FCO where compromise 
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and negotiation were ends in themselves.‖85 The difficulty with Thatcher‘s claim 
is that in the Arab-Israel arena, she was only too willing to embrace this 
compromise herself.    
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Chapter Five 
 
The Growing Power of the Prime Minister’s Office  
 
On the face of it, with power shifting gradually from Whitehall to 10 Downing 
Street, it appeared that the Prime Minister was increasingly ready to counter the FCO 
policy on the Middle East. Thatcher‘s support for the US operation against Libya 
suggested that she was tilting British policy in a pro-American direction. In fact, as 
this chapter will demonstrate, Thatcher was increasingly exasperated by the Reagan 
Administration‘s reluctance to support King Hussein, as well as its lack of resolve 
over a Middle East peace settlement.  Thatcher‘s growing interventions in foreign 
policy actually reflected a tendency to outflank the FCO by taking a lead on policies 
that the Whitehall bureaucracy had traditionally supported. Thatcher intervened 
personally to advance the peace initiative of King Hussein by inviting a Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation to London which included two prominent PLO officials. 
Thatcher also played a direct role in the sale of arms to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. 
These policies were fiercely opposed not only by Israel‘s Likud leadership but even 
by Labour leader Peres. 
  
In fact, both of the Prime Minister‘s actions in this realm were interlinked since they 
were designed to strengthen moderate forces in the Arab world at a time of 
heightened concern over Soviet ambitions, while boosting Britain‘s standing in the 
region. Thus, if anything, as Thatcher acquired growing power in the foreign affairs 
arena, there was a tendency to reinforce the traditional objectives of the Whitehall 
bureaucracy rather than to challenge them.      
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Thatcher’s Personal Intervention in the Arab-Israel Arena 
 
During the second half of 1985, Thatcher made arguably her most significant 
personal intervention in the Arab-Israel conflict when she invited a Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation to London in a bid to advance the Middle East peace process. 
The initiative was a reflection of Thatcher‘s growing confidence in the international 
affairs arena. However, it also underlined 10 Downing Street‘s growing control over 
foreign policy.  The initiative signified that the objectives of the FCO regarding a 
Middle East settlement could still be met even as power shifted to Number Ten. 
Indeed, Thatcher‘s intervention was significant in that she had essentially decided to 
bring the PLO out of the cold by means of an invitation to two of its representatives.  
 
During the second half of 1985, it became clear that there was a growing 
convergence between Thatcher and the FCO. Within NENAD, an emphasis was 
placed on breaking the regional deadlock by promoting a Middle East settlement. 
This would require the bolstering of moderate forces in the region. Thatcher was 
now working actively in a bid to achieve just that objective. Thatcher‘s growing 
concerns about a regional stalemate resulted in her direct intervention in the Arab-
Israeli dispute. Thatcher viewed Egypt‘s President Mubarak, Jordan‘s King Hussein 
and Israeli Prime Minister Peres as three moderate leaders who held the key to the 
advancement of the Middle East peace process. The recent visit of Shamir to London 
had made it clear to Thatcher that she would need to back Peres in order to achieve 
progress in the peace process. Her growing confidence in Peres was boosted by his 
address to the Knesset on 10 June 1985. In a policy statement, Peres put forward a 
five-stage Israeli plan which envisaged talks between Israeli, American, Jordanian, 
Egyptian and Palestinian representatives who were not PLO members. An Israeli-
Jordanian-Palestinian working group would be established to put forward an agenda 
for a conference with US participation. The support of the other permanent members 
of the Security Council would be enlisted for a conference. One of the most 
important points in the plan was that ―authentic Palestinian representatives from the 
territories‖ would be appointed on behalf of the inhabitants who would be acceptable 
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to all the sides. It was envisaged that a conference would be convened within three 
months in the Middle East, Europe or the United States.
1
 
  
During the second half of 1985, it was King Hussein who most impressed the British 
Prime Minister. He had visited Thatcher in Downing Street on a number of 
occasions. During a meeting with Thatcher in London on 8 June 1985, King Hussein 
spoke of his interest in forming a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would 
meet with the Americans. It was hoped that such a meeting could take place in July.  
In his discussion with Thatcher, he also requested that the British Government agree 
to host a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in London. The British viewed this 
request in terms of a Jordanian bid to build momentum for Hussein‘s diplomatic 
initiative, and to secure European support for his proposals. Following her meeting 
with the Jordanian monarch, Thatcher contacted Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia to 
enlist his country‘s support for King Hussein‘s moves. 2 
  
On 19 July 1985, King Hussein met secretly in London with Peres. This was their 
first direct meeting in nearly ten years. The two leaders agreed that the peace process 
would unfold in stages. In the first stage, a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation 
would meet with the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, Richard 
Murphy; in the second stage, the PLO would meet the American conditions for a 
dialogue; and in the third stage, negotiations would commence. Peres was opposed 
to the participation of PLO members on the joint delegation.
3
  
 
 Peres later informed US Secretary Shultz through a personal envoy that if PLO 
supporters were to meet with Richard Murphy as part of the joint delegation, Israel 
would reluctantly accept it – after it had issued public objections on the matter.  
Peres, however, had to contend with his own Foreign Minister who sent a message to 
Shultz making it clear that he did not want Murphy to meet with any Palestinians. 
According to Shamir, such a meeting would constitute a violation of the US pledge 
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not to meet with PLO members, and would jeopardize US-Israeli relations. President 
Reagan told his Secretary of State that he could not approve talks with anyone 
remotely connected with the PLO.
 4
   
 
King Hussein worked with the Reagan Administration in a bid to resolve the impasse 
over the Palestinian members of the delegation. Hussein came up with a list of seven 
Palestinians who were not leading members of the PLO.  Shultz had given Murphy 
the go-ahead to travel to Amman to meet with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. 
A short time later, the US Secretary of State cancelled Murphy‘s meeting with the 
delegation following protests from pro-Israeli groups.
5
 Shultz was intensely loyal to 
Reagan. Israel‘s supporters in Washington warned the US Administration that the 
PLO was trying to trick them into breaking their pledge. Shultz took the pledge very 
seriously and wanted to do nothing that could embarrass Reagan.
6
 
 
King Hussein was in despair following the cancellation of the meeting.  Peres angrily 
told his friends that Shultz was a ―very stupid man‖ who had ―blown it‖.7 Thatcher 
was furious with the Reagan Administration over the failure to produce a meeting 
with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Thatcher resolved to move into the 
vacuum left by Shultz, and decided that she would host the delegation, even if this 
involved meeting with PLO members.
8
  Thatcher and the FCO shared the same 
attitude on the urgency of promoting a regional settlement, and ending the stalemate 
in the Middle East. In her memoirs, Thatcher writes:  
During my time as Prime Minister all initiatives eventually foundered on the 
fact that the two sides ultimately saw no need to adjust their stance. But that 
did not mean that we could simply sit back and let events take their course. 
Initiatives at least offered hope: stagnation in the Middle East peace process 
only ever promised disaster.
9
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In September 1985, Thatcher visited both Egypt and Jordan. During her visit to 
Cairo, Mubarak called on Thatcher to put forward a British initiative in order to put 
pressure on the Reagan Administration. Thatcher stated during a press conference in 
Cairo that a Palestinian delegation could include members of the PLO as long as they 
had rejected terrorism. She added, ―There are a number of PLO members who have 
rejected terrorism as the way forward.‖10 Thatcher was taking an increasingly 
flexible position on the PLO, and moving closer to the FCO on the issue.  During 
Thatcher‘s trip to Jordan, she clearly sympathized with the King‘s disappointment 
with the Reagan Administration: one minute, the Americans were encouraging 
Hussein with his peace initiative, and the next minute, they were pulling out as a 
result of domestic Jewish pressure. During a press conference in Jordan, Thatcher 
publicly expressed her disappointment with the Reagan Administration and pledged 
that Britain was obligated to do everything to help King Hussein.
11
  
 
Thatcher’s Diplomatic Initiative 
 
During her visit to Amman, King Hussein informed Thatcher that two leading PLO 
supporters would be ready to publicly renounce terrorism, and accept UN Security 
Council Resolution 242. Thatcher responded that if they would do so, she would 
meet them in London as part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Explaining her 
move as a bid to help King Hussein‘s initiative, she expressed her hope that the 
United States would take a similar step.
12
  Thatcher‘s comments were a reflection of 
her deep disappointment with the Reagan Administration, as well as a call to the 
Americans for action.  
 
Thatcher‘s readiness to sanction high-level meetings with PLO representatives in 
London served to highlight the contrasting pressures facing the British Prime 
Minister and the US Secretary of State. Shultz was unwilling to authorize a meeting 
with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation as he feared a backlash from pro-Israeli 
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organizations such as AIPAC (The American Israel Public Affairs Committee) 
which possessed considerable clout in Washington. Shultz was insistent on not 
exposing the President to any suggestion that he had weakened the US formula on 
the PLO. He believed that it was his responsibility to protect the White House from 
criticism on this issue.  Thatcher did not face the same level of intense pressure as 
the Reagan Administration did from leaders of the Jewish community and AIPAC.
13
 
The British Prime Minister was not constrained to the same extent, notwithstanding 
pressures from the Board of Deputies, the CFI and her own constituents. 
 
During a press conference in London following her visit to Jordan, Thatcher was told 
of the strong protests of the local Jewish community, and was pointedly asked 
whether she had given any consideration to the ‗Finchley Factor‘ in making her 
decision to meet with PLO representatives. Thatcher responded that she did not feel 
that her constituents or the local Jewish community had any reason to be concerned 
about what she was doing. Rather, they should be welcoming her initiative as a step 
forward in the peace process.
14
 
 
Thatcher‘s readiness to receive the two PLO officials indicated that she did not feel 
constrained by pro-Israeli pressure groups or by the feelings of many of her Finchley 
constituents.   The precedent of the June 1983 general election showed that there was 
solid support for the Conservative Party within the Anglo-Jewish community, in 
spite of disquiet over policies towards Israel. Thatcher‘s rhetorical support for the 
Jewish State, her links with pro-Israeli organizations such as the CFI, her 
appointment of a number of Jews to senior positions in the cabinet and her 
outspoken support for Soviet Jewry meant that the Jewish community, as a whole, 
continued to view her as a friend of Israel. This helped to shield her from criticism 
when she took actions which upset the Israeli Government.     
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Nevertheless, Thatcher still took care not to alienate supporters of Israel. On 3 
October 1985, she held a meeting with a CFI delegation. The delegation expressed 
their unhappiness over the Prime Minister‘s forthcoming meeting in London with a 
joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, including the two leading members of the 
PLO Executive Committee.
15
  The Prime Minister maintained that the two 
Palestinians, Mohammed Milhem and Bishop Elias Khoury, were both men of peace 
who were visiting London on the understanding that they had rejected terrorism and 
recognized UN Security Council Resolution 242.
16
   
 
The delegation maintained that Milhem had not renounced violence, and expressed 
concern that the British Government was moving towards recognizing the PLO. The 
CFI representatives pointed out that if the two Palestinians were unwilling to 
renounce terrorism or recognize Israel‘s right to exist, the Prime Minister would find 
herself ―in a very invidious position.‖ The delegation suggested that the promised 
statement by Milhem and Khoury should be made prior to their visit to Britain. The 
Prime Minister countered that it would not be feasible to impose such a precondition, 
and that it would increase the danger faced by the two Palestinians. King Hussein 
had already undertaken that they would make a clear statement accepting UN 
resolutions and renouncing terrorism. She had to put her trust in the Jordanian 
Government on the issue. Nevertheless, she agreed that if the proposed statement 
were to turn out to be unsatisfactory, the British Government would be placed in a 
difficult position. In such a situation, the Prime Minister would have to make it clear 
that the statement was unsatisfactory, and that British support for King Hussein‘s 
initiative and contacts with moderate Palestinians would be affected.
17
   
 
The delegation concluded that a letter of reassurance from the Prime Minister 
confirming that the Government‘s attitude to the PLO had not changed would be 
helpful for relations with the Jewish community.
18
 Representatives of the Board of 
Deputies also held discussions with Thatcher‘s Private Secretary, Charles Powell, to 
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express their concern over the Prime Minister‘s planned meeting with the PLO.19 
Thatcher‘s meeting with the CFI delegation demonstrated that she was sensitive to 
the views of the Jewish community on Israel. The Prime Minister‘s resolve to go 
ahead with the invitation to the two Palestinians indicated that such sensitivities were 
not the determining factor in her policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Nevertheless, the vociferous Israeli response to Thatcher‘s initiative, and the strong 
pressures exerted from home could not be ignored.   
 
Within Israel, there was considerable displeasure over Thatcher‘s invitation to the 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Foreign Minister Shamir and Israel‘s Ambassador 
to the UN, Binyamin Netanyahu, met with Howe at the UN in the autumn of 1985. 
Shamir claimed that Britain was violating its own policy by inviting PLO officials to 
London, and argued that it would boost the PLO‘s prestige throughout the Arab 
world while directly encouraging acts of terror. Howe responded that it was very 
difficult to find Palestinian representatives who did not have any links with the PLO. 
He added that both Milhem and Khoury were suitable Palestinian representatives. 
Shamir countered that Milhem had repeatedly called for armed struggle. Howe stated 
that the Prime Minister‘s policy on terrorism was clear, and Britain would never give 
any encouragement to terrorists. Netanyahu remarked that Israel sympathized with 
Britain‘s struggle against the IRA, and asserted that the PLO should be treated in the 
same way as the IRA. Howe countered that there was no comparison between the 
two organizations: there were those within the PLO who did not support terrorism.
20
 
  
Shamir‘s position on Thatcher‘s invitation to the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation 
was not surprising. Nevertheless, Thatcher was increasingly pinning her hopes on 
Peres who she viewed as the moderate force within the Israeli Government. 
Following her visits to Egypt and Jordan, she wrote an urgent letter to Peres 
notifying him of her meeting with King Hussein and the initiative she had taken: 
Thatcher informed the Israeli Prime Minister that she had remained greatly 
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impressed by King Hussein‘s genuine desire to reach a just and lasting peace and 
was aware that he shared the same objective. She informed Peres that a Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation would soon be received in London including Mayor Milhem 
and Bishop Khoury, both of whom were ―moderates‖. In doing so, it would 
demonstrate that Britain was extending support to moderate Palestinians who were 
―willing to take risks for peace.‖ She ended her letter to Peres by emphasizing ―that 
the consequences of failure in the current efforts to move towards peace negotiations 
would be extremely serious for all of us.‖21 
 
 
Peres, however, was walking a tightrope in his capacity as Prime Minister of the 
National Unity Government. His room for manoeuvre was severely constrained by 
his coalition arrangement with Shamir. Peres did not take kindly to Thatcher‘s 
initiative, as he felt it undermined his own plan of action and made this very clear to 
her in a swift response: 
 
I am unable to share your conclusion that a meeting between Secretary Howe 
and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that includes senior officials of the 
PLO will contribute to the peace process. Quite the contrary. As we labour to 
impress on Jordan and the Palestinians the need to address the issue of direct 
negotiations with no unnecessary detours as well as the need to force the 
PLO to cease its terrorist activity, any reinforcement of the present course 
seems counter-productive.  
 
Such a course is particularly puzzling in light of your firm, consistent and 
courageous stand against international terrorism...  
 
I would like to hope that constructive steps, taken after thorough consultation 
and coordination, may facilitate progress in the not-too-distant future. I trust 
that you share this hope and determination to do the utmost to remove 
obstacles rather than aggravate them.
22
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Thatcher‘s initiative was blighted by unfortunate timing. Just days before the 
planned meeting with the delegation, an Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, was 
hijacked by a splinter group of the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Front. An elderly 
American Jew in a wheelchair was thrown overboard the ship by the terrorists. A 
few days before, three Israelis had been killed in a Palestinian terrorist attack in 
Larnaca, Cyprus. Thus, it was hardly surprising that the Israeli Government was very 
unhappy about the planned meeting in London. On 1 October 1985, Peres ordered an 
air raid on the Tunis headquarters of the PLO, in response to the terrorist attack in 
Cyprus. Some 56 Palestinians and 15 Tunisians were killed in the air raid while 
Arafat narrowly escaped.
23
  Thatcher was very unhappy with the raid, and asked the 
Irish leader Garret Fitzgerald to imagine what the Americans would say if Britain 
had ―bombed the provos in Dundalk.‖24 There were additional reasons for Thatcher 
to be unhappy about the operation in Tunis. Her Private Secretary had expressed 
concerns that the raid would make it more difficult for the PLO representatives to 
issue a statement that would be satisfactory for the British Government. Powell 
foresaw that there was likely to be a difficulty in obtaining from them a clear and 
unconditional recognition of Israel‘s right to exist.25  
 
Following the arrival of the two Palestinians in London (the other members of the 
delegation were the Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), Powell 
spoke to the Prime Minister and suggested that they inquire whether Milhem and 
Khoury really intended to renounce terrorism and accept UN Resolution 242.
26
  The 
advance commitment elicited from them during Thatcher‘s visit to Amman had not 
been completely satisfactory in reference to the UN resolution.
27
 Now that they were 
in London, Khoury was prepared to adhere to the conditions set but Milhem was not. 
As a result, Thatcher and Howe declined to meet with the Palestinians.  King 
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Hussein supported Thatcher‘s decision not to see the PLO members in view of the 
refusal to meet the conditions.
 28 
  
  
Thatcher had viewed her invitation to the two PLO representatives as a unique 
opportunity to strengthen the forces of moderation in the region. Nevertheless, the 
glaring failure of the visit undermined the Prime Minister‘s hopes of achieving this 
goal.  Her invitation to the two PLO representatives could also be seen as an attempt 
to wean the PLO away from the arms of the Soviets. Thatcher wanted to move 
quickly while Peres was still Prime Minister in Israel.
29
 However, Peres was 
unhappy about Thatcher‘s plan to bring the PLO out of the cold, and he felt that her 
initiative undermined his own plan.
30
  Israel‘s Foreign Ministry believed that the 
unsuccessful outcome of the visit would dampen British enthusiasm for similar 
initiatives in the future.
31
  
 
The former Conservative MP, Sir Ivan Lawrence, has claimed that Thatcher 
cancelled the meeting at the last minute as a result of pressure from the CFI.
32
  Once 
the two PLO officials were in London, Thatcher came under pressure to inquire 
whether they were prepared to renounce terrorism and recognize Israel. It would 
therefore be more accurate to claim that Milhem and Khoury were required to restate 
their acceptance of the two conditions as a result of pressure from the CFI.  It has 
also been claimed that Thatcher cancelled the meeting as a result of American 
pressure in the wake of the Achille Lauro affair.
33
 The second explanation is the 
more convincing one. Certainly, in the wake of the terrorist attack, the atmosphere in 
Washington was highly charged in regard to contacts with the PLO. Downing Street 
would have faced a very negative response had it sought approval from the White 
House on the meeting with the two PLO representatives.
34
  When one of the PLO 
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representatives failed to renounce terrorism and accept Israel‘s right to exist, 
Thatcher and Howe felt they had no choice but to cancel the meeting.     
 
However, the fact that Thatcher had shown a readiness to meet with PLO officials at 
all demonstrated that she had moved much closer to the FCO on this issue. Howe 
and Thatcher‘s close coordination during this period was a reflection of the broad 
cooperation between the FCO and Number Ten in the Arab-Israel arena. In fact, 
Thatcher‘s attempt to bring the PLO out of the cold was an example of the Prime 
Minister utilizing her growing power to direct a policy initiative in an area which 
was traditionally the preserve of the FCO. The invitation to Milhem and Khoury saw 
Thatcher outflanking the FCO, and taking a lead in advancing a policy that caused 
difficulties not only for Likud politicians but even for a dove such as Peres. 
 
The worry for the Thatcher Government was that Arab opinion would perceive the 
eventual cancellation of the meeting as capitulation to Israeli pressure. The FCO was 
concerned that there would be a ―misunderstanding‖ by the Saudis of the decision of 
the British Government. It was therefore recommended that the Prime Minister write 
to King Fahd, and explain to him why the meeting had been cancelled.
35
 Thatcher 
duly wrote to the Saudi monarch, expressing her deep disappointment that the 
meeting with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation could not take place. Thatcher 
sought to reassure King Fahd of her full support for a ―just and balanced settlement‖ 
which met the ―legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people to self-
determination.‖36  
 
In spite of the Thatcher Government‘s disappointment with the PLO, there was no 
immediate change in policy towards the organization. In fact, a few months later in 
March 1986, Sir David Miers, the FCO Under-Secretary for the Middle East, met 
with the PLO‘s Farouk Kaddoumi. The Board of Deputies were very quick to protest 
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to Miers in the wake of the meeting.
37
 Avner met with the Minister of State at the 
FCO, Timothy Renton, to express his disappointment at the meeting, and maintained 
that it would not help the position of King Hussein.
38
  The meeting between Miers 
and Kaddoumi underscored the fact that Thatcher had given the FCO a reasonably 
free hand in regard to contacts between diplomatic officials and PLO representatives.  
 
In the meantime, a serious rift had developed between King Hussein and Arafat. The 
Americans had informed the Jordanian monarch that they would be prepared to 
accept an invitation to the PLO to attend an international conference if the 
organization were ready to negotiate peace with Israel, accept resolutions 242 and 
338 and renounce terrorism. However, Arafat was not prepared to accept the 
conditions. By February 1986, King Hussein had made it public that he could no 
longer work together with Arafat since he could not be trusted.
39
 This was a 
welcome development for Peres since it appeared to increase the likelihood of a 
political solution emerging through the Jordanian option.  At the same time, it 
resulted in a temporary shift in Thatcher‘s attitude towards the PLO. The Prime 
Minister had lost patience with the PLO, and this became clear during her visit to 
Israel a few months later.  
 
Arms Sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
 
Thatcher‘s correspondence with King Fahd reflected the growing importance of the 
relationship between Britain and Saudi Arabia. Thatcher played an increasingly 
active role in the promotion of British arms exports to the Arab world during her 
second and third terms of office. Israeli policymakers had always been deeply 
concerned by arms sales to Arab countries as they appeared to threaten Israel‘s 
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qualitative military edge. This extended even to Arab countries that did not pose a 
concrete military threat.
40
 Thatcher was not deflected by such concerns.    
 
The Prime Minister‘s concern over the possible growth of Soviet influence in the 
Middle East was an important factor in her determination to forge a closer 
relationship with the Jordanians and Saudis, and was one of the most significant 
considerations in her approach to the region. This lay behind her wish to develop 
stronger relationships with moderate Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf States. Her fierce opposition to Soviet expansion was a major incentive 
for the Saudis to build a strong relationship with Britain – this applied particularly to 
King Fahd. 
41
 The Arab-Israeli conflict was not completely unrelated to the concerns 
over the expansion of Soviet influence in the Gulf area, as the Prime Minister had 
already acknowledged during her first term.
42
 Thatcher was unhappy at the thought 
that the Soviets could win greater influence among Arab States and the PLO by 
standing up for the Palestinians while the United States was giving automatic 
support to the Israelis.
43
   The Prime Minister was concerned that the Soviets would 
exploit the deadlock in the region in order to expand their influence in the Middle 
East. This made Thatcher increasingly unhappy about Israeli policies that appeared 
to exacerbate this state of affairs. Arguably, this was a background factor that 
constrained Thatcher in her dealings with Israel, and helped to explain the non-
interference of Number Ten on such matters as the sale of North Sea oil. 
 
 Throughout 1984 and most of 1985, Britain and Saudi Arabia conducted 
negotiations over the sale of British fighter aircraft. Thatcher met Prince Bandar, a 
nephew of King Fahd, at least twice in 1985, once in Riyadh in April and the second 
time in August.
44
 At the last minute, the Prime Minister managed to secure Britain‘s 
most lucrative arms export deal ever, interrupting a holiday in Austria in order to 
secure the deal with the Saudis in Switzerland.  On 17 February 1986, Britain and 
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Saudi Arabia formally signed the £5 billion Al Yamamah deal in Riyadh, under the 
terms of which Britain was to supply 132 military aircraft to the Saudis.  Britain had 
also reached an arms deal with Jordan worth £270 million in September 1985. On 8 
July 1988, a new phase of the Al Yamamah deal between Britain and Saudi Arabia 
was announced. The value estimated was £10 billion. The deal signed by Prince 
Sultan and Defence Minister George Younger on 3 July 1988 had followed 
discussions which again included the British Prime Minister.
45
  
 
There were strong parallels between Thatcher‘s involvement in the arms deal with 
Saudi Arabia and the invitation to the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to London. In 
both cases, they showed the growing involvement of 10 Downing Street in the realm 
of international affairs. Thatcher had exploited her personal relationships with King 
Hussein and Prince Bandar to advance her policy in the Middle East which focused 
on strengthening Britain‘s moderate Arab allies while keeping radical forces at bay. 
Thatcher‘s growing intervention in the foreign policy arena was reinforced by the 
increasingly significant role of her Private Secretary Charles Powell.  
 
Thatcher took advantage of the difficulties facing the Reagan Administration in this 
arena. Israel‘s supporters in Britain were not in a position to exert influence on the 
Thatcher Government on arms sales to the Arab world. In the United States, a 
proposed sale of arms to Jordan and Saudi Arabia would have required careful 
congressional scrutiny. In contrast, the British political system was clearly more 
amenable to those purchasing arms. As Phythian points out, parliament did not 
oversee this area of foreign policy with the result that greater secrecy was granted to 
the purchaser.
46
 This would have made it even more difficult for pro-Israel 
organizations in London to lobby against the sale of arms to Arab countries.  The 
Board of Deputies certainly attempted to dissuade the Thatcher Government from 
selling Tornado aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Indeed, in 1984, a letter had been sent to 
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Heseltine expressing the anger and dismay of the Board and the Jewish community, 
as a whole, in the wake of early reports on a possible deal.
47
   
 
In late September 1985, Israel‘s Defence Minister Arens summoned the British 
Ambassador to express Israel‘s great concern over the arms deals. Arens claimed 
that the proposed sale was a significant deviation from British policy in the Middle 
East, and would have very negative ramifications for the region. He maintained that 
the deal would seriously threaten Israel‘s security. Arens also bemoaned the fact that 
Britain had chosen to sell weapons to countries which were at war with Israel while 
it maintained an embargo on arms sales to the Jewish State. Squire was unable to 
answer Arens on the question of whether restrictions had been placed on the aircraft 
as had been the case with other suppliers.
48
 Peres had also written to Thatcher to 
express his opposition to the arms deal. He claimed that the sale would ―become a 
potential added threat to Israel and aggravate the economic burden of sustaining an 
adequate balance.‖49 Nevertheless, the British Prime Minister was unmoved by such 
protests. The strategic importance of the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia overrode any 
concerns that Thatcher may have had over upsetting the Israeli Government and the 
local Jewish community. Furthermore, she had the luxury of knowing that the 
Americans were providing for Israel‘s security.50   
 
There were four clear benefits to Britain in this arena which highlighted the 
importance of both international and domestic factors in the policy-making process: 
Firstly, there were clear commercial benefits in selling arms to the Saudis.  Thatcher 
was fiercely protective of British industry which required her to pursue large-scale 
export projects.
51
 Thus, there were clear domestic economic benefits to be had from 
selling arms. The deal would contribute to the defence of a major source of Western 
oil supplies, and would ensure that many of the other oil producers remained friendly 
to the West. The deal was also designed to strengthen traditional ties with moderate 
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Arab countries and prevent penetration by the Soviet Union.
52
 Aside from concerns 
over Soviet influence, there was growing unease also over the threat of Iranian 
subversion to moderate Arab states.
53
 Thus, there were strong factors at the 
international-level which dictated this policy. The arms deal appeared to be strongly 
in line with Western strategic interests, in terms of maintaining stability in the 
Middle East. There was also an argument that if the British did not sell arms to the 
Saudis, other powers would rush into the vacuum.
54
 
 
 Thatcher herself was defiant on the issue of the arms deal with Saudi Arabia during 
a meeting with Israeli journalists on 30 September 1985: 
No, I do not believe Saudi Arabia will ever attack Israel, ever, ever, ever. 
Saudi Arabia is really quite a bastion for stability in the Middle East and, as 
you know, she has taken a very statesmanlike position on many things that 
could have destabilised the Middle East, a very statesmanlike position. She 
too is entitled to defend herself.
55
 
 
During the same meeting, the Prime Minister angrily denied suggestions that there 
had been a link between the invitation to the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the 
arms deal to Saudi Arabia. She stressed that she had supported King Hussein‘s 
initiative for a long time, and had been anxious to do what she could to advance the 
peace process.
56
 Certainly, Thatcher‘s invitation to the Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation was a fundamental element in her bid to strengthen King Hussein‘s 
standing and advance the peace process. Nevertheless, the invitation could only have 
bolstered Britain‘s standing in the eyes of the Saudis, thereby enhancing the chances 
of an arms deal.  Furthermore, it was surely no coincidence that the FCO had been so 
concerned about the reaction of the Saudis to the cancellation of the meeting with the 
two PLO representatives.  The Prime Minister‘s letter to King Fahd explaining the 
circumstances behind the cancelled meeting could arguably be seen also in the 
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context of safeguarding the arms deal that had recently been agreed between the two 
countries.  
 
Thatcher‘s direct involvement in the invitation to the Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation and the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia not only signified the solid 
agreement between Number Ten and Whitehall in the Arab-Israel arena. It also 
indicated that Thatcher was ready to outflank the FCO: she was prepared to take the 
lead in pursuing policies which enhanced Britain‘s strategic and commercial interests 
in the region, even while they posed clear difficulties for the Israeli Government. 
Thus, Israel‘s Foreign Ministry concluded that while there had been an improvement 
in the tone and atmospherics of Anglo-Israeli relations under Howe, British policy 
itself had been largely unchanged since the early 1980s.
57
   
 
In spite of the concentration of powers in the Downing Street policy unit, 
cooperation between Thatcher and Whitehall continued.   As with the issue of North 
Sea oil, the arms sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia provided a clear example of 
cohesive government on matters of strategic importance.   In this case, the MOD, the 
Department of Trade and Industry and the FCO were working in coordination with 
Number Ten to boost Britain‘s political and commercial interests in the Middle East.  
Thatcher‘s strong personality and leadership style had served to cement the 
coordination with Whitehall rather than to undercut it.  
 
The Visit of Peres 
 
In spite of the recent disagreements between Thatcher and Peres, the British Prime 
Minister had been greatly impressed by Peres‘s Knesset address of 10 June, 
describing it as ―a very courageous speech‖, and was encouraged by his position on 
an international framework for negotiations between a Jordanian-Palestinian 
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delegation and Israel.
58
 Peres would be arriving in London towards the end of 
January 1986 on an official visit. Thatcher viewed this as a unique opportunity to 
advance the peace process, but realized that she would have to move swiftly since 
Peres was due to step down as Prime Minister the following autumn.
59
  
 
Peres saw his visit to London as an opportunity to enlist Thatcher‘s influence with 
King Hussein. Peres and Hussein both sought an international framework for 
negotiations, but there were considerable disagreements over the type of framework. 
The King had envisaged an ongoing international conference with the participation 
of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In contrast, Peres sought an 
emasculated international framework that would have only symbolic value. The 
Israeli Prime Minister wanted Thatcher to sell his idea to the King, and persuade him 
that progress was still possible on this basis.
60
 
    
Peres‘s visit to London provided the Israeli leader with an opportunity to strengthen 
his domestic position. Thatcher was happy to oblige. She gave a dinner for Peres at 
10 Downing Street. During their meeting, Thatcher accepted an invitation from Peres 
to visit Israel in the coming months. She would become the first British Prime 
Minister to visit the Jewish State while in office. During their meeting, Peres also 
raised the idea of holding secret working-level discussions with Jordan.
61
  
 
Ahead of the Israeli Prime Minister‘s trip to London, there had been a re-
examination of Anglo-Israeli ties including a review of the various restrictions.
62
  
One outcome of the visit was the discontinuation of the practice of authenticating 
Arab boycott documents within Whitehall.
63
  Avner viewed the decision as a 
personal victory.
64
 The decision to discontinue the practice arguably constituted a 
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small symbolic gesture in support of Peres. Nevertheless, the difficulties arising from 
the boycott had not been eliminated since the Arab-British Chamber of Commerce 
was now administering the authentication of boycott documents instead.
65
 Indeed, 
The Guardian newspaper, hardly a supportive voice on Israel, had opined that the 
authentication of boycott documents should not be taking place at all.
66
 Thus the 
gesture was of very limited value.  
 
There was no change in policy on the arms restrictions and North Sea oil. Lynda 
Chalker, an FCO Minister of State, had stated in January 1986 that while Britain had 
welcomed Israel‘s decision to withdraw from Lebanon, there was disappointment 
over the residual presence of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory. The policy of arms 
sales to Israel would be kept under review.
67
  More significantly, a short time before 
the Prime Minister‘s visit to Israel, Howe had recommended that there be no change 
in the restrictions on arms sales to Israel. The Prime Minister endorsed her Foreign 
Secretary‘s recommendation.68   This indicated the clear agreement between Thatcher 
and the FCO in regard to the restrictions on arms sales to Israel. 
 
Charles Powell 
 
Disagreements began to emerge, however, between Thatcher and Howe in the course 
of 1985 and 1986 over the transatlantic relationship. Howe believed in a greater 
detachment from US policies, and felt that his Prime Minister was excessively loyal 
to the Reagan Administration.
69
  Certainly, a closer relationship had developed 
between Thatcher and Reagan during her second term of office.
70
 This reflected the 
growing shift in power away from the FCO towards 10 Downing Street. 
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As the Foreign Affairs Private Secretary, Powell‘s role was to represent the thinking 
of the FCO, and to act as a bridge between his ministry and Downing Street, while 
keeping the Prime Minister informed on foreign affairs, defence and Northern 
Ireland. Nevertheless, the post expanded during Powell‘s tenure. Powell became 
increasingly close to Thatcher, he quickly understood her thinking and articulated it. 
She liked his competence, elegance and charm. There was a strong chemistry 
between them.
71
 Within a short time of assuming his post, Powell had established 
himself in a position of considerable influence. He would be quick to reject certain 
courses of action if he felt that his Prime Minister would not go along with them. 
Powell‘s status was recognized in Washington, and he listened in to all conversations 
between the President and the Prime Minister.
72
 By the second half of the 1980s, no 
important foreign affairs decision was made without reference to Number Ten.
73
 
   
Powell had served in NENAD before his appointment to the post of Private 
Secretary. Nevertheless, he was untypical of many fellow diplomats who had served 
in the department.  Most of the NENAD heads had been distinguished Arabists by 
training, and served most of their working lives in the Middle East. Powell moved 
into NENAD with no background in the Middle East. He was not an Arabist, and 
had not learned Arabic or served anywhere in the Middle East. He was disposed to 
give the Israeli Government a reasonably fair hearing, and was ready to see its 
diplomats on a regular basis.
74
 During his period of service in the department, his 
positive approach towards the Jewish State helped to win the trust of the Israelis. 
One Israeli diplomatic official had described him as ―a good source, reliable and a 
good friend.‖75    
 
Following Powell‘s appointment as Private Secretary, he allowed the Israelis greater 
access to Downing Street. In this case, it meant access to Powell rather than direct 
access to Thatcher. Among those who visited Powell‘s office was Israel‘s 
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Ambassador to the UN, Binyamin Netanyahu. Powell would also meet Israelis on 
the recommendation of the local Ambassador. Israelis had indirect access to 
Thatcher herself through the Jewish community in Britain. The Prime Minister 
attended many Jewish community events at which an Israeli leader or minister would 
be present.
76
  One former British diplomat believes that the Israelis were well served 
by Powell, although they were not the only beneficiaries of his patronage:  
 
Charles Powell was seen as Israel‘s friend at court and cultivated as such 
once he became Mrs Thatcher‘s Private Secretary. He was the channel of 
influence which the Israelis very cleverly used to get a fair hearing... He was 
very open. There were lots of other countries doing this to Charles Powell.
77
   
 
Middle East specialists were also put out by the fact that the private office was used 
as a back channel to send instructions to the FCO, instead of advice coming in from 
the FCO to Downing Street.
78
 Powell‘s indulgent attitude towards the Israelis 
arguably reinforced the belief of some Israeli officials that there were differences 
between the FCO and Thatcher on policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.  In 
substance, however, there is little evidence to show that the greater access to 10 
Downing Street made a difference to the Thatcher Government‘s policy towards 
Israel. At best, it reinforced the belief of Israeli officials that they had a friend in 
Number Ten.
79
 Indeed, a former diplomat who had served in NENAD during the mid 
1980s believed that there were few if any differences between the FCO and 10 
Downing Street in the Arab-Israel arena while he served in the post: 
 
The FCO didn‘t attempt to do anything different from Mrs Thatcher‘s line 
nor did they want to. She judged the realities of what could be done with 
British policy domestically, and therefore, we worked together. I don‘t think I 
ever put a brief to Charles Powell that challenged him or surprised him. This 
was a consensus, and I wasn‘t aware of great tensions - occasional 
differences but nothing substantial.
80
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Thatcher’s Support for the US Bombing of Libya 
 
Powell was said to have reinforced Thatcher‘s positions against those of the FCO. 
This applied particularly on European issues.
81
 A clear example of Powell‘s 
closeness to Thatcher was the eventual decision to support the Reagan 
Administration‘s bombing raid on Libya in April 1986 which was in line with the 
closer relationship between London and Washington. The United States possessed 
intelligence pointing to Libyan involvement in a bombing attack on American 
servicemen in West Berlin, and sought to carry out air strikes on Libya in response. 
On 8 April, Reagan contacted Thatcher to request her support for the use of 
American F1-11s based in Britain for raids against Libya.
82
  However, Howe was 
uncomfortable about giving Reagan carte blanche to launch attacks on Libya from 
British soil. There were also concerns over whether such a raid could be defined as a 
legitimate act of self-defence. Thatcher, for her part, expressed her anxieties to 
Reagan over the risk of civilian casualties and the accuracy of an offensive.
83
  
 
A separate concern for Thatcher was related to the reaction of the Saudis. She 
contacted Jonathan Aitken, a Conservative MP with close ties to Riyadh, asking him 
how the Saudis would react if the Americans used British bases to bomb Libya. 
Aitken responded that the Saudis would ―huff and puff‖ but that would be it. In 
private, they would be happy to see Colonel Gaddafi getting his comeuppance.
84
 
When the time for the final decision came on 10 April, Thatcher contacted Powell 
rather than Howe. She authorized her Private Secretary to send a message to the 
Americans giving them permission to use the bases.
85
 Thatcher was alone among 
Western leaders and virtually the only one in her cabinet to support Reagan‘s action 
against Libya.
86
 The Prime Minister‘s readiness to support the action would have 
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been reinforced by the fact that Britain itself had suffered from Libyan terrorism in 
the spring of 1984 when a British policewoman was killed by gunshots fired from 
the Libyan Embassy.  
 
Thatcher‘s decision to support the US bombing raid on Libya was significant for a 
number of reasons. She sought to exploit her influence with the United States in 
order to maintain Britain‘s standing as a leading power. According to Sharp, since 
the end of the Second World War, Britain has traditionally asserted its usefulness to 
Washington as a uniquely valuable source of political support. In return for this 
assistance, it was hoped that the Americans would listen to Britain‘s advice on 
policy, and demonstrate understanding for Britain‘s efforts to maintain its standing 
as a leading power.
87
  This was directly related to Thatcher‘s own involvement in 
policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the coming period, Thatcher would 
attempt to take advantage of her growing influence with the Reagan Administration 
by, among other things, arguing for stronger US engagement in the Middle East 
peace process. Nevertheless, while the Reagan Administration did show a greater 
degree of sympathy towards some British concerns (for example, over the extradition 
of IRA terrorists, much to the delight of the Prime Minister
88
), there was a reluctance 
to heed Thatcher‘s arguments over the Arab-Israeli conflict.   
 
Secondly, Thatcher‘s support for the US action was also an opportunity to reassert 
her anti-terrorist credentials.  It certainly helped her win support on the Israeli street 
ahead of her visit to the Jewish State. The Israelis appreciated Thatcher‘s support for 
what they perceived as an American operation against state sponsored terrorism.
89
 
Furthermore, Thatcher‘s strong stand against terrorism would enhance her position 
also within the local Jewish community. On the debit side, there were concerns in the 
FCO about the fact that Britain would have to ―make up lost ground‖ in the Arab 
world after its support for the US action in Libya.
90
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Thirdly, the raid on Libya appeared to reflect the Prime Minister‘s growing tendency 
to cut the FCO out of the loop. Powell had noted that the FCO were ―whole-
heartedly‖ against the raid on Libya, believing that British interests in the Middle 
East would be severely damaged.
91
 Nevertheless, Thatcher felt that she had no 
choice but to support America in its time of need.
92
  As the relationship between 
Thatcher and Reagan grew closer, the FCO felt itself increasingly marginalised in 
the British-American sphere.
93
  
 
Thatcher Government Breaks off Ties with Syria 
 
A second area of disagreement between Thatcher and the FCO revolved around 
policy towards Syria. Thatcher had moved to cut off diplomatic relations with 
Damascus in October 1986 following Syrian involvement in an attempted bombing 
of an El-Al airliner. Britain‘s Ambassador in Syria, Roger Tomkys, had argued for 
the expulsion of the Syrian Ambassador because of his implication in the affair, but 
did not believe that President Hafez Assad had been directly responsible. Tomkys 
advised against a complete severing of diplomatic ties with the Syrians. He 
maintained that once ties were broken off, it would be difficult to restore them. 
Tomkys lost the argument to the Prime Minister.
94
 Thatcher‘s FCO Adviser, Percy 
Cradock, believed that the Prime Minister had a ―good case‖ for breaking off 
relations with Syria, although he was concerned that the dictates of counter-terrorism 
policy were forcing Britain ―into an almost Israeli-style isolation‖ which was not 
ideal for Britain‘s position in the Middle East.95  Arguably, the differences between 
Number Ten and the FCO over Syria were reflected not so much in the severing of 
diplomatic links, but rather in Thatcher‘s later resistance to restoring ties with 
Damascus.    During Thatcher‘s third term in office, the FCO would have to work 
hard to overcome the Prime Minister‘s resistance on this issue.  
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Rynhold and Spyer argue that Thatcher‘s steps against Libya and Syria together with 
the later hardening of her views on an independent Palestinian State represented a 
move towards a more pro-American strategic position.
96
  In fact, while Thatcher‘s 
steps on Libya were certainly taken with a view to supporting the Reagan 
Administration, the measures against Syria had to be seen in a different light. 
Thatcher had revealed to Peres in 1987 that the United States was actually exerting 
pressure on Britain to restore normal ties with Syria.
97
 Thus, Thatcher‘s action 
against Damascus did not represent part of a larger shift towards a pro-American 
policy. In view of Thatcher‘s strong public stand against international terrorism, the 
Prime Minister arguably had little choice but to cut off diplomatic relations with 
Syria after its involvement in an attempt to blow up an airliner with British civilians 
on board. After all, Howe had also given his full support to the British move against 
Syria.
98
  
 
Nevertheless, Thatcher‘s actions against Libya and Damascus highlighted one area 
of disagreement between Number Ten and the FCO. Thatcher felt as strongly as the 
FCO on the need to build strong alliances with moderate Arab forces in the Middle 
East. However, there were differences in regard to radical forces in the region. 
Towards the end of Thatcher‘s second term of office, the Prime Minister adopted a 
zero-tolerance approach towards states or organizations that were sponsoring 
terrorism. Syria, Libya and the PLO certainly fell into this category. The FCO, 
however, was concerned to maintain good ties with all the Arab actors in the region. 
In spite of these tensions, the FCO adapted itself to the stronger line emerging from 
Number Ten. 
  
Thatcher‘s decisions on Libya and Syria were significant in that they represented two 
rare occasions in which the Prime Minister exerted her independence on Middle East 
policy. Thatcher‘s readiness to take such steps was augmented by the stronger 
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foreign policy machine that she had at her disposal in 10 Downing Street. However, 
this thesis contends that such steps were the exception rather than the norm during 
Thatcher‘s eleven and a half years in power. For the most part, where Thatcher 
exerted her growing authority in the sphere of Middle East policy, it was to promote 
a policy that was closely aligned with cherished objectives of the FCO. Her 
interventions in British arms sales to the Arab world and her involvement in the 
invitation to the two PLO representatives were a perfect illustration of this.    
188 
 
Chapter Six 
 
Thatcher’s Visit to Israel 
 
Thatcher was the first British Prime Minister to visit Israel while still in office. 
Thatcher‘s visit to Israel was actually the culmination of earlier efforts by the FCO to 
improve Anglo-Israeli relations, rather than a direct initiative from 10 Downing 
Street. Although Peres had issued the invitation for her visit during his recent trip to 
London, the FCO had played an important role behind the scenes in improving the 
bilateral atmosphere between the two countries. Indeed, the FCO was enthusiastic 
about the visit, viewing it as an opportunity to strengthen Peres and undercut the 
Likud. In addition, it provided an opportunity for Thatcher to build a dialogue with 
Palestinian moderates in a bid to show that Britain was sympathetic to Palestinian 
grievances. Although Thatcher deviated from the FCO line on the issues of the PLO 
and an independent Palestinian State during her visit, the Prime Minister and the 
FCO were in close agreement on the need to strengthen the standing of Peres who 
represented the peace camp in Israel.  
 
The following spring, the FCO was once again outflanked by Thatcher as she 
extended discreet support to Peres during his secret talks with King Hussein which 
culminated in the London Agreement of April 1987. The FCO was not aware of the 
secret talks which had been arranged by Powell,
1
  reflecting the concentration of 
powers in 10 Downing Street. Nevertheless, it is argued here that Thatcher‘s growing 
control over policy in the Arab-Israel arena actually saw her take actions to reinforce 
traditional FCO objectives: in other words, she sought to strengthen moderate forces 
such as King Hussein and Peres, while simultaneously seeking to counter Likud 
hardliners who favoured a status quo in the region.     
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Thatcher’s Visit: An Opportunity to Strengthen the Doves 
 
Thatcher‘s visit to Israel in May 1986 was highly significant for her policy towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. The visit was an opportunity to reinforce the moderates in 
the region both on the Israeli and Palestinian sides. The FCO sought to strengthen 
the position of the dovish Peres at the expense of his rival Shamir. The Prime 
Minister would use her international standing to articulate support for the peace 
process as advocated by Peres, in the hope of strengthening the Labour leader‘s 
domestic position. She would also be sending a message to Arab opinion by meeting 
with Palestinians, and expressing sympathy for their rights and aspirations. 
Arguably, the greatest challenge of her trip was to strengthen the moderate 
Palestinians who she hoped would eventually prevail over the extremists within the 
PLO.
2
  The stronger control of the Number Ten private office over foreign policy 
was exploited by the Prime Minister to cultivate closer ties with Israel under the 
premiership of Peres.   
 
As the first British Prime Minister to visit the Jewish State, there would be a unique 
opportunity for Thatcher to enhance her credentials as a friend of Israel. Within the 
FCO, Thatcher‘s visit to Israel had been viewed as the culmination of a series of 
visits, beginning with Richard Luce‘s trip in 1983. The process had intensified 
during the premiership of Peres, as the British Government had sought to encourage 
his more flexible approach on the Palestinian issue.
3
  
 
It was no coincidence that Thatcher was visiting Israel while Peres was at the helm. 
As Yossi Ben Aharon, Shamir‘s adviser, points out:  
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Peres wanted to strengthen his standing, and there were many who wanted to 
help him. Therefore, when he invited Thatcher to visit, she came. She would 
not have come to visit Shamir.
4
 
   
In her own memoirs, Thatcher writes that she timed her visit to coincide with Peres‘s 
term as Prime Minister. She felt that ―it was a great pity‖ that under the Israeli 
coalition rotation arrangement, he would soon be replaced by ―the hardline‖ Likud 
leader. 
5
  The FCO was greatly concerned about the regional stalemate, and the 
consequent danger of the radicalization of Arab states which threatened renewed 
conflict.
6
 On this basis, Squire argued that Thatcher‘s visit to Israel was a timely 
opportunity to break the status quo. In a cable to London, he noted that Thatcher‘s 
standing was very high in Israel – in particular, after her support for the US raids on 
Libya. Thatcher‘s influence with President Reagan and King Hussein together with 
her strong stand on terrorism would therefore enable her to say unpalatable things to 
the Israelis that would be regarded from others as unwelcome interference in 
domestic affairs. He expressed the hope that the Prime Minister would send a ―tough 
message‖ to the Israelis on the need for a realistic solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict which would take Palestinian nationalistic aspirations into account – a 
failure to do so would undercut moderates like Peres. Squire added that Thatcher had 
an opportunity to shape the debate in Israel.
7
 This underlined the fact that the FCO 
was hoping for cooperation from Thatcher with a view to strengthening the domestic 
standing of Peres.    
 
Howe entirely agreed with Squire that Thatcher had to exploit her high standing in 
Israel to speak firmly on the Arab-Israel issue: it would help Peres against the Israeli 
hardliners. Nevertheless, there was concern within the FCO that Israeli hawks would 
exploit rhetoric about a ―common crusade against terrorism‖ and portray Arabs as 
the villains. The FCO noted that the Arabs would be paying very careful attention to 
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every word of the Prime Minister against the background of Britain‘s support for the 
US action against Libya.
8
 Ahead of Thatcher‘s dinner speech at the Knesset, Sir 
David Miers, the FCO Under-Secretary for the Middle East, recommended removing 
references to Jewish sufferings from terrorism to avoid any suggestion of a link 
between Britain‘s actions against terror and Israel‘s problems with the Palestinians.9 
There had also been a suggestion that the Prime Minister make a swift visit to Cairo 
to counter-balance her trip to Israel, were it necessary, in order to pacify Arab 
opinion. Howe rejected the idea.
10
 
 
As Foreign Secretary, Howe would hold a weekly bilateral meeting with the Prime 
Minister. Prior to Thatcher‘s visit to Israel, a briefing was prepared for the bilateral 
on 20 May which was devoted to the forthcoming trip. A minute was circulated 
within NENAD alluding to Howe‘s concern that Thatcher would become suspicious 
of the briefing because it was written in the ―notoriously pro-Arab FCO.‖11 Howe 
therefore suggested that the strongest points in the briefing were best expressed by 
reference to their adoption by King Hussein or John Coles, the British Ambassador 
in Amman who had served as Private Secretary to Thatcher.
12
 The Prime Minister 
would take these points more seriously if they were linked to King Hussein. 
Furthermore, Howe felt that the briefing could emphasize the need for the Prime 
Minister to tell her hosts some ―home truths‖, particularly over Palestinian rights.13   
 
The briefing for the Howe-Thatcher bilateral stated that in view of the stagnation in 
the peace process, it would be important to emphasize the urgency of the difficulties, 
the need for the amelioration of conditions in the Occupied Territories and to switch 
the focus away from terrorism. The briefing mentioned also that the Israelis were not 
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pushing for additional bilateral concessions. The Prime Minister‘s visit to Israel was 
―sufficient in itself‖.14  
 
In a cable to the FCO, John Coles expressed his hope that the Prime Minister would 
emphasize the need for a ―just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian problem as an 
urgent necessity.‖ Coles added that it would help if the Prime Minister could appeal 
to Washington to restart the peace process. It was hoped that Thatcher would stress 
the need for an early Israeli withdrawal from the territories, and the need for an 
improvement in the living standards of the Palestinians as a prelude to and not a 
substitute for withdrawal.
15
  
 
The Knesset Address 
 
Thatcher‘s after-dinner speech at the Knesset on 25 May was possibly the 
centrepiece of her entire visit. On the one hand, Thatcher played to the gallery of 
Israel‘s supporters in expressing her sincere admiration for Israel‘s outstanding 
accomplishments, and pledging Britain‘s commitment to ―a stable, peaceful and 
secure future for the people of Israel.‖ Indeed, she highlighted her personal 
connections with the Jewish State, mentioning her daughter‘s stay on a Kibbutz and 
the fact that her Finchley constituency was twinned with the Israeli municipality of 
Ramat Gan. There were also strong words of support for Soviet Jewry. On the other 
hand, Thatcher used her address to state uncomfortable truths to her audience: 
because Israel had set high standards, more was expected of her than other countries. 
As a result, the world expected Israel to protect the rights of Arabs in the territories. 
Israel could surely not accept a situation where two classes of people coexisted with 
different standards and rights. Thatcher also asserted that the situation in the 
Occupied Territories could not last. There was encouragement for the idea of West 
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Bank elections.  Above all, the British Prime Minister emphasized that the 
Palestinians had to be given the right to determine their own future.
16
  
 
Thatcher had not broken new ground with her speech. After all, she had already 
pledged her support for Palestinian self-determination in 1980. Nevertheless, there 
was a shift of emphasis towards the steps that were expected of Israel and its 
responsibilities. Thatcher‘s address was aimed essentially at four constituencies: the 
British Jewish community, the Israeli electorate, Arab opinion, and Washington. 
Squire maintained that her speech was designed to support Peres and other 
moderates while challenging Likud arguments in favour of the status quo. The 
address ―touched raw nerves‖ on the need for progress in the territories, self-
determination for the Palestinians and West Bank elections. Squire believed that 
almost everything she had said converged with the position of Peres, with the 
exception perhaps of mayoral elections in the territories. It was no surprise, 
therefore, that Peres‘s adviser Nimrod Novik was delighted with the speech.17 
Thatcher‘s remarks on the need for an urgent solution had also been intended for 
Washington‘s consumption.18 In view of Thatcher‘s oft-stated hostility to the FCO, it 
was interesting how closely her keynote address dovetailed with the hopes and 
expectations of senior mandarins. 
 
Thatcher’s Visit to Israel and the ‘Finchley Factor’ 
 
During her visit to the Yad Vashem Holocaust Heroes and Martyrs Authority, 
Thatcher stated: ―Who better than you, with the experience of the fate of a 
persecuted minority, can understand the Palestinians?‖ Following her frank remarks 
at Yad Vashem, the Haaretz newspaper later commented that ―Thatcher made it clear 
that she didn‘t come to Israel to win the hearts of the Jews of Finchley but to express 
the European consensus.‖19  In fact, Thatcher had set out to do both. The Prime 
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Minister‘s visit had also been organized in such a way as to appeal to the Israeli 
people and her Jewish supporters in Britain. Thatcher brought with her a large 
entourage, including her constituency chairman and prominent Jews such as Gerald 
Ronson and Marcus Sieff. She relished the symbolism of being the first British 
Prime Minister to visit the State of Israel.
20
 Israel‘s Ambassador to Britain noted that 
she was quite overwhelmed during her trip: 
 
It had a royal cavalcade feel about it. Thousands of people came out to cheer 
her... [She was given] a ceremony of a Head of State with a Guard of 
Honour... She was astonished as she drew up by the King David Hotel at the 
number of people behind the barriers. She was also surprised how clean 
everything was.
21
 
  
The Prime Minister visited a school in the town of Ashkelon which had been built 
with the support of British Jews. The visit offered her an opportunity to pay tribute 
to the multifaceted contributions of Anglo-Jewry to Israeli life.
22
 Later, on her way 
to the airport, Thatcher visited Ramat Gan, a suburb of Tel Aviv that was twinned 
with Finchley. On her arrival, the Prime Minister found a very enthusiastic crowd of 
25,000 people awaiting her. According to Ewen Fergusson, a FCO official who 
accompanied Thatcher during her trip, the visit was clearly something that played to 
her Finchley constituency.
23
 Thatcher herself was visibly moved by the enthusiastic 
response within Israel. A few weeks later, at a State banquet in London for the West 
German President, Thatcher went over to Avner and spoke with great excitement 
about her visit to Israel, with members of the Royal Family within earshot.
24
  
 
The Meeting with Palestinian Leaders 
 
Thatcher‘s planned meeting with Palestinian leaders from the West Bank was also a 
fundamental element of her visit. Howe believed that such a meeting would be 
                                                          
20
 Interview with Ewen Fergusson  
21
 Interview with Yehuda Avner 
22
 MTF, Speech at Henry Ronson Comprehensive School, 26 May 1986 
23
  Interview with Ewen Fergusson  
24
  ISA 9707/1, Cable from Israeli Embassy, London, to MFA, 8 July 1986 
195 
 
―important presentationally‖ at a sensitive time for relations between Britain and the 
Arab world.
25
 A number of newspapers had claimed that Thatcher would become the 
first Western Prime Minister to meet with West Bank leaders while on a visit to 
Israel.
26
 A FCO cable to the Consulate General in Jerusalem provided an indication 
of the importance of the meeting for British policy in the region:  
 
The atmosphere at the Prime Minister‘s meeting with Palestinians will be 
vitally important for the success of the visit to Israel and its wider impact in 
the Arab world, where we need to make up lost ground after Libya.
27
   
 
Ahead of the meeting, the Palestinians prepared a Memorandum for the Prime 
Minister. Appreciation was shown for the position of the Thatcher Government on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Memorandum stated that unlike successive US 
Administrations, the British Government had shown a ―sincere willingness‖ to 
resolve the conflict on a fair basis reflected in the October 1985 attempt to meet two 
PLO officials in London. Furthermore, Britain openly recognized the ―all important 
Palestinian right to self determination‖ as a signatory to the Venice Declaration. The 
Palestinians had also welcomed the British statements on the illegality of Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank.  The Palestinians called for the British Government to 
open a direct dialogue with PLO representatives without preconditions.  Awkwardly, 
there was a denunciation of the air strike on Libya which had ―unfortunately 
received British backing.‖ 28  
 
Thatcher met with eight Palestinian leaders on 26 May. Five of the Palestinians were 
from the West Bank, and three were from Gaza. The meeting lasted nearly two and a 
half hours.  The leaders welcomed Thatcher‘s speech in the Knesset, and were 
reassured by her position on Palestinian self-determination.
29
 The Palestinians 
described to Thatcher the difficulties they faced living under Israeli occupation. 
There was a unanimous rejection of terrorism, and a commitment to a peaceful 
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settlement, as well as total support for the PLO under Arafat. The leaders asked the 
Prime Minister to tell King Hussein that they wished to see a revival of the Amman 
Accord and a resumed dialogue between Jordan and PLO representatives.  The 
leaders asserted that Israel had to grant democratic rights to the residents of the 
territories, and stop land expropriation and settlements. No mention was made of the 
bombing raids on Libya during the meeting itself.
30
  
 
Britain‘s Consul General, Patrick De Courcy-Ireland, viewed the meeting as ―a 
resounding success.‖ The Palestinians had felt honoured that the Prime Minister had 
devoted so much time to their concerns while on an official visit to Israel. They 
regarded the first ever meeting of the head of a leading Western Government with a 
Palestinian delegation during a visit to Israel a very significant political development 
which demonstrated that the Palestinian case demanded to be heard. They expressed 
their hope that the meeting would lead to the reactivation of the peace process.
31
 
Thatcher later wrote to King Hussein that she found her meeting with the 
Palestinians ―very helpful in reaching a better understanding of their grievances‖, 
and was encouraged by their willingness to reach a peaceful agreement by 
negotiation.
32
 Some three months before Thatcher‘s visit, Howe had made it clear 
that he viewed such a meeting as a matter of ―great importance.‖33  It was important 
to show the Arab world that Britain was sympathetic to Palestinian grievances. 
Thatcher‘s successful meeting with the Palestinians was a further demonstration of 
the cooperation between the FCO and Number Ten. Furthermore, the Prime Minister 
had utilized her personality and growing international stature to make her own 
distinctive contribution to British diplomatic efforts in the Arab-Israel arena.  
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The Meetings with Peres    
 
Thatcher held some four hours of discussions with Peres, as well as a number of 
conversations while they were travelling around Israel.
34
  Novik who had been 
present at Peres‘s meetings with international statesmen believed that his relationship 
with Thatcher was unique since the discussions with her were more intimate than 
those he held with Kohl, Mitterand or anyone else. Peres was friends with Mitterand, 
but his meetings with him did not hold the same weight because of her connections 
with King Hussein and President Reagan. The discussions he held with Thatcher on 
internal political issues were much more open than those he held with others from 
the outside.
35
  
 
During their discussions, Thatcher found Peres sympathetic to King Hussein‘s needs. 
Peres was prepared to implement promptly a number of measures on the West Bank 
which had been proposed by Hussein, such as doubling the numbers of family re-
unifications. Nevertheless, he was unenthusiastic about the idea of the election of 
Mayors on the West Bank, citing the unsatisfactory precedents of such elections in 
1976 and the risks of PLO intimidation.
36
 He was also sceptical about King 
Hussein‘s proposal for an international conference.37 Peres proposed the idea of a 
‗Gaza First‘ arrangement whereby Egypt would become directly involved in Gaza‘s 
economic development, while Jordan would build political links in the area.   Peres 
also returned to his idea of holding confidential working-level discussions with 
Jordan, and urged Thatcher to raise it with King Hussein. Thatcher informed Peres 
that she knew that Hussein had strong reservations about both ideas. Nevertheless, 
she would pass on any message which the Jordanian King wished to pass on to 
him.
38
  Thatcher was encouraged by Peres‘s wish to see progress being made, and 
by his readiness to improve the situation in the West Bank which in itself constituted 
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an advance. She wrote to King Hussein that it would be important to take advantage 
of this willingness before the Israeli Government rotated in the autumn. 
39
  
 
Following her meetings with the Israeli Prime Minister, Thatcher was pessimistic 
about future prospects in the region. Peres understood the need for compromise, but 
it appears that Thatcher was a little disappointed with him. She expected more 
flexibility over issues such as the international conference.  Nevertheless, in 
comparison to Shamir, Peres‘s policies still represented a ray of hope for the peace 
process.  Thatcher was therefore unhappy that Peres would soon be rotating with 
Shamir. As she wrote in her memoirs, ―the succession of Mr Shamir as Prime 
Minister would soon seal off even these few shafts of light.‖40 
 
Powell maintains that Thatcher did not attempt to influence internal political 
developments in democratic countries. In her discussions with the Soviet leader, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, she would try and influence him to introduce systemic changes 
in his country. When it came to democratic countries, however, she did not believe 
in backing one side against the other.  According to Powell, the FCO may have been 
motivated to do so, but not Thatcher.
41
 The correspondence from the FCO during 
this period confirms that it certainly believed in strengthening Peres at the expense of 
his Likud rivals.
42
 Nevertheless, Thatcher‘s actions during her visit to Israel and her 
later discussions with the Americans demonstrated that she too was putting her full 
weight behind this policy, as she also wanted Peres to prevail over Shamir. 
43
  
 
Thatcher was disappointed by the readiness of Peres to go ahead with the rotation. 
She was even prepared to intervene in domestic Israeli affairs by subtly trying to 
discourage Peres from going ahead with the rotation with Shamir in October 1986. 
During one meeting with Peres, she had expressed her concern about the 
forthcoming rotation. In the talks between them, she would ask a lot of questions 
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about Israeli politics. Thatcher was very concerned about the rotation agreement, and 
was very surprised by his responses on the matter. She probed to see if there was any 
way of preventing the arrangement from going ahead. 
44
  The Reagan Administration 
had serious misgivings over this approach. In a meeting with Thatcher during 1987, 
Shultz expressed his unease over attempts to support Peres against Shamir, and 
warned that such an approach could be counter-productive.
45
 
 
A Shift on the PLO and a Palestinian State 
 
At her final press conference shortly before leaving Israel, Thatcher appeared to 
backtrack from one of the commitments she had made as a signatory to the Venice 
Declaration. The Prime Minister had originally committed that the PLO had to be 
associated with peace negotiations. Now, she was stating that if the PLO could not 
be persuaded to renounce terrorism, it would become necessary to find other 
representatives who ―truly represented the Palestinian people.‖ 46  Thatcher was 
suggesting that there could be an alternative Palestinian leadership to the PLO. She 
went even further during a European Council meeting in London in December 1986 
when she stated at a press conference that ―it is not acceptable to some of us that the 
Palestinians should be represented by the PLO.‖ Israel‘s Foreign Ministry noted that 
this was the first time that Thatcher had publicly identified with Israel‘s position on 
the PLO.
47
 
 
There was further controversy during Thatcher‘s visit to Ramat Gan when she stated 
that an independent Palestinian state would cause difficulties. Thatcher preferred the 
West Bank to be part of a federation with Jordan.‖ 48   Since 1980, the Prime Minister 
had not ruled out the possibility of an independent Palestinian State. Now it appeared 
that she had stronger reservations about such an eventuality. In making the 
aforementioned statements, Thatcher had gone further than the FCO would have 
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liked. This was a rare example of the Prime Minister departing from the FCO line. 
Nevertheless, according to one official within NENAD, her statements were an 
expression of the policies that King Hussein had espoused and was trying to 
implement.
49
 Indeed, it soon emerged that King Hussein had been very pleased by 
the Prime Minister‘s statements – in particular, her reference to ―federation‖.50 In 
other words, Thatcher was trying to strengthen the position of King Hussein who had 
recently fallen out with Arafat. At the same time, Thatcher left the door open for a 
new approach towards the PLO, in the event of a renunciation of terrorism and an 
acceptance of Israel‘s right to exist. 51  
 
During the first term of the Thatcher Government, the FCO prevailed largely as a 
result of the lack of political leadership from Number Ten on policy towards the 
Arab-Israel conflict. By the mid 1980s, however, Thatcher had exercised stronger 
political leadership in this realm. The Whitehall bureaucracy did not challenge 
Thatcher, but accommodated her position. This was particularly evident with regard 
to Thatcher‘s new political line on the PLO and an independent Palestinian State. In 
the same way that Thatcher adapted her position during her first term in office, the 
FCO was similarly able to adjust itself to the new line emerging from 10 Downing 
Street.   
 
This was illustrated perfectly by an FCO cable sent out in the wake of Thatcher‘s 
visit to Israel. On the one hand, the FCO expressed concern that there was 
misunderstanding in the Middle East over some of the Prime Minister‘s remarks. In 
particular, there had been suggestions that her support for ―some kind of Federation 
with Jordan‖ ruled out self-determination for the Palestinians. There was also unease 
that her support for the election of Mayors on the West Bank would be viewed as 
excluding the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. On 
the other hand, the FCO urged British officials to counter such misunderstandings by 
pointing out that the Prime Minister had not dismissed the principle of self-
                                                          
49
 ISA 9707/1, From Political Counsellor, London, to MFA, 2 June 1986 
50
 FCO/FOI 351-09,  Minute from SWJ Fuller, FCO,  to Ambassador, Cairo, 4 June 1986 
51
 MTF, Press Conference Ending Visit to Israel, 27 May 1986 
201 
 
determination for the Palestinians. In advocating a federation with Jordan, she had 
merely presented the most realistic option for achieving self-determination. The 
Prime Minister had also accepted the possibility of a confederation which both 
Jordan and the PLO had supported in February 1985. In addition, it was pointed out 
that Thatcher had not ruled out the PLO‘s association with negotiations.52 In fact, 
Thatcher‘s position on an independent Palestinian State broadly followed the views 
of both Jordan‘s King Hussein and Egypt‘s President Mubarak.53 Thus, Thatcher‘s 
apparent policy shift on the Palestinian question did not have far-reaching 
significance and was accommodated by the FCO 
 
Thatcher’s Letter to King Hussein 
 
On her return from Israel, Thatcher wrote to King Hussein. She informed him that 
the starting point for her discussions was that the stagnation in the peace process was 
―dangerous‖, and that a way had to be found to achieve some momentum. Until 
progress in negotiations could be achieved, a focus had to be placed on practical 
steps to improve conditions in the Occupied Territories. These steps could only 
constitute a confidence building measure, and not a substitute for an eventual 
settlement. Israel could not claim democratic rights for itself, and deny them to 
others. Thatcher also insisted that the PLO would have to renounce violence and 
accept Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 before becoming involved in 
negotiations. Thatcher informed the King that she had stated that the Palestinian 
right to self-determination could be pursued most effectively within the framework 
of a federation with Jordan. She also informed the King about her discussions with 
Peres, and emphasized that it would be important to take advantage of Peres‘s 
flexibility ahead of the rotation in the Israeli Government in the autumn.
54
   
 
King Hussein had responded very positively to Thatcher‘s visit. Coles cabled the 
FCO to report that Hussein had been very grateful for the Prime Minister‘s efforts in 
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Israel, and looked forward to their forthcoming meeting in London on 17 June. The 
Jordanian monarch asked Coles to relay to Thatcher his ―great admiration for the 
way she had conducted the visit and his appreciation for her efforts to get to the heart 
of the problem.‖ 55  
 
FCO Reaction to the Visit 
 
The FCO viewed Thatcher‘s visit to Israel as a great success. Squire believed that 
Thatcher‘s visit was a ―personal triumph‖ in its impact on Israeli public opinion. The 
response of the Israeli public had been ―remarkable‖ and ―beyond expectations‖. In 
terms of atmosphere, relations between the two countries were at an all time high. 
Nevertheless, Squire had warned that once the euphoria had subsided, there was a 
danger of a reaction in the opposite direction.
56
 Significantly, there was 
encouragement for Israeli politicians such as Peres who were working for a 
negotiated settlement. There was also an emphasis on the need for urgency in 
resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute. Squire maintained that a good bilateral 
relationship was not an end in itself – such a relationship had to be designed to 
advance British interests. The success of the visit had not removed the differences 
between the two countries, but had provided a more conducive atmosphere for the 
advancement of British perspectives. Furthermore, the point that Thatcher had made 
about urgency was designed for Washington‘s consumption as well as for Israel. The 
visit had to be viewed as not just an event, but as part of a larger process.
57
  
 
The FCO had noted with satisfaction that ―the usual bilateral irritants‖ had scarcely 
arisen in Britain‘s contacts with Peres, although this had not affected the ―persistent 
zeal of some of Israel‘s supporters‖ in Britain. Unlike his Likud rivals, Peres did not 
make an issue out of arms restrictions, oil sales and the Arab boycott.  This gave the 
FCO further reason to hope that Peres would prevail over Shamir. At the same time, 
Israel‘s supporters in Britain were exerting pressure on the Thatcher Government to 
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put an end to the ―bilateral irritants‖. 58  The Haaretz newspaper pointed out at the 
end of the Prime Minister‘s visit that the chemistry between Peres and Thatcher was 
not able to ―overcome the British arms embargo on Israel.‖59  The FCO was now 
bracing itself for renewed Israeli pressure on the issues of the arms restrictions, the 
supply of North Sea oil and the Arab Boycott, once Shamir was Prime Minister.
60
 
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister had managed to pull off a remarkable balancing act 
– she had buttressed her reputation as a friend of the Jewish State, both among the 
Israeli public and the Jewish community in Britain, while also winning the support 
of moderate Arab opinion as a result of her outspoken support for Palestinian rights.  
Furthermore, the British Government had presided over a noticeable improvement in 
relations with the Jewish State without having to make concessions on the issues of 
arms restrictions and oil sales. Thus, the FCO had an additional reason to be satisfied 
with Thatcher‘s visit.  
 
The FCO had accepted that reaction to Thatcher‘s visit in the Arab world was 
―mixed‖. The main criticisms focused on Thatcher‘s remarks about the PLO. There 
was concern that the remarks would leave some lingering doubts in the minds of 
Palestinians. Nevertheless, Arab governments had responded well to the ―corrective 
line‖ put out by the FCO. The FCO stressed that Britain had to continue highlighting 
the Prime Minister‘s messages that the Israeli occupation could only be temporary, 
and that there was an urgent need to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.
61
  Thus, 
in spite of Thatcher‘s remarks about the PLO and an independent Palestinian State, 
the FCO was largely positive about the messages that the Prime Minister had relayed 
during her visit.  
 
Thatcher and the FCO shared identical perspectives regarding King Hussein.
62
 The 
visit to Israel provided a unique opportunity to build support for the positions 
espoused by the King.  Hussein was gratified by the British Prime Minister‘s public 
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statements while in Israel. Thatcher had also played an important role in narrowing 
the differences between Peres and Hussein, paving the way for the eventual London 
Agreement of April 1987.  Nevertheless, in regard to making up ―lost ground‖ in the 
Arab world after the bombing of Libya, there were mixed results. Alongside Jordan, 
moderate Palestinians were greatly encouraged by Thatcher‘s vigorous statements in 
support of Palestinian rights. There was also some appreciation expressed in Cairo 
and Riyadh.
63
 However, Thatcher‘s statements on Palestinian representation 
arguably played into the hand of extremists in the region, while enraging the PLO 
leadership.
64
 
 
Thatcher‘s visit to Israel had been designed with a view to breaking the regional 
status quo and strengthening the voices of the moderates. On this score, her record 
was mixed, notwithstanding the upbeat assessments of the FCO. Thatcher‘s 
addresses and statements in Israel had been carefully calibrated to strengthen public 
support for the positions espoused by Peres, just as FCO mandarins had hoped for. 
This reflected the cooperation between the FCO and 10 Downing Street on policy in 
the Arab-Israel arena. Nevertheless, Britain was not in a position to exercise an 
influence on internal Israeli dynamics. Thatcher‘s visit would make little difference 
to Peres‘s political standing in Israel. Since he was intending to go ahead with the 
rotation in October 1986, Peres would soon be swapping positions with his hardline 
political rival Shamir. This would leave him less room for manoeuvre.    
   
Ultimately, in order to break the regional deadlock, it would become necessary for 
the Reagan Administration to take an initiative. Thatcher‘s statements in Israel had 
been aimed at the Americans, as well as the Israelis and the Arabs.
65
  Nevertheless, 
there was no sign of any movement on the part of Washington. One of the successes 
of the Thatcher visit lay in the positive atmosphere which had been created. 
Following the visit, FCO officials believed that relations between Britain and Israel 
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had never been better.
66
 However, the warmer bilateral ties were designed to provide 
Britain with a greater measure of influence over the Israelis. In the period that 
followed, there did not appear to be any evidence to suggest that Britain had 
acquired this influence over the Israeli Government. 
  
Thatcher‘s visit to Israel had provided evidence that the Prime Minister was 
beginning to utilize her expanded involvement in foreign policy to impose her 
leadership in the Arab-Israel arena. This was noticeable in regard to her attempts to 
strengthen the standing of Peres, her well publicized meeting with Palestinian 
moderates and her new statements on the PLO and an independent Palestinian State. 
Thatcher‘s controversial statement on the PLO and Palestinian independence did not 
constitute a far-reaching departure from the traditional FCO position. Arguably, it 
was designed to strengthen the position of King Hussein rather than to win support 
among the Israelis.  Nevertheless, it was the closest that Thatcher came to exerting 
an independent line on policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict.      
 
Policy on East Jerusalem 
 
Thatcher‘s readiness to follow the FCO‘s traditional position on the Arab-Israel 
conflict was exemplified by her attitude over east Jerusalem. The FCO had always 
taken pains to ensure that representatives of the British Government avoided any 
action which appeared to constitute recognition of Israel‘s claims over east 
Jerusalem. In this context, it was the British practice to hold separate receptions for 
Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem to celebrate the Queen‘s birthday. The FCO was 
opposed to the holding of joint receptions in Jerusalem for Arab and Jewish residents 
on National Days, as there was a concern that this would constitute recognition of 
Israeli claims over the entire city of Jerusalem.  
 
                                                          
66
 ISA 9707/1, Cable from Political Counsellor, London, to MFA, 2 June 1986 
206 
 
The Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek, wrote to Thatcher in the wake of her visit to 
express his dissatisfaction over the holding of separate functions by the Consul 
General of Britain. Kollek claimed that the Americans had stopped such a practice, 
and he hoped that the British would follow suit.
67
 Indeed, during a later meeting with 
David Mellor, the Minister of State at the FCO, Kollek claimed that the British 
Government was unhelpful to him as Mayor of Jerusalem. Kollek did not understand 
the British Consul General‘s objections to joint parties in which both Arabs and Jews 
could participate, and maintained that he was doing nothing to establish better 
relations between the parties in Jerusalem.
68
  
 
Thatcher responded that it was European practice to hold two receptions for national 
days, and that it provided opportunities to meet with more people. Thatcher rejected 
the option of a change in the policy.
69
 In a letter to the Director General of Israel‘s 
Foreign Ministry, Kollek‘s Special Adviser wrote that Thatcher‘s response was 
―unsatisfactory‖.70 In fact, it signified that Thatcher was not prepared to deviate from 
the FCO position on east Jerusalem.  
 
Shamir Takes Over as Prime Minister 
 
In the months following her visit to Israel, Thatcher tried to use her growing 
influence with the Reagan Administration, in view of her increasing concern over the 
vacuum in the Middle East. During talks at Camp David in November 1986, the 
Prime Minister urged the Americans to launch a Middle East initiative.
71
 A month 
earlier, Shamir and Peres had swapped places, with Shamir becoming Prime Minister 
and Peres Foreign Minister. With Shamir now serving as national leader, Thatcher 
believed it was particularly important for Washington to apply pressure on Israel. 
During a television interview, she asserted that there could be no movement without 
the United States using its influence with Israel. She expressed her hope that the 
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remaining two years of Reagan‘s presidency would be used for this very purpose, 
adding that the problems being experienced throughout the Middle East meant that 
negotiations were ―even more urgent, as one of the world's post-war problems to be 
tackled.‖72 Thatcher appeared to be echoing the sentiments of Toynbee and leading 
FCO Arabists in expressing the view that the Israel/Palestinian impasse was a central 
factor affecting developments in the Middle East: a resolution of the conflict would 
be the key to eradicating Middle East unrest.   
 
As Prime Minister, Shamir was actively opposed to any initiatives to change the 
status quo. The Reagan Administration was therefore reluctant to put forward new 
ideas for breaking the deadlock. It was feared that any initiative on its part would be 
viewed as an intervention in internal Israeli politics. Thatcher and the FCO shared 
the views of Peres and Hussein on the appeal of an international conference as a 
means to breaking the regional stalemate. Shamir was fiercely opposed to an 
international conference, viewing it as a danger to Israel.
73
  
 
The London Agreement 
 
In view of the bleak situation in the region, Peres and Hussein chose to act together 
in a bid to break the deadlock. Lord Mishcon, a British Jew and a friend of both 
Peres and Hussein hosted the two leaders in his flat for a meeting on 11 April 1987.
74
 
Thatcher‘s private office was involved in putting together the arrangements for the 
meeting. The FCO, however, was left out of the loop.
75
 Peres notified Shamir before 
and after all of his meetings with King Hussein, so the Israeli Prime Minister was 
well aware of the secret meeting of April 1987.
76
 Peres was accompanied on his trip 
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to London by Dr. Yossi Beilin, the Director General of the Foreign Ministry and 
Efraim Halevy, the Deputy Director of the Mossad.
77
 
    
On the plane to London, Peres said to Beilin that there was an opportunity to achieve 
―something special‖.78  Peres, Beilin and Halevy were joined in London by King 
Hussein and his Prime Minister, Zaid Rifa‘i. Agreement was reached on the 
convening of an international conference to launch a process of negotiations. King 
Hussein agreed that the conference should not have the power to impose solutions. 
There was agreement also on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation which would 
not include declared members of the PLO. There would be direct negotiations in 
bilateral committees consisting of Israelis and their Arab adversaries. The Israelis 
drafted two documents, as suggested by Hussein. One of the documents dealt with 
the procedures of an international conference, and the other detailed the 
understandings reached between Israel and Jordan. Peres viewed the London 
understandings as a major accomplishment. He had long sought an agreement with 
King Hussein, and now he had one. Hussein had managed to obtain an Israeli 
agreement on an international conference which was also an important 
achievement.
79
 The Agreement was subject to the approval of the Israeli and 
Jordanian Governments, and it would be shown and recommended to the United 
States for its endorsement.
80
 
 
Peres and Beilin were convinced that Shultz would enthusiastically support the 
London Agreement, and that the Likud would also accept it. Beilin recounts that on 
their return to Israel, Rabin was shown the document. The Defence Minister, a 
sceptic by nature, responded that they had to do all they could to advance it. Peres 
then despatched Beilin to Helsinki in order to notify Shultz of the London 
Agreement. Beilin believed it was critical that the London Agreement ―was on the 
table‖ ahead of the superpower summit meeting that Shultz was preparing for in 
Moscow. Beilin spoke to Charles Hill, Shultz‘s aide. Hill was very emotional about 
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the Agreement, believing it constituted a breakthrough. He informed Beilin that 
Shultz was very enthusiastic about the document.
81
 Nevertheless, Shultz believed it 
―extraordinary‖ that he had been asked by Peres to sell the agreement to Shamir, his 
own Prime Minister, before Peres himself had done so.  Shultz was well aware that 
Shamir was strongly opposed to an international conference.
82
   
 
Peres later met with Shamir, and told him about the London Agreement. Shamir 
asked to be shown the document, but Peres refused to do so, claiming that he was 
afraid of leaks by Shamir‘s staff.83  Shamir was stung by Peres‘s refusal to show him 
the document. Peres gave Shamir the impression that he was working behind his 
back. Beilin believes that the London Agreement ultimately failed partly because of 
Peres‘s behaviour towards Shamir. Furthermore, Beilin claims that the objections of 
Likud ministers towards the London Agreement were not based so much on ideology 
but rather on the fact that it came from the hand of Peres.
84
   
 
On 22 April, Shultz telephoned Shamir to inform him that Peres had told him about 
the London Agreement. Shultz indicated that he was ready to travel to the Middle 
East to advance the understandings that had been reached. Shamir was clearly 
unhappy.
85
 Shamir immediately sent Arens to meet with Shultz. Arens told the US 
Secretary of State that Peres wanted to hurt Shamir. He warned Shultz that he would 
be getting embroiled in internal Israeli politics, and advised him not to endorse the 
Agreement. Shultz accepted Arens‘s advice. Shultz came to see the London 
understandings as an internal Israeli concern and a waste of the Reagan 
Administration‘s time. The London Agreement had effectively collapsed.86  
 
Peres did not hold a cabinet debate on the Agreement, as it was clear that he did not 
have a majority in favour.  However, a meeting was held in Peres‘s office with other 
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Labour ministers. A number of ministers demanded that the Government be brought 
down on the issue, but Peres together with Rabin felt that Labour had to remain in 
the Government. Beilin prepared a letter for Peres announcing his readiness to resign 
as Director General of the Foreign Ministry. Peres pleaded with Beilin not to do so, 
as he feared that it would reflect badly on him. King Hussein was very angry with 
Peres because he understood that the Israeli Foreign Minister would resign if the 
agreement fell. Hussein felt that Peres was effectively abandoning him.
87
  
 
The London Agreement held much promise, but was ultimately a missed 
opportunity. Peres claimed that the eruption of the Intifada some nine months later 
might have been avoided had there been success with the Agreement.
88
 The failure 
of the London Agreement had left King Hussein dangerously exposed.
89
 This was 
arguably a factor in his eventual decision to disengage from the West Bank in 
August 1988. 
 
The London Agreement provided a further manifestation of the growing control of 
Downing Street over foreign policy. Thatcher had given her full support to the 
London talks. In particular, she viewed the Hussein-Peres understanding as an 
opportunity to clip the wings of the Soviets, at a time of heightened concern over 
their growing influence in the region.
90
  Her private office was involved in the 
arrangements for the meeting, while the FCO was left out of the loop. Thus, in a 
sense, the FCO found itself outflanked once again by a Prime Minister who was 
exploiting the growing authority she now possessed to play a direct supporting role 
in the peace process.  Nevertheless, the Prime Minister limited her involvement in 
the London talks since she knew that the Americans were already playing a role in 
the proceedings. There was very close coordination between Shultz and the British 
Government on the issue. Furthermore, King Hussein, in particular, kept Thatcher 
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closely informed on the discussions and their outcome.
91
 Thus Thatcher‘s strong 
backing for the London Agreement suggested that even as Number Ten exerted 
greater control over Middle East policy, the Prime Minister tended to take the lead 
with a view to strengthening traditional FCO objectives in the Arab-Israel arena, 
rather than challenging them.  
  
The fragile position of Peres in Israel‘s National Unity Government meant that 
support from the Americans would have made a considerable difference in terms of 
strengthening his domestic standing. Peres would have been in a stronger position to 
win the backing of the Israeli public for the London Agreement had the Reagan 
Administration pledged its support.  In her talks with the Americans some three 
months later, Thatcher expressed her great disappointment and anger over their 
failure to help Peres. Shultz, in particular, made it clear that American support for 
the position of Peres would be viewed in Israel as outside intervention in its 
domestic affairs.
92
 Yet American intervention was exactly what Thatcher was hoping 
for from the Reagan Administration. 
    
Peres must also bear some responsibility for the ultimate collapse of the London 
Agreement. Thatcher and Howe both believed that Peres had to be strengthened 
domestically since it appeared that only he was prepared to work for the 
advancement of the peace process. Thatcher had given her full support to the Peres-
Hussein London meeting. Yet Peres did not have the courage to resign and bring 
down the Israeli National Unity Government over the London Agreement.  Peres has 
claimed that he could not have resigned since he had agreed with King Hussein to 
keep their understanding a secret. A resignation would have dishonoured the pledge 
he had made to Hussein, and would have embarrassed him.
93
 Nevertheless, those 
close to Peres have dismissed this argument. Peres had already promised the King 
that he would leave the Government, and could have sought his approval prior to 
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resignation.
94
 Beilin maintains that from the moment Peres decided against leaving 
the Government, the London understanding became a marginal issue. Had the 
Government fallen, a subsequent Israeli election would have revolved around the 
issue of the London Agreement. Peres would have had a reasonable chance of 
forming a coalition after such an election. According to this view, Peres‘s decision 
not to resign was a mistake.
95
 
   
In spite of the failure of the London Agreement, Thatcher and the FCO continued to 
support Peres for the duration of the National Unity Government. There were no 
other options available. Nevertheless, over the longer term, both King Hussein and 
Thatcher were extremely disappointed with Peres. He had promised to bring down 
the Government and go to elections, but would not do so.  Peres did not have the 
courage to do what he had promised.
96
  Furthermore, Peres had handed the initiative 
to his rival Shamir who was determined to maintain the status quo.  
 
The eventual failure of the London Agreement also indicated the scale of the 
challenge facing the Thatcher Government in persuading the Reagan Administration 
to play a more active role in the peace process. Although Shultz had originally been 
enthusiastic about the London Agreement, he refused to support it since he did not 
want to be perceived as backing one Israeli faction against another.
97
 Nevertheless, 
by refusing to support the London Agreement, Shultz was effectively killing it – in 
this way, he was clearly exerting an influence over the internal Israeli process.
98
 
Peres‘s Labour Party would lose out while the Likud faction clearly stood to benefit 
from the non-intervention of the United States. Thatcher was angry equally with 
Peres and with the Reagan Administration over the missed opportunity embodied by 
the failure of the London Agreement, since King Hussein had been left dangerously 
exposed.
99
 The Prime Minister was also concerned that a vulnerable Jordanian 
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monarch could now turn to Moscow for arms.
100
 In his end of year report for 1987, 
the British Ambassador to Israel encapsulated the agreement between Thatcher and 
the FCO on the matter, at a time of growing concern over Soviet ambitions in the 
Middle East: 
The United States Administration failed to add its weight at the critical 
moment in May to secure Israeli cabinet endorsement of the Hussein/Peres 
understanding...An opportunity was lost to move one step nearer negotiations 
at a time when the influence of moderate Arab leaders is stronger than for 
many years. In the face of a more active and sophisticated Soviet policy in 
the region, this may prove to be a damaging near-miss for both US and Israeli 
policy makers.
101
 
 
Summary 
 
Thatcher was known for her suspicion of the FCO and its supposed pro-Arab bias.
102
 
In line with her reputation as a strong leader, Thatcher might have been expected to 
counter the FCO line on the Middle East, as power shifted from Whitehall to 
Number Ten. The Prime Minister‘s interventions on Libya and Syria, as well as her 
statements on the PLO and a Palestinian State, suggested a possible readiness to take 
an independent line on Middle East policy.  However, Thatcher did not challenge the 
FCO Middle East policy. She was a pragmatist who remained concerned that Likud 
policies would perpetuate a regional stalemate which could ultimately prove 
damaging to Western interests. Instead, the Prime Minister used her growing 
authority to promote a policy that was closely aligned with the FCO. Thatcher‘s 
direct intervention in supporting King Hussein‘s diplomatic initiative, her meeting 
with Palestinian moderates, the backing for the London Agreement of April 1987 
and her strong involvement in arms sales to the Arab world actually signified that 
she was using her growing power to take a lead in reinforcing traditional FCO 
objectives in the Arab-Israel arena. Indeed some of the actions taken by Thatcher 
were deeply problematic from the Israeli Government‘s perspective. Thus, her active 
involvement in arms sales to the Arab world and her efforts to bring the PLO out of 
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the cold in 1985 were fiercely opposed not only by the Likud leadership but also by 
Peres.
103
   
 
The leading representatives of the Anglo-Jewish community and Israeli officials had 
traditionally viewed the FCO and not 10 Downing Street as the source of difficulties 
affecting Britain‘s relationship with Israel.104 Paradoxically, though, it was the FCO 
and not Number Ten which had initiated a conciliatory policy towards Israel, in 
order to improve the bilateral atmosphere and acquire greater leverage over the 
Jewish State.  The FCO had played a significant part in the noticeable improvement 
in Anglo-Israeli relations during the mid 1980s, culminating in Thatcher‘s visit to 
Israel in 1986.  
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Section Three 
Chapters Seven – Nine  
 
Introduction 
 
 
Between 1987 and 1989, Thatcher remained concerned that the Soviet Union would 
be able to expand its influence in the Arab world at a time when the United States 
was granting automatic support to Israel.
1
 It was during this period that the Prime 
Minister appeared to express her strongest opposition to US policy on Israel. 
Thatcher was deeply unhappy that Washington was allowing Shamir to veto any 
chances of a Middle East settlement. Thus, even where the FCO was largely frozen 
out of the Anglo-American relationship, the Prime Minister exploited her personal 
rapport with the Reagan Administration to push for the convening of an international 
conference – an idea that was approved by the FCO and fiercely opposed by the 
Likud leadership.
2
 In fact, Thatcher‘s private diplomacy with the Reagan 
Administration was one area where the Prime Minister had attempted to exert her 
strong leadership in the Arab-Israel arena, but she had limited success here. 
 
Thatcher did not challenge Whitehall policies on Israel, nor did she push an 
independent line. In this context, there was agreement between Downing Street and 
Whitehall that Britain had to maintain some distance from the Israeli Government 
while Shamir was Prime Minister, out of concern for British political and 
commercial ties in the Arab world. The cooperation between Number Ten and 
Whitehall on the Arab-Israel question was strengthened further during Thatcher‘s 
last years in office, in spite of the marginalization of the FCO in some areas of 
policy.  Thus, the FCO expressed its strong objections to the hosting of Shamir in 
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London during the first thirty months of his premiership in the National Unity 
Government. The FCO also advised against visits to Israel by representatives of the 
Royal Family. The Israeli Government and its supporters were unsuccessful in their 
attempts to counter these policies, largely because Thatcher herself accepted the 
advice of the FCO.
3
 Pro-Israeli interest groups remained unsuccessful in challenging 
restrictions on arms sales and the Arab Boycott. Furthermore, there were also 
domestic-level factors which Downing Street had to take account of, as British 
public opinion swung against the Jewish State.  
 
By 1990, the ending of the cold war had provided a fresh opportunity to achieve a 
settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict.  From an American perspective, as the Soviet 
Union was gradually weakened, Israel‘s value as a strategic asset had declined. Thus, 
the Bush Administration was ready to take a tougher line with the Shamir 
Government. Thatcher was also increasingly critical of the Israeli Government on 
settlement building. Once King Hussein had disengaged from the West Bank, 
Thatcher was persuaded that the PLO had to be brought into the peace process. 
Indeed, even when faced with clear evidence of the PLO‘s fresh involvement in 
terrorism, Thatcher insisted on maintaining high-level contacts with the organization. 
The fact that Washington had welcomed Britain‘s dialogue with the PLO was an 
important factor in this decision.
4
 Thatcher had been reluctant to move too far ahead 
of Washington during the Reagan years.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Thatcher and the Reagan Administration 
 
During the first half of Thatcher‘s final term in office, the FCO found itself 
outflanked by a Prime Minister who sought to exert decisive influence in the Arab-
Israel arena. This was most noticeable in Thatcher‘s direct contacts with the Reagan 
Administration.  Thatcher had attacked Shultz for treating Shamir with kid gloves. 
She insisted that the Likud Prime Minister could not be allowed to veto an 
international conference, and expressed her anger over his settlement policies in the 
West Bank.
1
  Indeed, Thatcher‘s indignation over Shamir‘s policies was arguably a 
key factor in her readiness to allow Whitehall to take a number of measures which 
reflected a gradual cooling of relations between Britain and Israel.  
 
Thus, it is argued in this chapter that the tighter control of Number Ten over foreign 
policy did not see Thatcher counter the FCO position in the Arab-Israel arena. On 
the contrary: policy in this sphere remained cohesive with close coordination 
between Number Ten and Whitehall. Perhaps, the main difference at this stage was 
that Thatcher was prepared to use all the resources at her disposal to achieve these 
objectives, reflected through her direct contacts with the Americans. Arguably, the 
greatest concern of the Prime Minister was that the Soviet Union would be able to 
expand its influence in the region as long as there was no solution in sight to the 
Arab-Israel conflict.  This was a significant factor which dictated Thatcher‘s 
approach to the Arab-Israel conflict, and ensured that cooperation remained, even in 
the wake of the controversial visit of FCO Minister David Mellor to Israel and the 
Occupied Territories. While there was considerable irritation within 10 Downing 
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Street over the confrontational approach adopted by Mellor during his visit to Gaza
2
, 
the message he was promoting on the bankruptcy of the status quo and the urgent 
need for an international conference was essentially that of his Prime Minister. 
 
The Peres Visit of June 1987 
 
Just over a week after winning a third consecutive general election on 11 June 1987, 
Thatcher hosted Peres at 10 Downing Street.  The meeting had already been 
proposed some months earlier. Back in March 1987, Britain‘s Ambassador to Israel 
had written that Peres had been experiencing domestic difficulties. Squire 
maintained that meetings in London would help him in the domestic struggle against 
the status quo policies of the Likud.
3
 Peres was visiting London to enlist support for 
an international conference.
4
 Both for the British Government and for the Israeli 
Foreign Minister, the visit to London served the same purpose as Thatcher‘s recent 
visit to Israel: to strengthen the domestic standing of Peres, and help him prevail 
over his Likud rivals. The FCO officials felt that they could work with Peres, they 
trusted him and they therefore sought to boost his position.
5
   Thatcher readily 
cooperated with the FCO policy outlined by Squire.  
 
In the days prior to the visit, Squire cabled the FCO to present his view of Peres‘s 
objectives. The Israeli Foreign Minister sought to strengthen his standing in Israel, to 
consolidate support for his peace policies and to regain the initiative from Shamir in 
the foreign policy argument at home. Squire believed that a European tour would 
help Peres by showing that international public opinion viewed an international 
conference as the way forward in the peace process. Thatcher herself would have an 
important part to play. Squire maintained that the timing of Peres‘s visit to London 
was favourable since the re-election of a Conservative Government under Thatcher 
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was popular among ―all sections of opinion‖ in Israel. Any public statement made by 
the British Prime Minister would catch the attention of the Israeli public.
6
   
 
The Prime Minister met with Peres on 23 June. The meeting lasted one and three 
quarter hours. The only other person present was Dr. Novik. The meeting focused on 
the issue of an international conference. Peres told Thatcher that while general 
understandings had been reached between Israel and Jordan over an international 
conference, there appeared to be some uncertainty about the actual role of a 
conference. Peres bemoaned the fact that the Americans were sceptical over an 
international conference – this attitude was largely due to concerns over a Soviet 
foothold in the Middle East. Peres pointed out that the Soviets were already present 
in the region, and were strengthening their position. The goal would be to bind the 
Soviets into a responsible role.
7
  
 
Peres lamented the US refusal to take a position on an international conference out of 
a fear of appearing to intervene in Israeli politics. He had told Shultz that there was a 
difference between being neutral in Israeli domestic politics, and being objective 
about the peace process.
8
 Peres‘s aides had publicly blamed Shultz for the collapse 
of the London Agreement.
9
  The Peres camp was angry with Shultz for refusing to 
state a clear US position lest this be viewed as ―taking sides‖ in Israeli internal 
politics.
10
 Peres had repeatedly warned the Americans that if they did not become 
more active in their support for a conference and engage seriously with Russia on the 
issue, an opportunity would be lost until 1990 at least (because of the US 
elections).
11
 This would accrue to the advantage of the Russians who would be given 
a free hand in the Middle East on this basis.
12
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Peres shared with Thatcher the details of his domestic political difficulties. He told 
her that he had only 58 or 59 of the 60 votes needed to force an election. This 
suggested that Peres was under pressure to explain to Thatcher why he was still 
serving in the National Unity Government. He felt that the Israeli public had 
responded more positively than he expected to the idea of an international 
conference. The problem he faced was in the Knesset rather than in the country, as a 
whole. Peres believed that it was essential to win over Israeli public confidence in an 
international conference, and show that there was Western agreement on the 
conditions for Soviet participation. Peres told Thatcher that it would help if she was 
able to encourage King Hussein to take measures which would strengthen Israeli 
public support for a conference. Peres suggested further that if King Hussein were to 
receive him in Amman, this would have a similar impact on Israeli public opinion as 
the Sadat visit to Jerusalem. He also wanted Thatcher to tell the King that an 
international conference could be convened without the Russians, if necessary. Peres 
asked Thatcher to urge the Americans to speak up robustly for the understanding 
between Israel and Jordan, and to take full account of time constraints. He stated that 
without urgent progress, an opportunity would be lost.
13
  
 
Following the meeting, Powell wrote to Howe‘s Private Secretary, Anthony 
Galsworthy, informing him that the Prime Minister believed it would be ―very 
helpful‖ if the Foreign Secretary were to present in detail the UK‘s position on an 
international conference during his parliamentary address of 26 June.
14
  In his 
speech, Howe declared that Britain and its European partners strongly supported an 
international conference. It was the most practical way forward to negotiations 
between the parties, it would help to enhance Israel's security and would lead to 
justice for the Palestinian people. Such a conference would not have the right to 
impose solutions, nor to veto agreements that were reached between the parties. 
Britain was ready to play a full role, and welcomed the efforts made by Peres and 
King Hussein. Howe added that the Prime Minister would be discussing the issue 
shortly with President Reagan in Washington.
15
 The Foreign Secretary‘s address on 
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the issue of the international conference reflected the ongoing coordination between 
Number Ten and the FCO in the Arab-Israeli arena.  
 
Following the meeting with Peres, a statement was put out by 10 Downing Street. 
The statement made it clear that the Prime Minister considered an international 
conference the most practical route to peace negotiations between the parties. The 
statement added that the Prime Minister emphasized ―the importance of not missing 
this opportunity to take a major step forward in the peace process.‖16  A few days 
later, a meeting took place between the new Minister of State at the FCO, David 
Mellor, and Israeli Ambassador Avner. Mellor told Avner that Peres‘s ability to 
persuade Thatcher and enlist her support for his policy was a remarkable 
achievement and had become an asset for the bilateral relationship.
17
 
 
Thatcher’s Visit to Washington 
 
On 17 July, Thatcher met with US Secretary of State Shultz at the British Embassy 
in Washington. The remarks made by Peres during the recent meeting with Thatcher 
had made a strong impression on her. The Prime Minister expressed her concern 
over developments in the Middle East. She regretted the fact that there had been no 
major Western initiative since the Camp David Accords. While President Reagan‘s 
1982 speech had been very positive, it had been rejected by Begin. Thatcher praised 
Peres and Hussein as two constructive figures that were doing everything possible to 
advance the peace process, and were deserving of support.
18
 The Prime Minister was 
clearly frustrated that the Reagan Administration was not extending this support.   
 
It was the issue of the international conference, however, which brought into focus 
the Thatcher policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Prime Minister expressed 
her concern over Soviet efforts to increase its influence among Arab states. She 
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asked rhetorically whether it was not timely to begin to promote an international 
conference. She maintained that the Soviets had behaved responsibly at the UN on 
the Iran-Iraq issue, and could also do so on an international conference on the 
Middle East. Shultz replied that it was no good promoting a new initiative without 
Likud support: the American approach was to seek Shamir‘s approval. Shultz 
expressed his unease over Thatcher‘s approach which appeared to support Peres 
against Shamir in a domestic Israeli partisan showdown. Shultz suspected that Peres 
would lose such a contest. In spite of Peres‘s charm, the Arabs had to understand that 
Shamir was Prime Minister, and had to be brought into the peace process. Shultz 
stated that Shamir needed guarantees that an international conference would not 
result in an ambush on Israel by the Russians, Chinese and the Arabs. The US 
Secretary told Thatcher that they were examining a new approach with Shamir which 
would revolve around an international conference for Soviet Jewry. If the Soviets 
were to meet the Israeli price for a conference such as diplomatic recognition and the 
right of emigration for Soviet Jews, this would reduce the risks for Shamir. 
19
  
 
Thatcher, however, was becoming increasingly frustrated with Shultz‘s position. She 
asked Shultz whether he thought that Shamir ever intended to negotiate over the 
West Bank or Jerusalem, or whether in fact it was Shamir‘s view that all of Biblical 
Israel belonged to modern Israel. If it was the latter, Shamir was simply ―holding the 
entire world ransom‖, and there would never be negotiations. Shultz agreed that 
Shamir was not prepared to negotiate over territory, but was ready to negotiate about 
interim arrangements.  Thatcher described Shamir‘s position as ―hypocritical‖ 
because it denied basic rights to the Arabs and ―removed Israel‘s credibility as the 
only Middle East democracy.‖ The Prime Minister concluded the discussion on the 
Middle East by stressing the need for the US to take the lead, and asked whether 
there could be a joint push for an international conference. Thatcher proposed that 
she and Reagan agree to a common position on an international conference, and that 
it be announced during her Washington visit. Shultz agreed to look at the draft.
20
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The Soviet Threat 
 
In the weeks following her visit to Washington, Thatcher wrote to President Reagan. 
Thatcher‘s communication with Reagan demonstrated clearly that it was the Soviet 
threat which was the most significant factor behind her activism on the Arab-Israel 
conflict. She urged him to take a more active position in support of Peres and the 
international conference. She wrote that Shamir could not be allowed to veto 
progress, in particular, because he would not offer proposals that were acceptable to 
others. Thatcher added that by providing Shamir with a veto, the position of Peres 
would be undermined and there would be a danger of an increase in Soviet influence 
in the region. She had delivered an identical message to the President during her visit 
to Washington in July.
21
  
 
Thatcher informed Reagan that since her discussions with him in July, she had been 
in contact with both Shamir and Peres, as well as with King Hussein. Thatcher was 
―more concerned than ever‖ about the implications of the lack of support for the 
Peres-Hussein understanding. She warned Reagan that Western interests in the 
Middle East were threatened by ―an increasingly active and effective Soviet 
diplomatic effort.‖ The Soviets were ―taking great trouble‖ with moderate Arab 
states, and there was reason to fear that their efforts were being rewarded. It was 
Jordan‘s contacts with the Soviets that heightened Thatcher‘s anxiety. King Hussein 
had told the British Prime Minister that the Russians would be able to supply him 
with MIG-29 jet fighters by the end of 1987. Thatcher warned Reagan that such a 
deal would endanger Western defence cooperation with Jordan, and would be highly 
damaging for Western interests in the region.   Thatcher pointed out that there was a 
risk of ―losing the initiative‖ and being outflanked by the Soviets, unless a strong 
diplomatic effort was made to promote the peace process in the Arab-Israel arena.
22
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In her correspondence with Reagan, Thatcher accepted that an international 
conference had to be properly prepared, and that it would be ―preferable‖ if Shamir 
were included in such a forum. However, she feared that Shamir‘s obdurate position 
would hurt Peres, with the prospect of losing a unique opportunity to advance the 
peace process. Thatcher added that such an outcome would ―be a tragedy.‖ She 
concluded that there was no better option for progress than an international 
conference. Thatcher urged Reagan to support the Peres-Hussein Accord, since it 
offered ―the best bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, as 
well as the most effective way of reassuring the moderate Arab countries‖, at a time 
of growing tension in the Gulf region.
23
   
 
In response, Reagan wrote that while the United States was not abandoning the idea 
of a conference, certain realities had to be confronted. Shamir possessed 
considerable political power, and experience had clearly shown that he could not be 
ignored. The United States remained interested in the conference, and Shamir was 
aware of this. Nevertheless, it made little sense to go to a conference if immediate 
deadlock was likely. Quiet efforts were necessary to develop understandings with the 
parties on the nature of the negotiations.  Reagan wrote that the United States would 
maintain a dialogue with the Soviets, and would continue its efforts to launch 
negotiations. Reagan promised to keep Thatcher updated, and expressed appreciation 
for her assessment.
24
  
 
Thatcher‘s communication with Shultz and Reagan demonstrated that the Thatcher 
Government and the Reagan Administration were working at cross purposes on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  Reagan and Shultz were effectively strengthening the position 
of Shamir and weakening Peres by holding back their support for an international 
conference. In contrast, Thatcher was attempting to strengthen Peres at the expense 
of Shamir and his Likud party by supporting an international conference and trying 
to persuade the Americans to do so. Thus, the FCO once again found itself 
outflanked by a Prime Minister who was using her direct channel to Washington to 
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promote a policy that strongly converged with that of the FCO.  Shamir and his allies 
were fiercely opposed to the idea of an international conference. Yet it was Thatcher 
who took the lead in enlisting Washington‘s support for this idea. 
 
The perceived threat from the Soviet Union was the most significant issue that drove 
Thatcher‘s thinking on Middle East issues. She may have been a great admirer of 
President Mikhail Gorbachev, but she retained her suspicions of Soviet foreign 
policy.
25
 During her early months in power, Thatcher viewed Israel as a strategic 
asset which could help to contain Soviet ambitions in the Middle East.
26
 Yet, over 
time, it was becoming increasingly clear that she perceived the obduracy of the 
Likud-led Israeli Government as a liability which was helping to boost Soviet 
influence in the region at the expense of the West. This was evident from her 
communication with Reagan during 1987. It can, of course, be argued that the Prime 
Minister may have exaggerated the Soviet threat in an attempt to encourage Reagan 
to act. Thatcher knew only too well that Reagan shared her strong hostility towards 
the communist ideology of the Soviet Union.  Nevertheless, Thatcher‘s strong 
concerns over Soviet ambitions in the Middle East were genuine, and were not only 
expressed in talks with the Americans. She had raised these same issues during her 
talks with Begin, for example, only days after becoming Prime Minister.
27
 As Powell 
has pointed out, ―the Middle East was indeed a dimension of the cold war, and that 
played an important part in her thinking.‖28        
 
The Reagan Administration‘s diplomatic ambitions in the region had been damaged 
by the fallout from the Iran-Contra affair. Israel had conspired with officials in the 
CIA and the National Security Council to secretly sell arms to Iran in the spring of 
1985 when Peres was Prime Minister. Indeed, Peres had been closely involved in the 
deal. Ostensibly, the idea behind the sale was to obtain the release of American 
hostages in Lebanon. Iran was a fierce ideological opponent of the State of Israel. 
Shlaim maintains that the Israelis covertly sold arms to Iran largely with a view to 
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prolonging the Iran-Iraq war which had already been raging for five years. Israel 
believed that a stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war would ultimately weaken both these 
countries which were its enemies.
29
 Robert McFarlane, Reagan‘s national security 
adviser, and Oliver North of the National Security Council secretly delivered the 
arms, and used the proceeds to fund the Nicaraguan Contras. The Iran-Contra affair 
damaged the morale of the Reagan Administration including elements of its foreign 
policy.
30
 A related problem was the fact that North and McFarlane had been working 
on their own, and had left Shultz out of the picture. Shultz was furious with Peres 
over the affair, and believed that he had concealed the deal from him.
31
  According 
to Seale, Shultz‘s lukewarm support for the London Agreement may have been 
related to his anger with Peres over the Iran-Contra affair.
32
   
 
Likud Policy towards Jordan 
 
Thatcher‘s unease over the Likud policy was exacerbated by the message leading 
Likud politicians were sending out on Jordan. The Jordanians were concerned that 
some Likud personalities were seeking the removal of the Hashemite monarchy, with 
a view to turning Jordan into a Palestinian State. Indeed, Ariel Sharon, the Likud 
Minister for Trade and Industry had long been a strong advocate of the slogan 
‗Jordan is Palestine‘.  Thatcher summoned Avner to 10 Downing Street, and 
demanded a halt to Sharon‘s provocative statements on Jordan. Thatcher did not 
want to go through the FCO channel – she sought to settle the matter directly.33 
Avner would have taken more notice of Thatcher‘s admonishment than one coming 
from the FCO.  Furthermore, Thatcher‘s action reflected her tendency to exert 
greater control over policy at the expense of the FCO. The Prime Minister was 
pursuing the same objective as the FCO in terms of supporting a key Arab ally, but 
was using her stronger position to achieve a more immediate and effective outcome.  
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In order to allay Jordanian concerns, Shamir met with King Hussein on 18 July 1987 
just outside London. He started the meeting with the King saying that Israel attached 
importance to the role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and wished it stability 
and success.
34
 Shamir sought to reassure the King that ‗Jordan is Palestine‘ was not 
the policy of his party or Government. However, Shamir‘s meeting with the King 
also presented an opportunity to express his outright opposition to an international 
conference. He told Hussein that he opposed the convening of an international 
conference mainly because of the participation of the Soviet Union which was very 
hostile to Israel. Shamir suggested that the best way to advance to peace was through 
direct negotiations without mediators.
35
 The Israeli side believed that the meeting 
was a success, and that Hussein and Shamir saw eye to eye on many issues.
36
 
Nevertheless, it later emerged that the Jordanians did not feel the same way about the 
meeting. King Hussein later told Shultz that Shamir was hopeless and that he could 
not work with him.
37
   
 
International Conference 
 
Thatcher was becoming increasingly despondent about Shamir‘s position on an 
international conference. In early October 1987, Israel‘s Minister of Absorption, 
Yaakov Tsur, met with David Mellor in London. Mellor told Tsur that there was 
―some depression‖ over the position of Shamir, referring, in particular, to Thatcher‘s 
feelings on the matter. Mellor stated that Britain sought the convening of an 
international conference, and preferred the approach of Peres over that of Shamir. 
Mellor added that the British Prime Minister was trying to use her influence to 
advance the international conference, but this was dependent on the United States.
38
  
 
During the autumn of 1987, there were signs that the Reagan Administration was 
finally taking the idea of an international conference more seriously.  In early 
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September, Shultz proposed to Reagan that he and Soviet President Gorbachev 
would invite King Hussein and Shamir to a meeting in the United States at the end of 
the year under US-Soviet auspices. The Middle East talks would form a component 
of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit that was due to take place in Washington. The 
gathering would call on the parties to commence direct negotiations: the Jordanian 
delegation would include Palestinians with whom Israel was prepared to meet. 
Shamir would be able to save face by calling the gathering a summit rather than an 
―international conference‖. At the same time, King Hussein would have the 
international cover he needed to negotiate with Israel. Two weeks after Shultz 
proposed the idea to Reagan, the US President gave him approval to take it further.
39
   
 
On 12 October, Shultz sent Richard Murphy to Canada where he met with Thatcher 
and Howe for over an hour. He briefed them on Shultz‘s plans for the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In an enthusiastic response, Thatcher said, ―This is a way to kick it into life 
at last.‖ She continued, ―It‘s putting a stiletto to Yitzhak Shamir‘s throat. I like that!‖ 
Nevertheless, she sounded a note of caution over the proposed Soviet role, adding 
that there had been ―an astonishing U-turn in America‘s approach to the Soviet 
Union.‖ Howe‘s response to Thatcher‘s remarks was to say, ―Margaret, you‘ve 
badgered George for five years about doing something just like this; now don‘t send 
a message of apprehension.‖ Thatcher quickly responded that she was very much in 
favour of the initiative, before adding that she was sceptical of Shamir and reserved 
about giving a leading role to the Soviets.
40
  
 
Arguably, Thatcher‘s persistent efforts with the Reagan Administration were an 
important contributory factor to Shultz‘s initiative in the autumn of 1987. Thatcher 
enjoyed an enormous amount of trust in Washington.
41
  Her views on the issue of the 
international conference would have helped and strengthened Shultz‘s own efforts to 
persuade Reagan on the matter.
42
 Certainly Shamir believed that it was the British 
Prime Minister who had ―planted the seed‖ for Shultz‘s proposal. Indeed, Shamir felt 
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that Reagan ―always lent an extremely attentive ear‖ to Thatcher‘s views while the 
British Prime Minister was ―rather given to Peres‘s influence.‖43  In accordance with 
this view, Peres (and King Hussein) persuaded Thatcher to give her full support to an 
international conference. In turn, she persuaded Shultz who did the same with 
President Reagan.   
 
Shamir‘s suspicions of Thatcher‘s role in the international conference idea may also 
have been prompted by her own communication with him on the matter. During their 
difficult meeting in June 1985, the one point of agreement was that both felt that an 
international conference was undesirable.
44
 Now, over two years later, Thatcher was 
writing to Shamir to point out that the proposal to convene an international 
conference on the Middle East was the most practical route towards direct 
negotiations. She tried to reassure him that the conference would not have powers to 
impose a settlement or to veto agreements reached between the participants. It would 
provide a fresh opening to secure for Israel the lasting peace and recognition it 
deserved. Furthermore, Thatcher wrote, Soviet participation in the conference 
offered a unique opportunity for Israel to bring about the release of thousands of 
Soviet Jews and enable them to emigrate to Israel. She warned that the failure to 
grasp the opportunity would encourage the Soviet Union to greatly expand its 
activities in the region.
45
  
 
In an interview with the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronoth a short time later, 
Thatcher restated her view that an international conference was ―the only practical 
way forward to a peaceful settlement‖ and that she would continue to do what she 
could to facilitate progress towards it. Furthermore, she revealed that Howe had 
recently met with King Hussein in Amman to assure him of Britain‘s full support for 
an international conference. In the same interview, Thatcher warned that time was 
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not on Israel‘s side, and that it was ―sitting on a demographic time-bomb.‖46 
Thatcher had issued a similar warning to Begin eight years earlier.  
 
In the same interview, Thatcher warned that Israel‘s policies were having an 
unfavourable impact on the geopolitics of the region: it was very unhelpful that the 
United States was being perceived as ―Israel‘s lawyer‖, while the Soviet Union was 
being seen ―as the friend of the Arabs.‖ The Prime Minister argued for Britain and 
the EC to play a role as ―a third party‖ which was ―not bound by US or Soviet 
policies.‖47 Thatcher‘s concern over the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle 
East continued to be a major consideration in her policy towards the region. Thatcher 
also appeared to be distancing herself from the Reagan policy towards the Israel-
Palestinian question.  
  
Through 1987 and 1988, the FCO and Number Ten would continue to work in close 
coordination in the push for an international conference.  As part of this effort, 
Thatcher and Howe focused their attention on pro-Israeli and pro-Arab 
organizations. Thus, addressing a CFI lunch at the Conservative Party Conference in 
early October 1987, Howe took the opportunity to clarify Britain‘s position on an 
international conference. Avner noted that this was the first time he had done so in 
such a public and comprehensive manner, and believed that a decision had clearly 
been taken on this with Thatcher‘s backing. For the Israeli Ambassador, Howe‘s 
address was an expression of the quiet and intensive contacts that Britain was 
maintaining with the Americans in order to advance the idea of a conference. 
48
 
Some weeks later on 18 November, Howe addressed the Conservative Middle East 
Council, a pro-Arab lobby within the Conservative Party. Howe gave a warning of 
the ―dangers of the status quo‖, and called for urgent action. Like Thatcher, he 
warned of the demographic threat facing Israel, and stressed that time was not on the 
side of either Israel or the Palestinians. Howe maintained that Britain would continue 
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to push for an international conference under UN auspices.
49
 Howe and Thatcher 
were reading from the same hymn sheet.   
 
Cooperation on Policy towards Peres and Shamir 
 
On 23 November 1987, Peres paid another visit to 10 Downing Street. The meeting 
with Thatcher was a further opportunity for the Israeli Foreign Minister to boost his 
standing in Israel. Both Peres and Thatcher agreed that an international conference 
provided the best prospects for the advancement of the peace process.
50
  The fact that 
the Israeli Labour leader had been a guest of the British Prime Minister three times 
since January 1986, while Shamir had not been invited to London once during that 
period reflected the continued readiness on the part of Number Ten to strengthen 
Peres at the expense of Shamir.  
 
Avner had raised the issue of a visit by Shamir with the FCO on a number of 
occasions. During a meeting with Alan Munro, the Deputy Under-Secretary for the 
Middle East, Avner had dropped hints about the desirability of an early visit to 
London by Shamir. Avner claimed that Peres saw no objection to the proposal. 
Nevertheless, when the issue was raised with Peres‘s officials, they made it clear that 
further exchanges between the British Government and Shamir ―would not be 
helpful.‖ Thatcher herself had decided that she would not be seeing Shamir ―in 
present circumstances.‖ 51  
    
A briefing was prepared by Alan Goulty of NENAD for FCO Minister of State, 
David Mellor, ahead of a meeting with Avner. Mellor was warned that Avner would 
raise the issue of a Shamir visit. Mellor was advised to discourage Avner from 
raising the matter by telling him that a visit in the prevailing circumstances would 
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damage Anglo-Israeli relations.
52
 During the meeting itself, Avner did indeed 
strongly advocate a visit by Shamir to London. Mellor responded using the argument 
suggested by Goulty. Avner cautioned that the British Government should not lose 
contact with the Likud. The Israeli Ambassador suggested that during Mellor‘s 
forthcoming visit to Israel, he speak at least to some of the more ―open-minded‖ 
Likud members such as David Levy.
53
  
 
Shamir‘s office had been probing for a visit to London to counterbalance Peres‘s 
three meetings with Thatcher in 1987. There was concern in the FCO that Shamir or 
his aide Yossi Ben Aharon would put Mellor on the spot during his forthcoming visit 
to Israel. It was felt that Shamir‘s terrorist background as well as his hard-line views 
would present difficulties if he visited London as Prime Minister.
54
   Ultimately, 
though, Thatcher was no more interested than the FCO in hosting Shamir at Number 
Ten.  
 
The fact that the Prime Minister herself did not wish to host Shamir was an 
indication of the meeting of minds between the FCO and 10 Downing Street on 
policy. This was also noticeable in other areas. Thus, Avner had been pressing for a 
visit by Princess Alexandra to Israel. There were concerns that the Israelis would use 
the forthcoming visit of Israel‘s President, Chaim Herzog, to London in December 
1987 as an opportunity to renew pressure for Royal visits to Israel. No official visit 
to Israel by a member of the Royal Family had ever taken place. The official line 
used with the Israelis was that there were difficulties over scheduling, and that a 
Royal Visit could not be envisaged in the near future. Thatcher herself had agreed 
with the FCO that a visit by a member of the Royal Family would be inappropriate 
while Shamir was Prime Minister.
55
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The Thatcher Government also maintained its restrictions on arms sales to Israel. 
The Government continued to claim that the arms restrictions were an expression of 
its concern over the Israeli presence in Lebanon.
56
 Defence sales to Israel between 
1983 and 1985 totalled £1.97 million. In contrast, British arms sales to the Arab 
world in 1986 were worth £3.6 billion. The value of the Jordanian Tornado package 
alone was worth £240 million.  The FCO had expressed its opposition to visits by 
Defence Ministers, maintaining that this would be controversial while Britain 
maintained restrictions on arms sales to Israel. Thus, there was tight control over 
Israeli visits to MOD establishments and restrictions on visits by MOD officials to 
Israel. Britain had also recently refused attack training for Israeli submarine 
commanders aboard British submarines.
57
 Controversially, in the first half of 1987, 
the Thatcher Government had also turned down an informal Israeli request for the 
sale of gas masks on the grounds that this would have implications for chemical and 
biological weapons proliferation.
58
 
 
There had been no change at all in the policy of North Sea oil sales to Israel. The 
Israeli Ambassador called on the British Energy Minister, Cecil Parkinson, in 
November 1987. Following the meeting, the Department of Energy concluded that it 
would be wrong to relax restrictions as it would risk the oil security of the UK, while 
threatening commercial relations with the Arab world. It was argued that since Israel 
had no difficulty in gaining oil from such suppliers as Egypt and Mexico, there 
appeared to be no justification for relaxing restrictions. The guidelines to oil 
exporters originally introduced in 1979 were to define UK supply priorities in a tight 
oil market, but they served a useful purpose for ―disassociating the UK from the 
supply of crude to countries where this could prove embarrassing or provoke 
reprisals.‖59  
 
A further potential cause of difficulty was the 70th anniversary dinner marking the 
Balfour Declaration. Clearly, British officials remained concerned about the 
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possibility of stirring up Arab resentment over Britain‘s historic role in the creation 
of the State of Israel. The Israeli Embassy had sought high level participation in the 
dinner but was unsuccessful. No ministers attended the anniversary dinner. The FCO 
was ready to reject Israeli accusations of a ―cool UK approach‖ to the event, pointing 
out that Britain wished to ―avoid reawakening Arab sensitivities while reaffirming 
our friendship with Israel.‖  The Israeli Embassy informally asked whether the 
British Government was trying to ―downgrade‖ the Balfour Anniversary.60 
 
The aforementioned episodes had shown that the FCO, the MOD and other 
Whitehall departments were exerting considerable pressure on Downing Street to 
place constraints on ties with Israel while Shamir was Prime Minister. They were 
successful. Indeed, as Thatcher‘s response to the pressures over Shamir indicated, 
she accepted the advice of Whitehall on such matters. This was a further illustration 
of the close coordination between the various departments of Whitehall and Number 
Ten on matters relating to Israel.  The Prime Minister would also have come under 
pressure from the Israeli Government and local pro-Israeli organizations not to give 
in to the FCO. Nevertheless, as Sir Rob Young points out, this was not the 
determining factor in her decision-making:  
 
[Thatcher] was more pro-Israeli than most of her Conservative predecessors, 
but that didn‘t prevent her being pretty detached and calculating when 
required. When it came to policy decisions, she didn‘t let her gut instinct 
rule.
61
 
 
David Mellor’s Visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories 
 
The planned visit of Mellor to Israel in the beginning of January 1988 began to 
assume greater significance with the onset of the Palestinian uprising or Intifada in 
early December 1987. During the first half of December, a series of disturbances in 
Gaza quickly spread to the West Bank, culminating in a mass protest involving 
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commercial strikes, street demonstrations and riots aimed at the twenty-year Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.  Britain‘s Consul General in Jerusalem, Ivan 
Callan, had also warned about the risks of a trip to Gaza, but Mellor insisted on 
including the area in his visit.
62
 
  
 
 
 Squire believed that the unrest in the Occupied Territories would result in 
considerable public interest in Mellor‘s visit. This provided an opportunity to put 
over the Thatcher Government position of the last few years which had been 
―predicated on the dangers of leaving the status quo to fester.‖ There was an 
opportunity to emphasize the need for early negotiations through an international 
conference. Squire believed that Mellor would have the opportunity to push this 
message to the Israeli public. Nevertheless, he was concerned that ―the fully 
justified‖ British condemnations of Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza would 
provide the Likud with the pretext it needed to divert attention from this message.  
 
Mellor‘s visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories, however, was notable for 
generating headlines over his altercation with an IDF colonel in Gaza and his 
outspoken comments on conditions in the area. Mellor visited the Jabaliya Refugee 
Camp in Gaza on 4 January 1988. Several Palestinians gave accounts of their 
experiences to Mellor among excited crowds. A contingent of Israeli soldiers had 
gathered while Mellor‘s party was visiting a distribution centre for emergency 
rations, resulting in a highly charged atmosphere. The father of a boy arrested for 
allegedly throwing stones immediately made representations to the visiting Minister 
of State. Mellor held an on-the-spot exchange with the Israeli colonel in charge of 
the Jabaliya camp area which featured prominently in media coverage of his visit to 
the region. Mellor‘s reaction to the difficult conditions in the refugee camp became 
the focus of media reporting during his whole visit.
63
 In an interview, Mellor 
asserted that what he had seen in Gaza had been ―an affront to civilised values‖ and 
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that while a few miles away there was prosperity, in Gaza there was ―misery on a 
scale that rivals anything anywhere in the world.‖64 
 
Squire had viewed Mellor‘s decision to use his visit to highlight British concern over 
the stagnation in the peace process as a courageous move. The unrest in the West 
Bank and Gaza was viewed as an opportunity to ―dramatise the bankruptcy of the 
status quo.‖ In Squire‘s cable to the FCO, he wrote that ―Mr Mellor spoke out more 
bravely than any US politician or appointed official has dared do in my time here in 
criticism of status quo policies.‖ Furthermore, he believed that the attempt to use 
public opinion and events in the Occupied Territories as a means to stimulate new 
ideas was a ―courageous gamble‖ although it had not yet paid off.65  
 
Mellor made it clear during his discussions with the Director General of Israel‘s 
Foreign Ministry, Dr. Yossi Beilin, that the purpose of his visit to Gaza was to 
―show up the inadmissibility of the status quo.‖ Mellor had told Beilin his host that 
pressure on Israel over the West Bank and Gaza would be ―helpful in supporting the 
argument for change versus the do-nothing approach.‖ Mellor claimed that by 
remaining silent, those seeking to perpetuate the status quo were being 
strengthened.
66
   
 
Israel‘s Charge d‘Affaires, Moshe Raviv, wrote to Powell in protest at Mellor‘s 
actions, claiming that the Israeli Government had exercised considerable restraint in 
its reactions to the Minister‘s remarks and to the ―unfortunate incident with the 
Israeli army officer.‖ Raviv added that Israel viewed the Mellor incident as closed, 
and hoped for a ―reciprocal approach.‖ 67 Nevertheless, this was not the end of the 
matter. Raviv later met with a Downing Street official to express the feelings of his 
Government on the Mellor saga.
68
 Following the visit to Gaza, it was noted in Israel 
that Mellor had generally taken a ―one-sided approach‖ in parliamentary debates on 
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the Middle East, repeating the message conveyed during his trip to the region. 
According to this view, Mellor‘s visit had encouraged unfavourable coverage of 
events in the West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, it was felt that the Minister had 
achieved his goal of ―focusing public attention on the future of the Occupied 
Territories‖ since the Gaza issue was now in the media spotlight.  Therefore, there 
were good reasons for the Israelis to hope for Mellor‘s removal from the FCO. It was 
widely predicted that Thatcher would remove Mellor from his position. There was 
surprise within Israel‘s Foreign Ministry that he was still in his post some four 
months later.
69
  
 
Thatcher and her Private Secretary were also distinctly unimpressed with Mellor‘s 
conduct in Gaza, as Powell points out:  
He gave the impression that he was most concerned, to be perfectly honest..., 
with the promotion of David Mellor. I think that was what lay behind his ill-
fated visit to Gaza and his altercation with the Israeli colonel in Gaza. That 
was just publicity seeking that profoundly irritated Mrs Thatcher at the time. 
He got a ticking off for it.
70
 
 
The cabinet reshuffle of July 1988 provided an opportunity to transfer Mellor from 
the FCO without fanfare, and he was eventually moved to the Department of Health. 
Mellor left the FCO six months after his trip to Gaza. Thatcher herself was unhappy 
with his conduct, and this may have been a significant factor in the decision to 
transfer him to the Department of Health. In fact, the position taken by Mellor in 
Gaza accorded with the line taken by Thatcher herself on the dangers of the 
prevailing status quo. Indeed, during Mellor‘s visit to Gaza, a FCO spokesman 
confirmed that his remarks corresponded fully to the position of the British 
Government.
71
 Furthermore, when asked about Mellor‘s visit during an address to 
the Foreign Press Association, the Prime Minister did not criticize the Minister of 
State. Instead, she stated her great concern about the unrest in the territories which 
had merely underlined what her Government had been saying and what she had been 
trying to bring about. Thatcher restated her belief in an international conference as 
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the means to launching bilateral negotiations between Israel and her neighbours, just 
as Mellor had been doing during his trip.
72
  It was not the position espoused by 
Mellor that irritated the Prime Minister, but rather the manner of his intervention in 
Gaza.   
 
A related concern was that publicity given to Mellor‘s visit in Israel would only 
strengthen the Likud and weaken those such as Peres who sought to advance the 
peace process.  Labour figures such as Beilin were worried that the negative 
publicity from the visit would have an adverse effect on their electoral position, and 
feared that it had hardened opinion in Israel. A British diplomat revealed that some 
Israeli doves had ―rung their hands‖ in private conversations over the Mellor row.73   
 
Mellor’s Meetings with Israeli Ministers 
 
 The controversy engendered by Mellor‘s altercation with an Israeli colonel and his 
strong public criticisms of Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza overshadowed 
the discussions which the Minister held with leading figures in the Israeli 
Government. Mellor met with Shamir, Peres, Beilin and the Knesset Foreign Affairs 
Committee Chairman, Abba Eban. Mellor‘s talks with Peres, Beilin and Eban 
provided the clearest indication yet of the great difficulties facing the Thatcher 
Government‘s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The British policy was 
predicated on strengthening the positions of Peres and King Hussein, as well as 
persuading the Reagan Administration to provide active support for an international 
conference, thereby advancing the peace process. However, the Peres camp had 
become very disillusioned over the attitude of the Reagan Administration. 
Furthermore, Mellor‘s discussions with Peres, Beilin and Eban laid bare the 
increasingly precarious domestic position of the Israeli Foreign Minister.    
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Eban had been particularly scathing about the Reagan Administration‘s attitude 
during his talks with Mellor. He asserted that Shultz ―had badly let down Peres.‖ 
Eban charged that while Peres had been Prime Minister, ―Shultz had done nothing to 
advance the peace process.‖ When the US Secretary of State finally visited Israel, his 
attitude had been half-hearted at best. This had not helped Peres as he faced the 
forthcoming elections.
74
 The picture Beilin painted during his discussions with 
Mellor was bleaker still. He said to Mellor that it was an illusion to believe that there 
was a status quo. If no progress was made, there could be further unpleasant 
developments in the Occupied Territories, and even war. Beilin stated that while the 
Americans had leverage in the Middle East, at the highest levels of the 
Administration, they were ―sick and tired of Arabs.‖ He expressed his revulsion at 
the thought that only another war would persuade people to take action.  Mellor 
responded by highlighting the actions that the Thatcher Government had taken at the 
highest level with the Americans. He expressed his disappointment over the outcome 
of the last Shultz visit to Israel, and the unhelpful role of ―the [pro-Israel] lobby‖ in 
Washington.
75
  
 
The Peres camp, including the Foreign Minister himself, believed that the Thatcher 
Government could help to bolster his domestic position. During his talks with 
Mellor, Peres appeared to be pessimistic about future prospects – particularly, since 
he had no support from Washington. Peres claimed that Shultz had effectively 
―washed his hands of the international conference concept‖, since his visit to Israel.  
Peres believed that Shultz was merely trying to play for time with an eye on the 
elections in Israel and the United States (in November 1988), and had therefore 
proposed the idea of Israel/Jordan negotiations under a US/Soviet mini umbrella. 
Nevertheless, this had not worked out. In the meantime, the Reagan Administration 
was not helping his cause ―by sitting on the fence.‖76   
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In the six months since the Conservatives had won a third term of office, one could 
point to a continued readiness on the part of the Thatcher Government to support 
Peres at the expense of Shamir. The time that Mellor had spent with personalities in 
the Labour party during his visit was a reflection of this. Indeed, it was clear that 
Thatcher‘s animosity to Shamir had grown considerably, since he was blocking the 
prospects of an international conference. Thatcher believed in an international 
conference as the means to advancing a peace settlement and holding back Soviet 
influence.  Nevertheless, Mellor‘s visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories had 
underlined the difficulties facing the Thatcher Government policy. In seeking to 
challenge the status quo in the region, Mellor was doing exactly what his Prime 
Minister had sought to do during her visit to Israel in May 1986. Mellor was trying 
to strengthen support for the domestic position of the Labour doves much as 
Thatcher had done. Nevertheless, in the wake of the Palestinian uprising, Peres was 
quickly losing support, while the Likud Party was becoming stronger. Beilin claimed 
that Israelis viewed the Labour party as ―the defenders of the Arabs.‖ 77   
 
The FCO had been marginalized, to a degree, from the Anglo-American diplomatic 
process.
78
 Howe had been very unhappy about the way in which Powell became 
personally involved in communications with the White House, at his expense.
79
 
Nevertheless, a picture emerges of a Prime Minister who tried to exploit her direct 
influence in Washington to gain support for a policy which was in fact supported by 
the FCO. This policy focused on strengthening the positions of Peres and King 
Hussein, as well as pushing for an international conference.
80
 The fact that the FCO 
had been cut out of the loop in areas such as Anglo-American relations might have 
had an impact on the management of policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict, but the 
substance of policy was unaffected. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
The Thatcher Government Upgrades Ties with the PLO 
 
Regional developments were a crucial factor in removing one of the main sources of 
disagreement that still existed between Number Ten and the FCO in the Arab-Israel 
arena: the issue of contacts with the PLO.  The intensification of the Palestinian 
uprising in the course of 1988 resulted in a drastic weakening of King Hussein‘s 
regional standing, while the PLO gained in strength. The uprising was an important 
element in the eventual decision of the Reagan Administration to launch a peace 
initiative
1
 which was encouraged by Thatcher but ultimately rejected by Shamir. 
Significantly, the uprising also resulted in King Hussein‘s decision to disengage 
from the West Bank – an action which Thatcher deeply regretted.2  It was now clear 
that a solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians would have to go 
through the PLO rather than Jordan.  
 
By the end of 1988, Thatcher was persuaded that the PLO had moderated its position 
sufficiently to authorize the approval of a higher-level dialogue with the Palestinian 
organization. Arguably, Thatcher would have viewed such a dialogue as an 
opportunity to detach the PLO from Moscow.   Thus, even on the issue of the PLO, 
the Prime Minister was now in close agreement with the FCO. Yet the Israeli 
Government continued to view the FCO as the source of the difficulties afflicting the 
bilateral relationship, and tended to overlook the role that Number Ten had played in 
the policy.
3
 Once again, there was a notable discrepancy between the Israeli 
perception of Thatcher‘s position on the Arab-Israel conflict and her actual policy 
which was almost indistinguishable from the FCO‘s policy. 
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 The increasingly inflexible line of the Israeli Government and the growing decline 
in British public support for Israel were background factors that would have 
influenced the thinking in 10 Downing Street. Nevertheless, now that a solution to 
the Israel/Palestinian impasse required the involvement of the PLO, Thatcher would 
need to depend much more on the FCO as she did not enjoy the direct links to the 
Palestinian organization which she had with Amman. As a result, the FCO was able 
to exert a stronger influence on the Prime Minister. Indeed, Thatcher‘s capacity to 
take the lead on policy was gradually being eroded since both King Hussein and 
Peres, with whom she enjoyed warm ties, were becoming sidelined. Furthermore, 
with Reagan‘s departure from the White House, the Prime Minister‘s ability to exert 
her influence on the United States would be further weakened.  Thus, the FCO was 
now in a position to set the tone on much of policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict.  
  
The Shultz Initiative 
 
Thatcher believed that there would be no serious pressure on Israel to negotiate as 
long as successive US administrations were afraid of confronting the pro-Israel 
lobby in Washington, and she had made this clear to the Reagan Administration.
4
  
This was indeed true up until the end of 1987. Nevertheless, by early 1988, with 
rising Palestinian unrest in the West Bank and Gaza, it appeared that Reagan and 
Shultz were now listening to Thatcher. Indeed, in November 1988, prior to 
Thatcher‘s final discussions with Reagan before he left the White House, the FCO 
had suggested to Powell that the Prime Minister express her appreciation for Shultz‘s 
initiative which had been launched partly as a result of British encouragement. This 
suggested that the FCO believed that the Thatcher Government‘s powers of 
persuasion had made at least some impact on Reagan and Shultz in the Arab-Israel 
arena. 
5
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Following the eruption of the Palestinian Intifada, the Reagan Administration felt 
compelled to launch a new initiative in late January 1988 to break the impasse in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.
6
 Shamir had hinted at a more flexible approach on the issue of 
Palestinian ―autonomy‖ in a letter to Shultz on 17 January 1988.  Leaders from the 
American Jewish community began to urge the US Secretary to become more 
involved in the peace process. President Mubarak had also recently called on the 
Reagan Administration to take urgent action to ward off ―a radicalization of the 
entire region.‖ 7 While the initiative had been loosely based on some ideas from 
Camp David such as the call for Palestinian self-rule, there would be an accelerated 
timetable for the conclusion of autonomy talks. The important innovation was the 
establishment of an ―interlock‖ – a locked-in link between the autonomy talks and 
final status discussions. An international conference would also be convened at the 
start of the process.
8
 Significantly, Shultz had secured Reagan‘s support for his 
initiative.
9
 
 
Shultz met with Thatcher and Howe at 10 Downing Street on 1 March, following his 
talks with King Hussein. Shultz briefed them on his initiative, and his meetings with 
Hussein and Shamir. Murphy who was also present at the meeting observed that 
Thatcher demonstrated very little patience when it came to the issue of Shamir. The 
US Secretary told Thatcher and Howe that he recognized that there were differences 
between Shamir and Peres, and he did not want to play one against the other. In 
contrast, Thatcher showed a readiness to do so.
10
 
 
The following month, Thatcher stated in the House of Commons that her 
Government was doing its utmost to promote negotiations in the Middle East, adding 
that Britain had used its influence with the Americans. She emphasized that a 
vacuum would be disastrous for the region. She pledged her support for Shultz‘s 
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initiative, and stressed the importance of the ongoing efforts to convene an 
international conference, as a framework for negotiations between Israel, Jordan and 
a Palestinian delegation.
11
  Through the first half of 1988, the Reagan Administration 
continued its efforts to persuade Shamir to accept the international conference 
proposal, but the Israeli Prime Minister resisted. During his visit to Washington in 
March, the Israeli leader was given assurances by Reagan that his fears about an 
international conference were not justified, and that the United States would not let 
Israel down. Nevertheless, Shamir insisted that the US initiative was a danger to 
Israel. Prior to the Israeli leader‘s departure from Washington, Reagan told Shamir 
that the United States would not abandon its initiative.
12
      
 
Shamir remained fiercely opposed to any notion of an international conference.
13
 
The US President was becoming increasingly frustrated over the stance of the Israeli 
Prime Minister. Reagan had written in his diary that Shultz was simply unable to 
―move Shamir‖. The Israeli remained a ―hold out‖ while King Hussein and President 
Mubarak were more positive.
14
 Thus, as the Reagan Administration entered its last 
few months, the prospects of a breakthrough in the Middle East appeared as remote 
as ever. Thatcher had pinned her hopes on the Reagan Administration exerting 
sufficient pressure on Shamir to ensure that an international conference went ahead. 
While Reagan and Shultz had belatedly thrown their weight behind the idea of an 
international conference, they showed no inclination to confront Shamir on the issue.  
 
Shultz‘s initiative may have had the support of American public opinion but it had 
little chance of success. Aside from Shamir‘s opposition, Jordan was reluctant to get 
involved without PLO backing. In addition, the Palestinians were unhappy over their 
perceived role as a junior partner of Jordan. The Soviets and Syrians were also 
unenthusiastic. Only Egypt had been openly supportive of the initiative. Shultz‘s 
plan had depended upon cooperation with King Hussein. Once Jordan had cut its 
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administrative and legal ties with the West Bank on 31 July 1988, the basis for the 
Shultz initiative had effectively collapsed.
15
 
 
Thus, Thatcher‘s policy of strengthening the moderate forces and weakening the 
radicals appeared to have failed. The convening of an international conference would 
have helped both Peres and King Hussein. Instead, both were weakened by the 
Palestinian uprising, and had no diplomatic gains to show their respective 
populations. All the while, the PLO gained in strength at the expense of the 
Jordanian monarchy.
16
  
 
Domestic Sources of Pressure on Policy 
 
During the third term of the Thatcher Government, the Israeli Government became 
increasingly concerned over the impact of British public attitudes towards Israel. The 
Foreign Ministry published a paper in May 1988 on Anglo-Israeli relations against 
the background of the Palestinian uprising. It was noted that Israel now faced more 
hostility in the British Parliament than it had done during the Lebanon War. It was 
claimed that during the Lebanon conflict, Israel was viewed as a country at war. In 
confronting the uprising, Israel was portrayed as an occupying army facing a civilian 
population. It was noted that the British Parliament had devoted considerable 
attention to events in the territories. Parliamentary motions were tabled on various 
issues relating to the Israeli-Arab conflict, including an international conference, 
medical aid to the Palestinians and proposals for economic sanctions against Israel. It 
was felt that most of the debates were one-sided, with anti-Israeli voices gaining the 
upper hand. Of equal concern was the media treatment of Israel. Since the 
Palestinian uprising, it was claimed that Israel‘s image as portrayed in British media 
reports had never been worse.
17
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The first half of 1988 saw a steady deterioration in ties between Britain and Israel. 
Squire, the outgoing British Ambassador to Israel, had remarked during valedictory 
discussions with his Israeli counterparts that there had been a significant cooling in 
bilateral ties, against the background of outspoken British rhetoric and criticism. 
Squire argued that events in the Occupied Territories and the difficult public 
atmosphere arising from media coverage was having an influence on ties. He warned 
that the bilateral relationship was entering a new and different era.
18
  
 
The Shamir camp, in particular, was becoming very unhappy with the position of the 
Thatcher Government. This was expressed during a meeting between Yossi Ben 
Aharon, the Director General of Shamir‘s office and Alan Munro. Ben Aharon, as 
ever reflecting the views of his political master Shamir, expressed his strong 
opposition to an international conference which he argued would be used to pressure 
Israel. Ben Aharon asserted that Britain was not balanced in its policy towards Israel, 
citing its commitment to the Venice Declaration, its approach towards the PLO and 
the supply of arms to Arab countries. He was also unhappy about British pressure on 
the Americans to adopt the idea of an international conference.
19
 Ben Aharon‘s 
criticisms were directed at a policy that was strongly advocated by the FCO, but it 
was largely supported by Thatcher herself. Shamir was now well aware of 
Thatcher‘s efforts to enlist Washington‘s support for an international conference, but 
he was successfully resisting these efforts.
20
 
 
It is likely that the decline in public support for Israel had an impact on Thatcher 
herself. Indeed, Shamir was told by Thatcher some time later that television images 
from the Occupied Territories were losing Israel support even among its friends.
21
 
Thatcher would have found it more difficult to take a supportive line on Israel in 
these circumstances, and would have shown an even greater readiness to support the 
FCO position. Thus, domestic factors, reflected in declining public support for Israel 
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and lobbying against the Jewish State were having a measure of influence on policy 
in the Arab-Israel arena.   
 
Although the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising and Shamir‘s intransigence were 
significant factors in the increasingly difficult atmosphere afflicting Anglo-Israeli 
ties, there were also other elements at work.  Between 1986 and 1988, there had been 
a series of incidents involving Israel‘s Mossad which had caused growing anger at 
the highest levels of Britain‘s political establishment. The first difficulties arose in 
the autumn of 1986 after the abduction from British soil of Mordechai Vanunu, a 
former nuclear technician who had revealed Israel‘s nuclear secrets to the Sunday 
Times. The Israeli Government denied that it had been involved in the abduction of 
Vanunu, but the case proved embarrassing for the British Government.
22
  
 
These incidents clearly had a deleterious impact on the bilateral relationship. The 
Prime Minister raised Britain‘s concerns over the matter during her meeting with 
Peres in November 1987.
23
 Ahead of Mellor‘s visit to Israel in January 1988, he was 
instructed by the FCO to tell his Israeli interlocutors that they should not 
―underestimate the damage done by ill-considered high-handedness.‖24 Squire had 
written in the Annual Review for 1986 that the Vanunu case had cast a shadow over 
the bilateral relationship, adding:  
 
It is to be hoped that the repercussions of this kind of Israeli misbehaviour 
will not require us to curtail the political dialogue with the Israeli leadership 
which remains in our wider interests – and theirs.25 
 
Israel‘s Ambassador, Avner, issued a formal apology on instructions from his 
Government, and stated that there would be no recurrence of such incidents.
26
  
Nevertheless, the exposure of the above cases contributed to the growing difficulties 
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faced by Israel in the sphere of British public opinion. Aside from the damage 
caused to bilateral cooperation in the intelligence domain, Israel faced strong 
criticism in the British Parliament and in the media.
27
  Thus, during a meeting 
between Patrick Nixon, the outgoing Head of NENAD, and an Israeli official from 
the Embassy, Nixon remarked that the cases had placed ―burdens‖ on British 
politicians, and the Israeli Government had to take this into account.
28
 Public 
sympathy towards Israel had already declined considerably in the wake of the 
Palestinian uprising, and the revelations of Israeli intelligence activities in the UK 
increased the damage to Israel‘s image. It is likely that such incidents would have 
increased Thatcher‘s irritation with the Israeli Government, while arguably 
encouraging greater cooperation with Whitehall on Israel. 
 
Israeli Perceptions of Britain’s Policy 
 
As relations between Britain and Israel gradually deteriorated, Israel‘s Government 
was inclined to draw distinctions between the policy of Number Ten and that of the 
FCO. In a paper published by Israel‘s Foreign Ministry, it was noted that since 1984, 
there had been something of a rapprochement between Britain and Israel.  Of all the 
European Community member countries, Britain had been the most vociferous in 
expressing its opposition to an independent Palestinian State, and had ruled out the 
PLO as an interlocutor. The paper emphasized that while the mid 1980s could be 
perceived as a ―honeymoon‖ period for the bilateral relationship, this had been 
largely due to the friendship of Thatcher, and did not necessarily reflect the view of 
the British Government as a whole.  In spite of the Palestinian uprising and Israel‘s 
poor image in Europe and Britain, it was claimed that Thatcher had not changed her 
policy towards Israel. In contrast, the FCO was viewed as a source of the difficulties 
facing Israel. The Foreign Ministry was unhappy about Howe‘s strong backing for 
Mellor in the wake of his visit to Gaza. An additional source of dissatisfaction was 
the increasingly sharp and frequent FCO condemnations of Israel‘s actions in the 
West Bank and Gaza. In spite of the friendship of Britain‘s Prime Minister towards 
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Israel, the FCO was closing ranks with the other member states of the European 
Community in its statements on developments in the territories. 
29
 
 
Thus, it was convenient in Israel to believe that there was a dichotomy in Britain‘s 
policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict: it was perceived that 10 Downing Street 
adopted a friendly attitude while the FCO and Parliament were hostile. This view 
was arguably reinforced by the fact that Israeli officials tended to receive relatively 
easy access to 10 Downing Street, while Powell ran Thatcher‘s Private Office.30 
Nevertheless, this was a simplistic view of how British policy operated. Thatcher and 
Howe had their differences in certain areas of British foreign policy, but there was 
broad agreement on policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both Thatcher and 
Howe continued to view an international conference as the most effective path to 
launching negotiations between Israel and her neighbours. Thatcher had been at the 
forefront of efforts to encourage Washington to support an international conference 
which was fiercely resisted by the Shamir camp.  
 
While the FCO had been marginalized in certain areas of policymaking, there is a 
view that Thatcher had actually been timid in her attitude to the institution. Coker 
argues that under her leadership, the institution was able to ―weather every crisis‖ 
and continue much as before. Thatcher‘s personal advisers on foreign policy did not 
create the same upheaval as those in the Treasury. Thatcher might have ―dominated‖ 
Whitehall, but she had not ―transformed‖ it.31 The FCO retained its influence in spite 
of the growing involvement of the private office in foreign policy, and no more so 
than in the Arab-Israel arena.  Indeed, Thatcher‘s well publicized disagreements with 
the FCO have obfuscated this fact.  
 
As Clarke points out, much of the rancour between Thatcher and the FCO was based 
on her hostility to the culture of the institution as opposed to its actual policy 
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recommendations. The Prime Minister disliked its emphasis on continuity and the 
tendency to pursue compromise. Nevertheless, Clarke argues that Thatcher‘s 
radicalism on domestic issues was not applied to foreign policy. Thus, ―even a 
government as vigorous as that of Mrs Thatcher was not able to inject the ‗ism‘ of its 
leader – Thatcherism – very effectively into the foreign policy process.‖32 
 
While Thatcher‘s difficulties with the FCO were associated with its tendency to 
pursue ―compromise‖, it was this very virtue which enabled her to cooperate with the 
FCO in the Arab-Israel arena: this was the one area where the Prime Minister 
strongly believed in compromise, a point which she has emphasized in her political 
treatise, Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World: 
 
There are very few international questions in which compromise is more 
necessary or more difficult than in the conflict between Jews and Arabs in 
Israel/Palestine. Throughout my political life I have usually sought to avoid 
compromise, because it more often than not turns out to involve an 
abdication of principle. In international affairs, it is often also symptomatic of 
muddle and weakness. But over the years I have been forced to conclude that 
the Arab-Israeli conflict is an exception. Here a historic compromise is, 
indeed, necessary. This is because both sides have unimpeachable moral 
cases, because neither side can fully prevail without loss to the other, and 
because shared interests in security are ultimately greater than those which 
divide the parties.
33
  
 
The Collapse of the ‘Jordanian Option’ 
 
By the summer of 1988, Jordan‘s standing as a regional power was in steep decline, 
while the PLO had enhanced its status. This was reflected in the resolutions passed at 
the Algiers Arab summit which ignored Jordanian aspirations, and affirmed the right 
of the Palestinians to independent statehood under the PLO‘s leadership. The 
outcome of the Algiers summit encouraged King Hussein to initiate measures to 
disengage from the West Bank. Peres became deeply concerned by these steps 
because they presaged an end to the so-called ‗Jordanian option‘, and would place 
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the PLO at the centre of the diplomatic process. The PLO had still not recognized 
Israel‘s right to exist.34  
 
Peres became increasingly alarmed, and sought at the last minute to dissuade King 
Hussein from disengagement. Peres held an urgent and very dramatic discussion 
with Shultz and his aide Charles Hill to see if there was anything that could be done 
to discourage Hussein from disengaging from the West Bank.  Peres asked Shultz to 
go to Jordan with a note as a last resort. Novik who was present during the 
discussion sensed that Shultz did not appear to understand the gravity of the 
situation. Peres and his aides tried to convince Shultz to remonstrate with Hussein. 
They tried to impress on Shultz that as a superpower, the United States could help 
the King and reduce the risks he was facing. Nevertheless, the US Secretary resisted. 
He concluded that Hussein had made a decision, and that was the end of the matter.
35
 
Peres also contacted Thatcher, and asked her to try and dissuade the King.
36
 Before 
Hussein had made a formal announcement on the matter, Thatcher sent him a 
message asking him to reconsider his decision. The King declined. He argued that 
since 1967, he had been saddled with responsibility without power as far as the West 
Bank was concerned, and that he couldn't be expected to continue in that situation.
37
  
 
On 31 July 1988, King Hussein formally announced his decision to terminate 
Jordan‘s legal and administrative ties with the West Bank.38 Thatcher had good 
reason to be unhappy with King Hussein‘s decision. The King‘s view of the PLO, or 
at least of Arafat, was not dissimilar to Thatcher‘s. He believed that Arafat was 
unpredictable, not fully in control of his organization and probably unable to deliver 
what he might promise in negotiations. According to one view, this assessment of 
Arafat was an important part of the reason why the British Prime Minister was 
disappointed by the King‘s decision to disengage from the West Bank.39 Peres and 
Thatcher had invested great hopes in King Hussein as the address for a solution 
                                                          
34
 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, pp.460-462 
35
 Interview with Dr. Nimrod Novik  
36
 Ibid.  
37
 Correspondence with unattributed source,  14 September 2010 
38
 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, p.462 
39
 Correspondence with unattributed source,  14 September 2010 
252 
 
between Israel and the Palestinians. Now, the Jordanian monarch was abdicating his 
role, and handing it over to Arafat.   
 
The policy of the Thatcher Government in the Arab-Israel arena had been predicated 
upon strengthening the moderate forces in the region at the expense of the radicals. 
To this end, the FCO and Thatcher, in particular, had sought to strengthen the 
position of King Hussein as a leader who could represent the Palestinians and reach a 
settlement with Israel. At the same time, a concerted effort had been made to 
strengthen Peres at the expense of his rival Shamir. However, Hussein‘s decision to 
disengage from the West Bank had shown that this policy had failed. Instead of 
keeping the more radical forces at bay, it was clear that a solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict would now have to go through the PLO. For Peres, Hussein‘s decision to 
disengage was a bitter personal blow. It was his strategic conviction that Israel had to 
reach an agreement with the Jordanian monarch.
40
 He had staked everything on 
reaching an understanding with King Hussein, but now had little to show for it. 
 
Peres was therefore at a great disadvantage when running against his Likud rival 
Shamir in the Israeli election of 1 November 1988. Although there was no decisive 
winner in the election, the Likud emerged with one seat more than the Labour 
Alignment. The election result was a considerable disappointment for Peres and his 
party. Both Likud and Labour lost seats to the extreme right and left and the religious 
parties. As the leader of the largest party, Shamir was called upon by Israel‘s 
President to form a government. After failing to form a narrow government with the 
religious parties, Shamir reached an agreement with the Labour Alignment on a 
National Unity Government. This time round, however, there was no rotation. 
Labour was clearly the junior partner in the coalition. Peres left his post as Foreign 
Minister to become Vice Premier and Minister of Finance. Shamir was Prime 
Minister.
41
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Thus, the Thatcher Government‘s ongoing efforts to strengthen Hussein and Peres 
had failed. Hussein‘s influence had declined while the PLO had been strengthened 
considerably in the wake of the Palestinian uprising, leading eventually to Jordan‘s 
disengagement from the West Bank. In Israel, Peres‘s advocacy of an international 
peace conference had made little headway as evidenced by the Israeli election result 
of 1 November 1988. Thus, the Thatcher Government would have to adopt a new 
strategy in working for a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was 
advantageous for the FCO since it was now in a stronger position to push for a new 
British approach towards the PLO.   
 
Thus, by the end of 1988, an interesting new dynamic had emerged in regard to 
Thatcher‘s relationship with the FCO. As long as King Hussein had been the main 
address for a solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict, Thatcher could rely to a large 
degree on her own offices as she had a direct link to the Jordanian monarch. 
However, now that a solution to the Israel/Palestinian impasse required the 
involvement of the PLO, Thatcher would need to depend much more on the FCO as 
she did not enjoy those direct links to the Palestinian organization. As a result, the 
FCO was able to exert a stronger influence on the Prime Minister. Indeed, Thatcher‘s 
ability to impose her own personality on policy was gradually being eroded since 
both King Hussein and Peres, with whom she enjoyed close ties, were becoming 
sidelined. Furthermore, with Reagan about to leave the White House, the Prime 
Minister‘s ability to exert her influence would be further weakened.  Thus, the FCO 
was now in a position to set the tone on much of policy towards the Arab-Israel 
conflict while Thatcher would be following behind.  
 
The New Approach towards the PLO 
 
The early signs of the new British approach towards the PLO were evident during 
the spring of 1988 as the Jordanian influence in the Occupied Territories was quickly 
waning. A letter from Howe‘s Private Secretary to Number Ten revealed that a 
decision had been made at the highest levels to re-examine the possibility of a 
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resumption of ministerial contacts with the PLO. Since the unrest in the West Bank 
had reduced King Hussein‘s influence there, he had stated that he would not seek to 
represent the Palestinians in negotiations. Howe was concerned about the consequent 
damage to British interests, and proposed a meeting between Britain‘s Ambassador 
in Jordan, Anthony Reeve, and King Hussein. The British Ambassador would 
explore whether Hussein was interested in a meeting between the British Minister of 
State and a suitable PLO representative. The immediate objective was to encourage a 
more constructive approach by the PLO to the American peace initiative of February 
1988. It was thought that a UK/PLO dialogue would help fill the Palestinian vacuum 
in the American strategy. It would also align Britain‘s policy more closely with that 
of its European partners, and put it in a stronger position to lead a European 
contribution to the peace process. Howe believed that there would be considerable 
parliamentary and public support for renewed ministerial contacts with the PLO. He 
also felt that Britain‘s European partners would view this development favourably.42 
 
Towards the end of 1988, there was a significant shift in Thatcher‘s attitude towards 
the PLO. This had been brought about largely by the evolving positions within the 
PLO itself. In mid November 1988, at a Palestine National Congress (PNC) meeting 
in Algiers, Arafat hinted at the recognition of Israel, and proclaimed an independent 
Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza with east Jerusalem as its capital.
43 
 The 
PNC meeting took place while Thatcher was visiting Washington for her final talks 
with President Reagan.  Only a few days earlier, the Republican Party candidate, 
George Bush, had won a landslide victory in the US presidential elections. The FCO 
viewed the visit as an opportunity for the Prime Minister to urge Reagan and Shultz 
to do their utmost to encourage the new incoming team to advance the Middle East 
peace process as a matter of priority.
44
 
 
Notwithstanding the strong American hostility towards the PLO, there was a 
reluctant acceptance by most US policymakers that the organization had the widest 
                                                          
42
 FCO/FOI 954-09, Letter from RN Culshaw to CD Powell, 25 April 1988 
43
 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph , p. 1037 
44
 FCO/FOI 698-09,  Minute from FCO to CD Powell ,9 November 1988 
255 
 
support among the Palestinians. Thus, over the years, American officials had 
occasionally explored the possibility of establishing direct contacts with the PLO 
with a view to softening its position on peace with Israel and opening the way for 
direct involvement by legitimate Palestinian representatives in negotiations. At the 
same time, by the end of 1988, the PLO was making a concerted effort to meet the 
US conditions for a dialogue. The PLO was in danger of being eclipsed by the 
Palestinian Intifada and also faced pressures from the Arabs and Soviets to moderate 
its position.
45
 The PLO believed that American pressure could force Israel to make 
territorial concessions, but it first needed to win Washington‘s support. Arafat had 
concluded that ―nothing can get done in the region without the United States.‖ The 
PLO realized that in order to obtain US recognition, it had to appear moderate and 
flexible.
46
  
  
While the Americans were sceptical about the PNC communiqué of November 1988, 
Thatcher stressed the importance of giving encouragement to the parties to move in 
the positive directions implied by the Algiers statement.
47
 She had said to Reagan 
and Shultz: ―When people do things that we like, we should welcome it.‖48 While 
Thatcher was unhappy with the declaration of an independent Palestinian State, she 
stated at a Washington press conference that the PLO‘s apparent acceptance of 
Resolution 242 was a ―modest step forward.‖49  The Americans felt differently. 
Shultz decided on 26 November to deny Arafat a visa to visit the United States since 
he held the view that the PLO still engaged in terrorism.
50
 
 
Pro-Israeli organizations in London had consistently lobbied against British 
ministerial contacts with the PLO, and had opposed the establishment of a PLO 
office in the capital.
51
  The Israeli Government had claimed that since the PLO was a 
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terrorist organization, the office should be closed down. FCO officials had regular 
dealings with the PLO representative in London. Following Arafat‘s arrival in Tunis, 
it was considered important for practical reasons to allow British diplomatic contacts 
with the PLO leader. Thus, the British Embassy in Tunis was given permission to 
speak to Arafat. By 1988, Stephen Day was given authorization as Britain‘s 
Ambassador in Tunis to meet with the PLO leader.  Therefore, the taboo on contacts 
with the PLO had been gradually broken down under Thatcher.
52
 Over the past two 
years, Thatcher had kept the PLO at arm‘s length since the organization had not 
renounced terrorism or accepted UN Resolution 242. The Prime Minister now 
signalled a possible change of heart in view of the apparent shift in the PLO‘s 
position.  
 
Following the establishment of a new Israeli National Unity Government in 
December 1988, the basic policy guidelines of the new coalition included opposition 
to an independent Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza and no negotiations 
with the PLO.
53
  Peres‘s public position on the PNC communiqué in Algiers was 
starkly at odds with the new position of the Thatcher Government.  Peres sent a letter 
to Howe claiming that the PNC Algiers resolutions had complicated the chances of a 
resolution of the conflict since they prejudged the outcome of a negotiated 
settlement. Peres asserted that the Algiers statement had not constituted acceptance 
of Resolution 242, recognition of Israel or the renunciation of terrorism. Peres called 
on the Thatcher Government not to provide support to the PNC Algiers Resolutions 
which was ―bound to prove counter-productive.‖54  
 
Howe‘s response reflected the shift in the Prime Minister‘s own thinking on the 
PLO. While Howe understood Israel‘s wary approach towards the PLO, he 
expressed the hope that Israel would take advantage of the new opportunities 
presented by the PNC meeting in Algiers. In his letter, the Foreign Secretary 
betrayed the sense of frustration within the Thatcher Government on Israel‘s 
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position. He informed Peres that the Thatcher Government was unsympathetic to 
Israel‘s ―totally negative reaction to the PNC.‖  While the PNC communiqué had 
flaws, there were some constructive aspects which held promise. Howe wrote that ―it 
would be a tragedy‖ if an opportunity were lost because of Israeli intransigence.55 
 
In the course of December 1988, the Thatcher Government moved to upgrade 
relations with the PLO.  In a letter to Powell, Howe‘s Private Secretary, Stephen 
Wall, reported that Thatcher and Howe had persuaded other European Community 
member states that they had a threefold task: to engage the incoming Bush 
Administration in the search for a peace agreement, to persuade the Israeli 
Government that there was a fresh opportunity for negotiations and to encourage 
PLO moderates to maintain their pressure for acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 
338, the recognition of Israel and the renunciation of terrorism. Wall noted that an 
opportunity had presented itself for the Thatcher Government to exercise influence 
over the PLO. Bassam Abu Sharif, Arafat‘s senior adviser, would be visiting London 
in the second week of December. Abu Sharif was seen as a moderate within the 
PLO, and had recently written articles calling for acceptance of Security Council 
Resolution 242 and the renunciation of terrorism. Wall maintained that the British 
Government had an opportunity to enhance the process of moderation within the 
organization.
56
   
 
Day met with Abu Sharif to discuss the possibility of a meeting with Britain‘s 
Minister of State at the FCO, William Waldegrave. The two discussed the wording 
of a declaration to be issued during the meeting with Waldegrave. Following an 
agreement on the draft, it was then agreed that Abu Sharif would obtain Arafat‘s oral 
approval for the wording while it was transmitted it to London.
57
  An arrangement 
was made for Abu Sharif to meet with Alan Munro during his visit to London. Howe 
proposed that an undertaking by Abu Sharif to honour the commitments he had made 
in his articles should be rewarded by a meeting with Waldegrave. The Prime 
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Minister would then be able to convey this news to King Hussein during her meeting 
with him on 5 December.
58
  
 
The differences between 10 Downing Street and the FCO in regard to Britain‘s 
contacts with the PLO were gradually subsiding. While Thatcher was moving ever 
closer to authorizing upgraded contacts with the PLO, her suspicions remained. 
Powell wrote to Wall that the Prime Minister did not feel that the case for a meeting 
between Waldegrave and Abu Sharif was ―anything like as clear-cut‖ as his letter 
had suggested. Nevertheless, he added that Thatcher agreed that her Government 
could not ―move the goalposts in any direction.‖ Abu Sharif had to explicitly and 
publicly accept the same three conditions which the British Government had laid 
down in October 1985 for a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the two PLO 
members – points which the Prime Minister had referred to in the House of 
Commons the previous week.  The PLO had to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338, 
recognize Israel‘s right to exist and renounce violence.59  
 
Thatcher was extremely wary about the PLO, and took quite a lot of persuasion that 
the organization had shifted its position.
60
 In the event, the Prime Minister approved 
the text of the statement that Abu Sharif was to make following his meeting with 
Waldegrave on December 9, 1988. Thatcher believed that provided the meeting went 
to plan, it could be presented ―as a minor success for British diplomacy.‖ Abu Sharif 
had accepted the three conditions set by Thatcher. The next step was to encourage 
Arafat to make the same statement.
61
 Following the meeting, Waldegrave and his 
Palestinian counterpart came down the steps of the FCO to face the journalists and 
issue a declaration. The occasion was very fraught and tense. In the event, however, 
there were no surprises.
62
 Arafat was pleased with the results of the meeting, and 
called Abu Sharif to congratulate him on his accomplishment.
63
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Rob Young, a senior official within the Middle East Department during the third 
Thatcher term, maintains that if policy towards the PLO had been left exclusively to 
the FCO, contacts with the organization would have been upgraded some years 
earlier. The FCO had quite persistently tried to use its connections to initiate contacts 
with the PLO representatives at a high ministerial level, but Thatcher had resisted 
until 1988 because the organization had not renounced terrorism or recognized 
Israel.
64
  Yet now, Thatcher was seeking to present Britain‘s renewed contacts with 
the PLO in terms of ―a minor success for British diplomacy.‖ Arguably, she wanted 
to highlight Britain‘s relevance as an influential actor in the Middle East arena, by 
demonstrating its apparent ability to encourage a process of moderation within the 
PLO. It was not clear that Arafat had made a strategic decision to abandon terrorism 
and recognize Israel. Nevertheless, British strategic interests in the region could be 
enhanced through demonstrating to the Arab world that Britain could exert influence 
over the PLO. Furthermore, it was becoming clear to Thatcher that any future 
negotiated settlement would have to include the PLO.
65
 Thus, Thatcher‘s pragmatism 
on the issue of Palestinian terrorism now predominated, as her Government 
dismissed the objections of the Israelis on the upgraded ties with the PLO.   
Furthermore, at this stage in 1988, it is likely that Thatcher would have perceived a 
dialogue as an opportunity to detach the PLO from the Soviet Union.     
 
As a result of the Waldegrave-Abu Sharif meeting, Thatcher agreed to raise the level 
of dialogue with the PLO to ministerial level. A week after the meeting, Howe 
announced that Waldegrave would be visiting Tunis in January 1989. Nevertheless, 
at this stage, the Thatcher Government adopted a cautious approach, and its moves 
towards the PLO were coordinated closely with Washington. While the PLO had 
apparently renounced violence, there was a sense that it had not moved far enough. 
66
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The Reagan Administration was now pressing Arafat hard to explicitly renounce 
terrorism and issue a clear statement recognizing Israel‘s existence. Shultz remained 
unconvinced by Arafat‘s address at the UN in Geneva on 13 December, since the 
PLO leader had failed to renounce terrorism. While the PLO leader had previously 
rejected or condemned terrorism, Shultz wanted Arafat to explicitly renounce 
terrorism and not simply reject it. Finally, on 14 December, Arafat held a press 
conference in Geneva where he stated his recognition of Israel‘s existence and 
explicitly renounced terrorism.
67
 Following Arafat‘s statement, the Reagan 
Administration announced that the PLO had now met the US conditions for a 
dialogue.
68
 
 
The Reagan Administration‘s decision-making on the PLO dialogue followed a 
pattern that could be seen in other areas of policymaking in the Arab-Israel arena. 
Quandt argues that ―Reagan‘s disengaged style as President, his lack of curiosity, 
and his passivity on issues related to the Middle East were impediments to creative 
US peace diplomacy.‖ Reagan and Shultz produced policy in reaction to events 
rather than ―as part of a grand design.‖  Thus the Reagan Plan of September 1982 
was formulated in response to Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon while the Shultz 
initiative of 1988 was a reaction to the Intifada. The decision to open a dialogue with 
the PLO could also be viewed as a reaction to King Hussein‘s disengagement from 
the West Bank. The distinct lack of leadership displayed by the President and his US 
Secretary meant that little of substance was achieved in the peace process during the 
Reagan period.
69
  
 
The fact that the United States had now authorized contacts with the PLO made it 
considerably easier for Thatcher to sanction a higher-level dialogue with the 
Palestinian organization. According to one Palestinian view, she was very careful not 
to run ahead of the Americans on this issue, notwithstanding the fact that she 
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generally preferred to take the lead rather than to follow.
70
 In fact, Thatcher had 
moved ahead of Washington to some degree on this issue since there had already 
been low level British contacts with the PLO some years earlier, including meetings 
between her FCO Minister of State and PLO officials. Now, however, Washington 
was looking kindly on the Thatcher Government‘s readiness to upgrade contacts 
with the PLO. 
  
The British Government was now in close contact with the Americans in regard to a 
renewed dialogue with the PLO. The Thatcher Government held discussions with the 
Americans regarding Waldegrave‘s forthcoming trip to Tunis. In Washington, it was 
felt that a response was needed to the political shift within the PLO. At the same 
time, the Americans viewed the opening of a dialogue as merely the beginning of a 
negotiating process in which the PLO would have to demonstrate its moderation and 
convince Israel that a solution with Arafat was possible. The US Government 
defined the new stage not as negotiations but as a constructive dialogue that would 
be maintained only if the PLO honoured Arafat‘s pledge in Geneva.71  However, the 
United States had political difficulties in raising the dialogue to the level of elected 
politicians, and it was agreed that it would be a useful step if the British could do so. 
It took some persuasion for Thatcher to sanction Waldegrave‘s visit to Tunis. 
Certainly, if Thatcher had entertained any doubts at all about how the Americans 
would have perceived it, she would not have allowed the visit to take place.
72
   
 
Shultz designated US Ambassador to Tunis, Robert Pelletreau, as the only 
authorized channel for contacts between the United States and the PLO.
73
   Day 
effectively played a role in Tunis as a go-between with the Americans to help them 
establish a dialogue with the PLO, advising the US Embassy in Tunis on how to set 
up a meeting and with whom. He had also supplied his American counterparts with 
the telephone numbers of PLO officials including Arafat. For a short period, Day‘s 
contacts with Arafat enabled Britain to help the Americans orchestrate their own 
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dialogue with the PLO. Day maintains that Britain‘s dialogue with the PLO was 
certainly a helpful step which facilitated the American move.
74
 Waldegrave was in 
regular contact with Pelletreau.
75
  
 
Waldegrave‘s visit to Tunis in January 1989 resulted in a further strengthening of the 
ties between Britain and the PLO. The FCO Minister was attacked by sections of the 
British press following his meeting with Arafat. During his visit, Waldegrave stated 
that Shamir was what the British had once described as a terrorist but he had made 
the transition to political life. Waldegrave added that the Israelis had to give the 
same benefit of the doubt to Arafat who had wanted to make a similar change. 
Thatcher had also viewed Shamir as a former terrorist, and this had a significant 
influence on her attitude towards him.
76
 The Prime Minister gave Waldegrave her 
full backing on the episode.
77
   
 
On his return to London, Waldegrave appeared in the House of Commons, and 
robustly defended his visit to Tunis. The Minister argued that while Israeli anxieties 
over the PLO were understandable, the conditions were right for a political solution 
and Britain had to play a role. He emphasized that the steps taken by the PLO had to 
be tested by comprehensive negotiations.  Waldegrave added that he had met with 
Arafat to encourage him to maintain his moderate position.
78
 Thatcher sat stony 
faced in parliament while the Minister made his statement. At the end of his address, 
Thatcher patted Waldegrave on the shoulder as an endorsement of what he had 
done.
79
  The Prime Minister was always supportive of those who were carrying out 
her policy under pressure.
80
 There was now a growing convergence between the 
FCO and 10 Downing Street on the PLO question.  
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Thatcher‘s policy towards the PLO in January 1989 mirrored her attitude towards the 
Venice Declaration some nine years earlier. Thatcher was initially hesitant about 
upgrading relations with the PLO as there were some doubts about the sincerity of 
Arafat‘s true intentions. Thatcher was uncomfortable with anything resembling a 
terrorist organization. This was why she took her time to respond to the ANC in 
South Africa. On the issue of the PLO, Waldegrave observed that there was ―a very 
careful observation‖ from 10 Downing Street, but no intervention once the matter 
was agreed. Thatcher had ―tested the arguments‖, but once agreement was reached, 
she moved on.
81
  Since Thatcher was convinced that the PLO had moderated its 
position, she gave her full support to Waldegrave‘s dialogue with Arafat.   
 
It has been argued that there were few if any restraints left on Thatcher once William 
Whitelaw, had gone into retirement in 1988. Whitelaw, a close associate of the Prime 
Minister, had been able to intervene with Thatcher during private bilateral sessions. 
Howe had stated that Thatcher was now succumbing to the ―language of the 
battlefield rather than the language of partnership.‖ Thus, by this point, the tight 
policy unit in Number Ten had acquired even more influence as Powell and Ingham 
had become increasingly politicized.
82
 However, even as the centralization of policy 
was intensifying, the cooperation between Number Ten and Whitehall in the Arab-
Israel arena was also increasing. It may be true that the Number Ten policy unit was 
becoming increasingly dominant in the management of policy. Yet, as far as its 
substance was concerned, there appeared to be little impact. Thatcher had asserted a 
measure of independence in policy towards the PLO, yet even this difference was 
now evaporating. Since the PLO had met Thatcher‘s conditions, there was no longer 
any justification for opposing a dialogue with the organization. The disengagement 
of Jordan from the West Bank was an important factor in the new approach towards 
the PLO, as was the change in America‘s attitude towards the organization. 
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Chapter Nine 
 
A Renewed Focus on the Resolution of the Conflict 
 
In this final chapter, it is argued that Thatcher‘s resolve to support a resolution of the 
Arab-Israel conflict underpinned her close cooperation with Whitehall during her 
final years in office. By 1990, Thatcher appeared to be less concerned about the 
threat from the Soviet Union which was now in severe decline but, rather, from the 
dangers posed by radical regimes possessing weapons of mass destruction. She 
believed that a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict would help to address the 
insecurity which was gripping the region.
1
 Indeed, by this stage, the removal of the 
cold war dimension appeared to strengthen the belief of policymakers that a 
resolution of the conflict was possible.
2
  
 
The visit of Shamir to London in May 1989 saw the FCO and Thatcher work in very 
close cooperation in a bid to draw concessions from the Likud Prime Minister. This 
was unsuccessful since Shamir effectively ended up rejecting his own peace plan. By 
the summer of 1990, a new Israeli Government had been formed which adopted an 
even more uncompromising approach on the Palestinian question. The FCO was 
now led by Hurd who was in a stronger position than predecessors Major and Howe, 
and was at the forefront of calls for a just and comprehensive resolution of the Arab-
Israel conflict. Arabists within the FCO such as David Gore-Booth were also 
becoming increasingly influential in setting the tone of policy.  Thus, the stage was 
set for a return to the very tense bilateral relationship which had predominated 
during 1980-82, as Israel refused to demonstrate flexibility on the Palestinian 
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question. Leading representatives of the Jewish community and the Israeli 
Government expected Thatcher to counter the FCO line. Yet Thatcher was no less 
outspoken than the FCO on Israel, exemplified by her refusal to suspend a dialogue 
with the PLO and her strong condemnation of Jewish settlement in east Jerusalem. 
  
In the wake of Saddam Hussein‗s invasion of Kuwait, 10 Downing Street appeared 
to be playing a double game. While Thatcher was insistent that there could be no 
linkage between the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict and the Iraq/Kuwait crisis, 
the FCO led by Hurd and Waldegrave were given freedom to ratchet up the rhetoric 
on the urgent need for a settlement of the Palestinian question. Thatcher could only 
gain from such an approach, as there was a realization within Number Ten that some 
kind of linkage was necessary in order to rally Arab states to the anti-Saddam 
coalition.  Furthermore, it was this same interest which persuaded Thatcher to finally 
agree to the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Syria. Ultimately, both Hurd and 
Waldegrave were subject to fierce attacks from Israel and its supporters in the wake 
of their position while Thatcher was still perceived in more favourable terms. Thus, 
once again, there was a discrepancy between the Israeli perception of Thatcher‗s 
position on the Arab-Israel conflict and her actual policy which was very closely 
aligned with the FCO. 
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The Shamir Plan 
 
The close coordination between the FCO and Number Ten in the Arab-Israel arena 
continued through 1989, and was exemplified by the visit of Shamir to London in 
May of that year. Indeed this cooperation increased in spite of the strong control of 
the private office over policy. The change of heart over Shamir could be linked to 
several factors.  Thatcher had become disappointed with Peres as a result of his 
failure to bring down the Israeli National Unity Government over the London 
Agreement.
3
 The disappointment over Peres‘s failure to deliver was also felt by FCO 
officials.
4
 Now that the Likud was the senior partner in the National Unity 
Government, there was little to be gained from trying to strengthen Peres at the 
expense of Shamir.  
 
The fact that the new Bush Administration had made it clear that it was resolved to 
use its influence with Shamir was a source of encouragement for the Prime Minister. 
Thatcher now believed that a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict was a matter of 
the greatest urgency, in view of the ―fundamentally unstable‖ situation in the Middle 
East. During a trip to Morocco, Thatcher warned that the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and the ballistic missiles to deliver such weapons had brought 
home ―the horrors of a further conflict.‖ 5  
 
President Bush and his Secretary of State, James Baker, wasted little time in exerting 
pressure on the Israeli Prime Minister. Shamir visited Washington in April 1989 
where he unveiled his plan for elections in the Occupied Territories. Baker, in 
particular, pressed Shamir over the need to adopt fresh thinking and initiate 
negotiations with the Palestinians. Baker cautioned the Israeli Prime Minister against 
―digging one‘s heels in‖, and urged him to ―recapture the high ground‖.6 This was 
certainly a departure from the policy adopted by the Reagan Administration. Shamir 
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had presented a plan for elections among the Palestinians for representation to 
negotiate a transitional period of self-rule. Israel would continue to have security 
control over the West Bank and Gaza. Negotiations would begin three years after the 
implementation of interim arrangements towards a permanent solution with each side 
proposing whatever it saw fit.
7
 By mid May 1989, Shamir‘s initiative had been 
accepted by the Israeli cabinet, and he was ready to promote it in Europe.
8
  
 
The Visit of Shamir to London 
 
As a result of the Shamir Plan, both Thatcher and the FCO viewed the visit of 
Israel‘s Prime Minister to London as a golden opportunity to encourage diplomatic 
progress in the region. Shamir‘s visit was taking place amidst promising 
developments in the Middle East. Aside from the shift in the PLO‘s position, Egypt 
had been readmitted to the Arab League following a decade of ostracism in the wake 
of its Peace Accord with Israel.
9
 Britain‘s Ambassador to Israel, Mark Elliott, 
maintained that there was an extensive view that there had been a significant shift in 
Shamir‘s thinking.10 While Elliott was inclined to believe that Shamir was an 
unreconstructed tactician who was playing for time, he argued for Britain to 
encourage Shamir in his plan since it could have ―an unstoppable dynamic of its 
own‖, adding that the Israeli Prime Minister would be more receptive to reasoned 
argument than he was a few months ago. Shamir would hope to persuade Thatcher 
that in spite of his plan‘s ambiguities, it represented the only way forward.  The 
Ambassador maintained that Shamir‘s forthcoming visit to London in May was 
―timely‖. Since the details of his peace plan had been publicized, support from 
Thatcher would be ―a God-send to him‖. Elliott claimed that Thatcher was ―central 
to Israel‘s campaign for international support because of her influence in 
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Washington, Europe, Amman and Moscow, as well as her standing in Israeli public 
opinion.‖11   
 
Thatcher had prepared very carefully for Shamir‘s visit to London. She wrote to 
King Fahd, King Hassan, President Mubarak and King Hussein to canvass their 
views on how to handle Shamir. Thatcher had also written to US Secretary of State 
Baker. King Fahd had conveyed to Thatcher that she had to emphasize to Shamir 
that there had been a shift in Arab attitudes towards Israel and that it had to 
respond.
12
  
 
Mubarak conveyed his views to Britain‘s Ambassador to Egypt, James Adams. The 
Egyptian leader feared that Shamir would be ―incapable of taking a positive 
decision‖, and was pessimistic about the prospects of doing business with him. 
Adams tried to elicit Mubarak‘s reaction to the view of the British Government 
regarding the current impracticalities of a direct Israeli dialogue with the PLO. 
Mubarak avoided giving a straight answer to the question of direct negotiations with 
the PLO. However, he expressed his contempt for members of the PLO Executive 
Committee and other wealthy PLO exiles who had no future in a Palestinian entity, 
and advised against the inclusion of Palestinian outsiders in negotiations. 
Nevertheless, he commended to Thatcher that Arafat was ―far and away the most 
moderate PLO leader‖. Mubarak candidly told Adams that he tried hard not to speak 
about an independent Palestinian State because he did not believe in it.  
Nevertheless, he supported a confederation with Jordan – Mubarak maintained that 
King Hussein agreed with this although he would not say so now. Mubarak added 
that notwithstanding the Palestinian insistence on their right to a state, they would 
accept a confederation in the course of negotiations if there was progress.
13
   
 
King Hussein greatly valued the opportunity to present his views to Thatcher ahead 
of her meeting with Shamir. Hussein told Britain‘s Ambassador to Jordan, Anthony 
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Reeve, that he viewed Shamir‘s opposition to land for peace as the main obstacle to 
progress, and was deeply sceptical about his election proposal. The prospects for 
movement would be bleak unless Shamir could be persuaded to change his attitude.  
The King was convinced that Thatcher was aware of the importance of obtaining a 
shift in Shamir‘s attitude. He agreed with the PLO view that Shamir‘s plan had no 
value unless it was linked to a final settlement. He believed that the new Bush 
Administration was a great improvement on Reagan and Shultz, but feared that 
Shamir would simply buy time through his proposal and would split the Palestinians. 
The Jordanian monarch warned of the fragility of Arafat‘s position, and emphasized 
that time was short. He encouraged the Prime Minister to ―put the central issues 
squarely to Shamir.‖ King Hussein was convinced that Thatcher‘s ―plain speaking 
could have considerable impact.‖14  
 
Thus, Thatcher was left in no doubt that she had a unique opportunity to push 
Shamir to expand on his own plan, and create a new dynamic in the peace process 
which even he would find hard to resist. Nevertheless, there was also a certain 
amount of sensitivity within the British Government over the Shamir visit. Howe‘s 
Private Secretary informed Powell that British friends of Israel had suggested that 
Shamir had felt unwelcome in Britain. Shamir was placing an emphasis on getting 
the atmosphere right for his visit. Stephen Wall wrote that the Israelis had argued 
strongly to ensure that Shamir‘s visit resembled the visit paid by Peres in January 
1986. They had attached importance to the ―official working visit‖ title. Peres came 
in January 1986 as a Guest of Government. Unusually for a working visit, Wall 
pointed out, Shamir would be met at the airport by the Foreign Secretary and there 
would be a ceremonial lining party. Wall wrote that one of Britain‘s objectives 
during the visit would be to reassure Shamir that he is treated on the same basis as 
his Labour predecessor.
15
 A ceremonial lining party was exceptional for official 
working visits, but Howe was at pains to make sure that Shamir felt at home.
16
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Both Number Ten and the FCO were in an awkward situation over the visit of 
Shamir. Over the past four years, they had worked in cooperation to strengthen the 
domestic position of Peres at Shamir‘s expense, and he had been feted in Downing 
Street on numerous occasions. Now that the Likud Prime Minister was finally an 
official guest at 10 Downing Street, he wanted to enjoy the same treatment as Peres. 
Pro-Israel groups in London had pressured the Thatcher Government over the issue.  
Dr. Lionel Kopelowitz, President of the Board of Deputies, was concerned about the 
treatment Shamir would receive in London. In his contacts with the Israeli Embassy, 
it was suggested that Shamir was worried about the reception he was going to 
receive. Kopelowitz met with Waldegrave for lunch to air his concerns on the issue. 
Waldegrave stated that Shamir would get a suitable reception. Kopelowitz responded 
that when Peres visited London as Prime Minister, Thatcher gave him a dinner at 
Number Ten. However, there was no dinner for Shamir. Waldegrave responded 
quickly, ―Mr Peres came on an official visit, Mr Shamir is coming on a working 
visit!‖17  There were limits to how far the Thatcher Government would go to satisfy 
the Likud Prime Minister. 
 
There was also a second concern ahead of Shamir‘s visit. Wall had written of the 
need to prepare for ―the common Israeli tactic of wedge-driving between the Prime 
Minister and the FCO.‖ 18 Alan Goulty, the Head of NENAD, had also written to the 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Middle East, David Gore-Booth, and 
suggested that Howe discuss with Thatcher the handling of the talks with Shamir, 
since the Israelis perceived that the Prime Minister was more sympathetic than the 
FCO. It was recommended that the Prime Minister put across the tougher points 
since he feared that Shamir and his entourage would pay more attention to Thatcher 
and would ―discount‖ points raised by FCO Ministers on the following day. Goulty 
wrote that ―such an approach would reduce the scope for Israeli wedge-driving.‖19 
For example, the Prime Minister would wish to register her disapproval of Israeli 
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policies in the Occupied Territories: it was important for public and presentational 
reasons that the British Government could say that this was done.
20
  
 
Gore-Booth agreed that there would be a significant advantage in the Prime Minister 
discussing beforehand with Howe the handling of talks with Shamir. Thatcher had to 
make it clear to Shamir that there was no alternative to territory for peace or to 
dialogue with representative Palestinians. Furthermore, there was no prospect of 
resolving the issue purely on a superpower basis. Gore-Booth claimed that Shamir‘s 
proposals were very deficient in these areas.
21
 The contacts between Downing Street 
and the FCO relating to Shamir‘s visit reflected the close cooperation between the 
two institutions and the fact that they were working for the same goal: the 
advancement of a peace settlement based on the land for peace formula.   
 
A third difficulty related to the issue of ―bilateral grievances‖. The issues of arms 
restrictions, the sale of North Sea oil and the Arab boycott had barely arisen during 
Peres‘s visits to London.22 It was expected that Shamir and the Director General of 
his office, Ben Aharon, would dwell on the issues during the meeting with Howe. 
Goulty had written to Gore-Booth, stating that Ben Aharon could not be allowed to 
dwell on the ―bilateral grievances‖.23  The Thatcher Government maintained 
restrictions on arms sales which were still ostensibly linked to Israel‘s military 
presence in Lebanon. The Israeli Government had renewed pressure to lift the 
restrictions following the large British sales contract with Saudi Arabia in 1988. 
Defence sales to Israel between 1985-1988 had totalled just over £9million. 
Thatcher, however, had agreed to lift unpublicized restrictions on the British 
purchase of Israeli defence equipment.
24
  
 
There was no change in the British Government policy on sales of North Sea oil. The 
Israelis were still told that Britain sold oil only to EC and IEA partners. According to 
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the FCO, this was not discrimination but merely ―prudent energy cooperation.‖ 25 
Nevertheless, the FCO had also made it clear that these guidelines were ―useful‖ in 
preventing ―embarrassing‖ oil sales, in particular, to South Africa.26  Such sales 
would ultimately harm British interests. Israel and South Africa were placed in the 
same boat. In regard to the Arab boycott, while the FCO had stopped authentication 
of boycott documents following the Peres visit of January 1986, no anti-boycott 
legislation had been introduced in Britain. Effective anti-boycott legislation had been 
introduced in the United States. Furthermore, France had introduced such legislation 
in 1977, while the Netherlands had a statutory requirement for companies to report 
any requests to comply with foreign boycotts.
27
 It was deemed, however, that such 
legislation would not be in the British national interest.
28
  Number Ten under 
Thatcher would continue its acquiescence with this policy. 
 
The FCO had given plenty of thought to the tactics to be deployed by the Prime 
Minister during her meeting with Shamir. Wall had written to Powell about the 
likelihood that Thatcher would find the Israeli Prime Minister on edge. Since there 
would need to be ―frank speaking‖, it was suggested that Thatcher draw him out on 
―easy ground‖ such as Eastern Europe or Soviet Jewry.29 Whatever differences 
Thatcher and Shamir might have had over policy towards the Palestinians, the Likud 
leader had appreciated the British Prime Minister‘s stand over Soviet Jewry and had 
conveyed this to her in the past.
30
  
 
Thatcher treated her meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister as an opportunity to win 
over his confidence in view of their previous stormy encounter in London in June 
1985. On this occasion, the atmosphere was friendly and Shamir grew visibly more 
relaxed as the meeting progressed. Shamir did not raise any difficult bilateral 
questions. He told Thatcher that he attached great importance to the Prime Minister‘s 
views: her standing was ―extraordinarily high‖ in Israel, and there was admiration 
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for her patriotism and her policy of peace through strength. Shamir said to Thatcher 
that it was Israel‘s destiny to be surrounded by a sea of hostile Muslim states. 
However, he believed that King Hussein was different from other Arab leaders: 
relations between Israel and Jordan were ―an unsuccessful love story.‖ Shamir stated 
that Israel would be content to work silently with the King to prevent an independent 
Palestinian State which would be a ―mortal danger‖ to him. He called on Thatcher to 
help through her ―exceptionally close relations‖ with the King. Israel was prepared 
to work openly or secretly with Hussein. The King knew that he could trust Israel.
31
  
 
Shamir discussed his peace plan in detail, and maintained that in the third year of 
autonomy, negotiations would start for a permanent solution. Shamir insisted that 
Israel would oppose an independent Palestinian State which would become ―a basis 
for aggression against Israel‖, and would not negotiate with the PLO. Israel, 
however, would negotiate with the elected representatives of Palestinians in the 
territories. His proposals marked the limit of the concessions he could make. Israel 
needed the help of Britain and others in the Western world, as they did not want their 
future to be discussed between the United States and the Soviet Union alone.
32
 
 
Thatcher remarked to Shamir that the scenes shown on television from the Occupied 
Territories were losing Israel support even among its friends, and that higher 
standards were expected of Israel. She maintained that the PLO had made an 
important stride forward through their acceptance of UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338, and had underlined their right to be involved in 
negotiations. Britain had therefore raised its level of contacts with the PLO. 
However, Thatcher made it clear that she would not be meeting with Arafat.
33
  
 
Thatcher saw that Shamir was about to draw a comparison between the IRA and the 
PLO. She quickly stepped in, asserting that there could be no comparison between 
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the two organizations.
34
  Thatcher claimed that the great difference between the PLO 
and IRA was that the latter‘s supporters could express their wishes through free 
elections. The Palestinians did not have this option. Thatcher stated that there was no 
prospect of King Hussein‘s participation in negotiations unless they were clearly 
taking place on the basis of territory for peace. She expressed some understanding 
for Shamir‘s misgivings about an independent Palestinian State, indicating that she 
had always preferred the idea of a confederation between the West Bank and Jordan. 
However, Thatcher maintained that all this was academic until it could be 
established that negotiations were taking place on the basis of territory for peace.  
Thatcher stated that Shamir‘s elections plan needed elaboration – in particular, there 
had to be a link between elections and a permanent settlement.  There were other 
questions that had to be addressed such as the participation of neutral election 
observers, and the right of east Jerusalem residents to vote.
35
  
 
Thatcher shared Shamir‘s view that it would be a mistake to leave support for 
negotiations exclusively to the Americans and the Russians. Britain and France also 
had to play a role. The British Prime Minister expressed her concern over expanding 
the role of the Soviet Union in the region. She was unhappy about allowing the 
Soviet Union to become an advocate for Arab Governments against an Israel backed 
by the United States. Thatcher remained concerned over the Soviets gaining inroads 
in the Arab world. The British Prime Minister concluded by stating that she believed 
that Shamir had been sincere in expressing his wish for a peaceful settlement. 
Nevertheless, she reiterated that it could only be achieved by accepting the principle 
of territory for peace: this was the ―real problem which had to be addressed.‖ Shamir 
concluded by thanking Thatcher on behalf of the Israeli people for all she had done 
for Soviet Jewry. 
36
  
  
The Prime Minister had done just as the FCO mandarins had hoped in criticizing 
Israel‘s actions in the Occupied Territories, pressing Shamir to elaborate on his 
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election proposal and emphasizing at every opportunity the need for a solution based 
on land for peace. Thatcher and Howe were clearly working in close coordination 
over the Shamir visit. Later on during Shamir‘s meeting with the Foreign Secretary, 
Howe had said to the Israeli Prime Minister that there was no difference between 
Downing Street and the FCO on the issue of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
impasse. According to the FCO, Shamir had ―agreed histrionically‖ to this.37  
 
Nevertheless, the Likud continued to draw distinctions between the FCO and 
Number Ten. In his end of year despatch, Britain‘s Ambassador to Israel had written 
that ―in Likud eyes, the FCO remains especially suspect.‖ The Ambassador added 
that ―Mrs Thatcher remains clearly identified as a friend of Israel, both explicitly by 
Arens after his February visit to London, and implicitly when Shamir followed suit 
in May.‖ Elliott noted that Shamir had long wished for a visit to London as Prime 
Minister.
38
 The reality was that Thatcher and the FCO were actually working in close 
cooperation in a bid to pressure Shamir to demonstrate greater flexibility on the 
Palestinian question. If anything, this cooperation had been strengthened in the wake 
of King Hussein‘s disengagement from the West Bank. Following his meeting with 
the British Prime Minister, Shamir had actually been somewhat relieved that a 
―domineering and self-important‖ Thatcher had been more preoccupied with 
expressing her views to him on the issues of an international conference and the 
intifada than in hearing his perspectives on those matters.
39
 
 
 
 
Thatcher wrote to King Hussein following her meeting with Shamir. She informed 
Hussein that her talks with Shamir were ―friendly and very frank‖, but she detected 
no shift in Shamir‘s position. Thatcher reassured the King that her Government 
would continue to press the Israelis to develop their proposals. Nevertheless, if the 
Israelis were to move, the Palestinians would also need to develop ideas of their 
own. She hoped that the forthcoming Arab Summit would provide an impetus for 
                                                          
37
 FCO/FOI 698-09, PM Bilateral: Visit of Shamir, Undated 
38
 FCO/FOI 0591-10,  FCO Annual Report for 1989 by Mark Elliott 
39
 Shamir, Summing Up,  p. 188 
276 
 
Arafat‘s peace efforts.40 Thatcher had written also to President Mubarak, King Fahd 
and King Hassan. The FCO had viewed the letters as a good opportunity to 
consolidate a higher-level dialogue with the Arab leadership.
41
 The Prime Minister‘s 
warm relations with the moderate leaders of the Arab world were clearly an asset for 
the FCO.   
 
The Shamir Government Backtracks 
 
By July 1989, in spite of US pressure, there were already serious doubts over the 
readiness of the Shamir Government to take its initiative further. Indeed, there was 
strong opposition to Shamir‘s initiative from Ariel Sharon, David Levy and Yitzhak 
Moda‘i. Sharon argued that the initiative would lead to dealings with Arafat who was 
still a terrorist. Sharon had stated to Mark Elliott that concessions over any part of 
the West Bank would create an ―unacceptable military threat.‖ He suggested that 
Jewish settlements in strategic areas could be consolidated into a Jewish area, 
leaving Nablus and Ramallah as ―Arab cantons‖ where 540,000 of the 720,000 West 
Bank Arabs already lived. Sharon, however, believed that Gaza had to be treated 
differently to the West Bank, and could become viable with Western assistance.
42
  
 
The coalition rebels successfully pressured Shamir to bring his plan before the Likud 
Central Committee. Various restrictive conditions were introduced during the 
meeting which were designed to dilute Shamir‘s initiative. The conditions included 
opposition to ―territory for peace‖, support for settlement building in the territories 
and opposition to the participation of Arabs from east Jerusalem.
43
 
  
 In spite of Thatcher‘s deep scepticism about Shamir, she had decided to give him 
the benefit of the doubt during his visit in May 1989. Nevertheless, following her 
meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister, she had said that there was little prospect 
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that he would move sufficiently to make a solution possible.
44
 Thatcher was 
ultimately proved right in this respect. In the past, Thatcher and the FCO had sought 
to strengthen Peres who had previously served as an equal partner in Israel‘s 
National Unity Government. By the autumn of 1989, however, this policy was a 
non-starter. The Labour ministers in the coalition were now junior partners in the 
National Unity Government. Furthermore, in the course of 1989, Rabin‘s influence 
had increased at the expense of Peres. It was Rabin who ultimately kept Labour in 
the coalition in the autumn of 1989 at a time when the Likud was taking an 
increasingly intransigent position.
45
   
 
Douglas  Hurd 
 
By late October 1989, there was a significant change in the composition of the 
Thatcher Government. Howe had been moved out of the FCO in July 1989, in order 
to fill the post of Leader of the House of Commons. He had served in the post of 
Foreign Secretary for six years. In that period, there had been strong disagreements 
with Thatcher over policy towards Europe and South Africa. However, this had not 
been the case in regard to the Arab-Israel conflict. The cooperation between 
Thatcher and Howe in this realm reflected the broader agreement between Number 
Ten and the FCO. As Howe writes in his memoirs: 
Neither of us was so directly and passionately engaged in the politics of the 
Middle East that the Finchley factor ...could create an unbridgeable divide 
between us.
46
 
  
 
John Major, a man with no experience in foreign affairs, was appointed as Foreign 
Secretary in his place.  Yet within three months, Major was moved to the Treasury to 
replace Nigel Lawson who had resigned. Douglas Hurd was widely seen as the 
natural choice for the vacant post of Foreign Secretary, but Thatcher had been 
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reluctant to appoint him to the position.
47
 Ewen Fergusson recalls a conversation 
with Thatcher in Paris. She had said to him, ―Douglas, he is one of you.‖ Fergusson 
asked her what she meant. She responded, ―Well he was in the FCO, wasn‘t he?‖48 
Thatcher assumed that because Hurd was an ex-diplomat, he would automatically 
take the FCO line. Rifkind maintains that Thatcher was broadly correct on this score. 
However, she respected him and realized he was by far the best choice to be Foreign 
Secretary at that time.
49
 Therefore, Hurd was eventually appointed to the position in 
October 1989.  
 
Hurd took a greater interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict than Howe. The Israeli 
Government regarded him as an Arabist.
50
 Even a leading Israeli dove such as Beilin 
believed that Hurd was ―very problematic‖ from Israel‘s perspective.51  Hurd was 
close to several leading personalities in the Council for the Advancement of Arab-
British Understanding (CAABU), and was a particularly close friend of Dennis 
Walters – a Conservative MP and an outspoken supporter of the Palestinians.52 As 
FCO Minister during the first term of the Thatcher Government, Hurd had fallen foul 
of the Begin Government and pro-Israeli groups in Britain. During Thatcher‘s final 
year in 10 Downing Street, relations between Britain and Israel became increasingly 
cool. Hurd‘s influence over policy towards Israel was arguably one factor in the 
growing strain between the two countries. However, there were clear signs that 
Thatcher herself was becoming increasingly disenchanted with an Israeli 
Government that was becoming progressively more hard-line. In these 
circumstances, Hurd would have found Thatcher more receptive to his policy 
prescriptions in the Arab-Israel arena.  
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Thatcher’s Tougher Line on Israel 
 
Thatcher‘s disenchantment with the position of the Israeli Government was made 
abundantly clear during her address to the Board of Deputies on 18 February 1990. 
Thatcher continued to express her wholehearted admiration for the Jewish State‘s 
accomplishments, telling her audience that Israel was ―a remarkable country.‖ She 
expressed her ―utter rejection‖ of the UN ‗Zionism is Racism‘ resolution which she 
described as a ―total departure from truth.‖ However, she also took the opportunity 
to express her concern over Israeli policies much as she had done in the Knesset four 
years earlier. Thatcher stated that many of the problems which had troubled the 
international community had found solutions, and she was particularly ―anxious‖ to 
see similar progress in the Middle East. She emphasized that Israel‘s proposal for 
elections in the occupied territories would bring progress only if it involved 
Palestinian representatives both from inside the territories and outside, adding that 
―the tragic situation in the Occupied Territories‖ was ―hurtful to Israel's reputation 
and standing in the world.‖53  
 
Going further, the Prime Minister expressed her deep displeasure over reports that 
the Israeli Government was settling Soviet immigrants in the West Bank. There were 
good reasons why this troubled her. Firstly, she had always supported a land for 
peace formula as the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Clearly, by settling 
Jews on land that was to be vacated in return for peace, Israel was creating a greater 
problem. Secondly, Thatcher emphasized her role in supporting the right of Soviet 
Jews to emigrate. She asserted that ―it would be a very ironic and unjust reward for 
all our efforts‖ if the freedom of Soviet immigrants was secured ―at the expense of 
the rights, the homes and the land of the people of the Occupied Territories.‖54  
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The issue of the settling of Soviet Jews in the West Bank would become a major 
source of contention between the Israeli and British Governments. The fact that 
Thatcher had been a strong supporter of Soviet Jewry was an important factor that 
helped to protect her position among pro-Israeli organizations. As with a previous 
address to the Board of Deputies in 1981, the Prime Minister‘s well publicized 
emotional identification with Israel and her support for Jewish causes tended to 
insulate her from criticisms within the local Jewish community. Nevertheless, 
Thatcher‘s growing readiness to criticize Israel over its settlement policy during her 
last year in office would eventually embroil her in difficulties with local pro-Israeli 
organizations that were already unhappy that she was taking the FCO line. 
 
Collapse of the National Unity Government 
 
Britain‘s policy towards Israel in early 1990 was affected by the growing friction 
within Israel‘s National Unity Government over the approach towards the peace 
process. Peres had argued strongly, among other things, for including east Jerusalem 
Arabs in the peace talks. Shamir eventually fired Peres in response to his criticisms 
that the Government was not trying to advance the peace process. The remaining 
Labour ministers resigned collectively leading to the eventual collapse of the 
National Unity Government in March 1990.
55
 President Chaim Herzog called on 
Peres to form a coalition, but the Labour leader was unable to do so after six weeks 
of effort.
56
 Shamir eventually succeeded in forming a narrow coalition which was 
widely viewed as the most right-wing Government in Israel‘s history.57 
   
The new Israeli Government was presented by Shamir to the Knesset on 8 June 
1990. According to the guidelines of the new Government, there would be no direct 
or indirect negotiations with the PLO. Significantly, it was announced that the Israeli 
Government would take action to strengthen and expand settlements ―in all parts of 
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Eretz Yisrael.‖58 The rightward shift of the new Israeli Government accentuated the 
disagreements between Britain and Israel. The two issues which were particularly 
sensitive were Britain‘s dialogue with the PLO and the settlement policy of the new 
Shamir Government. On both the above issues, pro-Israeli organizations in London 
were increasingly ready to confront the Thatcher Government.  
 
Thatcher Alienates Israel’s Supporters 
 
During Thatcher‘s last months in office, there were concerns expressed both within 
and outside the Conservative Party that the Prime Minister was alienating Jewish 
supporters in her Finchley constituency. One particular Conservative MP tried to 
bring these concerns to the attention of the Prime Minister. Thatcher respected the 
politician, viewing him as a reliable supporter of her policies. The Israelis believed 
that the MP was an ally who could advance their interests both inside and outside of 
parliament.
59
 He wrote to Powell to express the concerns of the Jewish community 
over the apparent British support for the PLO. The MP pointed out to Powell that 
there were ―implications in these concerns for the Prime Minister and her 
constituents.‖ He was anxious to demonstrate to the Jewish community in London 
that the Thatcher Government was aware of the ―different faces of the PLO‖, and 
sought reassurance from Powell on the issue.
60
  In the event, Thatcher herself 
responded to the MP. The Prime Minister wrote that her Government had ―no 
illusions about the PLO‘s history of involvement with terrorism.‖ Nevertheless, once 
the PLO had accepted the conditions set for ministerial contact, she felt it was right 
to acknowledge this by upgrading relations with them. She emphasized that the PLO 
had to be involved in negotiations with Israel in order to reach a settlement.
61
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On 30 May 1990, a number of gunmen from the Palestine Liberation Front, a faction 
of the PLO, attempted an attack on an Israeli beach in Tel Aviv. They were 
ultimately thwarted by Israeli forces. In the days following the aborted attack, 
Israel‘s Deputy Foreign Minister Netanyahu met with the British Ambassador, and 
insisted that it was inconceivable that the attack could have been planned without the 
knowledge of the PLO leadership.  Netanyahu maintained that the recent terrorist 
attempt was a deviation from the conditions which Britain had set for its dialogue 
with the PLO.  The Israeli Minister said to Elliott that he hoped that his Government 
would halt its talks with the PLO, and asked him what it would take for Britain to 
end the dialogue. The Ambassador replied that he did not believe that the dialogue 
would be stopped, adding that a lack of progress in the peace process would result in 
Arafat‘s loss of control over the PLO.62  
  
The aborted terrorist attack provided the Board of Deputies with an added incentive 
to exert pressures on the Prime Minister to halt the British dialogue with the PLO. 
The Board of Deputies wrote to Thatcher in the hope that she would emulate the 
measure taken by Washington. President Bush had just announced on 20 June that he 
had suspended talks with the PLO in the wake of Arafat‘s refusal to condemn the 
attempted attack. The Board paid tribute to Thatcher in view of her ―consistent stand 
against negotiating with... terrorists of all kinds‖, and concluded by calling on 
Thatcher to issue a statement mirroring that of President Bush.
63
 
   
Britain had received intelligence about the different factions within the PLO. It was 
felt that a suspension of contacts with the PLO would have constituted a betrayal to 
the moderates within the organization. The extremist elements within the PLO would 
have prospered at their expense.
64
 In responding to the Board, Thatcher made it clear 
that she would not suspend the dialogue with the PLO. Thatcher maintained that her 
Government was no less opposed to terrorism than the US Administration. Britain 
had unreservedly condemned the attempted attack on the Tel Aviv beach, and had 
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urged the PLO to do the same. Thatcher noted in her letter that the PLO had not 
condemned the attack which resulted in the American suspension of contacts. 
However, she stated that Britain would maintain a dialogue with the PLO in order to 
encourage its members to pursue moderate policies and to renounce terrorism. 
Thatcher emphasized that it would be unwise to sever links with the PLO. Indeed, 
she pointed out, the United States had urged Britain to maintain contacts with the 
organization. The Prime Minister added that if progress was to be made towards a 
negotiated settlement, Israel would have to talk to ―credible representatives‖ of the 
Palestinian people both inside and outside the Occupied Territories. Thatcher added 
that ―too many Palestinians owe their allegiance to the PLO for a solution which 
excludes them to be durable.‖ Thatcher concluded by drawing attention to the recent 
European Council meeting in Dublin which had called for the PLO to participate in 
negotiations for a settlement. She enclosed a copy of the statement with her letter.
65
 
  
Thatcher‘s letters to the Conservative MP and the Board of Deputies were significant 
for a number of reasons. They indicated that the Prime Minister was not swayed by 
pressures from pro-Israeli organizations in regard to policy towards the PLO. 
Thatcher had not given up on the possibility of a negotiated settlement, and was 
ready to maintain a dialogue with the PLO if it could help the peace process. The 
fact that the Bush Administration had actually requested the British Government to 
maintain contacts with the PLO was a significant factor in this policy.
66
 However, 
the influence of the FCO on this issue was also important. Thatcher‘s support for the 
European Council statement on the Middle East indicated her readiness to bring 
Britain‘s position on the PLO back into line with that of other European countries 
such as France and Germany. Exactly ten years earlier, Thatcher had placed Britain 
at the heart of the European consensus in regard to policy towards the PLO, through 
her strong support for the EEC Venice Declaration.   
  
Inside Israel‘s Government, however, there was still a tendency to view the FCO as 
the source of the difficulties affecting the bilateral relationship. Thus, in a paper 
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published by the European Department of the Foreign Ministry, it was claimed that 
the positive FCO statements on the PLO did not reflect the perspective of Thatcher 
who was sensitive to the issue of the PLO dialogue and the FCO‘s modus operandi 
on the issue. Indeed, it was claimed that the FCO‘s approach of gradually upgrading 
contacts with the PLO was designed, in part, to conceal the developments from the 
Prime Minister herself.
67
  However, Thatcher‘s private correspondence from 1990 
has clearly demonstrated that the Prime Minister was in full agreement with the FCO 
on the need for high-level contacts with the PLO.  
 
The Prime Minister‘s concern over the dangers of instability in the Middle East and 
the consequent need for a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict remained as strong as 
ever. In a message to Shamir, Thatcher wrote that the European Council Declaration 
on the Middle East had provided a guide to efforts for the resolution of the conflict. 
She emphasized that the need for progress towards a settlement of the Arab-Israel 
dispute was urgent, and that the present deadlock in the region was dangerous. She 
warned that Middle East extremists would take advantage of the stalemate. Thatcher 
wrote that the way forward was through a direct dialogue between Israel and 
representative Palestinians, as the first phase towards a comprehensive settlement.
68
          
 
It was the issue of Jewish settlements, however, which provoked the greatest unease 
among Israel‘s supporters in Britain. A prominent member of the Anglo-Jewish 
community had written to the Prime Minister to express his concern over possible 
restrictions on the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel.
69
 Responding on the 
Prime Minister‘s behalf, Powell wrote that the British Government had made the 
Soviet leadership well aware of its views on the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate to 
Israel. However, the Thatcher Government did not believe that Israel could allow 
any of them to settle in the Occupied Territories. This included east Jerusalem. 
Israel‘s settlement programme there was illegal under international law, and would 
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undermine the search for peace in the Middle East.
70
  The respondent wrote to 
Powell expressing his gratitude for all the Prime Minister had done for human rights 
in the Soviet Union. However, he was disturbed by the final sentences of Powell‘s 
letter which were ―more in keeping with the traditional policies of the FCO than the 
enlightened office of the Prime Minister.‖71 As with the Israeli Government, there 
was a tendency among many Jewish supporters of the Prime Minister to believe that 
there was a gulf between the FCO and 10 Downing Street on policy towards Israel. 
This was manifestly not the case.   
On 14 June 1990, Thatcher told the House of Commons: 
 
We are also joining others in pointing out that Soviet Jews who leave the 
Soviet Union—and we have urged for years that they should be allowed to 
leave—should not be settled in the Occupied Territories or in east Jerusalem. 
It undermines our position when those people are settled in land that really 
belongs to others.
72
 
 
Thatcher‘s reference to east Jerusalem as land that ―belonged to others‖ could have 
come straight from the FCO. Israel‘s Foreign Ministry had noted that Thatcher as 
well as Hurd and Waldegrave had expressed opposition to the settling of Soviet Jews 
in east Jerusalem. The Zionist Federation and the Board of Deputies issued letters of 
protests following a series of statements on the matter by Hurd. The Israeli Embassy 
in London had reported that the muted response of the Anglo-Jewish community‘s 
leadership to Thatcher‘s statements on the matter had resulted in criticism within the 
community. It was felt that the references to east Jerusalem could only be stopped 
through persuasion of the Prime Minister herself. The Israeli Embassy had noted that 
in Britain over recent weeks, the references to east Jerusalem had become an 
inseparable part of every political statement on the Middle East. An increasing 
number of people had sought to make it clear to Thatcher that in spite of her 
friendship to the local community and to Israel, she was antagonizing the Jewish 
community on the issue of Jerusalem.
73
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Thatcher was less constrained on the settlements issue because of the hard-line 
nature of the new Israeli Government. Thatcher had generally refrained from 
criticizing the Israeli Government when Peres had served as Prime Minister.  It is 
also likely that Thatcher took her cue from the Bush Administration which was 
taking a much tougher line against Shamir.  Furthermore, since the Prime Minister 
had been a forceful advocate of the rights of Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel, it 
was galling for her to discover that they were being settled in the Occupied 
Territories.
74
 This fuelled her irritation with the Shamir Government. 
 
Influence of the FCO Arabists on Policy 
 
Within the FCO, David Gore-Booth was playing an increasingly significant role in 
policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the Thatcher period was drawing to a 
close. As the Assistant Under-Secretary for the Middle East, he worked closely with 
Waldegrave and Hurd. The Israelis viewed Gore-Booth as a ―rising star‖ within the 
FCO firmament.  In his capacity as a leading Arabist, the Israelis sensed that his 
activism did not make it easy to advance their interests. The Israeli Embassy noted 
that Gore-Booth was increasingly active, and searching for new ideas most of which 
were not to Israel‘s liking. It was believed that his standing among those dealing 
with the Arab-Israel issue in the FCO was strong and his influence over Waldegrave 
and Hurd was not inconsiderable.
75
  Gore-Booth was an optimist who believed 
strongly that a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israel conflict was possible. 
Waldegrave recalls that Gore-Booth became very irritated with him on discovering 
that he was reading Conor Cruise O‘Brien‘s book, ―The Siege‖ which took a 
pessimistic view on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
76
  
 
                                                          
74
 MTF, Speech to the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 18 February 1990 
75
 ISA 10085/1, Cable from Minister, London, to MFA, 16 July 1990 
76
 Interview with Lord Waldegrave 
287 
 
Like a number of other Arabists within the FCO, Gore-Booth did not believe that 
Thatcher‘s sympathy towards Israel necessarily had a negative influence, as they saw 
it, on Britain‘s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, as he explained in an 
interview:  
…She had the reputation of being pro-Israeli and… I think that‘s where her 
instincts lie but she actually produced the best dictum for the Middle East 
that I know of which is that the Israelis cannot deny to the Palestinians what 
they have claimed for themselves and actually as a solution to the Arab/Israel 
conflict that‘s a pretty perfect analysis.77 
 
  
The FCO exerted a strong influence on policy towards the Arab-Israeli dispute 
during Thatcher‘s last year, notwithstanding growing disenchantment over the role 
of Powell in 10 Downing Street. Patrick Wright, Permanent Under-Secretary during 
Thatcher‘s final term of office, noted that during Powell‘s tenure in Downing Street, 
very few members of the FCO had entered the building.
78
 Thatcher herself was 
unhappy with the way that Wright ran the FCO viewing him as a compromiser and a 
wet.
79
 
   
According to one view, Powell was a power grabber who was doing the Prime 
Minister a great disservice towards the end of her time in office because she was cut 
off from other sources of advice.
80
 However, Wright did not believe that FCO advice 
was countered or ignored.  Wright was a leading Arabist within the FCO, but he 
believed that Thatcher was very balanced in her Middle East policy, notwithstanding 
the fact that she was an MP in a constituency with a particularly large Jewish 
population.
81
 There is also a view that in Thatcher‘s last year in Number Ten, she 
was less inclined to act on her own across the board in foreign affairs. Hurd was in a 
much stronger position as Foreign Secretary than his two predecessors, and knew 
that he could not be ousted in another reshuffle prior to a general election.
82
 Thatcher 
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would ultimately have trusted Hurd much as she had trusted Carrington in previous 
years. 
 
Powell has claimed that during the Thatcher years, ―Number Ten could beat the 
bushes of Whitehall pretty violently.‖83 Yet during Thatcher‘s final year in power, 
her private office did not challenge Whitehall on policy in the Arab-Israel arena. 
Hurd was in a remarkably similar position to that of Carrington who had been given 
the freedom to initiate a far-reaching policy shift on the Palestinian question.  During 
Thatcher‘s last years in office, the main disagreements between the FCO and 10 
Downing Street revolved around the issues of Europe and German reunification 
rather than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Under Thatcher, Powell exerted particularly 
strong control over European Community matters. Powell shared his Prime 
Minister‘s scepticism over Europe, reinforcing Thatcher‘s views on the issue against 
those of the FCO.
84
 There were disagreements between the FCO and 10 Downing 
Street over Thatcher‘s growing wariness on European integration. These 
disagreements came to a head over her ‗Bruges speech‘ of 20 September 1988. There 
were also strong differences over the reunification of Germany. The FCO believed 
that the Prime Minister was impractical in attempting to delay reunification.
85
  
 
Waldegrave recalled that there had been some tension between Thatcher and Hurd 
over the issues of German reunification and Europe, but this did not apply to the 
same extent over the Arab-Israeli conflict. While Powell and Thatcher were both 
considerably more sympathetic towards Israel than the FCO, the Private Secretary 
was less active in this domain.
 86
 The Middle East was a high-priority issue for Hurd 
as it had been for Carrington, and he exercised a significant influence on policy in 
this arena at a time when the Prime Minister was preoccupied with fighting for her 
political life. This would explain to some degree why the FCO was able to exert a 
strong influence on the Arab-Israel issue during Thatcher‘s last year in office. 
Moreover, she largely agreed with the policy prescriptions of the FCO mandarins at 
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a time when there was a declining readiness to sympathize with the position of the 
Shamir Government.     
 
Furthermore, by 1990, the world was in flux. In South Africa, apartheid was on its 
way out. The Eastern Bloc had fallen, and the Soviet Union was on the verge of 
collapse. Thus, the Arab-Israeli conflict was only one of a great many issues that 
were concentrating the minds of policymakers. Nevertheless, there was a sense that 
the removal of the cold war dimension in the Middle East would help to bring about 
progress in the region.
87
 A new opportunity had emerged to resolve the Arab-Israel 
conflict. Thatcher had clearly subscribed to this approach as she makes clear in her 
memoirs: 
 
Certainly, the end of Soviet communist manipulation of disputed issues 
makes it potentially easier to reach agreement with moderate Arabs and 
allows the United States to place clearer limits on its support for particular 
Israeli policies.
88
  
 
Thatcher Government Suspends PLO Dialogue 
 
The Thatcher Government did finally suspend its dialogue with the PLO in 
September 1990. This, however, was related to the PLO‘s support for Iraq‘s invasion 
of Kuwait in August 1990 rather than the organization‘s refusal to condemn terrorist 
attacks against Israel.  The FCO appeared no less determined than Number Ten to 
carry out such a move. In his conversation with Beilin, Waldegrave stated that he 
was ―totally disappointed‖ with the PLO which had caused ―a major catastrophe‖ for 
the Palestinian question, and had caused great damage to the peace process. He was 
unsure how to rectify the damage to ties with the PLO. Waldegrave concluded that 
there would be no renewal of contacts at ministerial level until the PLO began a 
reassessment of its position on the Iraq/Kuwait issue.
89
 It was instructive that 
Thatcher did not suspend the British dialogue with the PLO when it had refused to 
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condemn terrorism against Israel in the summer of 1990. Thatcher had given short 
shrift to pro-Israeli organizations who were arguing for such a move. The Prime 
Minister only did so when the PLO came out in support of Saddam Hussein‘s 
invasion of Kuwait. Waldegrave‘s comments make it clear that the FCO supported 
this move.  
 
Thatcher‘s personal relationship with King Hussein had also become a casualty of 
Saddam‘s invasion of Kuwait.90 The Prime Minister had already been disappointed 
with King Hussein‘s disengagement from the West Bank. This disappointment was 
compounded by the Jordanian monarch‘s support for Saddam during the Gulf Crisis. 
Thatcher was particularly unhappy that Jordan appeared to be helping Iraq to evade 
the sanctions imposed following the invasion, and was dismayed that the King was 
justifying Saddam‘s actions. During a lunch with King Hussein on 31 August 1990, 
Thatcher admonished the monarch for defending Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait. She 
claimed that the Iraqi leader was ―a loser‖ who had caused great damage to the 
Palestinian cause.
91
 King Hussein maintained that he was not supporting anybody, 
but merely trying to restore peace to the region.
92
 The Prime Minister demanded that 
the King put an end to his support for Saddam, and cooperate in the implementation 
of sanctions against Iraq. Thatcher later conceded in her memoirs that the Jordanian 
leader had calculated that he could not openly oppose the Iraqi regime and survive.
93
  
Thatcher‘s relationship with King Hussein never recovered, in the wake of his stance 
on Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait.94  
 
The Gulf Crisis 
 
Thatcher‘s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict during her last four months in 
office was conducted in the shadow of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Bush did not 
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have a close relationship with Thatcher, unlike his predecessor Reagan. However, 
the Thatcher Government and the Bush Administration worked very closely during 
the Gulf Crisis. It provided an opportunity for Thatcher to rebuild the ‗special‘ 
Anglo-American relationship which had suffered since Reagan had left office. The 
Bush Administration up to this point had preferred to focus on Germany at the 
expense of London.
95
 Powell was a key player with the Americans in helping to 
build an alliance against Saddam.
96
  
 
While the Prime Minister, as well as the FCO, viewed a resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict as an urgent priority, Saddam‘s invasion of Kuwait severely 
complicated the situation. On 12 August 1990, Saddam linked the Kuwaiti issue to 
the Palestinian problem by suggesting a comprehensive solution for ―all issues of 
occupation.‖ The solution would include an ―immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab territories in Palestine, Syria and 
Lebanon...‖ Saddam insisted that the situation in Kuwait could only be resolved after 
the Palestine question had been settled.
97
 A number of days after the invasion of 
Kuwait, the Iraqi Ambassador in Britain came to see Roger Tomkys, the Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State for the Middle East. The Ambassador arrived with a 
message for the Government from Baghdad which explicitly linked a withdrawal 
from Kuwait with an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. Tomkys told 
the Iraqi Ambassador that it was a ―monstrous proposition.‖ 98 Like Thatcher, the 
FCO believed that the Israel/Palestinian conflict had to be resolved independently of 
the Gulf crisis. However, the FCO did emphasize at every opportunity that the 
Israel/Palestinian conflict had to be addressed once the Iraq/Kuwait issue had been 
settled.    
 
Thatcher reinforced Bush‘s own inclinations to take a stand over Iraq‘s invasion of 
Kuwait.
99
  Yevgeny Primakov, Gorbachev‘s special emissary to the Gulf visited 
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Thatcher at Chequers, and tried to win her support for a ‗flexible linkage‘ between 
the Gulf Crisis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order to save face for 
Saddam.
100
 President Mitterrand of France had taken a similar position on the 
issue.
101
 She strongly opposed the proposal. Thatcher maintained that while there 
was a duty to return to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict, this had to be done 
independently of Kuwait. There could be no appeasement. Primakov had later 
reported to Moscow that Thatcher had been the most determined opponent of his 
proposal.
102
 
 
In the House of Commons, Thatcher had to counter a charge of double standards. It 
was suggested that she had taken a strong stand against Iraq‘s occupation of Kuwait 
while neglecting Israel‘s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza because of oil 
considerations. Thatcher responded that both cases were grave but they were ―very 
different.‖ Kuwait had never attacked anyone before it was occupied by Iraq. In the 
second case, however, Jordan had attacked Israel [during the 1967 War]. As a result, 
it had lost the West Bank to Israel. Thatcher stated that once the Kuwait issue was 
settled, she would continue to support negotiations for a resolution of the Palestinian 
problem.
103
 Thatcher‘s statement demonstrated that she was still sympathetic 
towards the State of Israel, irrespective of her strong disagreements with the Likud 
Government.  
 
Hennessy maintains that Thatcher‘s imperious style of governing was taken to 
extremes during the Gulf crisis. Key figures such as the Cabinet Secretary, Robin 
Butler, and Patrick Wright were kept out of discussions while copies of minutes 
were restricted.
104
 Nevertheless, Hennessy‘s focus on Thatcher‘s leadership style is 
misleading in that it obscures the role of the FCO which was setting the tone on 
much of Middle East policy. In spite of Powell‘s important involvement in the 
handling of diplomacy during the Gulf Crisis, the FCO continued to place an 
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emphasis on the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict, in a bid to show the Arab 
world that Britain was not applying double standards or neglecting the Palestinians. 
Rob Young points out that the FCO saw the Gulf Crisis as a golden opportunity to 
resolve what it perceived as the core issue in the Middle East:  
 
It was certainly pretty clear to everybody at the FCO during the Gulf War 
that here was not just an opportunity but a need to address what we always 
saw as the core issue in terms of Middle East stability which was the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The Americans saw it the same way leading to the Madrid 
Conference... The consistent thread in FCO thinking for decades has been 
that the core problem is the Arab-Israeli conflict and unless that is solved, a 
lot of issues will arise which will cause more friction grief and confrontation 
between Western Europe and the Arabs over which we will have less than 
total control.
105
 
 
Hurd‘s authority and expertise on the Middle East put him in a strong position to 
handle the Gulf Crisis from the moment Iraq invaded Kuwait.
106
 While Thatcher was 
consistent in her vocal opposition to any linkage between the Gulf Crisis and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, her Government was sending a mixed message on the 
issue. Although both Waldegrave and Hurd had emphasized that the Iraq/Kuwait 
conflict had to be resolved first, the Israel/Palestinian issue was dangled as a carrot 
to win over Arab support. In the eyes of the Israeli Government and its most ardent 
supporters, however, any discussion of a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian question 
in the context of the Iraq/Kuwait crisis was perceived as linkage. This was 
exemplified by Hurd‘s address to the Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers‘ 
Association on 4 October. He told his audience that there was an opportunity to 
address the Israeli- Palestinian problem after Saddam Hussein had been driven from 
Kuwait. Hurd used strong language to condemn the Israeli occupation, stating that 
―anyone with a sense of humanity‖ had to sympathise with the Palestinians. They 
were occupied, had no political rights and were victims of a ―misguided policy‖ 
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which believed that Israel‘s security ―rested on closed schools, illegitimate 
settlements and even collective punishments.‖ 107 
 
Hurd wished to emphasize that the Palestinian problem had not been forgotten. 
Britain‘s Consul General in Jerusalem, Ivan Callan, viewed Hurd‘s address as part of 
a rearguard action to win over Palestinian and Arab opinion. He wrote that Britain 
had been unusually well regarded by Palestinians from the beginning of the Intifada 
to Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait, both for its national policies and its participation in EC 
declarations and policies. However, Britain‘s partnership with the United States in 
leading international action to remove Iraq from Kuwait had revived some difficult 
historical memories and ―generated bitter accusations of double standards.‖ The 
positive response to Hurd‘s speech reflected the continuing readiness of Palestinians 
to respond to assurances that the Arab-Israeli problem had not been forgotten.
108
  
Hurd would also have wanted to ensure that Britain was not out of step with the rest 
of Europe in the court of Arab opinion.  
 
The Board of Deputies, however, reacted with dismay to Hurd‘s address. In a letter 
to the Foreign Secretary, Hurd was told that his apparent attempt to ―rally moderate 
Arabs‖ was misconceived. The Board maintained that Hurd‘s address would 
inevitably be viewed as a ―minor victory for Saddam Hussein‖ and an attempt to link 
the Iraqi aggression with Israel‘s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The letter 
countered the implication that the Palestinian question was the core problem of the 
Middle East, arguing that the Iran-Iraq and Iraq-Kuwait conflicts had nothing to do 
with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
109
  
 
Waldegrave was also attacked by pro-Israeli organizations following a speech in 
parliament in which he spoke of the need to resolve the Palestinian issue once the 
Gulf crisis had passed. During a meeting in London with the Member of Knesset 
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Yossi Beilin, Waldegrave complained that he had been subjected to bitter personal 
attacks from CFI members and the Jewish community who believed that he had 
drawn a linkage between the Kuwait crisis and the Palestinian question.  The 
Minister emphasized that it was British policy to deny Saddam Hussein a 
―monopoly‖ on the Palestinian question, and he was therefore opposed to such a 
linkage.
110
 The voluble response of the Board and the CFI to Hurd and Waldegrave‘s 
statements was a reflection of the leading role played by the FCO on policy towards 
the Arab-Israel conflict during the Gulf Crisis.  
 
In spite of her forceful rhetoric against the linkage of the Kuwait issue with the 
Israeli-Palestinian impasse, Thatcher was aware that some kind of linkage was 
unavoidable in order to keep the anti-Saddam coalition intact, as Powell points out: 
She thought that was sensible diplomacy. It was really the whole part of the 
package at the beginning in assembling the coalition. There had to be some 
discernible benefit for getting the Arab governments including ones as absurd 
as Syria on side so there was an absolutely solid front apart from Jordan 
against Iraq. That gave her no particular problem.
111
   
 
 
The Resumption of Diplomatic Ties with Syria 
 
Gore-Booth had exerted considerable influence in persuading the Prime Minister to 
re-establish diplomatic ties with Syria just before she had left office on 28 November 
1990. Arguably, the one remaining difficulty between Thatcher and the FCO 
revolved around attitudes towards Damascus. Gore-Booth was a popular British 
diplomat among the Arab community, not least because of his charm. In a 
determined bid to achieve the restoration of relations with Syria, the FCO mandarin 
visited Damascus under ministerial instructions to see if he could get assurances that 
the guilty men involved in the attempted bombing had been punished and removed. 
Tomkys was not convinced that Gore-Booth had received all the assurances that he 
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needed.
112
 Thatcher remained very hostile to the notion of restoring diplomatic ties 
with Syria. Howe had tried unsuccessfully to persuade Thatcher to restore ties when 
he had served as Foreign Secretary.
113
 Now Hurd accepted Gore-Booth‘s 
recommendation that ties be restored. Gore-Booth had personally argued his case 
with the Prime Minister, and it was her Foreign Secretary who eventually persuaded 
Thatcher to re-establish ties with Damascus.
114
 Hurd believed that it was ―a hard-
headed calculation in British interests that diplomatic relations should be 
resumed.‖115 Hurd had tried harder than Howe ever did to encourage the Prime 
Minister to accept FCO advice on such matters.
116
 The decision to restores ties with 
Syria was linked to Saddam‘s invasion of Kuwait. The FCO believed that it was 
clearly in British interests to resume relations with Syria which would form an 
important part of the anti-Saddam coalition.
117
  
   
The resumption of diplomatic ties with Syria was announced by Hurd on 28 
November 1990
118
 - the day that Thatcher resigned from office. Thatcher‘s 
opposition to the renewal of diplomatic relations with Syria had been one area where 
she had asserted a measure of independence on Middle East policy. Thus, one 
remaining source of disagreement between Number Ten and the FCO was removed 
just before Thatcher left office.  
 
 
Summary 
 
For much of the third term of the Conservative Government, Thatcher was at the 
height of her powers. The Prime Minister was served by a very powerful policy unit 
which had unparalleled authority in the foreign policy arena. Nevertheless, Thatcher 
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did not pursue an independent policy towards the Middle East. International and 
regional factors constrained Thatcher‘s freedom of movement. Between 1987 and 
1989, the Prime Minister was concerned about the capacity of the Soviet Union to 
expand its influence in the Middle East through its support for the Palestinians, at a 
time when Washington was granting automatic backing for Israel. As a result, the 
Prime Minister was receptive to advice from Whitehall on the need for a cooler 
relationship with Israel. Moreover, the hard-line policies of the Shamir Government, 
exemplified by the acceleration of settlement building in the West Bank, profoundly 
annoyed the Prime Minister: in this environment, Thatcher was more inclined to 
accept FCO advice which was not to Israel‘s liking.  King Hussein‘s disengagement 
from the West Bank was also a key factor in forcing Thatcher‘s hand on the 
establishment of a dialogue with the PLO.  
 
One area where Thatcher had attempted to exert her influence and strong leadership 
had been in her contacts with the Reagan Administration. Once again, the FCO 
found itself outflanked by a Prime Minister who was using her expanded authority in 
a bid to encourage the Americans to reassess their policy towards the Likud 
leadership. Thatcher had interceded with Reagan and Shultz to grant support to Peres 
and provide strong backing for an international conference. The FCO had been 
marginalised, to some degree, from the Anglo-American relationship during this 
period. Yet, it was here where Thatcher had worked hardest to advance important 
FCO objectives in the Middle East: to promote an international conference leading to 
a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict and to persuade the Americans to put pressure 
on the Likud Government. 
  
By 1990, the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse. Thus, a new opportunity 
had emerged to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict. In this environment, Washington 
was taking a tougher line with the Shamir Government, and had also approved a 
dialogue with the PLO. This made it considerably easier for Thatcher to authorize 
higher-level contacts with the PLO. The Gulf Crisis had also created a new situation: 
Britain was at the forefront of efforts to build an Arab coalition against Saddam 
Hussein. In these circumstances, the FCO was given free rein to win Arab support by 
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underlining the need for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thatcher had 
conducted an ambiguous policy during the Gulf crisis. On the one hand, the Prime 
Minister was insisting that there could be no linkage between the Iraq/Kuwait crisis 
and the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. On the other hand, the FCO was allowed to set 
the tone on this issue by placing an emphasis on the resolution of the Israel-Arab 
conflict. 
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Conclusion 
 
In her memoirs, Thatcher has claimed that she did not ―share the established FCO 
view of...the Middle East.‖ Indeed, she wrote that the FCO viewed Israel as ―the 
pariah of the Middle East with which [Britain] would be ill-advised too closely to 
associate.‖ 1 It is certainly true that in the first decades after Israel‘s establishment in 
1948, the FCO as an institution believed that Britain could ill-afford to establish 
close ties with Israel since this would undermine Britain‘s ties with Arab states.2 
This view prevailed, to some degree, within parts of the FCO during the Thatcher 
period.
3
 The difficulty with Thatcher‘s claim, however, is that she herself was 
willing to cooperate with FCO policies which occasionally reinforced the perception 
that Israel was a pariah state within the Middle East.   
 
The present thesis has sought to demonstrate that Thatcher‘s policy in the Arab-
Israel arena was influenced most significantly by her concerns over Soviet ambitions 
in the Middle East, as opposed to pressures from her Finchley constituency or pro-
Israel interest groups in the UK.  A related concern was the growth of Islamic 
radicalism in the Middle East, in the wake of the Iranian revolution.
4
 Furthermore, it 
was these geopolitical factors which underpinned the growing convergence between 
10 Downing Street and the FCO during the Thatcher years.  Thatcher had initially 
viewed Israel as a bulwark against the danger of an expanded Soviet influence in the 
Middle East.
5
 Indeed, it can be argued that to a large extent, her early support for 
Israel was linked to her view of the country as a strategic asset against the 
communist threat. Nevertheless, over time, Thatcher increasingly began to view 
Israeli policies as a liability rather than an asset as far as British interests were 
concerned. Thatcher was anxious that the inflexible policies of Begin and Shamir 
were increasing instability in the Middle East and threatening Britain‘s moderate 
Arab allies. In particular, Thatcher was uneasy that the Soviets and other radical 
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forces would exploit regional instability in order to expand their influence in the 
region. As a result, Thatcher was increasingly unhappy about Israeli policies that 
damaged any prospects of a Middle East settlement. 
 
Thatcher was mindful of the concerns of the UK Jewish community in regard to 
policy towards Israel. During Thatcher‘s first term in office, she would have been 
more susceptible to pressures from pro-Israel organizations. Indeed, this may have 
been a minor factor in her initial opposition to a policy shift on Palestinian self-
determination and the PLO. Nevertheless, exaggerated claims have been made for 
Thatcher‘s Finchley constituency and the notion that it influenced policy in the Arab-
Israel arena.
6
 While Thatcher would have been exposed to sympathetic views on 
Israel in Finchley, her perception of Israel was a complex one
7
 which was influenced 
by many factors. Thatcher became increasingly critical of Israeli policies, and 
expressed this also in appearances before Jewish audiences. Thatcher‘s endorsement 
of the Venice Declaration in 1980, her forthright condemnation of Israel‘s raid on an 
Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, her strong involvement in arms sales to Saudi Arabia in 
1985 and her refusal to suspend talks with the PLO in 1990 are just a few examples 
of her readiness to support a British policy that conflicted strongly with the position 
of the Israeli Government of the time.  Ultimately, pro-Israel interest groups had a 
negligible impact on the Thatcher Government‘s Middle East policy.      
  
There is a view among some scholars that Thatcher‘s presidential style of leadership 
was noticeable in the international affairs arena, just as in the domestic sphere.
8
 
While it is true that the private office in Number Ten grew increasingly powerful 
during Thatcher‘s second and third terms in office, this was not necessarily reflected 
in Britain‘s Middle East policy where there was extensive cooperation between 10 
Downing Street and the FCO. Thus, this thesis suggests that Thatcher‘s leadership 
style was more significant in terms of the management of foreign policy than the 
actual substance and outcome of this policy. 
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As Thatcher acquired greater authority in the realm of international affairs, her 
policy in the Arab-Israel arena tended to converge increasingly with the traditional 
positions of the FCO.  Indeed, as power shifted from Whitehall to Number Ten, the 
FCO occasionally found itself outflanked by the Prime Minister. Thatcher‘s actions 
were motivated by her perception of Soviet ambitions in the Middle East and the 
consequent threat to Western strategic interests in the region. Thatcher was directly 
involved in the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia – a policy that was encouraged by the 
Whitehall bureaucracy and strongly opposed by the Israelis. In 1985, she had invited 
two PLO representatives to London, much to the dismay of both the Labour and 
Likud factions within the Israeli Government, as well as Israel‘s supporters in 
London. Thatcher had taken a step which the FCO itself would have taken long ago, 
had it been permitted to do so. The Prime Minister had robustly supported the 
Amman Accord of 1985 and the London Agreement of 1987 which were consistent 
with the objective of the FCO which was to encourage the forces of moderation 
within the region. Thatcher had also utilized her strong relationship with President 
Reagan to push for an international peace conference, in the face of strong Likud 
opposition. Indeed, she had even attempted to intervene in internal Israeli politics, in 
a bid to strengthen the dovish Peres against his hawkish rival Shamir.
9
 Thus, 
Thatcher was using her stronger authority in the Middle East arena to enhance the 
objectives of the FCO rather than to counter them.   
 
At the same time, during the second term of the Thatcher Government, it was the 
FCO rather than 10 Downing Street which took an initiative to advance a political 
dialogue with the State of Israel. This step was taken in late 1983 when a Likud 
Government was still in power. The dialogue led to a significant improvement in 
relations between Britain and Israel, culminating in Thatcher‘s visit to the Jewish 
State in 1986. Within Israeli Government circles and the Anglo-Jewish community, 
during the period in question, the FCO was generally perceived as the source of the 
apparently hostile policies on Israel, while Number Ten was viewed as a more 
sympathetic institution. To a certain extent, this view has prevailed. However, this is 
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a simplistic reading of the relationship between the FCO and 10 Downing Street in 
the Arab-Israel arena.  
 
It is true that Thatcher had marginalized the FCO in general terms through 
appointing Parsons and then Cradock as her advisor, and allotting her Private 
Secretary an augmented role in foreign policy. As power shifted slowly from the 
FCO to Number Ten towards the end of Thatcher‘s first term and, particularly, 
during her second term, differences did emerge. For example, Thatcher‘s strong 
opposition to direct ministerial contacts with the PLO came to a head over the 
planned Arab League delegation visit of 1982. However, Thatcher reached a 
compromise with the FCO on the issue. A close examination of Thatcher‘s attitude 
towards the PLO over her eleven years in power reveals two interesting conclusions: 
Thatcher was known for her strong public stand against terrorists of all stripes. On 
the PLO, however, she was consistent only in her inconsistency, and adjusted her 
position in accordance with prevailing circumstances. The FCO had succeeded on 
several occasions in using its influence to persuade Thatcher to show flexibility on 
the PLO. Furthermore, the FCO was also careful not to run too far ahead of the 
Prime Minister on this issue.  By 1990, Thatcher‘s position on the PLO was almost 
indistinguishable from that of the FCO.  
 
The decisive factor in Thatcher‘s decision-making on the PLO was not the Israeli 
Government and its supporters in Britain but, rather, the view from Washington. 
Since the Bush Administration had welcomed British contacts with the PLO, 
Thatcher approved an ongoing dialogue with the Palestinian organization, in spite of 
its ambiguous position on terrorism. Thatcher had actually encouraged the Reagan 
Administration to take a positive view of Arafat‘s announcement in Algiers.10 It is 
likely that Thatcher would have shown greater flexibility on the PLO in earlier years 
if the Reagan Administration had also done so. Either way, Thatcher‘s position on 
the PLO owed less to principle and more to political pragmatism. Under her 
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leadership, Britain had actually significantly upgraded its relations with the PLO.  
Her differences with the FCO on this issue were less substantial than they appeared. 
  
While Thatcher became increasingly assertive in the realm of international affairs, 
she exerted a degree of independence in some areas of policy but not in others. 
Thatcher was at loggerheads with her Foreign Secretaries over South Africa and 
Europe, for example, but not over the Arab-Israel issue. This can tell us something 
significant about British foreign policy in this arena. Britain‘s historic role in the 
creation of the State of Israel was a particularly problematic issue for policymakers 
who were conscious of the need to avoid upsetting Arab sensibilities.
11
 This has been 
an important factor behind the cooperation between Whitehall and Number Ten on 
the Palestinian question. Thatcher was fiercely protective of British political and 
commercial interests in the Middle East, and was therefore unwilling to risk these 
interests through automatic support for Israel.  
 
Furthermore, it can be argued that Thatcher and her successors adhered to a view 
that was commonly held by FCO mandarins in the years following the establishment 
of the State of Israel: the perception that the Arab-Israel conflict was at the core of 
the difficulties facing the West in the Middle East. According to this logic, a 
resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict would remove the central strategic threats to 
Western interests in the region.
12
 Thatcher held this view, although she tended to 
express it in private conversations with international leaders. Thatcher believed that 
the fallout from the Arab-Israel conflict was a factor which imperiled fundamental 
British interests, since it heightened the resentment of Arab leaders towards the West 
and allowed the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region by exploiting this 
antipathy.
13
 Yet even with the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse in 1990, 
Thatcher continued to push for a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict. On the one 
hand, the ending of the cold war provided an unprecedented opportunity to resolve 
the Israel/Palestinian impasse, because of the absence of a superpower rivalry. On 
                                                          
11
 See above, p.234 
12
 See above, pp.17-18 
13
 See above, pp.223-225 
304 
 
the other hand, radical regimes such as Iraq and Iran were destabilizing the Middle 
East.
14
 Thus, according to this perspective, a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict 
would help to remove these destabilizing elements.   
 
Even Tony Blair, viewed by many as a particularly strong supporter of the State of 
Israel, had declared as Prime Minister that the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians was ―the core problem of the Middle East.‖15 Blair‘s statement was little 
different to the view expressed by Toynbee decades earlier.
16
  Blair‘s remarks were 
made at a time when Iran and other radical elements were expanding their influence 
in the region, and using the Palestinian issue as a means to strengthen their position. 
Blair expected Israel to make far-reaching concessions in order to reach a settlement 
with the Palestinians, and help restore stability to the region.   Thus, the perception 
of Israel/Palestine as the core issue driving instability in the Middle East has been a 
powerful factor which goes a long way to explain why British Prime Ministers have 
refrained from pursuing an independent line in the Arab-Israel arena.      
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 MTF, Press Conference for Washington Post and Newsweek, 17 November 1988 
15 Neill Lochery, ‗Present and Post-Blair British Middle East Policy, The Annual Madame Madeleine Feher European Scholar 
Lecture No. 9‘, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,  March 2007 
16
 See above, p.22 
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